1
                                                                     
                              DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 12-04799
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Braden M. Murphy, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant was born and raised in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). His
mother, father, brother, and in-laws are resident citizens there and he visits annually.
His father and brother are members of the Chinese Communist Party. He is a loyal and
dedicated son, and an outstanding employee, but failed to mitigate resulting security
concerns. Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for
access to classified information is denied. 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SF 86) on September 9,
2009. On September 11, 2012, the Department of Defense issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign
Influence). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines for
Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information effective within the
Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. 
AR; AE A.1
GE 2 and GE 3.2
GE 1; GE 2; AR.3
2
Applicant answered the SOR in writing (AR) on October 6, 2012, and requested
a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed
on November 9, 2012, and the case was assigned to me on November 28, 2012. DOHA
issued a Notice of Hearing on December 10, 2012, setting the case for January 22,
2013. Due to the need to briefly continue an unrelated case originally scheduled for the
same date, DOHA issued an Amended Notice of Hearing on January 8, 2013, and I
convened the hearing, as rescheduled, on January 24, 2013. The Government offered
exhibits (GE) 1 through 3, which were admitted without objection. The Government also
offered a request that I take administrative notice of facts concerning the PRC, and
documents in support of that request. Applicant disputed the likelihood of inferences
that could be drawn from the facts in the administrative notice request, but had no
objection to the accuracy of those facts during or after the hearing, and I granted the
request. Applicant offered exhibits (AE) A and B, which were admitted without objection
by Department Counsel, and Applicant testified on his own behalf. His office manager
also testified for him. On January 25, 2013, Applicant submitted additional evidence to
which Department Counsel did not object. This evidence was marked AE C and
admitted. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on February 6, 2013.
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the truth of all the factual allegations in the SOR, with
extensive explanations.  Applicant’s admissions, including those contained in his two1
affidavits to an investigator from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM),  are2
incorporated in the following findings.
Applicant is a 58-year-old employee of a defense contractor, where he has
worked as a software engineer since August 2009. He has never held a security
clearance and has no military service. He completed a bachelor’s degree and worked
for several years for the government as a natural resources research assistant in China,
where he was born and raised. In the late 1980s, he moved to the United States with a
student visa and scholarship. He completed two master’s degrees in Geography and
Computer Science at different universities. Due to his disgust with the corruption of the
Chinese government, and his absence of hope for reform after the 1989 Tiananmen
Square massacre, he decided not to return to live in China. Applicant and his wife, who
were married in China before immigrating and have no children, became naturalized
U.S. citizens in 1999. She worked for the government as a secretary and a teacher in
China during the late 1970s and early 1980s before she came to the United States to
join her husband.  3
AR; AE A; AE B; GE 1; GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 55, 58, 72-73, 90-93.4
AR; AE A; AE B; GE 2; Tr. 69-71, 73-76, 97-98.5
AR; AE B; GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 76, 94-95.6
3
Applicant’s elderly parents and his wife’s elderly parents are citizens and
residents of the PRC. They worked for the Chinese government in non-defense-related
jobs, and have been retired and living off of Chinese government pensions for many
years. Both of Applicant’s parents are ill, and he consolidates his vacation and holiday
time from work to visit China to help with their care for an extended visit once per year.
During such visits, he and his wife also visit her family. His brother, who is also a
resident citizen of China, takes care of their parents during the rest of the year.
Applicant regularly sends his brother money to help care for their parents, and honors
the Chinese cultural tradition that children should care for and protect their elderly
parents to the best of their ability. He communicates regularly with his brother about
their parent’s well being. His brother is a mechanical engineer and works for a foreign-
owned private company in China. Applicant’s wife has also sent substantial sums to her
parents.  4
Applicant’s father and brother are members of the Chinese Communist Party. His
father joined during the 1940s in order to oppose the Japanese occupation and what he
subsequently viewed as corruption in the Nationalist government. Applicant’s brother
joined the party in order to provide better opportunities for professional advancement,
which is also why his father maintained his membership. Applicant says that he did not
join the Communist Party because he viewed it as a corrupt organization and he
preferred the freedom and opportunities available in the United States. He said his
father and brother do not care that he is not a communist and have not tried to convince
him to become one.    5
Applicant’s wife worked as an accountant until about 2006 when they moved
across country for Applicant’s employment. At that time, she opened a business selling
plumbing supplies and clamps manufactured by a Chinese company that was run by
her cousin. He has since retired. She also helps the Chinese company find U.S.
suppliers as needed. The business is an LLC (limited liability corporation) of which
Applicant and his wife are members, but his only involvement is to help her with the
physical handling and shipping of some of the merchandise at her request. She runs the
business out of their home, primarily by internet sales. It provides a very small portion of
their family income. The company formerly had one contract employee, who was a U.S.
citizen living in China, but she has since quit and returned to live in the United States. In
2010, Applicant and his wife closed two accounts in Chinese banks that they opened in
2005 with balances totaling about $120,000. His wife opened another small account in
her own name so they could manage funds during their annual visits. They have no
other assets or business connections in China.6
Applicant acknowledges that the PRC government engages in espionage activity
against the United States using Chinese nationals, and has taken steps to avoid coming
AE A; AE B; GE 2; Tr. 54-58, 77-81.7
GE 3; Tr. 52-64, 99.8
The request and supporting documentation were not marked as separate exhibits, but are included in the9
case file for reference purposes. A copy of each of these documents was provided to Applicant before his
hearing.
4
to their notice. He is careful to obey all laws and regulations while in China, has
received extensive foreign travel briefings from a DoD counterintelligence specialist, and
does not communicate with his employer from China. He also avoids Chinese-American
associations and organizations that could provide a recruiting environment for the PRC
government. He has not told family members or friends in China where he works or that
he is applying for a clearance.7
Applicant’s supervisor testified that he is extremely reliable, conscientious,
trustworthy, and sensitive to security procedures. Once, when Applicant was the only
employee present, he signed for a package containing Confidential information that was
mistakenly given to him by a delivery company. Immediately upon noticing the
classification marking on the exterior of the package, he reported the incident to his
facility security officer, who determined that the mistake had not resulted in any
compromise.   8
I took administrative notice of the facts set forth in the Government’s request
concerning the People’s Republic of China, which are incorporated herein by reference.9
Of particular significance are the aggressive economic and military expansion; poor
human rights situation; endemic corruption; and the highly active perpetration of
economic, industrial, technical, and military espionage against U.S. and other western
interests.   
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions (DCs) and mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶¶ 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
5
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “[t]he applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides: “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
6
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. The SOR allegations and substantial evidence in this case established
four DCs under this guideline: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information;
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion; and 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation. 
China exerts significant intelligence collection efforts that operate contrary to U.S.
interests in protecting classified and sensitive information. Accordingly, family and
business connections there have significant potential to generate heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion under AG ¶¶ 7(a),
(d), and (e), than would similar connections in many other countries.
Applicant’s mother, father, and brother, with whom he maintains regular
communication and close familial relationships, are resident citizens of China. His father
and brother remain members of the governing and, according to Applicant’s own words,
corrupt Chinese Communist Party that is responsible for the heightened risk. Applicant
shares living quarters with his wife, whose mother, father, and siblings are also resident
Chinese citizens. She also operates a business that exclusively markets Chinese
products manufactured by the company of which her cousin was in charge. Applicant
has an entirely legitimate, serious interest in the welfare of her family members and
business connections, as well as his own family in China.
These facts meet the Government’s burden of production by raising all four of the
aforementioned disqualifying conditions. Applicant’s contacts, relationships, and
connections with China, through his and his wife’s relatives and business interests
there, shift a heavy burden to him to prove mitigation under applicable Appeal Board
precedent. 
7
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Those with
potential application in mitigating AG ¶¶ 7 (a), (b), (d), and (e) security concerns are:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation; and
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property
interest is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be
used to effectively influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
Applicant did not demonstrate that it is unlikely he could be placed in a position of
having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual or government and those
of the U.S. due to his strong and continuing family ties and regular visits to them. His
communication and contact with his Chinese family members since he came to the U.S.
are neither casual nor infrequent. However, the evidence did not establish any ongoing
connection to China arising from his or his wife’s employment there before they
immigrated to the United States in the late 1980s. Accordingly, he failed to establish the
mitigating conditions set forth in AG ¶¶ 8(a) and (c), except with respect to that
employment.
The evidence also fails to establish significant mitigation under AG ¶ 8(b).
Applicant has substantial assets in the United States, but also provides significant
financial support to his Chinese family members and in-laws. His sense of loyalty and
obligation to them is commendable and speaks to his good character, but also
illustrates the potential for conflict to which his access to classified information would
expose him. He has not endured life-threatening conditions in support of U.S. national
interests, which would sufficiently demonstrate deep or longstanding U.S. relationships
and loyalties under applicable Appeal Board precedent. 
Finally, although his wife’s business ties to the Chinese manufacturing company
have the potential to support a conflict of interest and could be used for manipulation or
pressure, their work involves plumbing supplies and clamps, while Applicant works in
8
computer programming. Her cousin is retired, and the business does not significantly
affect their family income. Accordingly, mitigation of security concerns arising from her
business was demonstrated under AG ¶ 8(f).
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.   
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s conduct and loyalty
to the United States are not in question here. He is a mature and experienced
individual, who has acted responsibly and provided valuable service to his employer in
support of U.S. military operations. However, the inherent potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress from the presence of Applicant’s and his wife’s family
members in China remains unmitigated. Placing Applicant in a position wherein it is
foreseeable that he could be forced to choose between the security interests of the
United States and the interests of his or his wife’s family is the harm to be avoided
under the President’s guidelines and Appeal Board precedent. Applicant failed to show
that such potential is diminished to any reasonable extent. In fact, his commendable
activities to avoid drawing attention to himself and his position working for a defense
contractor demonstrate his awareness of this potential. His loyal and dedicated service
in support of American military interests is highly commendable, but does not justify
placing him or his relatives at risk of exploitation due to his access to classified
information. 
Overall, the record evidence creates substantial doubt as to Applicant’s present
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. He failed to meet his burden to mitigate
the security concerns arising from foreign influence considerations.
9
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge