Consisting of the transcript (Tr.), Government exhibits (GE) 1-2, and hearing exhibits (HE) I-II.1
DoD acted under the 9 April 1993 memorandum of agreement between the Composite Health Care System2
Program Office (CHCSPO), DOHA, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (ASD C I) for DOHA to conduct trustworthiness determinations for3
contractor personnel employed in Information Systems Positions as defined in DoD Regulation 5200.2-R,
Personnel Security Program (Regulation), dated January 1987. ADP cases are adjudicated under the policies
and procedures established by DoD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance
Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive) and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated
by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the DoD for SORs issued after September 1,
2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
 )       ADP Case No. 12-03286
)
Applicant for Public Trust Position )
Appearances
For Government: Tovah A. Minster, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
Based on the record in this case,  I grant Applicant’s trustworthiness1
determination.
On 5 December 2012, the Department of Defense (DoD) sent Applicant a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing trustworthiness concerns under Guideline B,
Foreign Influence.  Applicant timely answered the SOR, requesting a hearing before the2
Through administrative oversight, the SOR failed to inform Applicant of the correct authority for the DoD’s3
action. I corrected that shortcoming at hearing (Tr. 60-66), and, because the adjudicative guidelines are
identical for clearance and trustworthiness determinations, continued the hearing to its conclusion.
Based on Applicant’s answer, Department Counsel withdrew the original SOR 1.b and replaced it with the4
substantive allegations in SOR 1.c, slightly modified to clarify Applicant’s relationship to the foreign persons
(Tr. 11-12).
2
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). DOHA assigned the case to me 12
February 2013, and I convened a hearing 11 April 2013.  DOHA received the transcript3
18 April 2013.
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the allegations of the SOR 1.a, but denied the allegations of
SOR 1.b.  She is a 26-year-old consultant employed by a defense contractor since4
October 2008. She has not previously had a trustworthiness determination, but had
interim access granted in December 2008 and May 2009, on different contracts with her
current employer.
Applicant was born in India in February 1987, and immigrated to the U.S. with
her parents and older brother shortly thereafter. Their purpose was to obtain legal
permanent resident (LPR) status for themselves, but particularly for their children
because of the educational opportunities available in the U.S. The family obtained LPR
status in 1991. They moved to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where Applicant’s
father ran a perfume business. Her mother was a homemaker, occasionally helping with
the business.
From August 2000 to May 2004, Applicant attended highschool in the UAE. After
graduating from highschool, Applicant returned to the U.S. to attend college, from which
she graduated in August 2008. In November 2009, Applicant became a naturalized U.S.
citizen, and obtained her U.S. passport. Her brother is also a naturalized U.S. citizen.
India does not recognize dual citizenship, and Applicant states she renounced her
Indian citizenship when she became a U.S. citizen.
Applicant had typical college employments during her school years, including an
internship, but was unemployed after the internship ended in December 2007, through
her graduation, until she obtained her current job in October 2008. When Applicant first
got her job, her employment site was more than two hours’ drive from her home.
Consequently, from October 2008 to December 2009, she resided with two old family
friends from India who lived much closer to her work. Applicant has known the husband
all of her life, as he was good friends with her parents. She got to know the wife through
the husband. They were residing in the U.S. because the husband was on a diplomatic
assignment to the Indian embassy. His wife was a professor at an Indian university.
During her time in the U.S., she did some contract work for the World Bank. They
returned to India in October 2010. She resumed her job at the university; he is
3
employed by the Indian government. Applicant speaks to them infrequently by
telephone, and visits them if she is in India.
Applicant’s parents are citizens of India, residing in the UAE, where they run a
perfume business. As mentioned above, they are also LPRs of the U.S. Her father’s
business connections are largely in Italy and France, although he hopes to expand his
business to the U.S. They also plan to return to the U.S when they retire. Neither of
them have ever had any connection to the Indian government.
Applicant reported her foreign relatives as required on her clearance application
(GE 1). She discussed her contacts with her foreign relations extensively during a
subject interview in January 2011 (GE 2). She usually visits her parents in the UAE
once a year in December, and they visit her in the U.S. at least once a year. She
speaks with them regularly by telephone. Their business is self-sustaining, and she
does not provide them with any financial support. She has no financial or property
interests in either India or the UAE. What financial interests she has are in the U.S.
India is a stable multiparty federal, democratic republic with a bicameral
parliament and a population of about 1.21 billion. The central government has broad
administrative powers in relation to its states. The Indian government generally respects
the rights of its citizens. Recent elections have been free and fair, despite scattered
instances of violence. India has a vibrant civil society, free press, and a robust
democratic political system. Yet, endemic government and police corruption, caste-
based discrimination, and domestic violence and other abuses against women and
children persist, despite criminal penalties for violations and government efforts to
implement programs designed to empower members of the lower castes. Police and
security forces often act with impunity, and serious abuses have been reported in
criminal investigations and efforts to suppress domestic terrorism. Separatist and
terrorist groups remain active in areas of conflict. Because of these threats to safety, the
U.S. State Department has advised U.S. citizens to practice good security when in
India, and to avoid travel to areas of domestic conflict and to the India-Pakistan border. 
 
India’s size, population, and strategic location give it a prominent voice in
international affairs. India remains a leader of the developing world and of the Non-
Aligned Movement. Long a member of the United Nations, the country has a non-
permanent seat on the Security Council in 2011-2012, and seeks a permanent seat on
the Council. It has long participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and has
committed $1.3 billion to Afghan reconstruction efforts. The rapidly growing software
sector in India is boosting service exports and modernizing the country’s economy,
although excessive regulatory and bureaucratic structures and corruption present
obstacles to growth. The United States, India’s largest investment partner, strongly
supports the market reforms undertaken by India since 1991 and urges further
liberalization of trade and investment barriers. Foreign assistance was about $3 billion in
2006-2007, with the United States providing about $126 million in development
assistance.
4
Since 2000, India has been listed as actively engaged in economic intelligence
collection and industrial espionage directed at the United States. However, there is no
evidence that India then or now tortures or abuses its citizens to extract economic
intelligence. The United States has also had longstanding economic issues with India
regarding protection of intellectual property rights and trade in dual-use technology.
Differences between the United States and India still exist over India’s nuclear weapons
programs, the slow pace of India’s economic reforms due to inadequate infrastructure,
cumbersome bureaucracy, corruption, labor market rigidity, and regulatory and foreign
investment controls, and India’s bilateral strategic partnership with Iran.
At the same time, these differences no longer dominate the United States’
attitude toward India. The United States recognizes India as key to strategic interests.
Since 2002, the United States and India have held increasingly substantive combined
exercises involving all military services. Both countries are committed to political
freedom protected by representative government, and share common interests in the
free flow of commerce, in fighting terrorism, and in creating a strategically stable Asia.
The Bush and Obama administrations have been committed to establishing a strong,
dynamic partnership with India. In June 2005, the two countries signed a ten-year
defense pact outlining planned collaboration in multilateral operations, expanded two-
way defense trade and increasing technology transfer opportunities. In July 2007, the
United States and India reached a historic milestone in their strategic partnership by
completing negotiations on a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. In
July 2009, the Obama Administration launched a “Strategic Dialogue” calling for
collaboration on energy, trade, education, and counterterrorism issues. Major U.S. arms
sales to India are underway. In 2009, India signed a $2.1 billion deal to purchase eight
surveillance aircraft from a U.S. manufacturer, setting a new record for the largest-ever
U.S. arms transfer to India. During a recent visit to India in June 2012, Secretary of
Defense Panetta cited the strong, strategic, increasingly collaborative, and transparent
relationship between the two countries as the foundation for a new defense strategy
guiding the U.S.’ military rebalance in the Asia-Pacific region. He called for already
strong mutual participation in military exercises to become more regular and complex.
As evidence of the U.S.’ commitment to providing the best defense technology possible
to India, Secretary Panetta pointed to work by the Obama Administration to reform
export controls. He called for India to modernize its own regulations in defense
procurement and nuclear liability legislation.
Policies
The adjudicative guidelines (AG) list factors for evaluating a person’s suitability
for access to sensitive information. Administrative judges must assess disqualifying and
mitigating conditions under each issue fairly raised by the facts and situation presented.
Each decision must also reflect a fair, impartial, and commonsense consideration of the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). Any one disqualifying or mitigating condition is not, by itself,
conclusive. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a case
can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing access to
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).5
AG ¶ 6.6
AG ¶ 7 (a).7
5
sensitive information. Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence as a whole,
the relevant adjudicative guideline is Guideline B (Foreign Influence).
Trustworthiness decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s access to sensitive information. The
Government must prove, by substantial evidence, controverted facts alleged in the
SOR. If it does,  the burden shifts to applicant to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the
Government’s case. Because no one has a right to access sensitive information, the
applicant bears a heavy burden of persuasion.
Persons with access to sensitive information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the Government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the Government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.5
Analysis
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an applicant’s foreign contacts and
interests may raise security concerns if the individual 1) has divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests, 2) may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way contrary to U.S. interests, or 3) is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign influence adjudications can and
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located—including, but not limited to, whether the country is known
to target U.S. citizens to obtain sensitive information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.  Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications for access to sensitive information6
requires careful assessment of both the foreign entity’s willingness and ability to target
sensitive information, and to target ex-patriates who are U.S. citizens to obtain that
information, and the individual’s susceptibility to influence, whether negative or positive.
More specifically, an individual’s contacts with foreign family members (or other foreign
entities or persons) raise trustworthiness concerns only if those contacts create a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion.  Further, trustworthiness concerns may arise through connections to a foreign7
person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest
between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the
individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that
AG ¶ 7 (b).8
AG ¶ 7 (e).9
AG ¶ 7 (f).10
6
information.  In addition, security concerns may be raised by a substantial business,8
financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-
operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign
influence or exploitation.  Finally, failure to report, where required, association with a9
foreign national may raise trustworthiness concerns.10
Concerning potential mitigating factors, AG ¶ 8.(a), “the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or
the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the
individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.,”
largely mitigates the Applicant’s circumstances regarding India.
While the ongoing risk of terrorist activity by rogue elements in India raises safety
issues addressed by U.S. Government travel warnings, there is no evidence that
terrorist elements use violence as a means of obtaining sensitive information. Similarly,
the Indian government and companies are active collectors of such information, but
there is no evidence that they use coercive means or target ex-patriate citizens or
former citizens to obtain this information. Further, India is not known to target the kind of
data processing information Applicant is expected to have access to.
Applicant has ongoing contact with her parents in the UAE. The Government
asserted no security concerns relating to the UAE. Further, while Applicant’s parents
remain Indian citizens, they also remain LPRs of the U.S., where they plan to immigrate
eventually. They have never had any connection to the Indian government, and it is
difficult to imagine how India could influence Applicant through her parents in the UAE.
 
Applicant’s contacts with her family friends are mitigated by AG ¶ 8.(c), “contact
or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that, there is little
likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. It is over two
years since Applicant lived with them, and they are no longer in a position to influence
Applicant’s actions.
A heightened risk of undue foreign influence may also be mitigated under AG ¶
8.(b), where “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal,
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest.” Applicant’s sense of loyalty or obligation to her parents cannot be
characterized as “so minimal” for the same reasons that her contacts cannot be
7
considered “casual and infrequent.” Yet, there is no similar sense of loyalty to a foreign
group, government, or country. Further, her parents live in the UAE, they intend to
return to the U.S. once their time in the UAE is over, and India is not known to seek
sensitive information through coercive means—and in any event does not appear to
target data processing information like Applicant will have access to.
After considering all the facts and circumstances, I find it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a public trust position. Accordingly, I
resolve Guideline B for Applicant.
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT 
Subparagraphs a-b: For Applicant
Conclusion
Under the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue eligibility for a public trust
position for Applicant. Eligibility for a public trust position granted.
                                               
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge