Applicant re-signed Item 5 on February 13, 2012.1
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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
----------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 12-09392
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Caroline H. Jeffreys, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
February 27, 2013
______________
Decision
______________
ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing
(e-QIP) on January 19, 2012. (Item 5.)  On August 31, 2012, the Department of1
Defense (DoD) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns
under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the Department of Defense on September
1, 2006. 
 
Applicant submitted an Answer to the SOR on September 18, 2012, and
requested a decision be made without a hearing. Department Counsel submitted a File
or Relevant Material (FORM) to Applicant on November 19, 2012. Applicant received
the FORM on December 18, 2012, and was given 30 days to submit any additional
The signature block on Applicant Exhibit A is not that of the Applicant. However, a comparison of the written2
signature with that on the Applicant’s Answer shows this to be a typographical error.
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information. Applicant submitted additional information on December 20, 2012.
(Applicant Exhibit A.)  He stated the following, “I am currently in AFGHANISTAN2
working for the US ARMY and as a federal contractor.” (Emphasis in original.) The case
was assigned to me on January 11, 2013. Based upon a review of the pleadings and
exhibits, eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
Procedural Ruling
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Applicant did not object. The
facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below. 
Findings of Fact
Applicant is 42 and married. His wife is a permanent resident of the United
States. He has two children, one of whom was born in Pakistan and is a permanent
resident of the United States. His other child is a native-born American citizen. He is
employed by a defense contractor, since January 2012, as a linguist, and seeks a
security clearance in connection with his employment in the defense industry. Applicant
admitted the factual allegations in the SOR, except for 1.g. Those admissions are
findings of fact. 
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence)  
The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for
clearance because he has foreign contacts and interests that could lead to the exercise
of poor judgment, unreliability or untrustworthiness. Applicant was born and raised in
Pakistan, where he went to college. (Item 5.) He came to the United States in 2000, and
was granted permanent resident status in 2004. He became a naturalized American
citizen in November 2009. (Item 7 at 1.)
1.a. Applicant has five living brothers in Pakistan. One brother has passed away.
Four of his brothers are construction contractors, one of whom owns a welding shop,
and the fifth is the sales manager for a medicine company. (Item 8 at 5-6.)
1.b. Applicant has three living sisters in Pakistan. Two other sisters have passed
away. His remaining sisters are housewives. (Item 8 at 6.)
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1.c. Applicant’s mother-in-law is a citizen and resident of Pakistan. His father-in-
law has passed away. (Item 8 at 6.)
1.d. Applicant has two brothers-in-law. One is a citizen and resident of Pakistan.
The second is a citizen of Pakistan, but he resides in the United States. (Item 8 at 7.)
1.e. Applicant has two sisters-in-law who are citizens and residents of Pakistan.
(Item 8 at 6.)
1.f. Applicant has one nephew who is a citizen and resident of Pakistan. He has
one additional nephew, who is a citizen of Pakistan, but is currently residing in the
United Kingdom. (Item 8 at 7.)
1.g. Applicant denied maintaining close contact with several friends or associates
who are citizens and residents of Pakistan. He stated in his Answer, “I only maintain
close contact with my family & relatives.” The evidence in the record is insufficient to
support this SOR allegation, given Applicant’s denial. Accordingly, this subparagraph is
found for Applicant.
1.h. Applicant bought two pieces of property in Pakistan in about 2008. They are
worth $10,000 each. He has paid off one property and states that he transferred the
other to a friend. (Item 8 at 7-8.)
1.i. Applicant purchased a shop in Pakistan in 2002 for $11,000. He has paid off
the loan for purchase of the shop, but has also transferred the shop to one of his
brothers. Concerning this property, and the two discussed immediately above,
“[Applicant] advised that he has no allegiance, preference or obligation to Pakistan due
to these properties and would surrender these properties if required.” (Item 8 at 8.)
1.j. Applicant sends money to his family every few months, usually $100 to $300.
The total since 2005 is $10,000 to $15,000. (Item 7 at 1, 10.) 
In January 2012, before he started his current employment, Applicant was
unemployed and had a negative cashflow of over $2,600 a month. (Item 7 at 26.) No
information was submitted concerning his current financial condition.
Applicant provided no evidence concerning the quality of his professional
performance, the level of responsibility his duties entail, or his track record with respect
to handling sensitive information and observation of security procedures. He submitted
no character references or other evidence tending to establish good judgment,
trustworthiness, or reliability. I was unable to evaluate his credibility, demeanor, or
character in person since he elected to have his case decided without a hearing. 
I also take administrative notice of the following facts concerning the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan. The United States has had diplomatic relations with Pakistan
since the latter’s 1947 independence from the United Kingdom. The two countries’
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common interest in peace and stability in South Asia has informed their relationship
over the decades. Pakistan has been in the front line of counter terrorism efforts aimed
at Al-Qa’ida and other networks. However, the U.S. Department of State has noted that
terror networks continue to find safe haven in parts of Pakistan, despite the best efforts
of Pakistani security forces. The State Department also warns U.S. citizens to defer
travel to Pakistan based on security concerns. Finally, major human rights problems in
Pakistan include extrajudicial killings, torture and disappearances committed by security
forces, as well as by militant, terrorist and extremist groups, poor prison conditions,
arbitrary arrest, widespread government corruption, rape, honor crimes, and widespread
trafficking in persons.
Policies
Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum. When evaluating an
applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider
the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory explanations for each
guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and
mitigating conditions, which are to be used as appropriate in evaluating an applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.  In addition, the administrative judge may also rely on his or her own
common sense, as well as his or her knowledge of the law, human nature and the ways
of the world, in making a reasoned decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
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A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Security clearance decisions include, by
necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or
inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain
degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of
compromise of classified information.
 
Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any
determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms
of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
It is the Government's responsibility to present substantial evidence to support
the finding of a nexus, or rational connection, between the applicant's circumstances
and the granting or continued holding of a security clearance. If such a case has been
established, the burden then shifts to the applicant to go forward with evidence in
rebuttal, explanation or mitigation which is sufficient to overcome or outweigh the
Government's case. The applicant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving
that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him or her a security
clearance.
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence) 
The concern under Guideline B is styled as follows:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be
manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or
government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this
Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in
which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to
target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is
associated with a risk of terrorism.
Applicant has numerous family connections to Pakistan. In addition, he has
financial interests in Pakistan which, according to the available evidence, outstrip any
financial interests in the United States.
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The following disqualifying conditions apply to this case based solely on the facts
under AG ¶ 7: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member . . . who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) connections to a foreign person . . . that create a potential conflict of
interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information
or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person . . . by
providing that information; and
(e) substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country,
or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject
the individual to foreign influence or exploitation.
Applicant has not submitted any evidence to show that he has substantial family
and financial ties in the United States that outweigh his relationship to Pakistan and his
relatives there. Nor has he submitted any evidence showing that he does not have a
conflict of interest between his loyalties to Pakistan, the country of his family and birth,
and the United States. I have considered the fact that his immediate family lives here.
However, that fact is insufficient to overcome the adverse inference raised by his
substantial Pakistani connections.
Applicant has not provided sufficient evidence to show that the following
mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 apply to this particular case, given his particular
background: 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
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Based on my analysis of the available information, the Applicant has not
overcome the adverse inference of his family members’ presence in Pakistan, along
with his financial interests there.  Guideline B is found against the Applicant.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of
whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense
judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person
concept. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors
listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.      
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. My Guideline B analysis is
applicable to the whole-person analysis as well. Applicant may very well be a patriotic
American citizen. He failed to present any evidence showing that his preference is for
the United States and not Pakistan. It is Applicant’s burden to make such a case, and
he has not done so. Accordingly, I cannot find that there is little or no “potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress” as set forth in AG ¶ 2(a)(8). Using the
whole-person standard, Applicant has not mitigated the security significance of his
foreign connections. He is not eligible for a security clearance. 
On balance, it is concluded that Applicant has not successfully overcome the
Government's case opposing his request for a DoD security clearance. Accordingly, the
evidence supports a finding against Applicant as to the factual and conclusionary
allegations expressed in Paragraph 1 of the Government's Statement of Reasons.
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Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.I: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.j: Against Applicant.
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
WILFORD H. ROSS
Administrative Judge