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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 11-10674
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Tovah A. Minster, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
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Decision
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CURRY, Marc E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant’s relatives who are Peruvian citizens and residents do not generate a
foreign influence security concern. Applicant mitigated the foreign preference security
concern generated by her exercise of Peruvian dual citizenship. Clearance is granted.
Statement of the Case
On April 24, 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued Applicant a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) explaining why it was not clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue a security clearance. The action was taken under
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended
(Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the Department of
Defense on September 1, 2006. Applicant answered the SOR on May 15, 2013,
admitting the allegations and requesting a decision on the record evidence. On May 30,
2013, Department Counsel prepared a File of Relevant Material (FORM). 
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 Applicant received the FORM on June 4, 2013. She submitted a response on
June 24, 2013. The case was assigned to me on July 2, 2013. 
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 37-year-old woman. She has been married twice previously, with
both marriages ending in divorce. She has a bachelor’s degree in business
management and marketing, earned in 2003, and has been working for a defense
contractor as an assistant to the company’s facility security officer (FSO) since 2010.
(Item 5 at 19)  
Applicant is a native of Peru. At age 14, she immigrated to the United States with
her mother after her parents divorced. Her father remained in Peru. She has been a
naturalized U.S. citizen since 2001. (Item 6 at 31)
Applicant actively exercised her Peruvian citizenship after becoming a U.S.
citizen. She volunteered at the Peruvian consulate in the United States, helping
Peruvians living in the United States complete passport renewal forms and obtain
government identification cards. (Item 5 at 30) She traveled  to Peru eight times
between 2003 and 2007. The Peruvian consulate paid for one of her trips. (Item 6 at 40)
Applicant has held a Peruvian passport for most of her life. She used it for two of
her trips to Peru, and she last renewed it in 2007. Applicant voted in a Peruvian election
in 2006. She did so because she did not want to incur fees that the Peruvian
government imposes upon citizens who do not vote. (Answer at 3)
Two of Applicant’s trips to Peru were to receive medical treatment. In 2006,  she
began experiencing acute symptoms of rheumatoid arthritis. It got progressively worse
and hindered her ability to work. Applicant was self-employed and had no health
insurance. (Item 5 at 66) Rather than apply for Social Security disability benefits,
Applicant chose to travel to Peru and receive medical treatment that was less expensive
than the comparative medical care in the United States. (Answer at 3) While traveling to
Peru, Applicant maintained a bank account in order to transfer money from her U.S.
bank account and avoid international fees for purchasing the medications necessary to
treat her medical condition. (Answer at 3) She maintained a balance of approximately
$300. (Item 6 at 15)
As Applicant’s health improved, she was able to get a job with health insurance.
She then stopped going to Peru for medical treatment, and she closed the Peruvian
bank account in 2007. (Answer at 3; Item 6 at 38) She has not visited Peru since May
2007. (Item 5 at 55-56)
Applicant attributes her continued exercise of dual Peruvian citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen to not knowing “what the privilege of having a security
clearance entail[ed] before working with a DoD contractor.” (Response at 2) Since
obtaining her current job, she has surrendered her passport to the company’s FSO,  has
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no intention of voting in any future Peruvian elections, and is willing to renounce her
Peruvian citizenship. (Response at 2)
Applicant’s father, stepmother, and two half-sisters are Peruvian citizens and
residents. Her father is retired and in poor health. Applicant was not close to her father
while growing up because he “alienated [her] family when [she] was very young” and
was largely uninvolved with her child rearing. (Response at 1) Since his health has been
declining, Applicant has made efforts to keep in touch. She visited him during her trips
to Peru and she talks with him approximately once every other month.  
Applicant did not meet her stepmother or her half-sisters until 2006. Her
stepmother is a homemaker. (Item 6 at 36) Applicant has no relationship with her and
only talks with her when she calls her father and her stepmother happens to answer the
phone. (Response at 1)
One of Applicant’s half-sisters is a flight attendant. Applicant communicates with
her by e-mail approximately once or twice per month. (Item 6 at 38) Applicant’s other
half-sister works at a health clinic. Applicant exchanges e-mails with her approximately
four times per year. (Item 6 at 38)
Policies
The adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating
conditions. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a
conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.”
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
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the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
Under this guideline, “foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if
an individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interests.”  (AG
¶ 6) The following disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 7 are potentially applicable:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, or coercion; and
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information. 
According to the Appeal Board, “a current and accurate assessment of the
‘geopolitical situation’ and the security/intelligence profile of the [foreign] country vis-a-
vis the United States is crucial in Guideline B cases.” (ISCR Case No. 07-05686 at 4,
footnote 3 (App. Bd. November 12, 2008)) The Government provided no evidence
regarding Peru’s security/intelligence profile vis-a-vis the United States. Also, there is no
evidence that any of Applicant’s family members living in Peru are in positions that raise
a conflict of interest or serve as a source of vulnerability or exploitation. Neither  AG ¶
7(a) nor AG ¶ 7(b) applies. 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
Over the years, Applicant has volunteered for the Peruvian consulate in the
United States, traveled to Peru twice using a Peruvian passport, voted in Peru,
maintained a bank account in Peru, and used her Peruvian citizenship to purchase
medication in Peru at a cheaper cost than in the United States. These activities indicate
a preference for Peru over the United States. Under this guideline, “when an individual
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acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United
States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are
harmful to the interests of the United States” (AG ¶ 9). Consequently, the following
disqualifying condition under AG ¶ 10 applies:
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member . . . includ[ing] but not limited to
(3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social
welfare, or other such benefits from a foreign country; [and]
(7) voting in a foreign election.
Applicant did not understand the negative security implications of her activities
related to her Peruvian citizenship until she began working at her job that required a
security clearance. This does not lessen the nature and seriousness of her exercises of
foreign preference. Similarly, using her Peruvian citizenship to obtain cheaper
medication to treat a serious health condition, though emotionally compelling,
constitutes an example of what the Appeal Board has characterized as a “situational
preference.” (ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. (February 8, 2001)). As such, it does
not mitigate the negative security implications of the foreign preference either.
Conversely, Applicant’s understanding of the responsibilities of possessing a
security clearance combined with her surrender of her Peruvian passport over three
years ago, and her willingness to renounce her Peruvian citizenship make it unlikely that
any act of preference for Peru will recur. Moreover, she has not travelled to Peru in
nearly six years. The passage of time, together with the substantial likelihood that no
exercise of foreign preference will recur, outweigh the seriousness of the past exercises
of foreign preference. Applicant has mitigated the foreign preference security concern.   
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the Administrative Judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and
seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which participation
is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent
behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.”
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. Upon evaluating this
case in the context of the whole-person concept,  I conclude Applicant has mitigated the
security concern. Clearance is granted.
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Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a-1.b: For Applicant
Paragraph 2., Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a-2.e: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                             
MARC E. CURRY
Administrative Judge