DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)
----------------------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 11-02062
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Candace Le’i Garcia, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
 Decision
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WESLEY, Roger C., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified
information is denied.
History of the Case
On July 16, 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) detailing reasons why DOD adjudicators could not make the preliminary
affirmative determination of eligibility for granting a security clearance, and recommended
referral to an administrative judge to determine whether a security  clearance should be
granted, continued, denied, or revoked. The action was taken under Executive Order
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as
amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance
Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative
Guidelines (AGs) implemented by the DOD on September 1, 2006.
Applicant responded to the SOR on January 9, 2013, and elected to have his case
decided on the basis of the written record. Applicant received the File of Relevant Material
(FORM) on January 25, 2013, and did not respond to the FORM. 
2
Besides the identified items in the FORM, the Government requested
administrative notice of facts covered by 10 source documents. Included are the following
documents: Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, Chapter 5-Safe Havens-Strategies,
Tactics, and Tools for Disrupting or Eliminating Safe Havens, U.S. Department of State
(July 2012); Transcript of Interview, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike
Mullin, Interview on National Public Radio (May 2012); Worldwide Threat Assessment of
the U.S. Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence (February 2012); Travel Warning, Pakistan,
U.S. Department of State (September 2012); Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, Chapter
2 - Country Reports South and Central Asia Overview, U.S. Department of State (July
2012); Statement before the Armed Services Committee on Afghanistan and Iraq,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen (September 2011); U.S.
Declares Haqqani Network a Terrorist Organization, U.S. Department of State (September
2012); Press Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Killing of Osama bin Laden,
the White House Office of the Press Secretary (May 2011); Country Specific Information:
Pakistan, U.S. Department of State (August 2012);  2011 Human Rights Report: Pakistan,
U.S. Department of State (May 2012).
Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for
administrative proceedings.  See ISCR Case No. 05-11292, at 4 n.1 (App. Bd. Apr. 12,
2007).  Administrative notice is appropriate for noticing facts or government reports that
are well known.  See Stein, Administrative Law, Sec. 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006).  
For good cause shown, administrative notice was granted with respect to the
above-identified background reports containing facts pertaining to the geopolitical situation
in Pakistan. Administrative notice was extended to the documents themselves, consistent
with the provisions of Rule 201 of Fed. R. Evid.  This notice did not foreclose Applicant
from challenging the accuracy and reliability of the information contained in the reports
addressing Pakistan.    
Summary of Pleadings
Under Guideline B, Applicant allegedly (a) was employed by the Pakistani
government for 24 years (1973-1997); (b) maintains a bank account in Pakistan and has
intermittently received retirement funds for his service in the Pakistani government; (c)
holds a valid Pakistani identity card; (d) owns inherited property in Pakistan worth
approximately $10,000; (e) has four brothers who are citizens and residents of Pakistan;
(f) has three brothers who are currently employed by the Pakistani government; (g) has a
stepbrother who is a citizen and resident of Pakistan; (h) has five sisters-in-law who are
citizens and residents of Pakistan; (i) sends money to his family in Pakistan about three
times a year; and (j) maintains regular contact with two friends, who are citizens and
residents of Pakistan.  
In his response to the SOR, Applicant admitted all but one of the allegations
covered by Guideline B.  He denied holding a valid Pakistani identity card.  He claimed he
has never claimed, used, or benefitted from the property he inherited from his father. 
Findings of Fact
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Applicant is a 62-year-old linguist for a defense contractor who seeks a security
clearance. The allegations covered in the SOR and admitted by Applicant are adopted as
relevant and material findings.  Additional findings follow.
Background
                                  
Applicant married in June 1983. (Item 3) He has three adult children from this
marriage. He immigrated to the United States in April 1997 and became a naturalized U.S.
citizen in October 2010. (Item 3) He claims no military experience. (Items 1 and 7)
Applicant attended vocational classes between June 2010 and September 2010, but
earned no diploma or certificate. (Item 3)
Before immigrating to the United States, Applicant worked for the Pakistani
government for about 24 years (1973-1997) He maintains a bank account in Pakistan and
has intermittently received retirement funds he earned from his Pakistan government
service. (Item 7) Currently, he keeps an average balance in his account of $100. (Item 7)
He is willing to close the account if requested. And he holds an expired  Pakistani National
identity card. (Item 3) 
Applicant inherited property from his father in 1977. (Item 7) His oldest brother (AQ)
resides on the property and maintains it for Applicant.  He estimates the property to be
worth approximately $10,000. (Items 3 and 7) Applicant has never claimed, used, or
benefitted from the property. (Items 3 and 7) Between 1973 and 1997 he lived away from
his father’s village, while working in Pakistan. And he 1997, he immigrated to the United
States where he has resided continuously. (Item 3)  
Following his emigration from Pakistan in 1997, Applicant experienced lengthy
periods of unemployment. Based on his furnished accounts, he was unemployed  from
July 2001 through October 2006, June 2007 through August 2008, and from September
2008 through October 2010. (Items 1 and 7) During these extended unemployment
periods, he relied on his wife’s Social Security benefits and his son’s limited
unemployment benefits. 
Both of Applicant’s parents are deceased. His father died in 1997, and his mother
passed away in 2000. (Item 7) Applicant’s in-laws passed away before he immigrated to
the United States.  He has four brothers who are citizens and residents of Pakistan. Three
of the brothers are employed by the Pakistani government. (Item 7) The fourth brother is a
retired teacher with no known affiliations or connections with the Pakistani government.
(Item 7) Applicant has a stepbrother and three sisters-in-law who are citizens and
residents of Pakistan.  None of these family members have any known affiliations or
connections with the Pakistani government. (Item 7) 
Applicant maintains telephone contact with his brothers and stepbrother several
times a year. (Item 7)  He has little contact with any of his wife’s siblings. (Item 7)
However, he maintains regular contact with two friends who are citizens and residents of
Pakistan. (Item 7)  Periodically (typically three times a year), Applicant sends money to his
family members in Pakistan. (Item 7) 
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Political and economic background of Pakistan
Pakistan is a parliamentary federal republic located in Southeast Asia, with a
population of nearly 170 million. See Country Specific Information: Pakistan, supra, at 1.
Pakistan’s government is comprised of an executive (the president), a prime minister (the
functioning head of government), a bicameral parliament, and a judiciary. The judiciary
includes a supreme court, provincial high courts, and a federal Islamic (or Sharia) court.
(id.)
Background
Pakistan achieved its independence from Great Britain in August 1947. Still
disputed is the independent state of Kashmir. See Country Specific Information: Pakistan,
supra, at 3-7. Concerned over incursions of Pakistan tribesmen, the Maharajah of
Kashmir sought assistance from India (id.). He signed accession papers with India in
October 1947 that permitted Indian accession of Kashmir. Pakistan refused to recognize
Kashmir’s accession, and the legal status of Kashmir remains in dispute to this day.  See
id.  While direct military hostilities between India and Pakistan across the line of control
(LOC) have ceased, militant insurgent groups from the Indian side of the LOC have active
bases and supporters operating from the Pakistani side and pose considerable threats to
American visitors of the region. (id.)
The United States and Pakistan established diplomatic relations in 1947, following
Great Britain’s declaration in June 1947 that it would bestow full dominion status of two
successor states: India and Pakistan.  See Country Specific Information: Pakistan, supra,
at 1-7. Pakistan (comprised of West Pakistan and its provinces of Punjab, Sindh,
Balochistan, and the Northwest Frontier province and East Pakistan with its Bengal
province) became independent on August 14, 1947. (id.)  
Pakistan’s independence proved fragile and rife with political and economic
instability following the death of the country’s first head of state (Muhammad Ali Jinnah) in
1948 and the ensuing assassination of its first prime minister (Liaqat Ali Khan) in 1951.  In
October 1958, President Iskander Mirza (with military support) suspended his country’s
constitution (adopted just two years before), imposed martial law, and canceled the
scheduled elections. President Mirza’s action resulted in a military coup, his arrest, and
the establishment of a military dictatorship under the rule of General Mohammad Ayub
Khan.
Political and economic turmoil followed and new governments were installed over
the next 20 years: some as the result of general elections (such as the Pakistan People’s
Party or PPP which swept Zulfikar Ali Bhutto into power).  It was under Ali Bhutto’s civilian
leadership that Pakistan emerged as a nuclear power in the 1970s.  India’s nuclear test in
1974 injected further uncertainty and concern into Pakistan’s relationship with India, and is
generally credited as the principal impetus behind President Ali Bhutto’s decision to make
Pakistan a nuclear state.  See Country Specific Information: Pakistan, supra, at 1-8. 
Political tensions and economic unrest in Pakistan also produced military
interventions before the close of the 20  century. See Country Specific Information:th
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Pakistan, supra, at 1-8. Disputed national elections that marred Bhutto’s declared victory
in 1977 spurred anti-government unrest and ultimately prompted a military takeover of the
Bhutto government in July 1977 and installation of Army chief of staff, Muhammad Zia ul-
Haq) as the chief martial law administrator. When Zia assumed power, his military
government arrested Bhutto, tried him on conspiracy charges and hanged him in April
1979. 
With Zia’s untimely death in August 1988, the political parties of Benazir Bhutto and
Muhammad Mawaz Sharif competed for the formation of coalition governments to lead
Pakistan. Each party’s efforts were marked with ethnic conflict, fragmentation within their
coalitions, corruption and nepotism, which stoked political tensions, created  gridlock, and
contributed to the deterioration of law and order. 
Following the ouster of Prime Minister Sharif in October 1999, Pakistan’s military,
led by President Pervez Musharraf, declared a state of emergency and issued the
provisional constitutional order that suspended the federal and provincial parliaments,
placed the constitution in abeyance, and designated Musharraf as chief executive.
Musharraf’s presidency was extended for five years by referendum in 2004. See Country
Specific Information: Pakistan, supra, at 1. After the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in
September 11, 2001, Pakistan pledged and provided its support to the U.S. in its coalition
efforts to confront  Al Qaida terrorists and Taliban fugitives.  However, since the
successful raid on the Pakistan compound of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, U.S.
relations with Pakistan have deteriorated and become more difficult to manage. (id.) 
Political unrest, human rights,  and travel warnings
Anti-American sentiment is widespread among a coalition of Islamic parties in
Pakistan’s parliament. See Country Specific Information: Pakistan, supra, at 1-7. This
coalition controls approximately 20 per cent of the national assembly (long noted for their
adamant expression of anti-American sentiment against the United States. (Id., at at 1-8)
These groups have called for “jihad” against U.S. interests, which they view as a threat to
Pakistan sovereignty.
Pakistan has extensive terrorist networks operating within its borders. Members of
the Taliban are known to be in the Federally Administered Tribal Aeas (FATA) of Pakistan,
the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and in the Balochistan Province, which borders Iran and
Afghanistan.  Taliban senior leaders continue to enjoy safe haven in Pakistan.  See
Administrative Notice, at 2; Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, Chapter 5-Safe Havens-
Strategies, Tactics, and Tools for Disrupting or Eliminating Safe Havens, supra, at 4. The
leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, has operated openly in Pakistan. See  Transcript of
Interview, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs os Staff, Admiral Mike Mullin, supra, at 1.
Besides the Taliban presence, the FATA region in Pakistan continues to be a vital
sanctuary to al-Qaida and a number of foreign and Pakistan-based extremist groups,
including the Haqqani Network, the Quetta Sura, and Lashkar-e-Tayiba. See   Country
Reports on Terrorism 2011, Chapter 5-Safe Havens-Strategies, Tactics, and Tools for
Disrupting or Eliminating Safe Havens, supra, at 4. al-Qaida and other Afghan extremist
groups exploit that operating environment to plan and direct operations. (id.)
6
Extremist groups operating within Pakistan continue to target Americans and other
western interests, as well as high level Pakistan government officials and members of
minority, indigenous, and religious groups. See Administrative Notice, supra, at 3;
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, supra, at 10.  Despite increased efforts by
Pakistani security forces, al-Qaida terrorists, Afghan militants, foreign insurgents, and
Pakistani militants continue to find safe haven in portions of Pakistan’s FATA, Khyber
Paktunkwa, and Baluchistan, and have operated in those areas to organize, train, and
plan attacks against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan. See Administrative
Notice, supra; Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, Chapter 2 - Country Reports South
and Central Asia Overview, supra, at 1.
The Haqqani Network, an extremist organization operating as a strategic arm of
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, is also operating from Pakistan with
impunity. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, supra. This
group has staged attacks on Afghan and U.S. troops in Afghanistan (as well as civilians),
including the September 13, 2011 attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. (Id.)
On September 7, 2012, the United States formally declared the Haqqani Network a
Foreign Terrorist Network. See U.S. Declares Haqqani Network a Terrorist Organization,
supra, at 1.  
On May 1, 2011, U.S. special forces personnel raided a large al-Qaida compound
located in Pakistan and shot and killed al-Quaida leader Osama bin Laden.  See Press
Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Killing of Osama bin Laden, supra, at 1.
In announcing bin Laden’s death, senior administration officials characterized him as a
“sworn enemy of the United States and a danger to all humanity; a man who called for the
murder of any American anywhere on Earth,” who designated the United states as al-
Quaida’s “primary target,” and who was responsible for killing thousands of innocent men
and women not only on 9/11, but in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, the attack of
the U.S. Cole, and many other acts of brutality. “ (id., at 1-2) That bin Laden was found in
a residential neighborhood of Pakistan is illustrative of the heightened security concern
over Pakistan’s use as a safe haven for terrorists, militants, and insurgents. (id., at 3) 
The U.S. Department of State continues to warn U.S. citizens against non-essential
travel to Pakistan (especially in the border regions) out of concern for terrorist threats in
the country. (Travel Warning, Pakistan, id, at 1-2) In 2011, Pakistan experienced
hundreds of bomb blasts, suicide attacks, and  sectarian violence resulting in the deaths
of more than 2,500 civilians and 670 law enforcement personnel. See Country Reports on
Terrorism 2011, Chapter 2 - Country Reports South and Central Asia Overview, supra, at
12.  Attacks targeting civilians and security personnel occur almost daily across all
provinces. (Id.) These included attacks against the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, U.S.
Government vehicle convoys, and U.S. personnel, and against Pakistani government
authorities. (Travel Warning, Pakistan, supra). Terrorists have demonstrated their
willingness and capability to attack targets where Americans are known to congregate or
visit. (id)   Fatal bomb attacks have occurred in Islamabad, Peshawar, Quetta, Lahore,
and other Pakistan cities on a regular basis. (id., at 3)  Records document, too, that
several American citizens in Pakistan have been kidnaped. (id.)
7
Country reports on Pakistan reveal a poor Pakistani human rights record.  Reported
human rights problems include extrajudicial killings, torture, rape by security forces, lack of
judicial independence, arbitrary arrest and detention, wide-spread corruption,
disappearance and imprisonment of political opponents, and trafficking in women and
children. See 2011 Human Rights Report: Pakistan, supra, at 1-31. Additional problems
include poor prison conditions, arbitrary arrest, widespread government corruption, rape,
honor crimes, and widespread trafficking in persons. (id.) Military and terrorist operations
in all four provinces and in FATA resulted in large numbers of deaths and injuries. (id., at
13)  The Pakistani government also maintains several domestic intelligence services that
monitored politicians, political activists, suspected terrorists, and the media. (id., at 14)
Credible reports document that Pakistani authorities routinely used wiretaps and
intercepted and opened mail without the requisite court approval, as well as monitoring
mobile phones and electronic correspondence. (id.)  
Endorsements
Applicant provided no endorsements or performance evaluations on his behalf.
Nor did he provide any proof of community and civic contributions. His e-QIP reflects his
vocational classes. (Item 4)
Policies
The AGs list guidelines to be used by administrative judges in the decision-making
process covering DOHA cases. These guidelines take into account factors that could
create a potential conflict of interest for the individual applicant, as well as considerations
that could affect the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified
information. These guidelines include "[c]onditions that could raise a security concern and
may be disqualifying” (disqualifying conditions), if any, and many of the "[c]onditions that
could mitigate security concerns.” These guidelines must be considered before deciding
whether or not a security clearance should be granted, continued, or denied. The
guidelines do not require administrative judges to place exclusive reliance on the
enumerated disqualifying and mitigating conditions in the guidelines in arriving at a
decision. Each of the guidelines is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person in
accordance with AG ¶ 2(c). 
In addition to the relevant AGs, administrative judges must take into account the
pertinent considerations for assessing extenuation and mitigation set forth in AG ¶ 2(a) of
the revised AGs, which are intended to assist the judges in reaching a fair and impartial
commonsense decision based upon a careful consideration of the pertinent guidelines
within the context of the whole person. The adjudicative process is designed to examine a
sufficient period of an applicant’s life to enable predictive judgments to be made about
whether the applicant is an acceptable security risk. 
When evaluating an applicant’s conduct, the relevant guidelines are to be
considered together with the following AG ¶ 2(a) factors: (1) the nature, extent, and
seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which
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participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral chances; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.
Viewing the issues raised and evidence as a whole, the following individual
guidelines are pertinent in this case:
Foreign Influence
The Concern: Foreign contacts and interests may be a security
concern if the individual has divided  loyalties or foreign financial interests,
may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization,
or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this
Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which
the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to,
such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk
of terrorism.  (AG ¶ 6)
Burden of Proof
By virtue of the principles and policies framed by the AGs, a decision to grant or
continue an applicant's security clearance may be made only upon a threshold finding
that to do so is clearly consistent with the national interest.  Because the Directive
requires administrative judges to make a commonsense appraisal of the evidence
accumulated in the record, the ultimate determination of an applicant's eligibility for a
security clearance depends, in large part, on the relevance and materiality of that
evidence. See United States, v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-511 (1995).  As with all
adversarial proceedings, the judge may draw only those inferences which have a
reasonable and logical basis from the evidence of record.  Conversely, the judge
cannot draw factual inferences that are grounded on speculation or conjecture.
The Government's initial burden is twofold: (1) it must prove by substantial
evidence any controverted facts alleged in the SOR, and (2) it must demonstrate that
the facts proven have a material bearing to the applicant's eligibility to obtain or
maintain a security clearance. The required materiality showing, however, does not
require the Government to affirmatively demonstrate that the applicant has actually
mishandled or abused classified information before it can deny or revoke a security
clearance. Rather, the judge must consider and weigh the cognizable risks that an
applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information.
Once the Government meets its initial burden of proof of establishing admitted
or controverted facts, the evidentiary burden shifts to the applicant for the purpose of
establishing his or her security worthiness through evidence of refutation, extenuation,
or mitigation.  Based on the requirement of  Exec. Or. 10865 that all security
clearances be clearly consistent with the national interest, the applicant has the
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ultimate burden of demonstrating his or her clearance eligibility. “[S]ecurity-clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” See Department of the
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988). 
Analysis  
Born and raised in Pakistan, Applicant immigrated to the United States in 1997
and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2010.  He married his wife in 1983 and has
three adult children from this marriage. Security concerns focus on Applicant’s  siblings
and extended family members in Pakistan, his contacts with these family members,
and the financial interests he maintains in Pakistan. Cited security concerns about his
working for the Pakistani government prior to immigrating to the United States have
little security significance standing alone. When considered contextually with his
continued ties to family members employed by the Pakistani government, Applicant’s
past government service carries the potential to increase his vulnerability to pressures
exerted by Pakistani authorities on his family members.
By virtue of the Pakistani citizenship and residency status of Applicant’s family
members in Pakistan, the annual contacts he maintains with them, and the money he
remits to them when they are in need, Applicant manifests close working relationships
with his family and an abiding interest in their welfare. Potential heightened security
risks covered by disqualifying condition (DC) ¶ 7(a), “contact with a foreign family
member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of
or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion,” of the AGs for foreign
influence apply to Applicant’s situation.
Three of the brothers that Applicant communicates with are employed by the
Pakistani government. Another brother is a retired teacher who still resides in Pakistan.
As a result, DC ¶ 7(b), “connection to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information,” applies as well. 
The citizenship and residence status of Applicant’s siblings, stepbrother, and
other family members in Pakistan imposes heightened risk because of the political and
economic instability that currently pervades the country. Pakistan’s unsettling political
and economic conditions cannot be fully reconciled with U.S. security interests.
The AGs governing collateral clearances do not dictate per se results or
mandate particular outcomes for applicants with relatives who are citizens/residents of
foreign countries in general. What is considered to be an acceptable risk in one foreign
country may not be in another. While foreign influence cases must by practical
necessity be weighed on a case-by-case basis, guidelines are available for referencing
in the supplied materials and country information about Pakistan. Quite clearly, the
geopolitical aims and policies of the particular foreign regime operating in Pakistan
does matter. 
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Pakistan’s bilateral relations with the United States over the past half-century
have been uneven and sometimes contentious. Pakistan has extensive terrorist
networks operating within its borders. Extremist groups operating within Pakistan
continue to target Americans and other western interests, as well as high level
Pakistan government officials and members of minority, indigenous, and religious
groups. Despite increased efforts by Pakistani security forces, al-Qaida terrorists,
Afghan militants, foreign insurgents, and Pakistani militants continue to find safe haven
in portions of Pakistan’s FATA, Khyber Paktunkwa, and Baluchistan, and have
operated in those areas to organize, train, and plan attacks against the United States
and its allies in Afghanistan.
Based on his case-specific circumstances, neither MC ¶ 8(a), “the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or
the persons or activities of these persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the
individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.,”
nor MC 8(b), “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal,
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the
U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of
the U.S. interest,” are applicable.  Applicant only recently became a naturalized U.S.
citizen and has several brothers residing in Pakistan who work for the Pakistani
government. He has additional family members (e.g., a stepbrother and sisters-in-
laws) who are citizens and residents of Pakistan and property interests in Pakistan that
could place Applicant in a potentially conflicting situation. Not enough is known about
Applicant to facilitate safe predictions about how he would likely respond were he to be
placed in a pressure situation.
MC ¶ 8(c), “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or
exploitation,” has little applicability, too, based on Applicant own reported contacts with
his family members in Pakistan and monetary remittances to Pakistani relatives.
Neither MC ¶ 8(d), “the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government
business or are approved by the cognizant security authority;” MC ¶ 8(e), “the
individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the
reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organizations from
a foreign country,” nor MC ¶ 8(f), “the value or routine nature of the foreign business,
financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and
could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual,”
apply to Applicant’s situation. None of Applicant’s foreign contacts in Pakistan
embrace U.S. business or routine business or financial interests. And there is no proof
of any prior self-reporting of his family contacts in Pakistan to warrant any more than
minimal consideration.  
Whole-person assessment cannot minimize Applicant’s exposure to conflicts of
interests with his Pakistani family members. In Applicant’s case, the potential risk of
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coercion, pressure, or influence being brought to bear on him and his identified family
members in Pakistan are still too substantial to absolve him of security concerns.  
Overall, any potential security concerns attributable to Applicant's relations with
his brothers and other family members residing in Pakistan are insufficiently mitigated
to permit safe predictive judgments about Applicant's ability to withstand risks of undue
influence attributable to his familial relationships in Pakistan. Neither his own
citizenship and residence in the United State nor those of his siblings and other family
members in Pakistan are safely insulated from risks of coercion, pressure, or influence
by Pakistani authorities or terrorists. Unfavorable conclusions warrant with respect to
the allegations covered by sub-paragraphs 1.a, 1.b, and 1.d through 1.j of Guideline B.
Favorable conclusions are warranted with respect to sub-paragraph 1.c.
Formal Findings
In reviewing the allegations of the SOR and ensuing conclusions reached in the
context of the findings of fact, conclusions, conditions, and the factors listed above, I
make the following formal findings:
GUIDELINE B (FOREIGN INFLUENCE):    AGAINST APPLICANT            
                                          
           Subparas. 1.a, 1.b, and 1.d through 1.j:    Against Applicant 
Subpara.  1.c:               For Applicant
Conclusions
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security
clearance.  Clearance is denied.
                                          
Roger C. Wesley
Administrative Judge 
                                        
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