1
                                                             
                           
                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 12-04565
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Alison O’Connell,  Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
                                                                            
______________
Decision
______________
LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
On March 25, 2013, the Department of Defense  (DOD) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) listing security concerns arising under  Guideline E (Personal Conduct).
The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
(DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines
(AG), implemented in September 2006. 
Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested a hearing before an
administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on May 10, 2013. A notice of
hearing was issued on May 24, 2013, scheduling the hearing for June 21, 2013.
Government Exhibits (GX) 1-4 were admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant
testified, presented one witness, and submitted Applicant Exhibits (AX) A-B, which were
admitted without objection. The transcript was received on June 28, 2013.  Based on a
review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified
information is denied.
2
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the SOR allegations in ¶¶ 1.a
through 1.d. At the hearing, the Government amended the SOR by adding an allegation
1.e to include, Applicant’s failure to disclose his use of marijuana in response to
Question 27 of a 2003 security clearance application. Applicant admitted that he used
marijuana for a period of approximately six months before completing the 2003 security
clearance application.  Applicant denied that he falsified his 2003 application. (Tr. 25)
Applicant is 32 years old. He graduated from high school in June 1999. He
married his current wife in 2012. He has two biological children and one stepchild.
Applicant served on active duty in the U.S. Army from July 2003 until July 2006.
Applicant served in the National Guard from July 2006 until July 2007. Applicant
completed a security clearance application in 2003. He believes he had two interim
security clearances after  2003. Applicant has been employed with his current employer
since March 2010. (GX 1)
Applicant admitted that he used cocaine after a friend introduced the drug to him,
from July 2007 until at least April 2008. During that time he also purchased cocaine. He
used the illegal drug about two or three times a week.  Applicant was candid that his
frequent use of cocaine affected his daily life. He acknowledged that “things started to
go downhill.” He could not pay his bills due to the cost of cocaine. He stated he was not
responsible and he lost his apartment because he did not pay his bills. 
 Applicant began employment with a company  in the summer of 2007. Applicant
was required to take a preemployment drug test. He was informed of the company’s
no-drug policy. He was also aware that he was making bad decisions. He bought
cocaine from coworkers. (Tr. 14) He never reported the use of cocaine to his employer.
(Tr. 27)
In July 2009, Applicant reenlisted in the military by joining the National Guard. He
knew he had a security clearance, completed his training and in December 2009, he
returned home. He left the national guard due to a disciplinary action. He knew he had
to make a change in his life. Applicant stopped using cocaine in April 2008. (Tr. 27)  He
did not seek any professional help. He noted that he stopped using cocaine just like he
stopped smoking cigarettes cold turkey.
Applicant claimed that he did not know that he had a “full fledged” security
clearance. He also explained that he believed the interim clearances had expired in
2006. Applicant was not credible in his denial of having a security clearance. When
questioned, he admitted that he had never received notice that his clearance had been
denied or revoked. (Tr. 22 ) When Applicant completed his January 19, 2012, security
clearance application, he noted that he had a security clearance in 2006 and that it had
never been denied or revoked. 
Applicant testified that he has changed his ways. He provides for his family and
children. He is financially stable. He stated that he does not use cocaine. He has
Counsel requested to amend the SOR to include Guideline J, based on Applicant’s disclosure. I denied      1
the Amendment. 
3
changed his friends and acknowledges his bad decisions. He enjoys his current
employment and has been granted promotions. He would like a second chance.
 During the hearing, Applicant disclosed that he had a pending criminal charge
from May 2013. He stated that he was arrested for breaking and entering. (Tr. 32) He
has alerted his security officer of the charge. Applicant has a court date in August 2013.
Applicant provided his current security officer a statement concerning the matter. (Tr.
32)1
 
Applicant submitted a letter of recommendation from a former Army platoon
leader who worked with him in 2004. He described Applicant as a quiet, disciplined
trainer and leader who is a team player. He describes Applicant’s judgment and actions
as above reproach. He operated above his pay-grade and outperformed his peers.
Applicant possesses unlimited potential for advancement. He is an intelligent and
mature individual. (AX A)
Applicant presented a letter of favorable recommendation from a former
manager. The manager described Applicant as a consummate professional who
performs his job duties with the utmost of integrity. He is an outstanding performer and
supports his customers and team members. He works with little or no supervision. (AX
B)
Applicant’s team leader testified that Applicant’s work ethic is above reproach.
He never shies away from responsibility. He has had access to secret information and
has never compromised the information. After a year, Applicant was promoted to a
senior technician position, and is currently a system administrator. He is considered a
model employee. (Tr. 46) 
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions. These guidelines are not inflexible
rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, they are applied
in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. An administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the “whole-person concept.” An administrative judge must consider all
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).      2
 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).      3
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      4
 See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive      5
information), and EO 10865 § 7.
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      6
 Id.      7
4
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. 
The U.S. Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts
alleged in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other
evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven
by Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a2
preponderance of evidence.  The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  3 4
A person seeking access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified information. Such
decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather
than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.”  “The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance5
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Any reasonable doubt6
about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be
resolved in favor of protecting such information.  The decision to deny an individual a7
security clearance does not necessarily reflect badly on an applicant’s character. It is
merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President
and the Secretary of Defense established for issuing a clearance.
5
Analysis
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect
classified information.
AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;
(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning
relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent
medical authority, or other official government representative;
(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is
not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single
guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not
properly safeguard protected information;
(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any
other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse
determination, but which, when combined with all available information
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply
with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the
person may not properly safeguard protected information. This includes
but is not limited to consideration of:
(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of
client confidentiality, release of proprietary information,
unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or other
government protected information;
6
(2) disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the
workplace; 
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and
(4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other
employer's time or resources.
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct,
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such
as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's
personal, professional, or community standing, or (2) while in another
country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is
legal in that country but illegal in the United States and may serve as a
basis for exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or intelligence
service or other group;
(f) violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the individual to
the employer as a condition of employment; and
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity. 
For AG ¶ 16(a) to apply, Applicant’s omission must be deliberate. The
Government established that Applicant omitted material facts from his 2003 security
clearance application, when he failed to disclose using marijuana during the six months
before completing the 2003 security clearance application. This information is material
to the evaluation of Applicant’s trustworthiness and honesty. When the allegation of
falsification is controverted, the Government has the burden of proving it. Proof of an
omission, standing alone, does not establish or prove an applicant’s intent or state of
mind when the omission occurred. An administrative judge must consider the record
evidence as a whole to determine whether there is direct or circumstantial evidence
concerning an applicant’s intent or state of mind at the time the omission occurred.
Applicant denies giving any fraudulent information concerning his use of
marijuana on his 2003 security clearance application. He said he did not think about it.
He also stated that he could not answer that question. He did not seem credible in his
answer. ¶ 16(a) applies.
Applicant admitted the use of cocaine, as often as weekly, from about July 2007
at  least April 2008. He also admitted purchasing cocaine during that period. Applicant
had a security clearance during that time. Additionally, Applicant admitted that he used
cocaine while working for his employer in 2007 directly in violation of company policy.
He did not report that use to his employer. ¶ 16(c) applies. After considering the
mitigating factors, Applicant has not mitigated the personal conduct security concerns
under Guideline E.
7
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. As noted above, the
ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant seeking a security clearance. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case as well as the whole-person factors.
Applicant is 32 years old. He served in the military on active duty. He is married and
has children. He has worked for his current employer since 2010.  Applicant admitted
his use of cocaine from 2007 until 2008. After having seen the effect it had on his life,
he quite using cocaine. He has not used the drug since 2008. He stopped associating
with his older friends. 
Applicant’s guarded answers about holding a security clearance are self-serving.
He was intentionally vague about the dates that he held interim clearances, but
acknowledged that he was never given notice of any denial or revocation of a security
clearance. Applicant admitted that he violated the company’s policy in 2007 by using
illegal drugs. He purchased the drugs from coworkers.  Applicant acknowledged a
pending criminal charge against him. The charge is recent. Applicant has not
persuaded me through his demeanor or testimony that he is using good judgment or is
trustworthy and reliable or suitable for holding a security clearance. For all these
reasons, Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns under personal conduct
(Guideline E).  Clearance is denied.
 Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
8
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.e: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance.
Clearance is denied.
                                                     
NOREEN A. LYNCH.
Administrative Judge