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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 11-01253
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Candace L. Garcia, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Bradford Weston III, Esquire  
______________
Decision
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HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, Applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
Statement of the Case
Applicant completed and certified an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations
Processing (e-QIP) on December 17, 2009. The Department of Defense (DOD) issued
Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on September 6, 2012, detailing security
concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence. The action was taken under Executive
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960),
as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
Adjudicative Guidelines For Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
(AG) implemented on September 1, 2006. 
 
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Applicant received the SOR on October 9, 2012, and he answered it on October
17, 2012. Applicant retained counsel and requested a hearing before an administrative
judge with the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). Department Counsel
was prepared to proceed on January 28, 2013, and I received the case assignment on
January 30, 2013. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on February 14, 2013, and I
convened the hearing as scheduled on February 28, 2013. The Government offered
exhibits (GE) marked as GE 1 through GE 4, which were received and admitted into
evidence without objection. Applicant testified. He submitted exhibits (AE) marked as
AE A through AE K, which were received and admitted into evidence without objection.
The record closed on February 28, 2013. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on
March 14, 2013.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Notice
Applicant received the notice of the date, time and place of the hearing less than
15 days before the hearing. I advised Applicant of his right under ¶ E3.1.8 of the
Directive to receive the notice 15 days before the hearing. After consulting with counsel,
Applicant affirmatively waived this right under the directive. (Tr. 10.)       
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts related to Afghanistan. The request and the attached documents were
not admitted into evidence, but were included in the record as Hearing Exhibit 1. The
facts administratively noticed will be limited to matters of general knowledge and
matters not subject to reasonable dispute, and are set out in the Findings of Fact below.
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted all the factual allegations in the
SOR. His admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. He also provided
additional information to support his request for eligibility for a security clearance. After
a complete and thorough review of the evidence of record, I make the following findings
of fact.  
Applicant, who is 38 years old, works as a linguist and cultural interpreter for a
DOD contractor. He is fluent in Phestu, Dari, and English. He began working as an
interpreter in 2008 for another DOD contractor. While working for his first DOD
employer, Applicant served in Afghanistan for two years, beginning in October 2008. His
job required him to translate documents and to participate in patrols with his team. He
joined his team in approximately 250 patrols. His duties did not require a security
clearance. His current employer is sponsoring him for a security clearance. Applicant
GE 1; AE C; Tr. 22, 24-26, 35, 40-47. 1
GE 1; GE 3; Tr. 22, 29, 55-56. 2
W hen the Taliban controlled the Afghan government, members of Applicant’s family could not attend school,3
which is the reason his brother just completed high school. Tr. 60-63.
GE 1; GE 3; GE 4; AE A; Tr. 30-31, 33, 59-63, 70-71, 81-82.4
Tr. 32, 64-67.5
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worked in Afghanistan from April 2011 until October 2012. He planned to return to
Afghanistan after the hearing.1
Applicant was born and raised in Afghanistan. He left Afghanistan in 2001 to
marry. He and his wife married in July 2001. They have a nine-year-old daughter, who
was born in the United States and resides in the United States. Applicant’s wife was
born in Afghanistan and immigrated to the United States with her family in 1985. She
has lived in the United States since then. She became a U.S. citizen in 2000. Applicant
became a U.S. citizen in 2008. His wife does not work.2
Applicant’s parents are citizens of Afghanistan and retired. Applicant’s father
immigrated to the United States in November 2012, based on Applicant’s sponsorship.
His father is a permanent resident with a green card and lives with Applicant and his
family. His mother still resides in Afghanistan. His father is beginning the process to
sponsor his mother for entry into the United States. Applicant estimates that she will
arrive in the United States in six to eight months. Applicant has one brother, who lives in
the United States with his wife and daughters. Applicant’s 23-year-old brother is a
citizen and resident of Afghanistan. He recently completed high school and plans to
attend college in Afghanistan.  Applicant’s three sisters are citizens and residents of3
Afghanistan. His sisters are not married and live with their mother. They are not
employed and are homemakers. Applicant provides his family in Afghanistan $200 a
month for food. His wife’s family lives in the United States.4
Applicant’s father owns a house in Afghanistan, where Applicant’s mother,
brother, and three sisters live. Applicant estimates the value of the house at $250,000.
Once his family arrives in the United States, his father plans to sell the house and
purchase a house in the United States. Applicant believes his father can sell the house
through a real estate agent in the United States. There are no plans for his father to
return to Afghanistan to sell the house.5
Applicant’s Afghan family does not have any contacts with the Afghan
government or military nor do they belong to any organizations. Before his retirement,
Applicant’s father worked for a private Afghan newspaper as an interpreter. All
Applicant’s assets are in the United States. Since his arrival in the United States,
Applicant has not returned to Afghanistan on a personal visit. His only trips to
Afghanistan have been on behalf of the U.S. Government. When he is in the United
Tr. 34, 51-54, 63, 68-70, 75-76.6
Tr. 34-35,, 51-54, 71-81.7
AE B; AE D - AE K.8
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States, Applicant calls his family, particularly his mother, once a month. They do not
communicate by email nor does he send them gifts. Applicant has no intent to return to
Afghanistan to live.   6
When he is working in Afghanistan, Applicant does not contact his family. He
lives on a military base. His family believes he is a truck driver, who drives all over the
United States. However, his wife knows he is in Afghanistan. Since arriving in the United
States, his father has learned that Applicant works in Afghanistan. His father will not tell
his mother about his work as his father understands the risk to Applicant if he reveals
this information. Applicant would give greater priority to his job and the United States if
his family is taken hostage in Afghanistan. He would report any threats to his family to
his command. Applicant does not claim dual citizenship with Afghanistan. His loyalty is
to the United States because he swore allegiance to the United States when he became
a citizen and because his wife and daughter are U.S. citizens.7
Applicant submitted seven letters of recommendation from his co-workers in
Afghanistan and his military supervisors. In 2009, his co-workers praised his work and
sought to upgrade his Category 1 linguist level to Category 2 linguist. He submitted an
August 2011 recommendation from an Army captain, who praised his interpretation and
work skills and who considered Applicant a welcome addition to their team. The three
2012 recommendations also praise his linguistic skills and work ethic. He recently
received a Certificate of Appreciation from his commander for his outstanding
performance in Afghanistan. He submitted an unsigned performance appraisal for 2009,
which also indicates excellent performance.8
I take administrative notice of the following adjudicative facts. Afghanistan is an
Islamic Republic and emerging democracy. With the support of the United States and
other nations, its new government endeavors to build a new system of government and
to rebuild the country’s infrastructure. Its army and police force are well trained. It
continues to face significant challenges from the insurgency and terrorist organizations
supported by the ousted Taliban and Al Qa’ida. The Afghan government is not
complacent about the terrorist threat or the insurgency; rather it actively seeks to
eliminate both with the assistance of the United States and NATO. The new government
is working to reverse a long legacy of serious human rights abuses, but serious
problems remain. Afghanistan is now an active member of the international community,
has signed a “Good Neighbor” declaration with six nations bordering it, and promotes
regional cooperation. The United States supports the emergence of a broad-based
government in Afghanistan. Sometime ago, the leaders of both countries concluded a
strategic partnership agreement committing to a long-term relationship between both
countries. Despite its differences with the United States, Afghanistan continues to seek
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United States support as it moves towards democracy and stability. Afghanistan is not
an active collector of intelligence information.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” An
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
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applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.
Applicant’s wife and daughter are citizens and residents of the United States. His
father is now a permanent U.S. resident, living in the United States. One brother and his
family live in the United States. Thus, no security concern is raised by these family
members. Applicant’s mother, brother, and three sisters are citizens and residents of
Afghanistan. His mother, brother, and sisters do not work. Applicant maintains a normal
familial relationship with his mother, brother, and sisters in Afghanistan. He talks with
them by telephone once a month when he is in the United States, and he provides a
small amount of financial support for his family members in Afghanistan. He has not
visited his family in Afghanistan since moving to the United States, and takes care not to
contact them when he is working in Afghanistan. His family relationships are not per se
a reason to deny Applicant a security clearance, but his contacts with his family
members must be considered in deciding whether to grant Applicant a clearance. The
Government must establish that these family relationships create a risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion by terrorists or would
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create a potential conflict of interest between his obligations to protect sensitive
information and his desire to help his family members who may be threatened by
terrorists. 
In determining if such a risk exists, I must look at Applicant’s relationships and
contacts with his family, as well as the activities of the Government of Afghanistan and
terrorist organizations within the country. The risk that an applicant could be targeted for
manipulation or induced into compromising classified information is real, not theoretical.
Applicant’s relationship and contacts with his family in Afghanistan raise a heightened
risk and a security concern because of the activities of terrorist organizations in
Afghanistan. The evidence of record fails to show that the Afghani government targets
U.S. citizens in the United States or in Afghanistan by exploiting, manipulating,
pressuring, or coercing them to obtain protected information. Thus, the concern that the
Afghani government will seek classified information is moderate. The same cannot be
said of the terrorist organizations. 
Under the guideline, the potentially conflicting loyalties must be weighed to
determine if an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of U.S.
interests. In determining if Applicant’s contacts in Afghanistan cause security concerns,
I considered that Afghanistan and the United States have a relationship, which includes
working together on international security issues and trade. There is no evidence that
the Afghani government targets U.S. citizens for protected information, but the terrorist
threat is real. The human rights issues continue to be a concern. While none of these
considerations by themselves dispose of the issue, they are all factors to be considered
in determining Applicant’s vulnerability to pressure or coercion because of his family in
Afghanistan. Applicant’s contacts with his family raise a heightened risk under AG ¶¶
7(a) and (d).
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.; and
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.
Applicant’s family members in Afghanistan do not know that he works as an
interpreter and linguist for the DOD. They think that he drives a truck all over the United
States. He communicates with his family members by telephone once a month when
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living in the United States. His communications with his family in Afghanistan are limited
and create little likelihood for foreign influence or exploitation. His mother, brother, and
sisters do not work and do not have any contact with government officials. It is unlikely
that the Government of Afghanistan would target them to pressure Applicant for
classified information, and thus, Applicant would not be placed in a position of having to
choose between the interests of Afghanistan and the interests of the United States.
Applicant stated that he would place the interests of the United States over his family
should they be targeted by terrorists or others who seek to obtain classified information
from him. Outside of his family, his ties to Afghanistan are nonexistent as Applicant
does not own property, bank accounts, or other assets in Afghanistan. He does not
receive any benefits from Afghanistan. His contacts in Afghanistan do not show that he
would chose the interests of Afghanistan over the interests of the United States. In
reviewing all the evidence of record, there is little likelihood that Applicant’s family in
Afghanistan are a security risk. Applicant has mitigated the security concerns about his
family in Afghanistan under AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(b).
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. The decision to grant or
deny a security clearance requires a careful weighing of all relevant factors, both
favorable and unfavorable. In so doing, an administrative judge must review all the
evidence of record, not a single item in isolation, to determine if a security concern is
established and then whether it is mitigated. A determination of an applicant’s eligibility
for a security clearance should not be made as punishment for specific past conduct,
but on a reasonable and careful evaluation of all the evidence of record to decide if a
nexus exists between established facts and a legitimate security concern. 
The evidence in support of granting a security clearance to Applicant under the
whole-person concept is more substantial than the evidence in support of denial. In
reaching a conclusion, I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating
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conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant
was born and raised in Afghanistan. He left his homeland in 2001 to marry his wife, who
is a U.S. citizen and resident. He continues to live with his wife and young daughter in
the United States. After he became a U.S. citizen in 2008, he obtained employment as a
linguist and interpreter with DOD contractors because he is fluent in Pashtu and Dari,
Afghan languages. He does not claim dual citizenship with Afghanistan nor does he own
property or hold assets in Afghanistan. His mother, brother, and three sisters still live in
Afghanistan and are Afghani citizens. His father recently immigrated to the United
States and is preparing to sponsor his mother for immigration to the United States. His
family members do not have connections with the Afghani government. They live
quietly. When he is working in Afghanistan, Applicant takes care not to contact his
family members. He would report any threats to his family to his command. He is highly
respected by the United States military for his linguistic skills and his work in
Afghanistan for the United States. The United States is his home and his country. He
would place the United States first if there are any threats to his family.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I
conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from foreign influence under
Guideline B.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge