KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: The Board cannot consider new evidence on appeal.  Applicant asserts that the Judge
erred in a finding of fact.  The cited error appears to be merely typographical and, therefore,
harmless.  An ability to argue for an alternative interpretation of the evidence is not sufficient to
demonstrate that the Judge mis-weighed the evidence.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASE NO: 11-08541.a1
DATE: 07/16/2013
DATE: July 16, 2013
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 11-08541
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Department of Defense  (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance.  On
August 6, 2012, DoD issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that
decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested that the case
be decided on the written record.  On May 17, 2013, after considering the record, Defense Office
of Hearings and Appeals Administrative Judge Marc E. Curry denied Applicant’s request for a
security clearance.  Applicant appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
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Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant contends that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the
evidence  was sufficient to establish that he had been making reasonable efforts to resolve his
financial problems.  As part of his submission on appeal, he offers new evidence in the form of a
narrative statement that explains his continuing actions to resolve his financial problems.  The Board
cannot consider this new evidence on appeal.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.29.
Applicant also notes that the statement in the Judge’s decision, that Applicant had retained
a debt repayment agency in July 2012, was in error, in that he had retained the agency in 2010 and
had made monthly payments of $570 to them since that time.  The Judge’s statement regarding the
date appears to be at most a typographical error when read in context with the other findings.  The
Judge based his adverse conclusions on the fact that Applicant had only “ . . . produced documentary
evidence indicating that he made two monthly payments to the credit agency between May and June
of 2012" and “[h]e failed to produce any evidence of additional payments to the credit agency, or
any evidence that the balance of the debts owed to any of the creditors have decreased.”  Decision
at 2.
 
The presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to make a
favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as
a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice
versa.  A party’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for
a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the
evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 12-11097 at 2 (App. Bd. Jun. 20, 2013).
A review of the record indicates that the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by
Applicant against the length and seriousness of the disqualifying circumstances and considered the
possible application of relevant conditions and factors. He reasonably explained why the mitigating
evidence was insufficient to overcome the government’s security concerns.  The Board does not
review a case de novo.  The favorable evidence cited by Applicant is not sufficient to demonstrate
the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  Accordingly, the Board concludes
that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for his decision.
“The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the
interests of the national security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).
Therefore, the Judge’s unfavorable security clearance decision under is sustainable.
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Order
The decision of the Judge is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan            
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: Jean E. Smallin                  
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields                
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board