Item 4.1
1
                                                                     
                              DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 11-12063
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Daniel F. Crowley, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant was born and raised in Afghanistan. He fled to Pakistan in 2000, then
became a U.S. resident in 2002 after being granted refugee status. His mother, eldest
son, three brothers and their wives, parents-in-law, and brother-in-law are Afghan
citizens residing in Pakistan. Two sisters and their husbands are resident citizens of
Afghanistan. He failed to mitigate resulting security concerns. Based upon a review of
the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to classified information is
denied. 
Statement of the Case 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SF 86) on March 6, 2011.1
On November 21, 2012, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign
Item 1.2
Item 2. 3
The Government submitted 14 Items in support of the SOR allegations. 4
Item 4; Item 12.5
Item 2.6
Items 7 through 12.7
2
Influence).  The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding2
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines for
Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information effective within the
Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. 
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on December 21, 2012, and requested
that his case be decided by an administrative judge on the written record without a
hearing.  Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on March 11,3
2013. A complete copy of the File of Relevant Material (FORM)  was provided to4
Applicant, and he was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material in
refutation, extenuation, or mitigation within 30 days of his receipt of the FORM. 
Applicant received his copy of the FORM on April 4, 2013. On April 6, 2013, he
submitted the additional evidence (AE A) that is contained in the blue folder in the
record, made no objection to consideration of any contents of the FORM, and did not
request additional time to respond. Department Counsel did not object to the
admissibility of AE A, which is hereby admitted into evidence. I received the case
assignment on May 28, 2013.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 36-year-old employee of a defense contractor, where he has
worked as an interpreter assisting U.S. forces in Afghanistan for about two years. He
has never held a security clearance, other than a very brief interim clearance in 2009 in
connection with other potential employment, and has no military service. He completed
high school in Afghanistan and attended some English classes and vocational training
at U.S. community colleges. He is married, and has three children ages 15, 8, and 5.  In5
his response to the SOR, Applicant admitted all of the factual allegations as set forth in
SOR ¶¶ 1.a through 1.j.  Applicant’s admissions, including those made in his response6
to DoD Interrogatories and Counterintelligence Questionnaires,  are incorporated in the7
following findings.
Item 4; Item 5; Item 10; Item 12.8
Item 4; Item 12.9
Item 4; Item 10; Item 12.10
3
Applicant was born and raised in eastern Afghanistan. His father, who passed
away in 1994, was a farmer. His mother did not work outside their home. Applicant fled
to Pakistan, in April 2000, as a refugee from the Taliban, who had been repressing and
killing members of his minority sect. His elder brother had joined the military wing of a
party formed to protect their sect, leaving Applicant in danger as the male head of their
household. Applicant, using forged travel documents, went from Pakistan to Thailand,
Laos, and Singapore while in transit to Indonesia, where he was arrested and jailed in
June 2000. He had intended to continue traveling to Australia from Indonesia, along a
route followed by other Afghans seeking to work there illegally. In November 2000, the
United Nations granted Applicant refugee status, and directed him to remain in
Indonesia until another country would accept him as such. The United States granted
him a permanent resident/refugee visa on which he entered this country in November
2002. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in April 2009.8
Applicant and his wife married in Afghanistan in 1996. Their eldest son was born
there in 1998. When Applicant left Afghanistan his wife and son did not travel with him
because the Taliban was only concerned with adult males and he was not concerned
about their safety. At some later time, Applicant’s mother, wife, and son moved to a city
in western Pakistan due to their own safety concerns, presumably arising from the
increasing instability, fighting, and lack of security after the events of late 2001.9
Applicant visited his family in Pakistan from July to December 2004. His second
son was born in Pakistan in April 2005, with Afghani citizenship due to the citizenship of
his parents. The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan issued Applicant’s wife a refugee visa in
September 2006, and she traveled to the United States with their younger son. Their
elder son remained in Pakistan to help care for Applicant’s mother, and because
Applicant lacked the funds needed to pay for his travel. In October 2011, Applicant’s
wife became a naturalized U.S. citizen. In July 2010, Applicant’s second son was
granted permanent resident status. Applicant told an investigator from the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) that this son became a naturalized U.S. citizen in March
2011, but could provide no further information or documentation besides his permanent
residence card. Applicant’s wife gave birth to their daughter in the United States in
November 2007.  10
In 2004 due to a drought in Afghanistan, Applicant’s elder brother, his two
younger brothers, and their three wives, all of whom hold Afghani citizenship, moved to
the home occupied by his mother and eldest son in western Pakistan. They still live
there. The brothers all operated a local grocery shop, which provides enough income to
support their families as well as Applicant’s son and mother when he runs short of
funds. Recently, Applicant’s youngest brother opened a tailor shop. Applicant, when
able, sends his mother regular monthly payments of several hundred dollars through
Item 2; Item 4; Item 8; Item 10; Item 12; AE A.11
Item 2; Item 4; Item 8; Item 10; Item 12; AE A.12
ISCR Case No. 12-09326 at 2 (App. Bd. Jun 18, 2013); ISCR Case No. 10-02803 at 6 (App. Bd. Mar. 19,13
2012).
4
Western Union because she and his son have no other income. Applicant
communicates with his family members in Pakistan several times each month. Their
family relationship is close and strong. Applicant hopes to sponsor many of his family
members to enter the United States in the future.11
Applicant’s two sisters are resident citizens of Afghanistan, married to farmers
who are also resident citizens there. During 2010, one of his sisters had a medical
problem and he sent her between $1,000 and $1,400 to help pay for necessary
treatment. He last spoke to them and their husbands in 2010, at which time he had not
spoken to them since 1999. However, his willingness to pay for her medical treatment
demonstrates his dedication to family obligations toward his sisters. His wife’s parents
and brother are citizens of Afghanistan who, for unspecified reasons, moved to western
Pakistan in 2006 and currently reside in the same home with Applicant’s extended
family. None of Applicant’s extended family members have any connection to, or
employment history with, the governments of Afghanistan or Pakistan. Applicant stated
that, “I understand that it is going to be a risk for my relatives, that is why I did not say to
anybody that I am working for coalition forces. No one knows where or when I am
working. I understand that this is a secret and I have to keep as a secret.”  12
Applicant did not submit any evidence concerning the quality of his professional
performance, the level of responsibility his duties entail, or his track record with respect
to handling sensitive information and observation of security procedures. There is no
evidence or allegation of any security violation while he has been serving with U.S.
forces in Afghanistan during the past two years. However, he provided no information
from which to conclude that his service involved either dangerous, high-risk
circumstances, or a significant contribution to national security that could give greater
probative weight to a history of compliance with security procedures and regulations.13
He submitted no character references describing his judgment, morality,
trustworthiness, integrity, or reliability. I was unable to evaluate his credibility,
demeanor, or character in person since he elected to have his case decided without a
hearing. 
I took administrative notice of the facts set forth in Items 13 and 14 concerning
the Islamic Republics of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are incorporated herein by
reference. Of particular significance are the poor human rights situation; and the active
and hostile presence of Al Qaida, the Taliban, and other militant extremist groups that
generate instability and openly attack police and military forces of the respective
governments, as well as the local populace and U.S. persons and interests.   
5
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions (DCs) and mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶¶ 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “[t]he applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides: “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
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Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Department Counsel persuasively argued that substantial evidence in this
case established two of them: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.
After considering the SOR allegations and the record evidence, I find that an additional
DC under AG ¶ 7 is raised in this case:
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. 
Both Afghanistan and Pakistan have significant internal anti-western terrorism
threats that operate openly contrary to U.S. interests. According to Applicant, they also
have militant factions that operate against his minority sect. Accordingly, his close family
connections in those countries have more potential to generate a heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion under AG ¶¶ 7(a)
and (d), than would similar connections in many other countries.
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Applicant’s two sisters and their husbands, with whom he maintains very
sporadic communication and minimal familial relationships, are resident citizens of
Afghanistan. Applicant’s other extended family members, except his wife and two
younger children, live in an apparently temporary residence in Pakistan, without
significant evidence to indicate whether they will remain there, return to Afghanistan, or
seek permission to emigrate to the United States. Applicant shares living quarters with
his wife, whose parents are Afghan citizens and also reside with Applicant’s mother,
son, and brothers, in an area of Pakistan identified in HE II as particularly susceptible to
militant, insurgent, and terrorist presence and activity. He has an entirely legitimate,
serious interest in the welfare of her family members in Pakistan, as well as his own
family there, creating the potential for conflict of interest under AG ¶ 7(b).
These facts meet the Government’s burden of production by raising all three of
the aforementioned disqualifying conditions. Applicant’s contacts, relationships, and
connections with Afghanistan and Pakistan through his relatives who are citizens and
residing there shift a heavy burden to him to prove mitigation under applicable Appeal
Board precedent. 
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Those with
potential application in mitigating AG ¶¶ 7 (a), (b), and (d) security concerns are:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
Considered in light of the substantial anti-western terrorism threat and impending
departure of most NATO military forces from the region, Applicant did not demonstrate
that it is unlikely he could be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual or government and those of the U.S. due to his family
ties there. He has close relationships, particularly with family members now living in
Pakistan, and a strong interest in protecting his mother, son, brothers, sisters, and his
wife’s family, who are residents or citizens of those two countries. His communication
and contact with his Afghani and Pakistan-resident family members since he came to
8
the U.S. are neither casual nor infrequent. Accordingly, he failed to establish the
mitigating conditions set forth in AG ¶¶ 8(a) and (c).
The evidence also fails to establish significant mitigation under AG ¶ 8(b).
Applicant provided no evidence of longstanding relationships or loyalty to the United
States. In fact, he only came here when no other country accepted him as a United
Nations refugee during the two years after he was arrested in Indonesia while trying to
illegally emigrate to Australia. He did not establish that he has endured life-threatening
conditions or made a significant contribution to the national security, which would
sufficiently demonstrate deep or longstanding U.S. relationships or loyalties under
Appeal Board precedent.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.   
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s conduct is not in
question here. He is a mature and experienced individual, who has provided service to
U.S. military forces deployed in his native Afghanistan. However, the inherent potential
for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress from the presence of Applicant’s family
members in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains unmitigated. Placing Applicant in a
position wherein it is foreseeable that he could be forced to choose between the
security interests of the United States and the interests of his or his wife’s family is the
harm to be avoided under Appeal Board precedent. He failed to show that such
potential is diminished to any reasonable extent. His service in support of coalition
military units in Afghanistan is commendable, but does not justify placing him or his
relatives at risk of exploitation due to his access to classified information, particularly
since he left there as a refugee in fear for his safety from those who he thought saw him
as a threat to their interests. He did not demonstrate sufficient connections to the United
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States to outweigh the heightened risks and potential conflicts under these
circumstances. 
Overall, the record evidence creates substantial doubt as to Applicant’s present
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. He failed to meet his burden to mitigate
the security concerns arising from foreign influence considerations.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.i: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.j: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge