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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 10-04641
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Gregg A. Cervi,  Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
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Decision
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CURRY, Marc E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant mitigated the foreign preference security concerns, but failed to
mitigate the foreign influence security concerns generated by his relationship to his
family members who live in Israel. Clearance is denied. 
Statement of the Case
On September 26, 2012, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a Statement
of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guidelines B, foreign influence,
and C, foreign preference. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the
adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the DoD for SORs issued as of September
1, 2006. 
The 14-year-old children are twins.1
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Applicant answered the SOR on October 30, 2012, admitting all of the allegations,
except subparagraphs 1.d and 2.a., and requesting a decision on the record. On March
7, 2013, Department Counsel prepared a File of Relevant Material (FORM). Applicant
received the FORM on March 18, 2013, and he did not file a response. On May 24,
2013, the case was assigned to me.  
Evidentiary Ruling
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of the facts
contained in 11 documents submitted as Item 7, Exhibits I through IX. According to the
Appeal Board, “ a current and accurate assessment of the ‘geopolitical situation’ and the
security/intelligence profile of the [foreign] country vis-a-vis the United States is crucial in
Guideline B cases.” (ISCR Case No. 07-05686 at 4, footnote 3 (App. Bd. November 12,
2008)) Exhibit II, the National Counterintelligence Center, Annual Report to Congress on
Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, was published 13 years ago, in
2000. Because this is not recent, I decline to take administrative notice of the facts
contained within this document.
Exhibits VI through XI are press releases published by the U.S. Department of
Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security setting forth episodes of illegal or unlicensed
exports of various technologies to Israel. All of these documents, except Exhibit VIII,
concern U.S. companies violating the law. None of them involve Israeli foreign nationals
or U.S. citizens with relatives in Israel. Consequently, I take administrative notice of the
facts set forth in Exhibit VIII, involving an Israeli, but I will not take notice of Exhibits VI,
VII, and IX through XI.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 42-year-old married man with three children ages 14 and 9.  He has1
an undergraduate and master’s degree in engineering, and has worked for a defense
contractor as an electrical engineer since 2009. (Item 5 at 16)
Applicant’s mother is a U.S. citizen who moved to Israel in the early 1970s, shortly
after marrying his father, a citizen of the United Kingdom. Applicant was born in Israel.
Because his mother retained her U.S. citizenship when moving to Israel, Applicant was a
U.S. citizen at birth. He was raised in Israel as a dual citizen and moved to the United
States in 2007. 
While living in Israel, Applicant completed his mandatory military service,
participating in an academic reserve program, a ten-year program that allows Israeli high
school graduates to postpone military service until they earn their undergraduate
degrees. (Item 6 at 18) Under this program, Applicant attended basic training and officer
training school during the summers while in school. After graduating in 1993, Applicant
was assigned to an arms company owned by the Israeli government, where he worked
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as an electrical engineer for three years. (Item 6 at 18) He then became a full-time
employee of the arms company in 1996 under an Israeli directive “which allowed
academic reserve participants to convert their three years of additional service to full
time employment.” After graduating from the academic reserve program in 1999,
Applicant continued to work for the arms company through 2000, when he left and joined
a privately-owned company in Israel. 
Applicant held a top secret security clearance during his stint at the Israeli
government-owned arms company. (Item 5 at 67) He held a top secret clearance while
working for a classified project with his private employer in 2002. (Item 5 at 67)
While living in Israel, Applicant voted in several Israeli elections. Also, he
possessed an Israeli passport which he continued to use to travel to Israel after moving
to the United States in 2007. He used his U.S. passport to travel everywhere other than
Israel. (Item 6 at 26). The Israeli passport expired in January 2012.
Applicant’s wife and children are dual U.S./Israeli citizens. They moved with him
to the United States in 2007. Applicant’s parents continue to reside in Israel. His mother
is a teacher and his father is a businessman. (Item 6 at 52) Although the extent of
Applicant’s contact with them is unknown from the record, he maintains an Israeli driver’s
license to facilitate travel within Israel when he is visiting his parents and other relatives.
(Item 6 at 50) 
Applicant’s parents live in the home where Applicant lived before moving to the
United States. (Item 6 at 49) He continues to own the home and it is worth approximately
$170,000. (Item 4 at 1) As of the date of Applicant’s Answer, he was attempting to sell
the home. 
Applicant’s brother is a dual U.S./Israeli citizen. He lives in Israel and is an
engineer. Applicant has two half-sisters who are Israeli citizens and residents. One of
them is a student working on her master’s degree and the other one is a secretary for a
data storage company. (Item 6 at 49)
Applicant’s father-in-law is deceased. (Item 6 at 34) His mother-in-law is a citizen
and resident of Israel. She is a retired doctor. Applicant’s wife’s stepfather is a citizen
and resident of Israel. He is retired. Applicant is in touch with him approximately 15 times
per year, either through e-mail or telephone. (Item 6 at 45) Applicant’s brother-in-law is a
student working on a graduate degree in international business. (Item 6 at 34) He is an
Israeli citizen who lives in Taiwan with his family. There is no record evidence of how
often Applicant is in contact with any of his relatives other than his wife’s stepfather.
Applicant has approximately five close former neighbors and colleagues who are
citizens and residents of Israel. He stays in touch with them, primarily through e-mail,
approximately ten to fifteen times per year. (Item 6 at 45)
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Applicant’s net worth is approximately $1.5 million. Approximately $1.2 million of
Applicant’s assets are in the United States. The remainder of his net worth, including the
home where his parents live, a pension fund, and a savings account, constitute assets
located in Israel. (Item 4 at 1; Item 6 at 30) Applicant is in the process of liquidating his
Israeli pension fund and savings account. Recently, he sold approximately $20,000 of
these assets and transferred the proceeds to the United States. (Item 4 at 1)
Administrative Notice 
Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a modern economy. U.S.-Israel defense,
diplomatic, and economic cooperation has been close for decades. (HE XV at 5) Several
groups operating in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza have been designated by the U.S.
State Department as foreign terrorist organizations. (HE XI at 6) There is an ongoing
threat throughout Israel of terrorist attacks, kidnappings, and rocket attacks. (HE XII) 
Foreign countries, including Israel, aggressively target and acquire sensitive and
protected U.S. technologies. (Item 7 HE III at 2; HE IV) Over the years, Israeli
intelligence officers have been implicated in intelligence collection against the United
States. (Item 7, Ex. V at 35) In 1986, Jonathan Pollard, a civilian U.S. Naval intelligence
employee and his wife pleaded guilty to selling classified documents to Israel. Four
Israeli officials were indicted in connection with the case. (Item 7, Ex. V at 2, 35) 
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied together with the factors
listed in the adjudicative process. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a
conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.”
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of national security.” 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel . . .” The applicant
has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security decision.
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Analysis
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
Under this guideline, a security concern is generated “when an individual acts in
such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States.” (AG
¶ 9) Before moving to the United States, Applicant lived in Israel. He served in the
military and possessed a top secret security clearance.  He possessed a passport issued
by Israel which he used for travel to and from Israel both while living in Israel and after
he moved to the United States. The following disqualifying condition under AG ¶ 10(a)
applies:
(a) exercise of any right, privilege, or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen, or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member [including] but not limited to . . . military service or a willingness to
bear arms for a foreign country.
Applicant’s dual citizenship is based solely on his mother’s decision to relocate
from the United States, where she was a citizen, to Israel to start her family. AG ¶ 11(a),
“dual citizenship is based solely on parent’s citizenship or birth in a foreign country,”
applies. Applicant was a minor when he attended secondary school in Israel. His
subsequent pursuit of higher education in Israel and his decision to stay in Israel after
college to settle down and raise a family did not represent exercises of preference for
Israel over the United States. Rather, these actions were reflective of a young man who
had spent his entire life in his home country. In sum, Applicant technically was a dual
U.S. citizen, but Israel was his home. Consequently, although Applicant’s dual U.S.
citizenship at birth renders AG ¶ 10(c), “exercise of the rights privileges, or obligations of
foreign citizenship occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the
individual was a minor,” inapplicable, I nevertheless conclude that Applicant has
mitigated the foreign preference security concern.
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
Under this guideline, “foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if
the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in the U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest” (AG
¶ 6). Moreover, “adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of
the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including,
but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target
United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism” (Id.).
Over the years, several people have been involved with espionage against the
United States on Israel’s behalf. Applicant’s relatives who are citizens and residents of
Israel and his property interests in Israel trigger the application of AG ¶ 7(a), “contact
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with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person
who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk
of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion,” and AG ¶ 7(e),
“a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any
foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to
heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.” 
Applicant’s brother-in-law is now living in Taiwan. Although friendly countries can
conduct espionage against the United States as readily as hostile ones, it is unlikely that
a country as close to the United States as Israel, with a shared cultural history and a
similar respect for individual liberties, would attempt to utilize its security apparatus to
coerce an Israeli citizen who is not located in Israel. I conclude Applicant’s brother-in-law
living in Taiwan does not generate a heightened risk, and I resolve subparagraph 2.h in
Applicant’s favor. Also, for the same reasons, I conclude that  AG ¶ 7(d) “sharing living
quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship
creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion,”
does not apply to Applicant’s relationship with his immediate family. 
Regardless of how Israel has received classified or sensitive information over the
years, Applicant’s close family ties with relatives living in Israel, extensive financial
investments, and  past possession of a top secret Israeli security clearance render all of
the mitigating conditions inapplicable. Applicant has not mitigated the foreign influence
security concerns.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Applicant did not submit much evidence outside of his contacts and financial
interests in Israel for me to consider in my whole-person analysis. Judging by his level of
education, and his accrual of more than one million dollars of net worth by age 42, I can
extrapolate that he must be highly talented, motivated, and successful. These factors,
however, do not mitigate the vulnerability to coercion generated by his family, friends,
and financial interests in Israel. 
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Formal Findings 
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.g: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraphs 2.b-2.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.d: For Applicant
Subparagraphs 2.e-2.g: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.h: For Applicant
Subparagraphs 2.i-2.j: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                             
MARC E. CURRY
Administrative Judge