KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: The Judge engaged in extensive questioning of Applicant and spoke at greater length
than necessary about Applicant’s choices and circumstances. The totality of the comments may
have appeared as lecturing to the unrepresented Applicant.  A Judge is the finder of fact and
enjoys latitude in conducting the proceedings and asking questions to clarify the record.  Any
flaws in the Judge’s conduct are not sufficient to show bias.  Adverse decision affirmed
CASENO: 11-08844.a1
DATE: 01/10/2013
DATE: January 10, 2013
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 11-08844
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
2
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On May 4, 2012, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the
basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On October 19, 2012, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Robert Robinson
Gales denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to Directive
¶¶  E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issues on appeal: whether the Judge was biased against
Applicant; whether the Judge failed to consider all of the record evidence; and whether the Judge’s
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  Consistent with the following, we affirm.
The Judge made the following pertinent findings of fact: Applicant works for a Defense
contractor.  He has held a secret clearance since 1988.  He holds both a bachelor’s and a master’s
degree and has completed some course work toward a doctorate.
Applicant from time to time refinanced his home, using some of the proceeds to pay for his
children’s college educations.  In 2007, Applicant decided to sell his house and purchase a smaller
one.  However, his wife developed a serious illness, which delayed his plans and which entailed
some expenses that were not covered by medical insurance.  In addition, the national economy
collapsed, which had a deleterious effect on the local housing market.  A result of this economic
turmoil was that Applicant’s house value plummeted below the amount owed on his mortgage.
Although he continued to make his mortgage payments, he began using credit cards for his
every day living expenses.  He withdrew money from his retirement account.  However, he was not
able to withdraw the remainder penalty-free without resigning from his job.  He eventually moved
into his mother-in-law’s residence in order to economize.  Nevertheless, many of his accounts
became delinquent and were placed in collection or charged off.
He consulted with a financial counselor, who provided no education or debt consolidation,
but who did recommend that Applicant file for bankruptcy.  He initiated Chapter 13 proceedings but,
after receipt of the SOR, elected to wait.  He does not qualify for Chapter 7 bankruptcy because of
his salary.
His annual gross salary is $152,000.  After expenses, he has a monthly balance of $1,539.
He was not able to say where he spent this amount each month.
The SOR alleges 10 delinquent debts, totaling approximately $725,152.  Two of these debts
are first and second mortgages on his house.  The first mortgage went into foreclosure.  He has been
exploring a short sale as an alternative, but his efforts were ongoing at the close of the record.  The
remaining 8 debts are for credit card accounts.  He stated that he had spoken with his creditors, and
that they are willing to settle “for ten cents on the dollar.”  Applicant claims, though, that even this
is more than he can pay.  He has not provided corroboration for his claims to have been working
1Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 19(a): “inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts[.]”
2Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 19 (c): “a history of not meeting financial obligations[.]”    
3See Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 20(b): “the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond
the person’s control . . . and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances[.]”  
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with his creditors.  In any event, he admittedly has done nothing actually to resolve these debts.  He
intends nothing more than to proceed with his bankruptcy action.
In the Analysis, the Judge concluded that Applicant’s financial circumstances satisfied the
criteria for two Guideline F Disqualifying Conditions, (a)1 and (c).2  In examining Applicant’s case
for mitigation, he concluded that Applicant’s financial problems were both frequent and relatively
recent, that Applicant had received no actual debt counseling, and that there is no evidence to
demonstrate that Applicant has made good-faith efforts to pay his debts.  ` ` ` A l t h o u g h
acknowledging that Applicant’s financial problems were affected by circumstances outside his
control, the Judge nevertheless concluded that Applicant had not demonstrated responsible action
in regard to his debts.3  The Judge concluded that Applicant had failed to mitigate the security
concerns in his case.
Applicant contends that the Judge was biased against him.  A Judge is presumed to be
unbiased, and an applicant who contends otherwise has a heavy burden of persuasion.  See, e.g.,
ISCR Case No. 10-04136 at 3 (App. Bd. May 1, 2012).  We have examined the Judge’s decision and
the record as a whole, paying particular attention to his conduct of the hearing as set forth in the
transcript.  The Judge engaged in some extensive questioning of Applicant after the completion of
the Government’s case in chief.  He spoke at greater length than necessary about Applicant’s choices
and circumstances.  While no individual statement suggests bias, the totality of the Judge’s
comments may have appeared as lecturing, especially to the unrepresented Applicant.  However, a
Judge in a DOHA hearing is the finder of fact and he or she enjoys considerable latitude in
conducting the proceedings, to include asking questions to clarify the record.  See, e.g., ISCR Case
No. 08-07618 at 3 (App. Bd. Jan. 26, 2011).  In the case currently before us, any flaws in the Judge’s
conduct of the proceedings are not sufficient to convince a reasonable person that he had divested
himself of his impartiality.  
Applicant cites to record evidence which, he contends, the Judge did not appear to have
considered.  Among other things, he cites to a comment toward the end of his clearance interview
summary to the effect that there is nothing in Applicant’s background that could be used against
him.  A Judge is presumed to have considered all of the evidence in the record.  See, e.g., ISCR Case
No.  11-05512 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 24, 2012).  The comment to which Applicant draws our attention
is simply a summary of his reply to the interviewer’s question rather than the interviewer’s
independent opinion of his security worthiness.  Considering the record as a whole, Applicant’s brief
has not rebutted the presumption that the Judge considered all of the evidence.  
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Applicant challenges the Judge’s conclusion that he has a history of not meeting debts.  To
the extent that he is arguing that the evidence in his case does not raise security concerns under
Guideline F, we note that he admitted all of the allegations in the SOR.  Additionally, the
Government produced credit reports; Applicant’s answers to DOHA interrogatories; and Applicant’s
security clearance application, which contains relevant information about Applicant’s financial
problems.  These documents, taken together, demonstrate that, since 2007, Applicant has had a
difficult time with his finances.  This is sufficient to demonstrate a history within the meaning of the
Directive.  See ISCR Case No. 10-03125 at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 13, 2012), to the effect that an
applicant’s SOR admissions and credit reports can raise security concerns under Guideline F.
Applicant has challenged some of the statements in the Judge’s findings of fact, which he
believes are not supported by the record.  For example, he cites to a comment that he was unwilling
to sell his house at a loss.  Applicant contends that he was simply unable to sell his house and that
the Judge’s statement presents his circumstances in an improper light.  He also cites to other
comments which he believes are not accurate.  We have examined the Judge’s findings in light of
the record as a whole.  We conclude that the Judge’s material findings of security concern are based
upon substantial record evidence or constitute reasonable characterizations or inferences that could
be drawn from the evidence.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 11-04287 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep. 11, 2012).
Applicant has not cited to any harmful error in the Judge’s findings. 
The record supports a conclusion that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated
a satisfactory explanation for the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made,’” both as to the mitigating conditions and the whole-person factors.  Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983)(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  The
Judge’s adverse decision is sustainable on this record.  “The general standard is that a clearance may
be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’”  Department
of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  See also Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b):  “Any doubt
concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor
of the national security.”    
Order
The Decision is AFFIRMED.  
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan           
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
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Signed: Jean E. Smallin                   
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody                    
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board