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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
---------------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 11-12370
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Jeff A. Nagel, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
May 9, 2013
______________
Decision
______________
ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaire for Investigation Processing (e-
QIP), on October 8, 2010. (Government Exhibit 1.) On July 12, 2012, the Department of
Defense issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under
Guidelines C (Foreign Preference), B (Foreign Influence) and F (Financial
Considerations). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines
(AG) effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1,
2006. 
 
Applicant submitted an Answer to the SOR on August 3, 2012, and requested a
hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed
on September 4, 2012. I received the case assignment on September 10, 2012. DOHA
issued a notice of hearing on October 3, 2012, and I convened the hearing as
scheduled on October 24, 2012. The Government offered Government Exhibits 1
2
through 10, which were received without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf,
and submitted Applicant Exhibits A through I, which were also admitted without
objection. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) of the hearing on November 7, 2012.
Applicant requested that the record remain open until November 16, 2012, for the
admission of additional documents. He submitted further documents, which have been
entered into the record without objection as Applicant Exhibits J through L. The record
closed on November 16, 2012. Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and
testimony, eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
Procedural Rulings
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to the State of Israel. (Tr. 16-23.) The request and the attached
documents were not admitted into evidence but were included in the record. The facts
administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below. 
Issuance of Decision
DOHA received an email from the Facility Security Officer of Applicant’s
company on December 7, 2012. This email is attached to the record as Judge Exhibit I.
It states, in part, “I formally request to remove the request for Security Clearance of
[Applicant].” This email was received after the record closed on November 16, 2012,
which was the deadline for receipt of additional information.
In addition, the Directive at Paragraph 4.4 states: “Actions pursuant to this
Directive shall cease upon termination of the applicant’s need for access to classified
information except in those cases in which: 4.4.1. A hearing has commenced; 4.4.2. A
clearance decision has been issued; or 4.4.3. The applicant’s security clearance was
suspended and the applicant provided a written request that the case continue.”
(Emphasis supplied.) Subparagraph 4.4.1. applies to this case. Therefore, a decision
will be issued in accordance with the Directive.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is 56, married, and has a master’s degree. He is a senior executive
with a defense contractor and seeks a security clearance in connection with his
employment in the defense industry.
Applicant admitted all the allegations in the SOR with the exception of
subparagraph 3.a. Those admissions are findings of fact. He also provided additional
information to support his request for eligibility for a security clearance.  
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Paragraph 1 (Guideline C - Foreign Preference)  
The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for
clearance because he has acted in a way that shows a preference for another country
ahead of the United States. 
Applicant was born in Israel in 1956. He attended college in Israel, then in 1980
he came to the United States to continue his education. He received his master’s
degree from an American university in 1984. (Tr. 69.) Applicant became an American
citizen in December 2006. (Government Exhibit 1 at Section 9.) His wife is also a
naturalized American citizen. His children are native-born American citizens.
(Government Exhibit 1 at Section 17.)
Israel has mandatory military service. Applicant was obligated to perform that
service between 1973 and 1976, which he did as an enlisted medic in the Israeli
Defense Force.  (Tr. 68-69.) 
Applicant has a current and valid United States passport, which was issued to
him in December 2006. This passport contains many immigration stamps from different
countries, none are from Israel. (Applicant Exhibit J.) 
Applicant also has a current and valid Israeli passport, which was issued to him
in November 2006 and extended in January 2010. It is due to expire in November 2016.
This passport contains many immigration stamps from Israel. Applicant testified that he
traveled to Israel at least twice a year, and that he last went to Israel on this passport in
2012. (Tr. 79; Applicant Exhibit K.)
Because of his birth in Israel, he believes himself to be a dual citizen of Israel
and the United States. Applicant has attempted to obtain from the Israeli government
permission to travel to Israel using only his United States passport. Based on the
documents provided by the Applicant, his last contact with the Israeli government on
this point was in October 2011. If he is unable to succeed in that endeavor Applicant
testified, “My intent is to surrender the Israeli passport and subsequently try to renounce
my citizenship.” (Tr. 49-56, 70-71, 80-82; Government Exhibits 2, 4 and 5; Applicant
Exhibit L.)
Applicant was presented with a hypothetical regarding the unlikely event of
armed conflict between Israel and the United States.  He stated, “I’m going to be honest
and straight forward. My immediate gut feeling would be that I would resign all of my
responsibilities on both ends. I would not take sides, but I would not participate in any
matter which would destroy the country I was born in. It’s more than a country, a place
is the refuge of the Jewish people. That is my honest answer.” (Tr. 114-115.)
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Paragraph 2 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence)  
The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for
clearance because he has foreign contacts and interests that could lead to the exercise
of poor judgment, unreliability, or untrustworthiness on his part, or make him vulnerable
to pressure or coercion.
The allegations under this paragraph concern two very different areas.
Subparagraphs 2.a through 2.l concern Applicant’s family. Subparagraphs 2.m through
2.p regard Applicant’s business dealings. For ease of discussion the family situation will
be discussed first.
Applicant’s immediate family is his wife and three children. As stated, his wife is a
naturalized American citizen, and the three children are all native-born American
citizens. All of them are also Israeli citizens and carry both American and Israeli
passports. Applicant’s wife and his two daughters lived in Israel at the time the record
closed. They had lived there for approximately five years, while the daughters went to
school. Applicant’s son had been living and studying in Israel, but he now lives in Italy.
Applicant testified that he hoped his wife and youngest daughter would return to the
United States permanently by the end of 2012. One of the reasons Applicant’s wife
moved to Israel was to help take care of her parents, who are elderly citizens of Israel
and reside there. Both of them are in their 90s. In addition, her brother is also a citizen
of Israel and resides in the United States. (Tr. 86-94.)
In order to facilitate his family’s ability to live in Israel for an extended period of
time, Applicant bought a house in Israel worth approximately $1.5 million. In addition,
Applicant sends $12,000 a month to a bank account in Israel to help his family live
there. Applicant has been traveling to Israel at least twice a year to spend time with his
family. (Tr. 71-79.)
Applicant’s parents are citizens of Israel. His mother is also a French citizen.
They are both permanent legal residents of the United States, and have resided in the
United States since 1996. His brother and sister are also citizens of Israel who reside in
the United States as permanent residents. (Tr. 84-86, 91-92.)
At this point it is appropriate to note that Applicant is a very intelligent and
successful entrepreneur, establishing and running several companies that have had
very lucrative Department of Defense contracts. He is a highly respected member of the
defense industry. (Tr. 41-42, 48-49, 56-58, 65-67, 103-107.) Because of his business
success he is a very wealthy individual. His financial status is supported by bank and
other financial records. (Tr. 29, 48-49, 59-60; Government Exhibit 3; Applicant Exhibits
C, D, E, H and I.) 
Subparagraph 2.m of the SOR states security concerns of the Government
regarding a business relationship Applicant has with an Israeli corporation (G
All of the following statements are supported by the documents submitted by the Department Counsel in1
support of his request for administrative notice and its attachments. 
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Company). (Government Exhibit 10.) Applicant testified that he had made the decision
to terminate his company’s relationship with G Company. (Tr. 42-47.)
Subparagraph 2.n states security concerns of the Government regarding a
business relationship one of Applicant’s companies has with the Binational Industrial
Research and Development Foundation (BIRD Foundation). “The BIRD Foundation was
established by the U.S. and Israeli governments in 1977 to generate mutually beneficial
cooperation between the private sectors of the U.S. and Israeli high tech industries,
including start-ups and established organizations. BIRD provides both matchmaking
services between U.S. and Israeli companies, as well as funding covering up to 50
percent of project development and product commercialization costs.” (BIRD
Foundation, What Is BIRD, http://www.birdf.com/?CategoryID=317&ArticleID=374
(accessed May 3, 2013.) (See Government Exhibit 2 at 10-12.)
Subparagraph 2.o states security concerns of the Government regarding the fact
that two of Applicant’s employees are Israeli citizens. One of these employees is
Applicant’s father. The other has been in the United States since 1973. (Tr. 96-97.)
Finally, subparagraph 2.p states a security concern of the Government is the fact
that Applicant’s companies have sponsored Israeli citizens for work visas to be in the
United States. Applicant stated his companies have sponsored many foreign citizens for
work visas. However, “I have not personally sponsored anyone into the U.S.”
(Government Exhibit 2 at 12.) (See Tr. 97-98.)
Administrative Notice
Applicant has contacts with Israel. Accordingly, it is appropriate to discuss the
situation in Israel at this time.  Israel is a parliamentary democracy. Israel’s prime1
minister leads the executive branch of the government. The United States is Israel’s
leading trading partner. Israel respects the rights of its citizens; however, there are
some concerns about Israel’s detention and interrogation of alleged terrorists, and
discrimination against Arabs. Terrorism is a continuing threat to Israel and American
interests in Israel. Since 1948, the United States and Israel have developed a close
friendship based on common democratic values, religious affinities, and security
interests. Occasionally, Israeli and American interests have diverged. Several U.S.
government employees have been prosecuted for disclosure of classified information to
persons connected to the Israeli government. Israel has an active program to gather
proprietary information from U.S. companies.
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Paragraph 3 (Guideline F - Financial Considerations)
The Government alleges that Applicant is ineligible for clearance because he is
financially overextended and, therefore, at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to
generate funds. 
3.a Applicant denied being indebted to a company for a judgment against him in
the amount of approximately $3,016,152. This situation occurred because Applicant
signed financial guarantees for his brother, who wanted to get into an expensive, but
potentially lucrative, business. The brother’s business failed, and Applicant became
financially responsible because he had the money to pay the debts. Applicant has come
to an agreement with the company where he will pay $1,415,000 in full settlement of the
case. Applicant has already paid $365,000 and will make similar payments in 2013,
2014, and 2015. He has the financial ability to make such payments. (Tr. 58-59, 61-63,
98-101; Applicant Exhibits A and B.)
3.b Applicant was indebted to his state taxing authority in the amount of
approximately $1,036, which resulted in a tax lien being filed. Applicant paid the tax
debt and the lien was released on August 3, 2012.
Policies
Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum. When evaluating an
applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider
the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each
guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and
mitigating conditions, which are to be used as appropriate in evaluating an applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a) describing the adjudicative process. The administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision.
According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of
variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider
all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision. In addition, the administrative judge may also rely on
his or her own common sense, as well as knowledge of the law, human nature, and the
ways of the world, in making a reasoned decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
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on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Security clearance decisions include, by
necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or
inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a
certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk
of compromise of classified information.
 
Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any
determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms
of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
It is the Government's responsibility to present substantial evidence to support
the finding of a nexus, or rational connection, between the applicant's conduct and the
continued holding of a security clearance. If such a case has been established, the
burden then shifts to the applicant to go forward with evidence in rebuttal, explanation,
or mitigation which is sufficient to overcome or outweigh the Government's case. The
applicant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving that it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant him or her a security clearance.
Paragraph 1 (Guideline C - Foreign Preference) 
In this case the Government has met its initial burden of proving by substantial
evidence that Applicant is a dual citizen of Israel and the United States, that he has a
valid Israeli passport, and that he served in the Israeli military in the 1970s.
Mitigating Condition AG ¶ 11(a) also applies as his “dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship2
or birth in a foreign country.” However, under the circumstances of this case, it is not controlling.
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Applicant has not mitigated the Government’s concerns about the above
conduct.  The concern is stated thus under this Guideline at AG ¶ 9:
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of
the United States.
Disqualifying Condition AG ¶ 10 applies to the facts of this case: 
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include: (a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign
citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship
of a family member. This includes but is not limited to:
(1) possession of a current foreign passport; and
(2) military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign
country.
Applicant’s military service occurred when he was an Israeli citizen, and before
he came to the United States. Accordingly, AG ¶ 11(c) applies, “exercise of the rights,
privileges or obligations of foreign citizenship occurred before the individual became a
U.S. citizen or when the individual was a minor.” Subparagraph 1.b. is found for
Applicant.
Applicant continues to hold and use his Israeli passport. He has asked
permission of the Israeli government to only use his American passport, but that
approval has not yet been granted. In fact, no evidence was presented to show that
Applicant has been actively attempting to obtain such approval in two years.
Accordingly, Mitigating Condition AG ¶ 11(e) does not apply since “the passport has
been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise
invalidated,” is required by that condition. 
Applicant obviously has a close and continuing emotional tie with the State of
Israel. He has stated, “My intent is to surrender the Israeli passport and subsequently
try to renounce my citizenship.” (Tr. 82.) Mitigating Condition ¶ 11(b) states where it
may be mitigating where, “the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual
citizenship.” However, this condition must be seen in the context of Applicant’s
statement that he would choose not to choose sides in a hypothetical conflict between
Israel and the United States. Such a decision is, of course, his right. But it does not
make him eligible for a security clearance since he continues to actively exercise rights
and privileges of his Israeli citizenship.  Guideline C is found against Applicant.2
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Paragraph 2 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence)
The concern under Guideline B is styled as follows at AG ¶ 6:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
Applicant has extensive family, business and financial connections to Israel.
Accordingly, the following Disqualifying Conditions apply to this case under AG ¶ 7: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing the information; and
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation.
However, Applicant has not provided compelling evidence to show that the
following Mitigating Conditions under AG ¶ 8 apply to this particular case, given his
particular background, except in part: 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.; 
(b) There is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
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so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
Applicant is a conscientious and patriotic citizen, and member of the defense
industry. He has lived in the United States for more than half of his life, and his wife and
children are also citizens. What is of concern to the Government is the fact that
Applicant and his family made the decision for his wife and children to live in Israel for
most of the past five years. In order to facilitate this, Applicant has bought an expensive
house there and also sent thousands of dollars to Israel to support his family. 
Turning next to his business connections. First of all, Applicant has made a
management decision to cease his business relationship with G Company. That will also
have an impact on his relationship with the BIRD Foundation, which supplied a grant for
Applicant to do business with G Company. Based on all of the available evidence,
Applicant’s relationships with both G Company and BIRD Foundation were routine and
have now ended.
Finally, there is the concern that two Israelis work for Applicant’s companies and
that his business has legally sponsored Israeli citizens to enter the United States and
work. Once again, these are routine business relationships. Under the particular facts of
this case subparagraphs 2.m through 2.p are found for Applicant.
It is Applicant’s responsibility to show that his admitted contacts and relationships
with Israel do not make him vulnerable to coercion or pressure. He has not done so.
There is a dearth of independent evidence to support his application for a security
clearance. Based on my analysis of the available information, Applicant has not
overcome the adverse inference arising from his family and financial interests in Israel.
He has mitigated concern about his business interests. Guideline B is found against
Applicant.
Paragraph 3 (Guideline F, Financial Considerations)
The security concern for Financial Considerations is set out in AG & 18:      
Failure or inability to live within one=s means, satisfy debts, and meet
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise
questions about an individual=s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to
protect classified information. An individual who is financially overextended
is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. 
ISCR Case No. 06-12930 at 2 (App. Bd. Mar. 17, 2008) (quoting ISCR Case No. 04-09684 at 2-3 (App. Bd.3
Jul. 6, 2006)).
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The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns. Under
AG & 19(a), an Ainability or unwillingness to satisfy debts@ is potentially disqualifying.
Similarly under AG & 19(c), Aa history of not meeting financial obligations@ may raise
security concerns. Applicant, had an unsatisfied judgment against him in the amount of
over $3 million that was not resolved as of the date the SOR was issued. There was
also a state tax lien. The evidence is sufficient to raise these potentially disqualifying
conditions.
The guideline also includes examples of conditions that could mitigate security
concerns arising from financial difficulties. Under AG ¶ 20(a), disqualifying conditions
may be mitigated where Athe behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or
occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt
on the individual=s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.@ In addition, AG
¶ 20(b) states that disqualifying conditions may be mitigated where “the conditions that
resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of
employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce
or separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances.”  
The evidence shows that both of the above mitigating conditions apply to
Applicant. The judgment was the result of Applicant signing financial guarantees for his
brother. Since Applicant is a wealthy individual, the creditor has come to him for
payment. There is no evidence of poor judgment on his part. Rather, as shown above,
he has been attempting to resolve this debt by means of a mutually agreeable payment
arrangement.
As stated, Applicant has made acceptable payment arrangements with his
primary creditor, and has already made a substantial down payment. He has also
resolved the tax lien. Accordingly, based on the particular facts of this case, I find that
he has “initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve
debts,” as required by AG ¶ 20(d). I also find that “there are clear indications that the
problem is being resolved or is under control,” as required by AG ¶ 20(c). 
As the DOHA Appeal Board has said, “An applicant is not required to show that
[he] has completely paid off [his] indebtedness, only that [he] has established a
reasonable plan to resolve [his] debts and has taken significant actions to implement
that plan.”3
Applicant has acted in a way that shows good judgment. All of the stated
mitigating conditions apply to the facts of this case. Guideline F is found for Applicant.
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Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of
whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense
judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person
concept. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors
listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.      
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. My Guideline B, C, and F analysis is
applicable to the whole-person analysis as well. The evidence shows that Applicant is a
patriotic American citizen. It is Applicant’s personal situation, not his conduct, that is of
concern here. As stated at length above, it is Applicant’s responsibility to show that his
admitted contacts and relationships with Israel do not make him vulnerable to coercion
or pressure. He has not done so. I find that there is the “potential for pressure, coercion,
exploitation, or duress” as set forth in AG ¶ 2(a)(8). Using the whole-person standard,
Applicant has not mitigated the security significance of his alleged foreign preference
and foreign connections and is not eligible for a security clearance. 
On balance, it is concluded that Applicant has not successfully overcome the
Government's case opposing his request for a DoD security clearance. Accordingly, the
evidence supports a finding against Applicant as to the factual and conclusionary
allegations expressed in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Government's Statement of
Reasons. Paragraph 3 is found for Applicant.
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Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a : Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a through 2.l: Against Applicant
Subparagraphs 2.m through 2.p: For Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline F: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 3.a and 3.b: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
WILFORD H. ROSS
Administrative Judge