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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 12-05684 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
   
Appearances 
 
For Government: Daniel F. Crowley, Esquire, Department Counsel 
 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
ANTHONY, Joan Caton, Administrative Judge: 
 
 After a thorough review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, I conclude that 
Applicant mitigated security concerns under Guideline C, Foreign Preference. However, 
she failed to mitigate the Government’s security concerns under Guideline B, Foreign 
Influence. Her eligibility for a security clearance is denied. 
 
                                                  Statement of the Case 
 
On October 23, 2010, Applicant signed and certified an Electronic Questionnaire 
for Investigations Processing (e-QIP). On January 11, 2013, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns 
under Guideline B, Foreign Influence, and Guideline C, Foreign Preference. DOD acted 
under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry 
(February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and 
the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within DOD for SORs issued after September 
1, 2006.  
 
 
2 
 
 
 On February 6, 2013, Applicant answered the SOR and requested a hearing 
before an administrative judge from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals 
(DOHA). The case was assigned to me on March 27, 2013. I convened a hearing on 
April 26, 2013, to consider whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to 
grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. The Government called no 
witnesses, introduced three exhibits (Ex. 1, Ex. 2, and Ex. 3), and offered a summary of 
facts found in 21 official U.S. Government source documents for administrative notice. 
The source documents were identified as Ex. I through Ex. XXI. The Government’s 
exhibits were admitted without objection, and its summary of facts, along with the 
accompanying source documents, were identified as Hearing Exhibit (HE) I. HE 1 was 
admitted for administrative notice without objection.  
 
Applicant testified and offered five exhibits, which I marked and identified as Ex. 
A through Ex. E and admitted without objection. Applicant also offered a document for 
administrative notice. I marked this document as HE 2 and admitted it for administrative 
notice without objection. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) of the hearing on May 2, 
2013. 
                                                    
Findings of Fact 
 
 The SOR contains six allegations of security concern under AG B, Foreign 
Influence (SOR ¶¶ 1.a. through 1.f.) and two allegations of security concern under 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference (SOR ¶¶ 2.a. and 2.b.). In her Answer to the SOR, 
Applicant admitted the allegations at ¶¶1.a. through 1.d. under Guideline B. She denied 
the Guideline B allegations at ¶¶1.e. and 1.f. She admitted the two Guideline C 
allegations. Applicant’s admissions are admitted as findings of fact.   
 
 After a thorough review of the record in the case, including witness testimony, 
exhibits, relevant policies, and the applicable adjudicative guidelines, I make the 
following additional findings of fact:  
 
 Applicant is 54 years old and employed as a senior systems analyst by a 
government contractor. She seeks a security clearance.1  (Ex. 1.) 
 
 Applicant came to the United States at the age of 17, and she married for the first 
time in 1965. She and her husband divorced in 1967.  Applicant earned a bachelor’s 
degree in 1988. She became a U.S. citizen in 1991. (Ex.1; Ex. 2; Tr. 17-18.) 
 
  Since 1988, Applicant has lived in a spouse-like relationship with a man who 
was born in Iran and is now a U.S. citizen. She and her spouse are the parents of one 
adult son, who was born in 1991 in the United States. Applicant’s son excels at a 
particular sport and has won national and international recognition. Applicant estimated 
                                            
1 On the e-QIP she completed in October 2010, Applicant stated that her background had not been 
previously investigated, and she had not been granted a security clearance in the past. In a personal 
subject interview, conducted in December 2010, Applicant stated that she had been awarded a security 
clearance in 2006 or 2007. (Ex. 1; Ex. 2.)  
 
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that she had spent approximately $500,000 in support of her son’s training and 
participation in athletic competitions. She also reported that coaches representing other 
governments had contacted her and her son and offered to sponsor him if he would 
represent those countries. Applicant stated that she and her son had refused these 
offers. (Ex. E; Tr. 34-35; 61-63.) 
 
 After becoming a U.S. citizen, Applicant used her Iranian passport to travel to 
Iran to visit her family members in 1994, 2005, and 2012. In 2012, she renewed her 
Iranian passport. Applicant’s most recent Iranian passport will not expire until 2017. 
These facts are alleged at SOR ¶¶ 2.a. and 2.b. (Ex. 1; Ex. 2; Ex. 3; Tr. 44-45.) 
 
 Applicant explained that she possessed and renewed her Iranian passport after 
becoming a U.S. citizen because Iran does not recognize dual citizenship and considers 
U.S.-Iranian dual nationals as Iranian citizens and subject to Iranian law. Under Iranian 
law, Applicant could only enter and exit Iran by presenting an Iranian passport. In order 
to travel to Iran to visit her mother, who was in poor health, Applicant renewed her 
Iranian passport in 2012. Applicant’s current Iranian passport will not expire until 2017. 
(Ex. 1; Ex. 2; Tr. 44-46.) 
 
 At her hearing, Applicant presented a document from a security officer at her 
employer. The security officer reported that on February 7, 2013, Applicant had 
surrendered her Iranian passport. The security officer also reported that she had taken 
possession of the passport and invalidated it. Applicant testified that she had no 
intention to travel to Iran in the future. (Ex. A; Tr. 46.) 
 
 Applicant stated that she was one of eight children born to her parents. Her 
father, who is deceased, was a landholder who supported his family with his acquired 
wealth. After the shah was overthrown, the new government confiscated much of 
Applicant’s father’s property. Today, two of Applicant’s brothers and one of her sisters 
are citizens and residents of Australia. (Ex. 1; Tr. 57-60.)  
  
 The SOR alleges at ¶ 1.a. that Applicant’s mother is a citizen and resident of 
Iran. At her hearing, Applicant stated that her mother had died recently in Iran. (Tr. 36.) 
 
 The SOR alleges at ¶ 1.b. that one of Applicant’s brothers and two of her sisters 
are citizens and residents of Iran. Applicant stated that her 65-year-old brother has been 
retired since he was 37. He was employed by the Iranian military as a pilot. Applicant 
stated that she has spoken at times with her brother about once a month. She also 
stated that she spoke with her brother about once a year. (Tr. 36-37.)   
 
 One of Applicant’s sisters is a retired teacher. The other sister, who studied 
business administration, is also retired. Applicant speaks with her sisters in Iran about 
once a month or once every two months. (Tr. 37-38.) 
 
 The SOR alleges at ¶ 1.c. that Applicant has a sister-in-law who is a citizen and 
resident of Iran. The individual, who is a retired doctor, is the sister of Applicant’s 
 
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spouse. Applicant reported that she speaks with her sister-in-law once a year or once 
every two years. When she visited Iran in 2012, Applicant stayed with her sister-in-law 
for two days.  (Ex. 2; Tr. 39-40, 49.) 
 
 The SOR alleges at ¶ 1.d. that Applicant has two nieces who are citizens and 
residents of Iran. The nieces, young women of about 28 and 32 years of age, are the 
daughters of Applicant’s sister who is the retired teacher. Applicant speaks with her 
nieces about once a year. (Tr. 40-41.) 
 
 The SOR alleges at ¶ 1.e. that Applicant has a bank account in Iran valued at 
approximately $45,000. The SOR also alleges at ¶ 1.f. that Applicant has a trust fund in 
Iran valued at approximately $10,000. In her answer to the SOR, Applicant stated that 
the bank account alleged in SOR ¶ 1.e. is the same as the trust fund alleged in SOR ¶ 
1.f. She further stated that she learned for the first time in December 2012 that the value 
of the single account was approximately $8,500. (Answer to SOR) 
 
 Applicant explained that when his children were born, her father established a   
bank account for each of them. When he died, some of his property was sold and the 
proceeds deposited in the children’s accounts. At her hearing, Applicant revised her 
estimate of the value of her single account, and she stated her belief that it had a value 
of approximately $5,000 to $7,000. (Tr. 41-44, 50-52.) 
 
 Applicant stated that she believed her mother at one time administered the 
accounts established for his children by her father. She also stated that she gave one of 
her sisters who resides in Iran her power of attorney to administer her account. She 
reported that on occasion she would ask her sister to use some of the money in her 
account to buy a gift for their mother. (Tr. 52-54.) 
 
 Applicant testified that she did not expect to inherit anything from her mother’s 
estate. She stated that a ring her mother possessed would likely be given to one of her 
sisters who was a caregiver for their mother. (Tr. 53-55.) 
 
 Applicant provided documentation establishing that she and her spouse jointly 
own three homes with a total fair market value of approximately $1,545,670. 
Additionally, Applicant and her spouse jointly own a brokerage account valued at 
$130,000. Individually, Applicant owns an IRA account valued at $164,778 and a 401(k) 
account valued at $173,877. (Ex. D.) 
 
 Applicant provided documentation showing that, in 2011 and 2012, she had 
completed numerous training courses provided by her employer to increase security 
awareness. The program manager who supervises Applicant’s work team stated that 
she “was dependable in her work effort, respectful to the customer and her peers, and 
an excellent contributor to the team’s success.” The manager also stated that Applicant 
is a valued employee. (Ex. B; Ex. C.) 
 
 
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 I take administrative notice of the following facts about the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. These facts2 were provided by the Government to Applicant and to me: 
 
The United States, by executive orders issued by the President as well as by 
congressional legislation, prohibits nearly all trade and investment with Iran. 
Sanctions have been imposed on Iran because of its sponsorship of 
terrorism, its refusal to comply with international obligations on its nuclear 
program, and its human rights violations. 
 
• In January 2012, the Director of National Intelligence expressed concern 
that the 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States 
shows that some Iranian officials--probably including Supreme Leader Ali 
Khamenei--have changed their calculus and are now more willing to conduct 
an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions 
that threaten the regime. He also expressed concem about Iranian plotting 
against U.S. or allied interests overseas.  He assessed that Iran is keeping 
open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various 
nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should 
it choose to do so. 
 
• In January 2012, the Director of National Intelligence assessed that the 
most menacing foreign intelligence threats in the next two to three years 
will involve espionage by China, Russia, and Iran. He also assessed that 
Iran's intelligence operations against the United States, including cyber 
capabilities, have dramatically increased in recent years in depth and 
complexity. 
 
• The United States has long-standing concerns over Iran's nuclear 
program, sponsorship of terrorism, and human rights record. Iran still has 
not recognized Israel's right to exist and has hindered the Middle East 
peace process by arming militants, including Barnas, Hizballah, and 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 
 
• Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, Iran remained an 
active state sponsor of terrorism in 2011 and increased its terrorist-related 
activity. Iran also continued to provide financial, material, and logistical 
support for terrorist and militant groups throughout the Middle East and 
Central Asia. In 2011, the United States discovered that elements of the 
Iranian regime had conceived and funded a plot to assassinate Saudi 
Arabia's Ambassador to the United States in Washington D.C, which 
underscored anew Iran's interest in using international terrorism-- 
including in the United States--to further its foreign policy goals. Despite its 
pledge to support the stabilization of lraq, Iran continued to provide lethal 
support, including weapons, training, funding, and guidance, to Iraqi Shia 
militant groups targeting U.S. and Iraqi forces, as well as civilians. Iran 
                                            
2 Footnotes are omitted. 
 
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provided training to the Taliban in Afghanistan and shipped a large 
number of weapons to Kandahar, Afghanistan.  Since 2006, Iran has 
arranged arms shipments to select Taliban members. During the wave of 
pro-democracy demonstrations in Syria, Iran provided weapons and 
training to assist the Assad regime in its brutal crackdown that has 
resulted in the death of more than 5,000 civilians. In 2011, Iran remained 
unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qa'ida members it continued to 
detain, and refused to publicly identify those senior members in its 
custody. Iran also allowed al-Qa'ida members to operate a core facilitation 
pipeline through Iranian territory, enabling al-Qa'ida to carry funds and 
move facilitators and operatives to South Asia and elsewhere.  
· 
• In 2011, the Iranian Government continued its policy of severely limiting 
citizens' rights to peacefully change their government through free and fair 
elections, restricting civil liberties, and disregarding the sanctity of life 
through the government's use of arbitrary detention, torture, and 
deprivation of life without due process. Human rights abuses included the 
following: 1) politically motivated violence and repression, including 
torture, beatings and rape; 2) severe officially sanctioned punishments, 
including amputation and flogging; 3) arbitrary arrests and detentions, 
often holding individuals incommunicado; 4) little judicial independence 
and few fair public trials; 5) severe restrictions on right to privacy and civil 
liberties, including freedoms of speech and the press, assembly, 
association, and movement, and 6) monitoring the social activities of 
citizens, entering homes and offices, monitoring telephone conversations 
and internet communications, and opening mail without court 
authorization.  
 
• In October 2011, the Office of National Counterintelligence Executive 
reported that losses of sensitive economic information and technologies to 
foreign entities represent significant costs to U.S. national security. It also 
reported that the illicit transfer of technology with military applications to a 
hostile state such as Iran or North Korea could endanger the lives of U.S. 
and allied military personnel. Finally, it reported that Russia and Iran have 
aggressive programs for developing and collecting U.S. civilian and dual- 
use technologies, specifically in one area of advanced materials and 
development: nanotechnology. 
 
There have been various cases involving the illegal export, or attempted 
illegal export, of U.S. restricted, dual-use technology to Iran, including: 
aircraft parts and fighter jet components, specialized metals, missile 
components and radio tests sets, and radio frequency modules later found 
in bombs in Iraq. 
 
The Iranian government does not recognize dual nationality and will treat 
U.S.-Iranian dual nationals solely as Iranian citizens subject to Iranian 
 
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laws. The U.S. government does not have diplomatic or consular relations 
with Iran. U.S. citizens of Iranian origin should consider the risk of being 
targeted by Iranian authorities. Iranian authorities have prevented a 
number of U.S. citizen academics, scientists, journalists, and others who 
traveled to Iran for personal/cultural/business reasons from leaving the 
country and in some cases have detained, interrogated, and imprisoned 
them. Iranian security personnel may at times: (i) place foreign visitors 
under surveillance; (ii) monitor hotel rooms, telephones and fax machines; 
and (iii) search personal possessions in hotel rooms. 
  
                                                          Policies 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the 
Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security, and 
it has emphasized that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the 
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the 
authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine 
whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. 
at 527. The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant 
an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified.    
  
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an 
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition 
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list 
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, the administrative judge applies these guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
 
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responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion in obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
Analysis 
 
 Under Guideline B, Foreign Influence, “[f]oreign contacts and interests may be a 
security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may 
be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government 
in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any 
foreign interest.”  AG ¶ 6. 
 
 Additionally, adjudications under Guideline B “can and should consider the 
identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, 
including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is 
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with 
the risk of terrorism.”  AG ¶ 6. 
 
 A Guideline B decision assessing the security worthiness of a U.S. citizen with 
Iranian contacts must take into consideration Iran’s hostility to the United States, its 
sponsorship of terrorism, its refusal to comply with international obligations on its 
nuclear program, its increased espionage capacity, and its human rights violations. 
American citizens with immediate family members who are citizens or residents of Iran 
could be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure. 
 
 
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 I have considered all of the disqualifying conditions under the foreign influence 
guideline.  The facts of Applicant’s case raise security concerns under disqualifying 
conditions AG ¶¶ 7(a), 7(b), 7(d), and 7(e).3  
 
 Applicant’s mother was a citizen and resident of Iran. At her hearing, Applicant 
reported that her mother died recently. With this close relationship sadly ended, 
Applicant has one less familial tie to Iran. The SOR allegation at ¶ 1.a. is concluded for 
Applicant. However, Applicant’s brother, two sisters, and two nieces are citizens and 
residents of Iran. Applicant shares living quarters with her spouse, and he also has 
Iranian contacts. Applicant’s spouse’s sister is also a citizen and resident of Iran. 
Applicant’s familial relationships and contacts with her living relatives and her spouse’s 
relative in Iran, a country which is openly hostile to the United States, create a 
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, or coercion. 
Additionally, Applicant has a bank account in Iran, which could expose her to a 
heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.  
  
Several mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 might be applicable to Applicant’s 
case.  If “the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these 
persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are 
such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose 
between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the 
interests of the U.S.,” then AG ¶ 8(a) might apply.  If “there is no conflict of interest, 
either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, 
group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected 
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest,” then AG ¶ 8(b) might 
apply.  If “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that 
there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation,” 
then AG ¶ 8(c) might apply. If “the value or routine nature of the foreign business, 
financial, or property interest is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and 
could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual” then 
AG ¶ 8(f) might apply to Applicant’s bank account in Iran.  
 
Applicant has been a citizen of the United States for 23 years, and she has built 
her personal, professional, and financial life in the United States. As a daughter, she 
remained attentive to her mother, a citizen and resident of Iran, during her mother’s life. 
Additionally, as a faithful family member, she has maintained contacts with her family 
                                            
3 AG ¶ 7(a) reads: “contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or 
other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”  AG ¶ 7(b) reads: “connections to a 
foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the 
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a 
foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.”  AG ¶ 7(d) reads: “sharing living quarters 
with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of 
foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.” AG ¶ 7(e) reads: “a substantial business, 
financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, 
which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.” 
 
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and her spouse’s family in Iran. Those contacts, while varying in frequency over the 
years, reflect enduring family ties. Given Iran’s hostility to the United States and its 
reliance on terrorism and espionage to achieve its political ends, Applicant’s contacts 
with her six family members and her spouse’s sister currently living in Iran raise serious 
security concerns because those connections could raise a conflict of interest between 
Applicant’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and her desire to 
help her family members.  
 
 Applicant’s contacts and relationships with relatives who are citizens and 
residents of Iran could force her to choose between loyalty to them and the security 
interests of the United States. (ISCR Case No. 03-15485 at 4-6 (App. Bd. June 2, 
2005); ISCR Case No. 06-24575 (App. Bd. Nov. 9, 2007)) It is not clear that she has 
such deep and longstanding relationships in the United States that she could be 
expected to resolve a conflict of interest in favor of U.S. interests.  I conclude that the 
mitigating conditions identified under AG ¶¶ 8(a), 8(b), and 8(c) do not fully apply to the 
facts of Applicant’s case. 
 
I also note that Applicant’s financial interest of $5,000 to $7,000 in an Iranian 
bank account which was once a trust fund is minimal when weighed against her 
substantial financial interests in the United States. I conclude, therefore, that AG ¶ 8(f) 
applies in mitigation to the allegations at SOR ¶¶ 1.e. and 1.f. 
   
 Nothing in Applicant’s answers to the Guideline B allegations in the SOR 
suggested she is not a loyal U.S. citizen. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 
specifically provides that industrial security clearance decisions shall be “in terms of the 
national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.”   
 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference 
 
Under AG ¶ 9, the security concern involving foreign preference arises “[w]hen 
an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over 
the United States.”  Such an individual “may be prone to provide information or make 
decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.” 
 
AG ¶ 10 describes several conditions that could raise a security concern and 
may be disqualifying.  These disqualifying conditions are as follows: 
 
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after 
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family 
member.  This includes but is not limited to: 
 
(1) possession of a current foreign passport; 
 
(2) military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign 
country; 
 
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(3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare, or 
other such benefits from a foreign country; 
 
(4) residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements; 
(5) using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business 
interests in another country; 
(6) seeking or holding political office in a foreign country; and, 
 
(7) voting in a foreign election; 
 
(b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an 
American citizen; 
 
(c) performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as 
to serve the interests of a foreign person, group, organization, or 
government in conflict with the national security interest; and  
 
(d) any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country other than 
the United States: for example, declaration of intent to renounce United 
States citizenship; renunciation of United States citizenship. 
 
Under AG ¶ 11(a), dual citizenship might be mitigated if “it is based solely on [an 
applicant’s] parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign country.” Under AG ¶ 11(b), an 
individual’s dual citizenship might be mitigated if he or she “expressed a willingness to 
renounce dual citizenship.” Under AG ¶ 11(c), an individual’s “exercise of the rights, 
privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship might be mitigated if it occurred before 
becoming a U.S. citizen or when the individual was a minor.” Under AG ¶ 11(d), an 
individual’s use of a foreign passport might be mitigated if it were “approved by the 
cognizant security authority.” Under AG ¶ 11(e), an individual’s use of a foreign 
passport might be mitigated if he or she presents credible evidence that “the passport 
has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise 
invalidated.” 
 
After becoming a U.S. citizen in 1991, Applicant renewed her Iranian passport 
and used it in 1994, 2005, and 2012 to travel to Iran to visit her family there. In 2012, 
she renewed her current passport, which will expire in 2017. Applicant explained that 
she acquired and used an Iranian passport to travel to Iran after becoming a U.S. citizen 
because Iran does not recognize dual citizenship and considers U.S.-Iranian dual 
nationals as Iranian citizens and subject to Iranian law. Under Iranian law, Applicant 
could only enter and exit Iran by presenting an Iranian passport. If she wished to visit 
her mother, siblings, and other relatives in Iran, Applicant had to use an Iranian 
passport to enter and leave the country. 
 
Applicant’s dual citizenship was not a passive condition based solely on her birth 
in Iran. Instead, by acquiring an Iranian passport after becoming a U.S. citizen, 
 
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Applicant actively exercised dual citizenship with Iran. I conclude, therefore, that AG ¶¶ 
11(a) and 11(c) are not applicable. 
 
However, when Applicant learned that her dual citizenship and possession of an 
active Iranian passport raised security concerns, she surrendered her Iranian passport 
to her security officer, who invalidated the document. Applicant stated that she has no 
future plans to travel to Iran. I conclude that AG ¶ 11(e) applies in mitigation in this 
case. AG ¶ 11(b) applies in part, and AG ¶ 11(d) is not applicable because it is not 
raised by the facts in this case. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.        
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of the 
whole-person concept and all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. 
Applicant is a talented and valued employee of a U.S. government contractor. 
Applicant’s manager wrote a letter on her behalf which spoke highly of her professional 
skills. Applicant provided documentation establishing that she has diligently pursued 
security awareness training provided by her employer. 
 
Applicant has been a U.S. citizen for 23 years. She was a faithful and loyal 
daughter to her mother, who was a citizen and resident of Iran. She maintains familial 
ties with her siblings, her nieces, and her spouse’s sister in Iran. She visited Iran three 
times after becoming a U.S. citizen. 
 
Iran is a country openly hostile to the United States and its citizens. While 
nothing in the record suggests that Applicant is not a loyal U.S. citizen, her familial 
contacts with her relatives in Iran raise concerns that she could be subject to foreign 
exploitation, coercion, or duress. Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions 
 
13 
 
 
and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For these 
reasons, I conclude that while Applicant mitigated security concerns under the foreign 
preference adjudicative guideline, she failed to mitigate the security concerns arising 
under the foreign influence adjudicative guideline. 
  
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the 
amended SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:           AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
 Subparagraph 1.a.:            For Applicant 
 
 Subparagraphs 1.b. - 1.d.:                     Against Applicant 
 
 Subparagraphs 1.e. - 1.f.:                      For Applicant 
 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline C:           FOR APPLICANT  
 
 Subparagraphs 2.a. - 2.b.:           For Applicant  
 
                                       Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
                                               
 
________________________________ 
Joan Caton Anthony 
Administrative Judge