1 
 
                                                              
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 -------------------------------- )  ISCR Case No. 12-06885 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Pamela C. Benson, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Fadi G. Boumitri, Esquire 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
HOWE, Philip S., Administrative Judge: 
 
On January 17, 2012, Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF 
86). On September 11, 2012, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued Applicant a 
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guidelines C (Foreign 
Influence), B (Foreign Preference), and F (Financial Considerations). The action was 
taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry 
(February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense 
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as 
amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the 
Department of Defense on September 1, 2006.  
  
 Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on September 19, 2012. He 
answered the SOR in writing through counsel on October 5, 2012, and requested a 
hearing before an administrative judge. Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals 
(DOHA) received the request on October 10, 2012. Department Counsel was prepared 
2 
 
to proceed on December 31, 2012, and I received the case assignment on January 7, 
2013.  
 
DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on February 13, 2013, and I convened the 
hearing as scheduled on March 7, 2013. The Government offered Exhibits 1 through 7, 
which were received without objection. Applicant testified and submitted Exhibits A 
through M, without objection. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on 
March 22, 2013. I granted Applicant’s request to keep the record open until March 21, 
2013, to submit additional matters. On March 21, 2013, he submitted Exhibits N to AA, 
without objection. The record closed on March 21, 2013. Based upon a review of the 
pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to classified information is 
denied. 
 
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Request for Administrative Notice 
 
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice 
of certain facts relating to Lebanon. (Tr. at 10-12.) The request and the attached 
documents were admitted into evidence and were included in the record as Exhibit 7. 
The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted all the allegations in the SOR. He 
also provided additional information to support his request for eligibility for a security 
clearance. 
 
Applicant is 39 years old. He is married and has three children, two of whom are 
adults. All of them were born in the United States. His wife was born in the United 
States and is a U.S. citizen. He is not employed now. He has been a mechanic in 
previous positions, including his first overseas job in 2010. Applicant has been 
unemployed since 2010 after returning from his foreign employment for a defense 
contractor. He has lived in the United States since 1986 when he came to this country 
at the age of 12. He was born in Beirut, Lebanon. Applicant fled the civil war then raging 
in Lebanon. Applicant has two brothers and one sister. His sister was born in the United 
States. His two brothers came with him from Lebanon but have never returned there. 
They are U.S. citizens and employed in the U.S. Applicant attended high school here. 
He does not have a college degree but did complete two semesters of study at a 
vocational school after high school. Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 
March 1986, as he claimed at the hearing and in his SF-86. (Tr. 20, 21, 29, 50, 55-57, 
101, 105, 106; Exhibit 1) 
 
Applicant operated a motorcycle shop as a business from 2001 to 2010. He has 
a rental home that was his former residence. (Tr. 40, 108) 
3 
 
Applicant’s father lives in the United States and is a dual U.S. and Lebanese 
citizen. His mother died in 1985. Applicant stated he knew little about her death 
because the family does not discuss it. The story he heard was that she fell off a 
building. Applicant did not testify where the building was located. His father is 63 years 
old and came to the United States in 1984, before Applicant traveled here. Applicant’s 
grandmother and aunt live in Lebanon. He talks to them monthly by telephone. 
Applicant visited them during his 2009 and 2010 trips to Lebanon. His grandmother has 
a “green card” from the United States. Applicant has distant cousins in Lebanon with 
whom he does not associate. (Tr. 30-34, 55-59; Exhibit 1) 
 
Applicant obtained a Lebanese passport in May 2009. He obtained a free airline 
ticket from a Lebanese political party. To use his U.S. passport would have required 
Applicant to purchase a visa for $150. Applicant and his father went to Lebanon and 
visited relatives there. On the same trip he voted in the Lebanese general election in 
return for his airline ticket. He described the political party as “March 14” but did not 
know its platform or policies before voting. The Lebanese passport was valid for one 
year. Applicant surrendered it to his company’s security office recently. (Tr. 23-28, 33, 
61,103; Exhibits 4, 5) 
 
Applicant went to Lebanon in 2010 on vacation from his job in Afghanistan. He 
worked there as a mechanic for a defense contractor. In Lebanon Applicant met his wife 
for a vacation. They have been married 23 years and this was her first trip to Lebanon. 
Applicant went to Lebanon in 2010 instead of coming home from his foreign work site 
because the trip was shorter than returning to the United States and he wanted to see 
more sites in Lebanon than he was able to visit in 2009 on his last trip there. (Tr. 28, 64)  
 
Applicant testified he would travel to Lebanon again to vacation there. He also 
stated he would vote in future Lebanese elections. Applicant considers himself a dual 
citizen of the United States and Lebanon because of his birth in Lebanon. If he could 
legally renounce his Lebanese citizenship he would do so. (Tr. 67-69, 106) 
 
The SOR alleges eight delinquent debts. They total $12,348. They include credit 
card debts, unpaid utility bills, and state tax debts. The earliest debts date to 2002. (Tr. 
35-49; Exhibits 2, 3, 6, O) 
 
Applicant owes his home state delinquent business taxes from 2002 to 2007 
(Subparagraphs 3.a, 3.e, 3.f, and 3.g). Applicant claims his former accountant failed to 
file the proper documents or did not properly perform her duties. He gathered the proper 
information and submitted it to the state tax authorities to demonstrate he did file and 
pay the proper tax amounts. The amounts alleged in the later three subparagraphs are 
$769, $753, and $750. He submitted satisfactions of state tax liens showing the liens 
are released and he does not owe any money. He filed these satisfaction documents 
with the appropriate county officials on March 18, 2013. He delayed doing the filing 
because of the $55 filing fee required for each satisfaction. These debts are resolved. 
(Tr. 35-39, 46; Exhibits 2, 3, 6, A, E, O, P) 
4 
 
Applicant owes $4,768 to a credit card company on a 2008 judgment 
(Subparagraph 3.b). He recently concluded an agreement with the creditor to pay $50 
monthly on the debt. (Tr. 40, 41, 48; Exhibits 2, 3, 6, B, C, O) 
 
Applicant’s former utility company claims he owes it $1,178 for electricity 
provided (Subparagraph 3.c). Applicant made several attempts to arrange installment 
payment with this company, but they insist on payment in full on a debt. Applicant paid 
this debt but owes the utility company another amount. He is trying to make 
arrangements to pay the second debt. The SOR debt is resolved. (Tr. 41-43; Exhibits 2, 
3, 6, C, D, O, Q) 
 
The telephone company that provided cellular service to Applicant claims he 
owes them $3,611(Subparagraph 3.d).  Applicant testified he had four phones for his 
family. When his wife was dissatisfied with the service after they received a bill for $900 
for one month of texting while Applicant was working in a foreign country, he terminated 
the contracts early and went to another provider. Terminating the contracts before the 
contractual date caused fees to be assessed against Applicant. He objects to the 
original bill and the early termination fees as excessive. He asserts his family was really 
on one plan not four plans. He has not resolved this debt. (Tr. 44-46; Exhibits 2, 3, 6, O)  
 
Applicant owes a medical debt of $519 (Subparagraph 3.h) according to the 
SOR. He does not remember how this debt occurred. The debt appears on Applicant’s 
March 2013 credit report, which he submitted. It is shown as owed to a gas company. 
Applicant’s attorney submitted an affidavit after the hearing recording his efforts to 
determine the origin of this debt. He contacted the credit reporting agency showing this 
account. His investigation showed it is not a medical debt but rather a debt owed to a 
gas company, as it is shown on the credit report. Applicant’s notes record that the 
creditor was supposed to remove the debt from Applicant’s credit record as of February 
4, 2013. His attorney’s affidavit also states the debt is to be removed from Applicant’s 
credit record as of February 2013 by the collector. This debt is resolved. (Tr. 46, 47; 
Exhibits 2, 3, 6, O, Q) 
 
Applicant admits he still owes about $10,000 on the credit record, but only 
$7,000 is valid debt after subtracting the cell telephone debt. (Tr. 48, 49; Exhibits 2, 3, 
6) 
 
Applicant submitted six character statements from family members and his 
friends. Applicant’s son and brother, his sister, two policemen who are Applicant’s 
friends, and his wife’s brother all submitted favorable statements. The writers of these 
letters state Applicant is a hardworking, honest, trustworthy, and loyal individual. One 
letter from a policeman states Applicant told him he would like to vacation in Lebanon 
but would not live there. Applicant’s sister states in her letter that Applicant has no 
interest in going to Lebanon. His brother-in-law states Applicant is dedicated to his 
family in the United States and would never leave his family. (Exhibits H to M)  
 
5 
 
I take administrative notice of the following facts regarding Lebanon: 
 
Lebanon 
 
Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy in which people have the constitutional 
right to change their government. It has a unicameral legislature, and a president 
elected by the legislature. Its major elected officials have been allocated among the 
various religious and ethnic groups for many years, according to the Constitution and a 
long-ago negotiated agreement among all the parties.  
 
Lebanon is located at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle 
East area. It operated under a French mandate from the League of Nations between 
World War I and II. It became independent in 1943. It was peaceful until a civil war 
erupted in 1975 between various religious factions. Due to this civil war the full exercise 
of political rights were precluded from 1975 until 1994.  
 
Lebanon has a free-market economy and a strong laissez-faire commercial 
tradition. Historically, the Lebanese have been traders throughout the Mediterranean. 
The economy is service-oriented. The U.S. enjoys a strong exporter position with 
Lebanon and is its fifth largest source of imported goods. More than 160 offices 
representing U.S. businesses operate in Lebanon. Since the lifting of passport 
restrictions in 1997, a number of large U.S. companies have opened branch or regional 
offices in Lebanon.  
 
The foreign policy of Lebanon reflects its geographic location, the composition of 
its population and its reliance on commerce and trade. Its foreign policy is heavily 
influenced by neighboring Syria, which has also long influenced Lebanon’s internal 
policies as well. For over 10 years, Syrian troops occupied part of Lebanon, and 
controlled its internal politics and policies.  About three years ago, Syria was forced to 
withdraw its troops because of Lebanese opposition expressed in a popular uprising 
against the Syrian presence.  Syria maintains some influence in Lebanon.  The U.S. 
State Department has declared Syria to be a supporter of terrorism. Lebanon, like most 
Arab states, does not recognize Israel, with which it has been technically at war since 
Israel’s establishment.  
 
 The United States seeks to maintain its traditionally close ties with Lebanon and 
to help preserve its independence, sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity. 
The U.S. provides more than $400 million in aid to Lebanon and pledged $1 billion in 
additional aid. The aid reflects the importance the U.S. attaches to Lebanon’s 
development as a unified, independent and sovereign country. 
  
Lebanon’s history since independence has fluctuated between periods of political 
turmoil and prosperity. Since independence in 1943, Lebanon’s “national policy has 
been determined largely by a relatively restricted group of traditional regional and 
sectarian leaders,” and sectarianism is “a key element of Lebanese political life.” 
6 
 
Furthermore, “Lebanese political institutions often play a secondary role to highly 
religious and personality-based politics.” 
 
During the period 1994 to 2005, post-war reconstruction in Lebanon has included 
social and political instability, economic uncertainty, problems with basic infrastructure, 
violent clashes between Israeli military forces and Hezbollah, and political 
assassinations. Political assassinations also occurred in 2006, 2007, and 2008.  
 
Although Lebanon is a parliamentary republic, it has some human rights 
problems, including: Lebanese security forces “arbitrarily arrested and detained 
individuals” and “instances of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life, torture, and other 
abuse.”  Lebanese law does not specifically prohibit torture, and security forces have 
abused detainees and used torture in some instances. Although Lebanese law requires 
judicial warrants before arrests, except in situations involving immediate pursuit, the 
government had arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Many provisions of the law 
concerning the rights of persons arrested and detained are not observed in practice, 
and security forces continue the practice of arbitrary arrest and detention. Although the 
law prohibits it, Lebanese authorities “frequently interfered with the privacy of persons 
regarded as enemies of the government.” Furthermore, “[m]ilitias and non-Lebanese 
forces operating outside the area of [Lebanon’s] central government authority frequently 
violated citizens’ privacy rights” and “[v]arious factions used informer networks and 
monitoring of telephones to obtain information regarding their perceived adversaries.” 
 
“Lebanon’s foreign policy has been heavily influenced by neighboring Syria, 
which has also long influenced Lebanon’s internal polices as well.” Syria maintained 
troops in Lebanon from 1976 to 2005.  Even after the last Syrian troops were withdrawn 
from Lebanon, Syria maintained intelligence assets in Lebanon, and “Syrian influence in 
Lebanese politics remains strong.” Syria has been designated by the United States as a 
“state sponsor of terrorism,” and has “continued to undermine Lebanon’s sovereignty 
and security through its proxies.” On May 9, 2008, the Secretary of State condemned 
the use of violence by illegitimate armed groups in Lebanon, and stated that the 
legitimate authority of the Lebanese government and the institutions of the Lebanese 
state were being undermined by Hezbollah and its allies, backed by Syria and Iran. On 
August 13, 2008, the State Department issued a condemnation of a terror attack in 
Lebanon, and on September 10, 2008, it issued a condemnation of a car bomb attack 
that killed a ranking official of a Lebanese political party. The State Department 
condemned another terrorist attack in Lebanon on September 29, 2008. 
 
Hezbollah, a “Lebanese-based radical Shia group [which] takes its ideological 
inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini,” 
is a U.S.-designated “Foreign Terrorist Organization,” and is described by the U.S. 
Department of State as “the most technically capable terrorist group in the world.”  The 
Lebanese government recognizes Hezbollah as a “legitimate ‘resistance group’ and 
political party,” and until recently, Hezbollah was represented by elected members of 
the Lebanese Parliament and on Lebanon’s cabinet.  “Hezbollah is closely allied with 
7 
 
Iran and often acts at its behest,” and “has helped Syria advance its political objectives 
in the region.”  Hezbollah also “provides support to several Palestinian terrorist 
organizations” and “is known to have been involved in numerous anti-U.S. and anti-
Israeli terrorist attacks.”  The participation of Hezbollah in the Lebanese government 
has not changed the position of the U.S. government that it is a terrorist organization. 
 
Americans have been the targets of numerous terrorist attacks in Lebanon, and 
the perpetrators of many of those attacks are still present in Lebanon and retain the 
ability to act. Furthermore, Palestinian groups hostile to the Lebanese government and 
the United States operate largely autonomously inside refugee camps in different areas 
of Lebanon. “In addition to being subject to general Lebanese laws, U.S. citizens who 
also possess Lebanese nationality may be subject to other laws that impose special 
obligations on them as Lebanese citizens.” 
 
A Travel Warning issued by the U.S. Department of State in September 2008 
and renewed thereafter alerts American citizens to “security threats and ongoing 
political violence in Lebanon.” The U.S. Department of State “continues to urge that 
Americans avoid all travel to Lebanon. Americans who live and work in Lebanon 
presently should understand that they are accepting risks in remaining and should 
carefully consider those risks, especially those in Tripoli.” The Travel Warning also 
states that “The threat of anti-Western terrorist activity exists in Lebanon; groups such 
as Al-Qaeda and Jund al-Sham are present in the country and have issued statements 
calling for attacks against Western interests in the past.” 
 
There have been cases involving the attempted illegal export of U.S. restricted, 
dual use technology to Hezbollah. In August 2005, an individual pleaded guilty to 
attempting to illegally export military night-vision equipment and infrared aiming devices 
to Hezbollah. In November 2007, an individual pleaded guilty to attempting to provide 
night-vision goggles, a thermal imaging device, and two global positioning modules to a 
person in Lebanon who was purchasing equipment for Hezbollah. 
 
The source documents for the above facts and quotations are as follows: 
 
1. U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Lebanon, dated June 29,         
2012 (3 pages); 
 
2. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: 
Lebanon, printed on October 15, 2012 (32 pages); 
  
3. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, Chapter 3 - State     
Sponsors of Terrorism, dated July 31, 2012 (5 pages); 
 
4. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, Chapter 6 - Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, dated July 31, 2012 (45 pages); 
 
8 
 
5. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, Chapter 2 - Country 
Reports: Middle East and North Africa, dated July 31, 2012 (3 pages); 
          
6. U.S. Department of State, Travel Warning: Lebanon, dated September 17, 2012 (4 
pages); 
 
7. U.S. Department of State, Remarks After Meeting With Lebanese Parliamentary 
Speaker Nabih Berri, dated June 16, 2008 (2 pages); 
 
8. U.S. Department of State, Recent Developments in Lebanon, dated March 24, 2009 
(3 pages); 
 
9. U.S. Department of State, Remarks on Lebanon and Resolution 1559, May 7, 2009 
(2 pages); 
 
10. U.S. Department of State, United States Condemns Violence in Lebanon, dated 
May 9, 2008 (1 page); 
         
11. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Statement on Terror Attack in Tripoli, Lebanon,  
dated August 13, 2008 (1 page); 
 
12. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Condemns Car Bomb Attack in Lebanon, dated 
September 11, 2008 (1 page); 
 
 13. U.S. Department of State, Statement on Bus Bombing in Tripoli, Lebanon, dated  
September 29, 2008 (1 page); 
  
14. Congressional Research Service, Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress, 
dated December 2, 2010 (67 pages); 
  
15. U.S. Department of State, Country Specific Information: Lebanon, dated October 
11, 2012 (7 pages); 
 
16. U.S. Department of Justice, Former Employee of CIA and FBI Pleads Guilty to  
Conspiracy, Unauthorized Computer Access and Naturalization Fraud, dated 
November 13, 2007 (2 pages); 
 
17. U.S. Department of Justice, Man Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to 
Hezbollah TV Station, dated December 30, 2008 (1 page); and 
 
18. U.S. Department of Justice, Naji Antoine Abi Khalil Sentenced to 60 Months’ 
Imprisonment for Attempting to Export Military Night-Vision Equipment to Hezbollah, 
dated February 2, 2006 (3 pages). 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the AG list potentially disqualifying 
conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an applicant’s 
eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process (AG ¶ 2(a)). The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on 
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an “applicant is 
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or 
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information.  Decisions include, by necessity, consideration 
of the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
 
 
10 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference 
 
     AG ¶ 9 expresses the security concern involving foreign preference: 
 
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a 
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to 
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of 
the United States. 
 
AG ¶ 10 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying. Three disqualifying conditions apply: 
 
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after 
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family 
member.  This includes but is not limited to: 
 
(1) possession of a current foreign passport; 
 
(2) military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign 
country;  
 
(3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare, or 
other such benefits from a foreign country; 
 
(4) residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements; 
 
(5) using foreign citizenship to protect financial. or business 
interests in another country; 
 
(6) seeking or holding political office in a foreign country; and 
 
(7) voting in a foreign election; 
 
(b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an 
American citizen; 
 
(c) performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as 
to serve the interests of a foreign person, group, organization, or 
government in conflict with the national security interest; and 
 
(d) any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country other than 
the United States: for example, declaration of intent to renounce United 
States citizenship; renunciation of United States citizenship. 
 
 
11 
 
 
 Applicant accepted a plane ticket from a Lebanese political party whose policies 
he did not know before voting for them in the 2009 Lebanese general election. Applicant 
stated at the hearing he would vote again in a Lebanese election. Applicant obtained a 
Lebanese passport, for which he applied in 2009, to enter Lebanon because it was 
cheaper than paying for a visa to use with his U.S. passport. The visa fee was $150. He 
performed these actions after obtaining U.S. citizenship in 1986. AG ¶ 10(a)1 and (a)7 
apply to these actions.  
 
 Applicant’s actions to obtain a Lebanese passport in 2009 were done as part of 
his effort to obtain recognition of his Lebanese citizenship by the Lebanese government 
which would issue such a passport only to persons who were citizens of Lebanon. AG ¶ 
10(b) applies. 
 
 Applicant voted in the 2009 Lebanese general election in furtherance of a 
Lebanese political party’s agenda. He did not know of its policies and whether they were 
inimical to the interests of the United States. He merely voted in return for his airline 
ticket. Therefore, his vote was purchased for the price of that ticket. Applicant had not 
lived in Lebanon since 1986. AG ¶ 10(c) applies. 
 
AG ¶ 11 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Three 
conditions may apply: 
 
(a) dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a 
foreign country; 
 
(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual 
citizenship; 
 
(c) exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship 
occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the 
individual was a minor; 
 
(d) use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security 
authority. 
 
(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant 
security authority, or otherwise invalidated; and 
 
(f) the vote in a foreign election was encouraged by the United States 
Government. 
 
 Applicant was born in Lebanon and brought to the United States in 1986 by his 
father. He has lived in the U.S. since then. His Lebanese citizenship derives from his 
birth in Lebanon and his parent’s citizenship. AG ¶ 11(a) does not apply because 
subsequent to obtaining his U.S. citizenship Applicant voted in a Lebanese election in 
 
12 
 
 
return for a plane ticket. He knew nothing about the political situation in Lebanon but 
merely voted for the political party that purchased his vote with a plane ticket. 
  
 Applicant testified he would renounce his Lebanese citizenship if he thought he 
could do so under Lebanese law. As he understands it, he cannot legally renounce his 
Lebanese citizenship under Lebanese law. AG ¶ 11(b) does not apply because he has 
not taken any steps to attempt, as a minimum, to renounce his Lebanese citizenship. 
Instead, Applicant obtained a Lebanese passport to avoid paying $150 in visa fees, then 
goes to Lebanon and votes in a national election there for the party that purchased his 
vote with a plane ticket. All these actions were subsequent to Applicant obtaining his 
U.S. citizenship. 
  
 Applicant’s Lebanese passport is in the possession of his employer’s security 
office. AG ¶ 11(e) might have applied. However, the security concern about Applicant 
voting in 2009 and his statement he would go to Lebanon and vote again does not 
mitigate the Foreign Preference security concern.    
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence: 
 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual 
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a 
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by 
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should 
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such 
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United 
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a 
risk of terrorism. 
 
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying: 
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; 
 
 
13 
 
 
(c) counterintelligence information, that may be classified, indicates that 
the individual's access to protected information may involve unacceptable 
risk to national security; 
 
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign 
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which 
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or 
exploitation; 
 
(f) failure to report, when required, association with a foreign national; 
 
(g) unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent, associate, 
or employee of a foreign intelligence service; 
 
(h) indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are 
acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and, 
 
(i) conduct, especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make 
the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign 
person, group, government, or country. 
 
 Applicant has a grandmother and aunt living in Lebanon. He also has a father 
who lives in the U.S. but has dual U.S. and Lebanese citizenship. Applicant admitted he 
has cousins in Lebanon with whom he claims he does not have contact. All of these 
relatives are citizens of Lebanon. His grandmother has a “green” card. His aunt does 
not have that card. Applicant contacts them monthly by telephone. That contact and his 
association with them during his 2009 and 2010 visits, plus his vote in 2009 in the 
Lebanese election for a political party, about which he knew nothing, create a 
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. 
Lebanon is a country in which the terrorist organization Hezbollah has a governmental 
position. The country has also been involved in a lengthy civil war that only ended in 
1994. All of these elements make AG ¶ 7(a) applicable.  
 
 Applicant’s vote in 2009 in Lebanon, and his stated desire to return to Lebanon to 
vote and vacation in the future, make him vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or 
coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country. Hezbollah is of special 
concern in Lebanon because of its terrorist operations and connections to Syria and 
Iran, who are state sponsors of terrorism. Applicant’s connections through his family 
and his own interest in returning to Lebanon increase his vulnerability. AG ¶ 7(i) applies.  
 
 
14 
 
 
AG ¶ 8 provides six conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Two 
conditions may apply: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
U.S.; 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is 
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; 
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; 
 
(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or 
are approved by the cognizant security authority; 
 
(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements 
regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, 
groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and, 
 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property  
interests are such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not 
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
  
 Applicant’s grandmother and aunt are over 60 years old and they are not in any 
governmental position in Lebanon. It is very unlikely that Applicant, who is currently 
unemployed and a mechanic in previous positions, will be placed in a position to choose 
between the interests of Hezbollah or its allies, or the Lebanese government, and the 
interests of the U.S. government. His training and employments are not of a computer, 
intelligence, or management nature, making him an unlikely target for any terrorist 
group to try to exploit. AG ¶ 8(a) applies.  
 
 Applicant testified at the hearing of his loyalty to the United States. His wife is a 
native-born U.S. citizen, his three sons were born in the United States, and Applicant 
was brought to the United States by his parents when he was only 12 years old. His 
connections here are stronger than any shown to Lebanon. However, Applicant 
demonstrated an obligation to a foreign group or government when he accepted the 
plane ticket in 2009 and voted in the Lebanese general election for a political party 
about which he knew nothing. His expressed intention to vote again in a Lebanese 
 
15 
 
 
election is of particular security concern. Applicant may not resolve any such conflicts in 
favor of the United States. AG ¶ 8 (b) does not apply.  
 
Guideline F, Financial Considerations 
 
The security concern relating to the guideline for Financial Considerations is set 
out in AG & 18:       
 
Failure or inability to live within one=s means, satisfy debts, and meet 
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or 
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise 
questions about an individual=s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to 
protect classified information. An individual who is financially 
overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate 
funds.  
 
The guideline at AG ¶ 19 contains nine disqualifying conditions that could raise 
security concerns. Two conditions are applicable to the facts found in this case: 
 
(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;   
 
(c) a history of not meeting financial obligations, and 
 
(g) failure to file annual Federal, state, or local income tax returns as 
required or the fraudulent filing of the same. 
 
Applicant accumulated $12,348 in eight delinquent debts from 2002 to the 
present time that remain unpaid. Some of the debts resulted from unpaid state business 
tax obligations. Utility and credit card bills constitute other financial obligations Applicant 
is required to pay. Disqualifying conditions in AG ¶ 19 (a), (c), and (g) apply.  
 
The guideline in AG ¶ 20 contains six conditions that could mitigate security 
concerns arising from financial difficulties. Three conditions may be applicable:   
 
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred 
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast 
doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good 
judgment; 
 
(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely 
beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business 
downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or 
separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; 
 
 
16 
 
 
(c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem 
and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is 
under control; 
 
(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or 
otherwise resolve debts; 
 
(e) the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the 
past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides 
documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides 
evidence of actions to resolve the issue; and 
 
 (f) the affluence resulted from a legal source of income. 
  
Applicant is currently unemployed. Prior to now he had a motorcycle business 
the accountant for which did not perform properly her duties. Her errors resulted in the 
state tax authority levying the tax assessments. Applicant gathered the necessary 
information to demonstrate he did pay his taxes and the tax levies were satisfied. Those 
debts are now cleared from Applicant’s record.  
 
Applicant recently reached an agreement to pay the $4,768 debt owed to a credit 
card company. He paid his utility bill and is working on the second utility bill. It is likely 
he will resolve that obligation based on his recent work on the other debts. He does not 
owe the $519 medical bill, it being actually the second debt owed to a utility company. 
The debt is to be removed from Applicant’s credit report shortly.  
 
The only unpaid debt is for the four cellular telephones. That $3,611 debt 
resulted from the premature cancellation of Applicant’s contracts with his service 
provider. Applicant is seeking a compromise of that debt. He is disputing it. The 
likelihood of success is unclear, but Applicant persists in his efforts to resolve this debt 
for a more reasonable amount.  
 
Applicant admits he owes $7,000 to $10,000 dollars on all these debts. He has 
acted responsibly in resolving these debts regardless of his employment status. He has 
resolved, or is in the process of doing so, all but one debt. Therefore, there are clear 
indications from the evidence he presented that the financial problems are under control 
and being resolved. AG ¶ 20(b) applies.  
 
Applicant has made progress in repaying his delinquent debts. He has one on an 
installment payment plan. He has one debt he disputes. The others are resolved. AG ¶ 
20(d) applies because of Applicant’s good-faith efforts to repay his delinquent debts.  
 
The cellular telephone bill is being disputed as Applicant attempts to negotiate a 
settlement. He has a reasonable basis to contest the size of the debt incurred for 
cancelling his cellular service. All of Applicant’s contacts with the telephone company 
were by voice, so he has nothing in writing. AG ¶ 20(e) applies. 
 
17 
 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the “whole-person concept,” the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 AG ¶ 2(c) requires each case must be judged on its own merits. Under AG ¶ 2(c), 
the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be 
an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines 
and the whole-person concept.        
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant was credible in his 
testimony about his domestic situation. He is a person devoted to his wife and children. 
He has worked diligently to resolve his debts. 
 
 However, Applicant’s disclosures of his Lebanese visits and voting in 2009 are 
of great concern. He has a high school education and is unsophisticated when the 
subject is foreign elections and political matters, which makes him vulnerable should he 
succumb again to a plane ticket offer to Lebanon. His character witnesses gave 
conflicting statements about Applicant’s future intentions to visit Lebanon. Applicant 
testified he would travel there and vote for a Lebanese political party again. He 
considers himself a dual citizen of the U.S. and Lebanon. These actions and intentions 
cause a security concern. 
 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. Applicant did not mitigate 
his Foreign Influence or Foreign Preference security concerns. Instead, he clearly 
demonstrated the influence Lebanon and his father have on him and the preference by 
obtaining a Lebanese passport and voting for a foreign political party in a country where 
there is a significant terrorist threat. I resolve the whole person concept against 
Applicant. I conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from his 
Financial Considerations. 
 
 
18 
 
 
Any doubt concerning any applicant considered for access to classified 
information will be resolved in favor of the national security. There is significant doubt 
about Applicant based on his past actions. (AG ¶ 2(b)) 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline C:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:   Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 1.b:   Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline B:      AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 2.a:   Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 2.b:   Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 3, Guideline C:   FOR APPLICANT 
   
  Subparagraph 3.a to 3.h:  For Applicant 
    
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
                                                    
_________________ 
PHILIP S. HOWE 
Administrative Judge