1
 
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 12-01830
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Candace L. Garcia, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se  
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, Applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
Statement of the Case
Applicant completed and certified an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations
Processing (e-QIP) on August 10, 2011. The Department of Defense (DOD) issued
Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on September 4, 2012, detailing security
concerns under Guideline B, Foreign Influence, and Guideline C, Foreign Preference.
The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines For
Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (AG) implemented on
September 1, 2006. 
 
2
Applicant received the SOR on September 20, 2012, and she answered it on
September 25, 2012. Applicant requested a hearing before an administrative judge with
the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). Department Counsel was
prepared to proceed on November 7, 2012. DOHA assigned this case to another judge
on November 8, 2012. DOHA reassigned the case assignment to me on January 7,
2013. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on February 14, 2013, and I convened the
hearing as scheduled on February 27, 2013. The Government offered exhibits (GE)
marked as GE 1 and GE 2. GE 1 was received and admitted into evidence without
objection. Applicant objected to GE 2 on the grounds it contained incorrect information.
Initially, GE 2 was admitted subject to corrections. Applicant testified. She submitted
exhibits (AE) marked as AE A through AE P, which were received and admitted into
evidence without objection. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on March 12,
2013. I held the record open until March 21, 2013, for Applicant to submit additional
matters. Applicant timely submitted AE Q - AE Z, which were received and admitted
without objection. The record closed on March 21, 2013.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Notice
Applicant received the notice of the date, time and place of the hearing less than
15 days before the hearing date. I advised Applicant of her right under ¶ E3.1.8 of the
Directive to receive the notice 15 days before the hearing. Applicant affirmatively waived
this right under the directive. (Tr. 9.)       
Evidentiary ruling
 Applicant objected to the admission of GE 2 as written. She argued that the
document contained incorrect statements. Applicant provided clear and specific
testimony about the errors in this document. Her major concerns related to the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) investigator’s written summary about Applicant’s
business trips to foreign countries. Throughout the interview summary, the OPM
investigator identified a number of business trips to foreign countries by Applicant. The
OPM investigator then indicated that Applicant did not have any contact with foreign
nationals on these trips except for family members. Applicant’s business trips were to
countries many miles from India, where her family lives. She did have contacts with
foreign nationals on these trips, but did not have any contact with family members
because no family members lived in these countries. All statements in GE 2 which
indicated that Applicant had no contact with foreign nationals while on business trips,
but did have contact with family members are corrected to reflect that Applicant had
contact with foreign nationals and not with family members. The statement on page 4,
last paragraph in GE 2, which reflects that Applicant had an active Indian passport, is
corrected to show that Applicant‘s Indian passport had been cancelled as she told the
OPM investigator. On page two of GE 2, the spelling of Applicant’s mother’s name is
corrected, and on page one, the last number for her passport number is deleted as it is
extraneous. The reference on page 4, paragraph 2 of GE 2 is corrected to reflect a
Tr. 12-26.1
W hen  SOR allegations are controverted, the Government bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient2
to prove controverted allegations. Directive, ¶ E3.1.14. “That burden has two components. First, the
Government must establish by substantial evidence that the facts and events alleged in the SOR indeed took
place. Second, the Government must establish a nexus between the existence of the established facts and
events and a legitimate security concern.” See ISCR Case No. 07-18525 at 4 (App. Bd. Feb. 18, 2009),
(concurring and dissenting, in part) (citations omitted). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection
between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See
ISCR Case No. 08-06605 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 4, 2010); ISCR Case No. 08-07290 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 17,
2009).
SOR ¶ 2.b references SOR ¶¶ 1.c and 1.d. Applicant admitted 1.c, but denied 1.d. See response to SOR.3
GE 1; Tr. 37.4
3
savings account, not a retirement account, as Applicant remembered telling the OPM
investigator that it was a savings account for retirement. Finally, Applicant denied saying
that this savings account is like social security. Following these corrections, GE 2 was
admitted without objection. After a final review, Applicant noted that the statement that
she has contact with one brother once every two years when she visits India is not fully
correct. In addition to these contacts, Applicant has contact with this brother by email or
telephone at the same frequency as she has contact with her other siblings.1
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to India. The request was not admitted into evidence, but was
included in the record as Hearing Exhibit 1. The facts administratively noticed will be
limited to matters of general knowledge and matters not subject to reasonable dispute,
and are set out in the Findings of Fact below. 
Findings of Fact
In her Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a -
1.c of the SOR. Her admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. She denied
the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.d and 2.a of the SOR.  She neither denied nor admitted2
the factual allegation in allegation 2.b of the SOR, which is deemed denied.  After a3
complete and thorough review of the evidence of record, I make the following findings of
fact.  
Applicant, who is 47 years old, works as a consulting technical manager for a
Department of Defense contractor. She began working for her employer in August 1999
as a senior applications manager and transferred to her present position in August
2007.4
Applicant was born and raised in India. She obtained her bachelor’s and master’s
degrees at universities in India. She immigrated to the United States in 1997 and
GE 1; Tr. 37.5
GE 1; AE A; AE B; AE H; AE Q; Tr. 42, 82-86.6
AE C - AE F; AE H; Tr. 38-42, 82-92.7
GE 2; Tr. 61, 73-81.8
4
became a U.S. citizen in 2008. She is single, enjoys outdoor activities, and performs
volunteer activities.5
After she became a U.S. citizen in 2008, Applicant obtained a U.S. passport. At
this time, she held an Indian passport. She presented her Indian passport to the Indian
Consulate General’s office shortly after she became a U.S. citizen. Since India does not
recognized dual citizenship, the Consulate General’s office cancelled her Indian
passport because she acquired U.S. nationality. Applicant surrendered her cancelled
Indian passport to her security officer on March 1, 2012. He continues to retain
possession of it. She cannot obtain another Indian passport, unless she gives up her
U.S. citizenship.6
Under the Indian Citizenship Act of 1955, Section 7A, India allows the
Government of India to register any person as an overseas citizen of India, if the
individual was a citizen of India. The law specifically states that an overseas citizen is
not a citizen of India and is not entitled to the rights conferred on citizens of India. It
creates certain rights for overseas citizens, including the right to a lifelong visa for entry
into India. Applicant, as a U.S. citizen, applied for Indian overseas citizen status around
March 1, 2008. India granted her a six-month, multiple-entry visa effective from March
3, 2008 until September 3, 2008. India provided her with overseas citizenship and
issued a Certificate of Registration on July 8, 2009. On this date, India also gave her a
lifelong, multiple-entry visa. Her U.S. passport contains an overseas citizen visa stamp.7
Applicant’s mother, three brothers, and two sisters are citizens and residents of
India. Her father is deceased. Her 78-year-old mother has never worked and is a
homemaker. Her mother receives 50% of her father’s pension. Applicant does not know
the source of this pension. Her three brothers, ages  54, 51, and 48, and two sisters,
ages 60 and 56, are married. One sister teaches in a private school, and her husband
works for the Indian government in administrative services. The other sister teaches at a
university in India, and her husband retired from a state operated bank about a year
ago. Applicant does not know if this brother-in-law receives a pension from the Indian
government. One brother is self-employed as a business technical developer and a
second brother works as a software documentation writer. Neither of these brothers are
government employees. One brother’s wife is a homemaker, and the other brother’s
wife works as a teacher in Singapore. Applicant has email contact with one nephew,
who is a software engineer in private industry and some contact with a niece who lives
in London. Applicant sees her family members every two years, when she visits India.
She also has telephone and computer contact with her family members.  8
GE 2; AE O; AE P; AE S; AE T; Tr. 58-59, 72-73, 92-93.9
AE R; Tr. 61 -72.10
5
Applicant’s oldest brother, a marine engineer, retired prematurely from the Indian
Navy on October 31, 2012 at the rank of commodore, which is not a flag officer rank. He
is currently receiving a pension. Because of his rank, the Indian Navy required him to
request permission to work in commercial industry, if he obtained employment within
one year of retirement. Applicant’s brother accepted a position as an Asia, Academia
and Industry Interface Coordinator within commercial industry two weeks after his
retirement. As required, he applied for permission to accept this position and permission
was given conditioned upon his not working for marketing or as a liaison with the
defense establishment. His new employer provides global independent risk
management and safety assurance to the energy and transportation sectors of industry.
Applicant does not believe her brother’s new position shows a conflict between the
military and commercial industry. This brother is aware that Applicant has applied for a
security clearance, but her other family members are not aware of her application for a
security clearance, only that she works with computers.9
Applicant’s mother owns a multiple unit house, which is valued at $277,778. Her
mother lives in one of the units in the house. Her mother is the ultimate decision maker
on who inherits the house. At the present, Applicant understands that she and her five
siblings will inherit equally. They talk about rebuilding the house into six units. Applicant
has not ruled out returning to India in 10 or 20 years. She has no immediate or short-
range plans to return to India. Applicant and her siblings established a fixed deposit
bank account for their mother in the 1990s. They each made a one-time contribution to
the account when they established it. Her mother takes about $60 to $80 a month from
the account, which has a current balance of approximately $12,000. Applicant does not
regularly contribute, nor has she regularly contributed, to this account. She provides her
mother with $200 or $300 when she visits every two years.10
Applicant is not entitled to any benefits from the Indian government nor does she
receive any form of benefit from the Indian government. She does own three bank
accounts in India. Under a statute created in 1968, Applicant opened a savings-cum-
tax-savings account, which can serve as a retirement planning tool. The law provides
that a depositor cannot withdraw the full amount of money deposited until 15 years after
the account was opened. The law also provides that up to 50% of the account balance
at the end of year four may be withdrawn prematurely. A minimum yearly deposit of $10
is required to maintain the account and until recently, the maximum deposit per year
was $1,400. The current maximum yearly deposit is $2,000. The interest rate on this
account is set by the Government of India, but the Government does not deposit any
money to the account. Applicant opened this account in 1994, when she was working
and living in India. She has made periodic deposits to the account, which now has an
approximate balance of $5,200. She has not withdrawn any money from this account,
GE 2; AE K - AE N; Tr. 42-48, 95–103.11
The account reflects that the tax paid at any one time is less than $18.  AE J.12
GE 2; AE I; AE J; Tr. 48-55.13
AE U - AE Z; Tr. 55-57, 103-104.14
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but she can withdraw her money in 2014. This account is not [emphasis supplied]
similar to social security. The purpose of this account is tax savings, not retirement.11
Applicant owned three other accounts in India. She closed one account on her
November 2012 trip to India. The closed account has a balance of approximately
$3,000, which she gave to a nephew. Applicant opened an account in February 2001,
which has a current balance of approximately $5,000. She opened a second account in
December 2004, which has a current balance of approximately $3,000. The money in
this account is taxed by the Indian government.  She was still an Indian citizen when12
she opened these accounts. She keeps these accounts as a convenience because it is
easier than transferring money to India when she travels. She uses the money in these
accounts when she visits India. Occasionally and on special occasions such as her
birthday, one of her brothers will put some money into one of these accounts, usually
less than $100.13
Applicant has six accounts in the United States. One savings account has a
balance of $130,500 and the second savings account has an balance of $17,000. She
also has a 401k account valued at approximately $676,500, including $180,800 in stock
options. She has a brokerage account with approximately $61,000. She has two
checking and savings accounts combinations. One account has an approximate
balance of $4,000, and the other account has a balance of approximately $221,000.
Applicant does not own property in the United States or in India. Her smaller checking
and savings account reflects a monthly net income of nearly $9,000 from her
employment.14
I take administrative notice of the following facts. India is the largest democratic
country in the world. Like the U.S., India is committed to political freedom protected by a
representative government. The U.S. and India share a common interest in the free flow
of commerce and resources, in fighting terrorism, and in creating a strategically stable
Asia. Although the two countries differed over India’s nuclear weapons program and the
pace of economic reforms in India, the U.S. views India as a growing world power with
which it shares common strategic interests. Because of their strong partnership, the
U.S. and India enjoy a very active working relationship on many issues, including
terrorism, space, and nuclear weapons. The U.S. has authorized the sales of certain
arms to India. India is a collector of economic information and maintains a positive
relationship with Iran. The Government contends that India seeks to obtain proprietary
information by violating U.S. export laws and references specific cases, but does not
There is no evidence that the Government of India was involved in, or sanctioned, the criminal activity15
mentioned in the Government’s brief. 
HE 1; AE G.16
7
provide any detailed information about these cases.  The Government of India15
generally respects the rights of its citizens, although some serious human rights
problems remain. The Indian government does not support or sponsor terrorism or
terrorist organizations. However, several terrorist organizations, including Harkat-ul-
Jihad-i-Islam, Harakat ul-Mujahidin, Indian Mujahideen, Haish-e-Mohammed, and
Lashkar-e Tayyiba, and insurgent groups continue to operate, particularly in the
northeast areas along the Pakistan and China borders. Several of these areas are
designated “restricted areas” by the Indian government and require special permission
to visit. Applicant’s family lives many hundreds of miles from these restricted areas.16
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” An
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
8
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and
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(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation.
Applicant’s mother, three brothers, and two sisters are citizens and residents of
India. One brother, a marine biologist, prematurely retired from the Indian Navy at the
rank of Commodore. Applicant maintains a normal familial relationship with her mother
and siblings in India. She talks with them by telephone regularly and visits them in India
every two years. She does not provide regular financial support for her mother;
however, she helped fund a savings account for her mother in the 1990s and gives her
mother a few hundred dollars when she visits India. She also maintains three bank
accounts in India. Her family relationships are not per se a reason to deny Applicant a
security clearance, but her contacts with her family members must be considered in
deciding whether to grant Applicant a clearance. The Government must establish that
these family relationships create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion by terrorists or would create a potential conflict of
interest between her obligations to protect sensitive information and her desire to help
her family members by providing that information. 
In determining if such a risk exists, I must look at Applicant’s relationships and
contacts with her family, as well as the activities of the Government of India and of
terrorist organizations within India’s borders. The risk that an applicant could be
targeted for manipulation or induced into compromising classified information is real, not
theoretical. Applicant’s relationship and contacts with her family in India raise a
heightened risk and a security concern because significant terrorism activities occur
within the borders of India. The evidence of record fails to show that the Indian
Government targets U.S. citizens in the United States or in India by exploiting,
manipulating, pressuring, or coercing them to obtain protected information. Thus, the
concern that the Indian Government will seek classified information is moderate. The
Government has not provided documentary evidence showing that the Government of
India violates U.S. laws, by seeking and shipping controlled goods without proper
licenses to India, nor is there information that any such incidents alleged involved
classified information. 
Under the guideline, the potentially conflicting loyalties must be weighed to
determine if an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of U.S.
interests. In determining if Applicant’s contacts in India cause security concerns, I
considered that India  and the United States have a strong relationship, which includes
working together on international security issues and trade. There is no evidence that
the Indian Government targets U.S. citizens for protected information  The human rights
issues in India, while improving, and terrorist activities continue to be a concern. While
none of these considerations by themselves dispose of the issue, they are all factors to
be considered in determining Applicant’s vulnerability to pressure or coercion because
of her family and bank accounts in India. Applicant’s contacts with her family and the
10
bank accounts raise a heightened risk under AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b) and a concern under
AG ¶ 7(e).
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not 
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
While she has lived in the United States for over 15 years and abandoned her
Indian citizenship to become a citizen of the United States, Applicant still has close ties
with her family members in India. She travels home every two years, and in between
visits, she communicates periodically with her family members. Her elderly mother has
always been a homemaker and does not have ties with the Indian government. Two of
her brothers work in private industry, do not have contacts with the Indian government,
and are not involved in activities which would raise the interests of the Indian
government. Her two sisters teach, one at a private school and one at a university. The
husband of one works for the Indian government, but Applicant has no idea what work
he performs. Her sisters’ teaching positions are academic related, not government
related. The contacts and activities of her mother, two brothers, and two sisters in India
do not involve the Indian government. Their normal daily lives and activities in India are
unlikely to place Applicant in a position of having to choose between the interests of the
United States and the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or
government. Applicant voluntarily chose to give up her Indian citizenship when she
decided to become a U.S. citizen.  Most of her assets are in the United Sates, where
she has worked and lived for more than 15 years. Her decisions reflect her loyalty to the
United States and not to India. Thus, she can be expected to resolve any conflict of
interest in favor of the United States.
Applicant’s older brother recently retired after many years of active duty in the
Indian Navy. While he never achieved the rank of a flag officer, he retired as a senior
officer. His new employment concerns risk management in the energy and
transportation industry and utilizes his marine engineering and Navy experience as well
11
as his knowledge of Asia. His new employment does not relate to the Indian defense
establishment, and while his military experience would be a concern if he was still on
active duty, his new employment focuses on a career in a new and different industry,
utilizing his management skills learned as a naval officer. Applicant has mitigated the
security concerns raised by her family members in India under AG ¶¶ 8 (a) and (b).
Applicant’s three bank accounts in India are not a security concern because the
money in these accounts totals less than $15,000. Her financial assets in the United
States total more than $1,000,000, making it highly unlikely that she could be subject to
coercion or pressure because of the money in India or a need for money. Applicant
placed the money in these accounts, not the Government of India, for her convenience
or as a tax savings. She can withdraw the money from two accounts at any time and the
money from the third account in 2014. This money is not part of a specific retirement
account and is not controlled by the Government of India. She does not and will not
receive any benefits from the Indian government in the future. She has mitigated the
security concerns about her bank accounts In India under AG ¶ 8(f). 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
Under AG ¶ 9 the security concern involving foreign preference arises, “[W]hen
an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over
the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make
decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.”
AG ¶ 10 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member.  This includes but is not limited to:
(1) possession of a current foreign passport; and
(3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social
welfare, or other such benefits from a foreign country.
Applicant maintained a valid Indian passport until she became a U.S. citizen in
2008. When she became a U.S. citizen, she gave up her Indian citizenship as India
does not recognize dual citizenship. Given the lack of dual citizenship, the Indian
Consulate General invalidated her passport in 2008, issued her a temporary visa, and
eventually gave her a certificate of overseas citizenship which allowed her to obtain a
lifelong visa for entry into India. Since Appellant showed that her passport had been
invalidated in 2008, the Government did not establish her possession of a current
foreign passport under AG ¶ 10(a)(1). Because Applicant has three active bank
accounts in India, the Government established that she received a benefit from a
foreign country under AG ¶ 10(a)(2).
12
AG ¶ 11 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship;
(c) exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship
occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the
individual was a minor; and
(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant
security authority, or otherwise invalidated.
Applicant opened her three bank accounts before she became a U.S. citizen. By
law, she cannot withdraw the money in one account until 2014. The other two accounts
are kept for convenience. The accounts give her easy access to money when she visits
India. These accounts are very small in comparison to her assets in the United States.
Her overseas certificate of citizenship and lifelong visa provides her with no rights of
citizenship. The United States marked her U.S. passport with a stamp, which
acknowledges her certificate and visa status. She has mitigated any concern about
these accounts under AG ¶ 11(c).
Even if I found that Applicant had an active passport, she would have mitigated
any security concerns because she turned her passport into her security office in 2012.
In addition, when she decided to become a U.S. citizen, she made a decision to
renounce her Indian citizenship. The only way for her to regain her Indian passport is to
renounce her U.S. citizenship and obtain Indian citizenship. AG ¶¶ 11(b) and 11(e)
apply.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. The decision to grant or
13
deny a security clearance requires a careful weighing of all relevant factors, both
favorable and unfavorable. In so doing, an administrative judge must review all the
evidence of record, not a single item in isolation, to determine if a security concern is
established and then whether it is mitigated. A determination of an applicant’s eligibility
for a security clearance should not be made as punishment for specific past conduct,
but on a reasonable and careful evaluation of all the evidence of record to decide if a
nexus exists between established facts and a legitimate security concern. 
The evidence in support of granting a security clearance to Applicant under the
whole-person concept is more substantial than the evidence in support of denial. In
reaching a conclusion, I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating
conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant
maintains strong connections with her family in India. She visits them every two years,
and in between, she talks with various family members by telephone or communicates
with them by email. Despite her family relationships, she made a decision over 15 years
ago to leave her family and move to the United States. She has established a home for
herself in the United States and has steadily worked for a U.S. company for many
years. After 10 years in the United States, she applied for U.S. citizenship, knowing that
she would lose her Indian citizenship and her rights as an Indian citizen. She has
accumulated significant assets in the United States, not in India. Her three small bank
accounts located in India are insufficient to place her in a position of vulnerability to
future exploitation or coercion. She may inherit one-sixth of the house in which her
mother now lives. Her share of this house equates to just over $46,000 which is less
than 5% of her overall net worth. Again, her inheritance is not likely to place her in a
position of conflict. Her decisions to move to the United States and abandon her India
citizenship reflect her choice to be loyal to the United States and to resolve any conflicts
in favor of the United States.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I
conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from her foreign influence
and foreign preference under Guidelines B and C.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
14
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge