KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence is not enough to
demonstrate error.  Once the Government presents evidence of security concern, the applicant
bears the burden of persuasion as to mitigation.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASE NO: 12-02373.a1
DATE: 01/24/2013
DATE: January 24, 2013
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 12-02373
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On May 11, 2012, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the
basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On October 24, 2012, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Claude R. Heiny
denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to the Directive
¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
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Applicant contends that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because his
financial difficulties could be traced to his and his wife’s unemployment, he had paid off four of his
six debts prior to the issuance of the SOR, and he had favorable character and employment
references.  Applicant’s argument does not demonstrate that the Judge’s adverse decision is
arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
  
Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the
applicant to establish mitigation.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The presence of some mitigating evidence
does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of
fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence
outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s
weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that
is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 10-08508 at 2 (App. Bd. Jan.
4, 2012).
In reaching his adverse decision, the Judge considered the circumstances referenced in
Applicant’s appeal brief, including the fact that Applicant had paid off four of his six outstanding
debts.  However, he noted that the four paid off debts totaled less than $1,000, while the two
remaining debts, which were attributable to the repossession of two vehicles, totaled more than
$31,000.  He also noted that Applicant had received no formal financial counseling, and he had not
demonstrated that his financial problems were under control and that he had a plan to bring them
under control.  As a result, the Judge found that “[w]ith his limited income, the two debts are likely
to remain unresolved.”  Decision at 3,4,6, and 7.  The Judge’s adverse conclusions in this regard are
reasonably supported by the record evidence.
The Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the length and
seriousness of the disqualifying circumstances, and considered the possible application of relevant
conditions and factors.  He found in favor of Applicant as to the SOR allegations stemming from
the four debts that had been paid off, but reasonably explained why that mitigating evidence was
insufficient to overcome the government’s security concerns.  Id. at 5-8.
The Board does not review a case de novo.  After reviewing the record, the Board concludes
that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for the decision,
“including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general standard is
that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  The Judge’s unfavorable
security clearance decision is sustainable.
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Order
The decision of the Judge is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Jean E. Smallin              
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody              
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields             
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board