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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
----------------- )       ISCR Case No. 12-05575
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Christopher N. Morin, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Brendan M. Lill, Esquire
                                                                            
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Decision
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MARSHALL, Jr., Arthur E., Administrative Judge:
On September 4,  2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement
of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
and Guideline C (Foreign Preference). The action was taken under Executive Order
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as
amended; Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended
(Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the DOD on September
1, 2006. 
In a September 25, 2012, response to the SOR, Applicant admitted all
allegations, provided narrative explanations regarding the allegations, and requested a
hearing based on the administrative record. Government counsel converted the case to
a hearing before an administrative judge from the Defense Office of Hearings and
Appeals (DOHA). The case was assigned to me on February 7, 2013. The parties
agreed to a hearing date of March 21, 2013. A notice to that effect was issued on
February 15, 2013. The hearing was convened as scheduled.  
At the beginning of the hearing, the Government moved to withdraw the
allegation under Guideline C in light of evidence provided in response to the SOR
 Tr. 10-11.1
 Neither Applicant nor her husband performed military service in the Ukraine.2
 In addition, Applicant sought and received official renunciation of her Ukrainian citizenship from the Ukrainian3
government. She did so after the family decided to never return to the Ukraine, preferring to stay permanently
in the United States. Her renunciation request was approved in 2012. Ex. D (Certificate, dated Oct. 10, 2012);
Tr. 49-50.
 Tr. 51; Ex. E (Letter).4
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before the hearing.  Absent any objection, that motion was granted and Guideline C1
security concerns were struck from the SOR. Applicant gave testimony and offered
seven documents, which were accepted into the record without objection as exhibits
(Exs.) A-G. Department Counsel introduced two exhibits, which were accepted without
objection as Exs. 1-2. The transcript of the proceeding (Tr.) was received on April 2,
2013, and the record was closed.  Based upon a thorough review of the exhibits and
testimony, security clearance is granted.
Request for Administrative Notice
During the hearing, both Applicant and the Government introduced hearing
exhibits (HE) constituting requests for administrative notice regarding the country at
issue (Ukraine). They were accepted into the record as Applicant’s HE A and
Government HE 1. The facts administratively noticed are set out below.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 51-year-old manager who has worked for her present employer, a
defense contractor, for about seven years. At work, she is considered to be a highly
reliable, trustworthy, and effective employee. She has been married for 28 years and
raised two children.
Born in the Ukraine, Applicant moved to another eastern European country in the
1990s when her husband accepted a job there.   While abroad, Applicant was a2
housewife tending to the rearing of the couples’ children. The family moved to another
country for a brief period before returning to the Ukraine briefly in the late 1990s. In
2000, the family moved to the United States when Applicant’s husband accepted a
collegiate research position. Applicant devoted herself to learning English in order to
become an effective parent and to help her look for work. She also completed
certificate training and received multiple certifications in her current field. Meanwhile,
her children attended the local public schools.
Applicant, her husband, and their children became U.S. citizens in the late
2000s. When they became U.S. citizens, they expressly renounced their foreign
citizenship in favor of complete loyalty to the United States.  The Ukrainian passports of3
Applicant and her family were physically returned to a representative of the Ukraine at
that country’s embassy, where the documents were destroyed.  Since becoming a U.S.4
 Tr. 46.5
 Neither parent ever worked for the Ukrainian government. Tr. 58-59.6
 Tr. 93.7
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citizen, Applicant has voted in U.S. elections. She intends to remain in the United
States. 
For eight years, Applicant and her family have lived in the same home. They own
the house, which is their only residence. Their sole debt is the mortgage on the house.
They live within their means and contribute the maximum sums permitted to their
retirement accounts. Applicant and her family members are each financially secure,
including Applicant’s children, who are now college educated and gainfully employed.
The children do not have contacts in the Ukraine.  Like their parents, they consider the5
United States to be their home.
Applicant is not a member of any domestic or foreign organizations involving the
Ukraine. She has never had any work related to the Ukrainian military or government.
She was never politically active while living in the Ukraine. Neither Applicant nor her
husband have any ownership interests, financial holdings, savings, or other economic
ties in the Ukraine. Rather, they maintain retirement, savings, and checking accounts in
the United States. Applicant has visited the Ukraine four times since coming to the
United States in 2000. Two trips were as a tourist, while the other two trips were for her
parents’ funerals.  Each trip lasted about two weeks. She is devoted to her work and is6
proud to be an American. Her allegiance lies solely with the United States.7
Remaining in the Ukraine are Applicant’s sister, brother-in-law, and niece, all of
whom are citizens and residents of the Ukraine. Applicant’s sister is a physician. She
does not work for the Ukrainian government. She and her husband, a private sector bus
driver, have been married for nearly 30 years, are affluent, and well-traveled. They have
no financial issues and are presently preparing to retire. None of these relatives have
served in a foreign military. Their family and Applicant’s family exchange gifts on
various occasions. Sometimes, Applicant’s gifts to her sister have been in the form of
cash or a check, ranging in amounts from under a few hundred dollars to as much as a
thousand dollars in a given year. The sisters converse about three times a month via
Skype, often about family medical issues. Applicant’s sister’s daughter is 28 years old,
single, and lives in another part of the Ukraine, where she manages a private clinic.
Applicant speaks or emails with her about once every month or every other month.  
Applicant also has two female friends in the Ukraine with whom she maintains
contact. They are citizens and residents of the Ukraine. Applicant has been friends with
one of the women, whom she met in college, for over 30 years. She works with public
school students. At most, Applicant and this friend communicate about twice a month.
They exchange gifts on special occasions. Applicant has known the other woman for 40
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years, having met her in middle school. That woman is a private sector engineer. They
have telephonic contact on birthdays and some holidays. The gifts exchanged with
these women are nominal. 
Current Status of the Ukraine
I take administrative notice of the following facts regarding the Ukraine. The
Ukraine has existed as an independent state for just over 20 years. During that time, it
has moved to transition to a democratic society. It is ruled by a presidential-
parliamentary form of government. In 2008, the United States signed the U.S.-Ukraine
Charter on Strategic Partnership, which highlights the importance of the bilateral
relationship and outlines enhanced cooperation in the areas of defense, security,
economics and trade, energy, security, democracy, and cultural exchanges. In 2009,
the U.S. Vice President spoke highly of the relationship between the United States and
the Ukraine.
A cornerstone for the continuing partnership between the United States and the
Ukraine has been the Freedom Support Act, under which the Ukraine has received
from the United States more than $4.1 billion since its independence. Ukraine has
contributed troops and military personnel to the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Despite these facts, there has been some criticism of the Ukraine’s 2010 electoral
process. In addition, the Director of National Intelligence recently expressed concern
that the Ukraine could drift toward authoritarianism. At present, however, there is no
evidence the Ukraine’s government is presently threatened, that it target U.S. citizens
for classified or protected information, or is associated with any risk of terrorism.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the AG. In addition to brief introductory explanations
for each guideline, the AG list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating
conditions, which are required in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to
classified information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead,
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the “whole-person concept.” All available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, must be and were considered in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching my
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).8
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).9
 Id.10
 Id.11
 Executive Order 10865 § 7.12
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decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence submitted.
The Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged
in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to
rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by
Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a8
preponderance of evidence. The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  9
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration
of the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information). “The clearly consistent standard
indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.”  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access10
to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive
information.   The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily11
a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the12
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense
have established for issuing a clearance.
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Analysis
Guideline B – Foreign Influence
The concern under Guideline B is that foreign contacts and interests may be a
security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may
be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government
in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any
foreign interest. Consideration should be given to the identity of the foreign country in
which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to,
such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target U.S. citizens to
obtain protected information or is associated with a risk of terrorism. Conditions
pertaining to this adjudicative guideline that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying, as well as those which would mitigate security concerns, are discussed in
the conclusions below.
Applicant was born, raised, educated, and married in the Ukraine. She and her
family ultimately immigrated to the United States in 2000. Despite the fact she and her
husband have built a new life for themselves and their children in this country, Applicant
maintains close relationships with her sister, her sister’s husband and daughter, and
two school friends, all of whom are residents and citizens of the Ukraine.
Consequently, Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions AG ¶ 7(a) (contact with a
foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who
is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion) and AG ¶ 7(b)
(connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential
conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or
technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by
providing that information) apply. With disqualifying conditions thus raised, the burden
shifts to Applicant to mitigate security concerns
Applicant admits that she is close to the relatives and friends at issue. None of
them, however, appear to have a direct nexus with either a foreign government or
military, to be financially dependent on the Ukrainian government, or otherwise be
under scrutiny by a foreign power. While it is suggested that the Ukraine may be drifting
toward an authoritarian government, there is no evidence that the country has yet made
that move. While other concerns may exist, none appear to have compromised,
jeopardized, or impacted the United States’ strategic relationship to the Ukraine as an
ally and partner, or the friendly relations enjoyed by the two countries. Moreover, there
is no evidence the Ukraine is involved in terrorism or targets United States citizens in
the pursuit of gathering classified or protected information. Foreign Influence Mitigating
Conditions AG ¶ 8(a) (the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country
in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that
country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to
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choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government
and the interests of the U.S.) applies.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the
Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should
consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a). Under AG ¶ 2(c), the
ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an
overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and
the whole-person concept. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the whole-person factors.
Applicant is a mature and straight-forward woman who is well-educated and successful.
Since coming to the United States 13 years ago, Applicant and her husband have
become U.S. citizens, become active members of their community, raised their children,
bought a home, saved toward retirement, and made plans to remain in the United
States. Applicant is financially stable and there is no evidence suggesting that she is
vulnerable to duress, coercion, or blackmail. All evidence indicates that Applicant’s
family, assets, work, and life are grounded in the United States.
Applicant maintains an understandably close relationship with her sister, her
sister’s family, and two school friends. They exchange gifts on certain occasions and
either speak or correspond on a regular basis. However, none of these contacts
maintains a relationship with the Ukrainian government or military, or is financially
dependent on the Ukraine or any other foreign entity. Further, Applicant’s relationships
with these individuals are long-term. She has an intimate understanding of both the
Ukraine and these individuals. Therefore, should a  shift in the direction of the Ukraine’s
government and interests take place in the future, Applicant is in a unique position to
assess her contacts’ vulnerability. Based on the facts regarding the Ukraine and
Applicant’s depiction of these individuals, this scenario is highly unlikely, especially
absent evidence that the Ukraine actively targets U.S. citizens or their contacts in order
to cull confidential information. Here, neither Applicant’s Ukrainian contacts nor the
government of the Ukraine pose notable concerns in terms of either compromising
Applicant’s loyalties or her ability to protect classified and protected information. Based
on these considerations, I find that Applicant mitigated foreign influence security
concerns. Clearance is granted. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
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Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.b: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Clearance granted.
ARTHUR E. MARSHALL, JR.
Administrative Judge