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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 11-02724 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Braden M. Murphy, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Holly Svetz, Esquire and Steven Cave, Esquire 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
CREAN, Thomas M., Administrative Judge: 
 
Based on a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access 
to classified information is granted. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant had been granted eligibility for access to classified information in 2001. 
On June 6, 2010, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations 
Processing (e-QIP) to continue a security clearance required for a position with a 
defense contractor. The Department of Defense (DOD) issued interrogatories to 
Applicant to clarify or augment potentially disqualifying information. After reviewing 
Applicant's response to the interrogatories, DOD could not find that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to continue his security clearance. On July 25, 
2012, DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns for 
personal conduct under Guideline E. This action was taken under Executive Order 
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as 
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
 
 
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Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and 
the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective in the DOD on September 1, 2006. Applicant 
acknowledged receipt of the SOR on August 1, 2012. 
 
 The Government alleges two security concerns under Guideline E. Applicant 
answered the SOR through counsel on September 13, 2012. He provided an eight-page 
response and two extensive exhibits. Applicant denied the first security concern (SOR 
1.a). He admitted in part and denied in part the second security concern (SOR 1.b). He 
requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was prepared 
to proceed on October 11, 2012. The case was assigned to me on October 22, 2012. 
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Notice of Hearing on 
November 9, 2012, for a hearing on December 4, 2012. I convened the hearing as 
scheduled. Two witnesses testified for the Government. The Government offered 11 
exhibits, which I marked and admitted into the record as Government exhibits (Gov. Ex.) 
1 through 11.1 Applicant and two witnesses testified. Applicant offered two exhibits 
which I marked and admitted into the record without objection as Applicant Exhibits 
(App. Ex.) A and B. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on December 13, 
2012. 
 
Procedural Issues 
 
 On October 24, 2012, Applicant moved to have his case heard by another 
administrative law judge who had heard and decided a companion case. On November 
1, 2012, Department Counsel filed a brief opposing the transfer. Since good cause was 
not shown why the case should be transferred, I denied the request on November 6, 
2012. (Tr. 12; See, Hearing Exhibit I)  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 After a thorough review of the pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the 
following essential findings of fact. Applicant admitted one and denied in part the other 
allegation of misconduct under personal conduct. His admission is included in my 
findings of fact.  
 
Applicant is 38 years old and employed as a systems engineer for a defense 
contractor. He graduated from high school in 1993, and has approximately three years 
of college. In college, he worked part-time for the college in their computer operations. 
Instead of completing college, he went to work in the computer technology field. He 
worked for various companies, including defense contractors, before starting work for 
his present employer in 2008. He was first granted access to classified information in 
2001. He is married with two children. (Tr. 167-170; Gov. Ex. 1, e-QIP, dated June 1, 
2010) 
                                                          
1 Applicant did not object to Exhibits 1, 2, and 4 to 11. He did object to parts of Gov. Ex. 3. Gov. Ex. 3 was 
the transcript of a deposition Applicant gave in a federal court case. Applicant authenticated the transcript 
as accurate in Gov. Ex. 4. The objection was overruled and the document was admitted. (Tr. 37-42) 
 
 
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Applicant started working for Dr. L, his mentor, at a defense contractor in 
approximately 2005. When Dr. L left to work for company R in 2006, Applicant followed 
him to company R in August 2006 as a consultant on classified projects in a DOD data 
center. He worked on business development and proposals as well as being the 
enterprise storage architect for a large defense program. In August 2007, the security 
clearance of company R’s president, Mr. N, was revoked, making the facility security 
clearance of the company defective. A new organization had to be established for 
company R to continue to work on classified contracts. As the leader of the government 
contracting unit of company R, Dr. L proposed a novation plan to Mr. N to transfer the 
classified contracts to a company that he formed years earlier, Q3, but never 
implemented. The Government had to approve any plans so the new organization could 
continue to work on the classified contracts previously awarded to company R. 
Applicant participated in a few meetings and discussions during March and April 2008 
on the transfer of the classified contracts to a new company, so that he was aware of 
the potential novation of contracts to Q3. The contracts had not been transferred to a 
new contractor by May 2008. The indications were that Mr. N was reluctant to make 
changes because he could possibly lose his share of profits from the contracts. There 
were ongoing discussion between Mr. N, the attorneys for company R, Dr. L, and 
possibly the Government contracting officer’s representative. There were major 
disagreements between Mr. N and Dr. L on the plans and implementation.  
 
Mr. N terminated Dr. L’s employment with company R on May 1, 2008. Dr. L left 
company R that day. He then incorporated a new company QB in May 2008. In June 
2008, Mr. N and company R sued Dr. L, Applicant, and three other individuals who went 
to work at QB, in federal court for breach of their employment contracts and breach of 
trust and loyalty to company R. After depositions were taken from some of the 
individuals involved in company R and QB, the court action was settled and dismissed. 
(See, Gov. Ex. 3, Deposition transcript at 10-34; Tr. 133-145; Gov. Ex. 11, resume, 
undated; App. Ex. B, e-mails, date April 29, 2008)2  
 
The SOR alleges that Applicant breached his loyalty to company R in May 2008 
by planning with others to start a competing business (SOR 1.a). He denied this 
allegation. The SOR also alleges that after resigning from company R in May 2008, he 
improperly and without authorization deleted company R files and business records 
from his company R computer and copied the records onto his own computer. Applicant 
admitted that he deleted the files after copying them to his own personal computer. He 
denied that he deleted the files with the deliberate intent to harm the business interests 
of company R. The Government’s allegation is basically that he breached his loyalty to 
his former employer and then tried to cover-up his actions. (Tr. 16-19; See, Response to 
SOR, dated September 13, 2012) 
 
On May 19, 2008, Applicant notified company R that he would leave company R 
at the end of May 2008. Dr. L’s departure did not affect the work Applicant was doing for 
company R, but he knew Dr. L intended to start a new company to pursue business. In 
early May 2008, he discussed salary and employment opportunities with Dr. L about 
                                                          
2 The parties agreed to stipulate to these facts. (Tr. 16) 
 
 
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working at the new company. Applicant wanted to move with Dr. L because he worked 
for him for a number of years and they were always working on “cool” technology 
projects. In addition, the work he was doing with company R was becoming more 
mundane and operational rather than developmental. He was concerned about the 
future of company R because of the failure to reach agreement on a novation plan, the 
potential end of funding on the contracts, and the lack of vision for company R caused 
by the departure of Dr. L. Applicant did not know if he had a valid future with company 
R, so he took a leap of faith and went to work with Dr. L in his new company. The 
company had no business and no income, just employees. He wanted to follow Dr. L 
because he thought Dr. L provided the direction while he was the core capability for 
company R. He did not leave believing the new company was formed to compete with 
company R. By May 19, 2008, Dr. L had recruited two or three employees of company 
R, including Applicant, to work for him in QB. Applicant never discussed or tried to 
market any work he was doing with company R with any employee of QB. (Tr. 167-183) 
 
The Government’s information on the security concern raised in SOR 1.a is 
based on responses Applicant gave to questions asked at a deposition in the federal 
court action. He testified in the deposition and at the hearing that in May 2008, he 
decided to leave company R, after Dr. L was terminated, and move with him to his new 
company, QB. Shortly after he agreed to move to QB and had notified company R that 
he was leaving, using his wife’s private e-mail account, Applicant sent information to Dr. 
L of potential contracts for the new company. The information he provided was based 
on proposals he created at the request of the Government contracting officer for the 
data center while working for company R. The information centered on projects under 
discussion for the data center. He knew of the projects since he worked on project 
planning as an employee of company R. As part of his work, he actually developed the 
plans for the Government. The information was about potential future work that may be 
needed in the data center. The projects were not funded and were basically items that 
could potentially be requested and funded. He developed a bill of materials for the 
projects that could be provided by a contractor. In developing the list, his aim was to 
include as many items as possible that may be needed by the data center. The 
information contained his best guess on the proposed budget and cost of items to be 
used by the Government for planning purposes only.  
 
Applicant used his wife’s computer account because he did not have a personal 
e-mail account, and he wanted to separate the information he forwarded from his work 
at company R. He did not consider the information he sent Dr. L to be business 
information since it did not have funding or a contract associated with it. He considered 
the information public since it was available to and known by most if not all of the 
contractors that were working in and on data center projects. He did not believe 
company R or any of its subsidiaries could perform the work because the company no 
longer had a facility security clearance for classified work. He knew that any company 
could make a proposal for work on unfunded requirements. However, there had to be 
funding and a contract before work could be awarded. Companies would have to bid on 
the work and actual cost would be determined if a contract was awarded.  
 
 
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Applicant forwarded the information because he did not know if Dr. L was aware 
of the potential work even though the list was developed prior to Dr. L being terminated 
by company R. He did not know if Dr. L had seen the list of potential work. He was 
unsure of the business potential of the new company or what Dr. L intended for the 
company to pursue. He considered the information to be public and available to all 
potential contractors. (Tr. 184-186, 195-203; Gov. Ex.3, Deposition, dated September 2, 
2008, at 78-95)  
 
When Applicant started working for company R, he was provided a company 
laptop computer to use in his business activities. Company R had no policy concerning 
what information could be placed on the company laptops. There also was no policy 
concerning the information and material an employee could take when leaving the 
company. If there was any such policy, Applicant had never been advised or trained in 
the policy. Applicant stored his personal information, including bank account 
information, music files, and other private information on his company-R-issued laptop. 
When he notified company R that he was leaving their employment, arrangements were 
made for him to turn in his security passes, company-provided cellphone, laptop, and 
other equipment. Applicant worked at a site different from the company headquarters. 
On his last day with company R, May 30, 2008, Applicant returned his security passes 
to a Government representative. He left his company-ssued cellphone and other 
equipment with a company representative. Since he worked at a secured facility and 
was unable to take his unsecured company-issued laptop into the facility, he did not 
have the laptop with him. He made arrangements with a representative of company R to 
return the laptop to him in a parking lot where he worked on June 10, 2008. (Tr. 45-75, 
186-210) 
 
A forensic computer expert examined the laptop computer for company R to 
determine if there were files on the computer that were the property of company R, how 
the computer may have been used, and if the use violated any law or policy of company 
R. He did not receive policy information on use of company computers from company R. 
The expert testified that he performed a preliminary examination of the laptop’s 
programs and stored files. He discovered that there was little data on the computer that 
would enable him to draw significant conclusions about how the computer was normally 
used. It appeared that a good deal of the information that would have been contained in 
the standard locations had been deleted. There was evidence that some files had been 
contained on the system but were now deleted. He identified the files as not being 
related to company R but to another business, Q3. (Tr. 75-79) 
 
The expert noted that a legally available utility, called Sdelete, had been run on 
the system. This program would not be known to a typical computer user, but would be 
used by a sophisticated knowledgeable computer savvy person. The utility is used as 
an anti-forensic tool to make files that may have been deleted permanently 
unrecoverable. It finds the space where the file had been located and overwrites it with 
random data, so that the original file can no longer be retrieved. The program as used 
on this computer was targeted to specific files and was not a blanket deletion of the data 
on the computer. It deletes the data but still indicates the file existed on the master list. 
 
 
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The deletion was done in a way that would leave the system intact and still functional. It 
targeted the files the person running Sdelete wanted deleted. The event log contained 
only one day of data where normally such a file contained weeks and even months of 
data. The data was only for dates between June 9 and June 10, 2008.  
 
There was evidence that external storage devices had been attached to the 
computer usually for the purpose of copying files to an external device. There was no 
evidence that company R files had been on the computer. However, there is an 
indication that a file pertaining to the budget for Q3 had been received from an external 
source and stored on the laptop by Applicant. The expert concluded that prior to the 
computer being returned to company R, a significant effort by a reasonably 
sophisticated user erased much of the content of the computer, as well as any 
indications of the user’s actual use of the computer. (Tr. 79-81)  
 
The expert also noted that there are circumstances where overwriting used files 
with random data is appropriate to protect private information. He would advise that if a 
computer was to be donated, all personal data be removed so it could not be retrieved. 
However if the computer was to be returned to an employer, this would not be the 
typical mechanism used to delete files. It may delete vital information of the business. 
When the computer is the property of a business and not an individual, it was his 
opinion that this was not the common technique used to delete data. The data regarding 
the activities of the user would be deleted by Sdelete. Using some sort of file-wiping 
system would not be unusual. But only someone with sophisticated knowledge of 
programs and computers would use something like Sdelete. It would delete not only 
personal information and music files but other files of interest to the business. He was 
able to determine that Applicant was the primary user of the laptop. He found traces of 
some, but not all, files Applicant had on the computer. The external devices could have 
been used to save files and presentations. There was no indication that any deleted 
files may be available to company R from other sources or on the company’s master 
files. There was no indication that any files were copied or transferred for unauthorized 
purposes. (Tr. 81-121)  
 
Applicant was not aware of any company policy concerning deletion of 
information and he had not received any training on any such action. Before returning 
his company R computer, he wanted to be sure all of his personal information and files 
were deleted. In previous positions working on Government computers, personal 
profiles and information were deleted before reissuing the computers. The data deletion 
was performed to ensure there was no accidental spillage of classified information or 
personal information. In his past positions, he took a broad range of actions to delete 
information from computer files before reissuing a computer to another person. On June 
9, 2008, Applicant copied his personal information on the company R laptop computer 
to his new computer by copying the entire directory of files rather than copying files 
individually. He deleted his personal information files, including his financial information, 
and music files from the computer. He also deleted some data and e-mails he received 
concerning Q3. His intent was to restructure the data, and delete any information he did 
not need in his new position. A list of file names would still be available but not data 
 
 
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within the files. He ran the Sdelete program to be sure that all his personal data was 
deleted from the computer. He also deleted Q3 reference data since he did not believe 
the material was his or company R property, and he did not have authorization to 
provide the data to company R.  
 
Applicant acknowledged that he returned his company R laptop computer to a 
company representative on June 10, 2008. He was not concerned with potentially 
deleting company R material because he knew the material was stored on a company 
computer storage site. He did not intend to delete any company R or Government 
deliverable material. He wanted to leave the laptop operable so company R could log in 
and retrieve company R or Government deliverable material. Some company R material 
was transferred when he copied files to his new computer. He intended to delete the 
information from his new computer but did not have a chance before litigation started. 
He used Sdelete in the past because it is a free program used by other government 
agencies to overwrite data. (Tr. 145-195, 203-208) 
 
Applicant believed the duty he owed company R when he resigned was to 
continue to support the contracts he was assigned until his resignation was effective. He 
continued to work on business development activities until he left. He also has a duty to 
safeguard company R information. He had a duty to return his laptop in a state that 
company R could still use it to access its information. He wanted to leave the company 
in a favorable friendly manner. There was no evidence that he had a do-not-compete 
agreement with company R. He was not an executive of the company but a low-level 
worker and project manager. (Tr. 210-222) 
 
His discussions with Dr. L about the new company centered more on his salary 
and position than potential business opportunities. They did not talk in detail about 
contracts that company R could still compete on and manage. Dr. L had more 
information on company R than he did. Dr. L knew in detail all of the opportunities being 
worked by company R. (Tr. 208-210) 
 
A senior executive and part-owner of Applicant’s present employer testified that 
he has known Applicant for almost ten years. He first knew Applicant when they both 
worked for different companies supporting the same government agency. He not only 
sees Applicant at work but their families also socialize together. He considers Applicant 
to be honest, reliable, and with the highest integrity. He has complete trust in Applicant 
and feels he should receive access to classified information. (Tr. 124-132) 
 
Dr. L testified that he has known Applicant for approximately ten years. He 
recruited Applicant to fill a challenging technical strategic role for the witness’s defense-
contractor employer. Applicant had technical expertise, business intelligence, and 
understood organizational needs. When Dr. L moved to company R, he hired Applicant 
to work in a strategic position for company R. Applicant was instrumental in developing 
solutions for company R projects since Applicant is very determined to solve problems. 
He learns all aspect of the problem and understands the business practices, policies, 
and technical issues. Dr. L socializes with Applicant and his family. Applicant has 
 
 
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always shown good responsible business judgment. He is worthy of a position of trust 
and access to classified information. (Tr. 148-156)  
 
Policy 
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or protect 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
 
 
 
 
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Analysis 
 
Personal Conduct 
 
 A security concern is raised because conduct involving questionable judgment, 
untrustworthiness, unreliability, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations 
can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect 
classified information. Personal conduct is always a security concern because it asks 
the central question does the person’s past conduct justify confidence the person can 
be entrusted to properly safeguard classified information. (AG ¶ 15)   
 
The Government allegation is that Applicant breached his duty of loyalty to 
company R by planning with others to start a competing business. The Government 
information on this allegation was from a deposition taken from Applicant. In the 
deposition, Applicant admitted he agreed to join the new company and communicated 
potential work project information to the founder of the new company. Applicant knew 
about the potential projects from his work as an employee of company R. Applicant 
admitted he deleted certain information from his company R computer before returning 
it. This information is sufficient to raise Personal Conduct Disqualifying Conditions AG ¶ 
16(c) (credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not 
sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which, 
when considered as a whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable 
judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with 
rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not 
properly safeguard protected information); and AG ¶ 16(d) (credible adverse information 
that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself 
for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information 
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, 
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other 
characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard protected 
information).  
 
 The Government produced sufficient evidence to establish the disqualifying 
conditions as required in AG ¶¶ 16(c), and 16(d). The burden shifted to Applicant to 
produce evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the security concerns under 
personal conduct. An applicant has the burden to prove a mitigating condition, and the 
burden to prove or disprove it never shifts to the Government.  
 
Applicant presented information to explain, rebut, and extenuate the security 
concerns raised by the Government. I considered this information in regard to Personal 
Conduct Mitigating Conditions AG ¶ 17(c) (the offense is so minor, or so much time has 
passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique 
circumstances that is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's 
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment); and AG ¶ 17(f) (the information was 
unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability).  
 
 
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 When Applicant’s mentor and friend, Dr. L, was terminated by their mutual 
defense contractor employer and formed a new company, Applicant agreed to work for 
the new company. There was no evidence presented that Applicant had a do-not-
compete agreement with company R. Since Applicant and Dr. L were computer 
technology experts and worked in that field for company R, the new company would be 
working in the computer technology field. The new company would undoubtedly be 
competing with company R for future government contracts. Applicant had a reasonable 
basis to leave company R and work for QB. He no longer enjoyed the work he was 
doing at company R and he was concerned for the company’s future. He enjoyed 
working for Dr. L and considered him a friend and mentor. After notifying company R 
that he was leaving for the new company, Applicant sent information to Dr. L on 
potential business opportunities for the new company. He learned of these opportunities 
when as an employee of company R, he developed the information for the Government 
contracting officer. The information was not company R proprietary information but 
common information on future potential business opportunities. The information was 
known and available to all potential contractors. It was only potential work that the 
Government may in the future request. The potential projects were not funded and there 
were no contracts provided by the Government. Applicant’s actions in joining the new 
company and sending common information to his new employer did not undermine or 
affect the possible business potential of company R. The company did not lose any 
contracts or work based on Applicant’s action and it still had the ability to compete as a 
contractor for the same work that QB would be competing for.  
 
The information presented by Applicant refuted and mitigated the security 
concern raised by the Government’s information. He had reasonable, plausible, and 
credible reasons for his actions. He had good and valid reasons for leaving company R 
and moving to another company. There was no prohibition against him going to work for 
the new company. He was a low-level employee of company R and he did not have a 
do-not-compete agreement. He forwarded to his future employer common information 
available to any company. The projects had not been funded or placed for contract. The 
information was merely speculative as to potential future work. The Government still 
had to fund the work and contractors had to win a contract to do the work. It was not 
proprietary business information that was damaging to company R’s business. The 
transmission of this information under the circumstances did not rise to the level of a 
security concern. The situation was unique and does not cast doubt on his reliability, 
trustworthiness, and good judgment.  
 
Applicant admitted that he used a computer program to delete information from 
his company R computer before returning it. He presented reasonable, logical, and 
credible explanations for his action in deleting information from the laptop computer. 
Applicant is a computer expert who in the past had worked on computers being returned 
and recycled. He had personal information on the computer and wanted to delete the 
personal information since he did not know how and by whom the computer would be 
used in the future. He was familiar with a sophisticated program that would overwrite 
and delete the data from his accounts but still have the computer available to this former 
employer for their use. He ran that program with the intent that the computer could be 
 
 
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used again. Since Applicant had reasonable bases for all of his actions, he refuted and 
mitigated the personal conduct security concerns under Guideline E.  
 
Whole-Person Analysis 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s security eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all 
the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative 
process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the 
extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or 
absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral 
changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for 
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood 
of continuation or recurrence. 
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant a security clearance 
must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the 
guidelines and the whole-person concept.  
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. I considered the information 
provided by his supervisors concerning his reputation for honesty, reliability, and 
trustworthiness. I considered that Applicant has been eligible for access to classified 
information for many years without incident. Applicant’s actions in sending information 
to his future employer and deleting files from his computer were not inappropriate and 
illogical. He sent his future employer only information that was commonly available to all 
potential contractors. He deleted his communications with his future employer from his 
computer while erasing his personal files and data from his computer before returning it. 
He has appropriate reasons for his actions so that the actions do not cast doubt on his 
reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information. How he handled 
his departure from company R, his new employment with QB, and the return of his 
computer to company R indicate he would properly handle, manage, and safeguard 
classified information. The record evidence leaves me without questions and doubts 
about Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, 
I conclude Applicant has mitigated the personal conduct security concerns.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 
 
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 Paragraph 1, Guideline E:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraphs 1.a - 1.b:   For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
_________________ 
THOMAS M. CREAN 
Administrative Judge