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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
         
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 12-10336
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Julie Mendez, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
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LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
On February 15, 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny Applicant a
security clearance, citing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2,
1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented in
September 2006. 
Applicant received the SOR and requested a hearing before an administrative
judge. The case was assigned to me on April 25, 2013. I convened the hearing as
scheduled on June 6, 2013. Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 3 were admitted in
evidence without objection. Applicant testified, presented the testimony of two witnesses,
and submitted one folder (AE A), which was admitted without objection. DOHA received
the hearing transcript (Tr.) on June 13, 2013. Eligibility for access to classified
information is granted.
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Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
relating to Afghanistan. (Tr. 15) The request and the attached documents are included in
the record as Hearing Exhibit I. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the
Findings of Fact, below.
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a -
1.d.  His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact. I make the following findings:
Applicant is 37 years old and was born in Afghanistan. He came to the United
States in 1985, when he was eight years old. Before he left Afghanistan, his mother was
killed and Applicant was gravely injured. His father took him to a field hospital in
Pakistan. Applicant was brought to the United States for medical treatment. He had
many operations to remove shrapnel from his body. He survived many reconstructive
surgeries. After the operations and therapy, Applicant was able to walk again. 
Applicant lived with a U.S. guardian in the United States. He had no contact with
his father in Afghanistan. Applicant graduated from an American high school, and he
received his undergraduate degree in 2005. Applicant became a naturalized American
citizen in 2004. He married in 2010. His wife was also born in Afghanistan, but she is in
the process of becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen. (AE A) He and his wife have one
child from their marriage. (GX 1)
In May, 2004, Applicant was employed as a cultural advisor by a language school
in Afghanistan. He was granted a secret clearance. For periods of time from late 2005
until October 2006, Applicant served with the U.S. Army Special Forces as a category 2
interpreter. He received a favorable recommendation from the commander. Applicant
was described as having a unique ability to communicate clearly and with clarity. He has
an excellent command of Farsi, Dari, and Pashto languages. Applicant displayed a very
good understanding of the different cultures in Afghanistan and is able to educate those
around him. He was always willing to assist the detachment. His demeanor and
professionalism made him a valuable asset to the team. Applicant understands the
dynamics of multiple cultures and levels of command that had a positive impact to
various locations. (GX 2) 
In February 2007, Applicant was hired by a defense contractor. After training for
four months, Applicant was deployed to Afghanistan in July 2007.  (Tr. 80) Applicant
worked as a human terrain systems analyst to provide combat brigade commanders with
relevant socio-cultural information and analysis to assist in operational planning.
Applicant worked in this position in Afghanistan until 2008. Applicant was praised for his
Pashto and Dari translations of conversations between village elders, the local
population, and team members. The senior social scientist, US Army, described
Applicant believed he had a phone call with his father sometime in 1997.(Tr.75)1
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Applicant as an extraordinarily pleasant and dedicated man who is driven to succeed.
(GX 2)
In August 2009, Applicant returned to work in Afghanistan with the Department of
State as a public diplomacy officer. (Tr. 89) Applicant provided information concerning
the development of roads, hospitals, clinics, and other public works by the U.S. (Tr. 90)
He remained in country until July 2010. Applicant saw his father once in 2010. He also
saw his two sisters.  
The SOR alleges security concerns based on Applicant’s family in Afghanistan.
His father and his two sisters are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. Applicant’s wife
is a citizen of Afghanistan. Applicant’s in-laws are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. 
Applicant’s wife was born in Afghanistan. She now lives with him and their child in
the United States. His father introduced Applicant to his wife in 2006. Applicant met his
wife in 2006, 2008, and 2010.  Applicant wanted a wife and a family and he agreed to an
arranged marriage. (Tr. 98) Applicant’s wife, as noted above, is beginning the process to
become a U.S. citizen. (Tr. 69) She returned to Afghanistan in 2012 to see her family.
Applicant was working there, but was called back due to the security clearance issue.
She followed him to the United States. (Tr. 112)
Applicant’s father is a citizen and resident of Afghanistan. He is a farmer in a
small province. Applicant had not seen or spoken to his father since leaving Afghanistan
as an injured child until 2006.  He now calls him monthly. (GX 1) Applicant provides1
some financial support to his father as he is the eldest child and this is part of his cultural
heritage. He estimates that he provides $1,200 a year to his father. Applicant’s father
has no connection with the government in Afghanistan.
Applicant has two sisters who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. They are
married and do not work outside the home. Applicant does not maintain contact, but he
saw them in 2006 when he was working in Afghanistan. They do not know anything
about the nature of Applicant’s work.
Applicant’s father-in-law is a teacher in a small village in Afghanistan. Applicant’s
mother-in-law is also a citizen and resident of Afghanistan. They have no connection with
the government in Afghanistan.  Applicant’s wife calls her mother occasionally. 
Applicant has no property in Afghanistan. He has no desire to permanently return
to the country. Applicant owns a home in the United States.  He has substantial assets in
the United States. (GX 2)
At the hearing, Applicant was passionate about his feelings for the United States.
He related that he is an American in every sense, and his wife will become a citizen as
soon as she is eligible. His daughter was born in the United States. He wants to continue
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serving the United States through his work in utilizing his unique skills to help the United
States bring peace and stability to a troubled part of the world.   
Applicant’s linguistic and cultural advisory skills have won him much praise during
his years working with the U.S. military. Applicant asserted his pride of U.S. citizenship
and love for his work with the Army. He went on missions with the U.S. Army. He has
willingly put himself in danger every day for years in order to help the United States.
Applicant emphasized that he would never betray the United States. He wants to “give
back” to the United States.
There is no evidence in the record that Applicant breached any security policies or
procedures while in Afghanistan. He has letters of appreciation for his work in
Afghanistan. (AE A)
Applicant has been with his current employer since 2010. Applicant’s senior
linguistic coordinating officer commended Applicant on his performance. There has
never been an issue in Applicant’s handling of sensitive information. He consistently
exercises patience, perseverance, and professionalism in all assigned tasks. He is
dependable, exercises good judgment, and has a mature outlook concerning his
endeavors. He is a team player and is committed to excellence. He is well respected by
his peers and superiors alike. (AE A) Applicant presented three awards and certificates
of appreciation for  service in Afghanistan in 2010-2011. (AE A)
At the hearing, a government affairs officer, testified that he has known Applicant
since 1987. He first met Applicant when a U.S. congressman was introduced to
Applicant who was speaking to groups throughout the United States about the political
situation in Afghanistan. Applicant testified before Congress and met the President. The
witness helped Applicant gain political asylum in the United States. He believes Applicant
to be steadfast in his devotion and loyalty to the United States.  He understands that
Applicant has visited his father while working in Afghanistan and that he married
someone from his village in Afghanistan. (Tr. 33-36)
Another witness, a graduate of West Point (a retired U.S. Army officer), testified
that Applicant was introduced to him in the 1980's. He and his wife became the
guardians for Applicant. Applicant lived with them until he graduated from high school.
He described Applicant as a remarkable young man who wanted to serve the United
States by working for a contractor in Afghanistan. He has taken risks and is an
outstanding man.  The witness served in Afghanistan in 2011-2012 with Applicant. He
commented on Applicant’s courage, tenacity, and capability working with Special Forces.
Applicant has willingly risked his life in order to serve the United States. (Tr. 50-58)
 
Administrative Notice
I take administrative notice of the following facts about Afghanistan, including the
fact that Afghanistan has been an independent nation since August 19, 1919, after the
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British relinquished control. A monarch ruled from 1919 until a military coup in 1973.
Following a Soviet-supported coup in 1978, a Marxist government emerged. In
December 1979, Soviet forces invaded and occupied Afghanistan. Afghan freedom
fighters, known as mujaheddin, opposed the communist regime. The resistance
movement eventually led to an agreement known as the Geneva Accords, signed by
Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union which ensured Soviet
forces withdrew by February 1989.
The mujaheddin were not a party to the negotiations for the Accords and refused
to accept them. As a result, civil war continued after the Soviet withdrawal. In the mid
1990s, the Taliban rose to power largely due to the anarchy and warlordism that arose
after the Soviet withdrawal. The Taliban sought to impose an extreme interpretation of
Islam on the entire country and committed massive human rights violations. The Taliban
also provided sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden, Al Qa’ida, and other terrorist
organizations.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, demands to expel Bin Laden and
his followers were rejected by the Taliban. U.S. forces and a coalition partnership
commenced military operations in October 2001 that forced the Taliban out of power by
November 2001. A new democratic government took power in 2004. Despite progress
made since the Taliban was deposed, Afghanistan still faces many daunting challenges.
Among these challenges are defeating terrorists and insurgents, recovering from over
three decades of civil strife, and rebuilding a shattered physical, economic, and political
infrastructure.
The Taliban, Al-Qa’ida, other insurgent groups, and anti-Coalition organizations
continue to operate in Afghanistan, resulting in numerous attacks and deaths. Insurgents
have targeted non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Afghan journalists, government
workers, and UN workers. Instability along the Pakistan-Afghan frontier continued to
provide al-Qa’ida with leadership mobility and the ability to conduct training and
operational planning, targeting Western Europe and U.S. interests in particular. Kabul, in
particular, has seen a rise in militant attacks, including rocket attacks, vehicle borne
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and suicide bombings.
At this time, the risk of terrorist activities remains extremely high. The country’s
human rights record remains poor and violence is rampant. According to recent reports
from the U.S. Department of State, insurgents continue to plan attacks and kidnappings
of Americans and other Western nationals. Travel warnings are ongoing. Overall, the
State Department has declared that the security threat to all American citizens in
Afghanistan remains critical as no part of Afghanistan is immune from violence.
The United States supports the efforts of the Afghan Government to establish a
vibrant civil society, one that emphasizes democratic principles through a rule of law and
creates accountable and transparent forms of government. The United States and its
international partners remain committed to helping Afghans realize their vision for a
country that is stable, democratic, and economically successful, and to an Afghan
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Government committed to the protection of women’s rights, human rights, and religious
tolerance.
On May 2, 2012, the United States and Afghanistan signed the Enduring Strategic
Partnership Agreement between the Islamic republic of Afghanistan and the United
States of America, a 10-year-strategic partnership agreement (SPA) that demonstrates
the United States’ enduring commitment to strengthen Afghanistan’s sovereignty,
stability, and prosperity and continue cooperation to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates.
Policies
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . .
control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  Id. at 527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of
Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information
“only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec.
Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as
amended and modified.  
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon an applicant meeting the
criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines (AG). These guidelines are not inflexible
rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines
are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person,
past and present, favorable and unfavorable.
The government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the
possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of
potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant concerned.”  See Exec. Or.
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is not necessarily a
determination of the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication the applicant has
not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify an applicant from
being eligible for access to classified information.  The government has the burden of
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establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).  The guidelines
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.  See ISCR Case No. 95-0611
at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial
evidence, the burden shifts to an applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the
facts.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).  “[S]ecurity clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Egan, 484 U.S. at 531;
see AG ¶ 2(b).
Analysis
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The security concern under Guideline B is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”  AG ¶ 7(a).  A disqualifying condition
also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information.” AG ¶ 7(b). 
Applicant’s father is citizen and resident of Afghanistan. Applicant had no contact
with him for more than 20 years. When Applicant was working with the Special Forces in
Afghanistan in 2006, he saw his father for a brief visit. He also saw his two sisters who
are homemakers. Applicant’s in-laws are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. They
have no connections to the government. However, they could create a potential conflict
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of interest between his security obligations and his desire to help them, only in a situation
wherein he was taken hostage or otherwise threatened with harm if Applicant did not
cooperate. Applicant maintains regular contact with his father by phone. He does not
maintain contact with his sisters or his in-laws. However, his wife keeps in touch with her
parents. However, under either disqualifying condition, security concerns could arise in
connection with the potential that hostile forces might seek protected information from
Applicant by threatening harm to his family members in Afghanistan. Based on this
evidence, AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b) are raised.
Since the Government produced evidence to raise the disqualifying conditions in
AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut, explain,
extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of
proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the
government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those
of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.
Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States,
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-0317,
2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the nature of
a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights
record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are
vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is
significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family
member is associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known
to conduct intelligence operations against the United States.
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a). The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). Similarly, AG 8(b) “there is no conflict of interest, either because the
individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or
country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of
interest in favor of the U.S. interest.”) applies.
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Applicant has been in the United States since 1985, and he has been a U.S.
citizen since 2004. His wife resides with him and his daughter in the United States. His
wife is in the process of becoming a U.S. citizen. Applicant has substantial interests in
the United States. He has no desire to return to Afghanistan to live. Applicant has had a
unique background and relationship with the United States since his childhood. 
Applicant maintains contact with his father by telephone once a month. He had
not seen his father until 2006 when he was working with the U.S. Army in Afghanistan.
He also saw his father in 2010 for a brief visit. He does not maintain contact with his
sisters or his in-laws.
Applicant’s work as an interpreter and cultural advisor supported the U.S. military
mission in Afghanistan, not the work of those who seek to destroy the growing
democracy in Afghanistan. The new Afghanistan government relies upon the United
States for support, both financially and militarily, as it moves forward with a new form of
government. While Afghanistan’s human rights record under the Taliban was dismal and
serious problems continue, its human rights record is slowly improving. Since working as
an interpreter with the Army for years, neither Applicant nor his family has been
pressured by any organization to provide any type of information, classified or otherwise,
about the United States.
In every case where a family member lives overseas, there is a risk of pressure
on this relative and through them upon the holder of a security clearance. Under the
facts of this case, a heightened risk for exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion is not substantial. Applicant has significant ties to the United States and few
ties to Afghanistan. Applicant has no financial or property interests in Afghanistan. He
wants to help the United States in its role in the redevelopment of Afghanistan.
Applicant’s ties with the United States are much stronger than his ties with Afghanistan.
The Army holds his work as a translator and cultural advisor in high regard. He provided
more than language interpretation skills. He explained nuances and practices that greatly
assisted the military in accomplishing its mission. During his time in Afghanistan, he
worked  hard to help the Army. He developed a high level of trust with the Army and the
Afghan locals.
Applicant spoke about his undivided loyalty to the United States. Based on his
unique relationship and loyalty to the United States, he can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. He came to the United States as a gravely
injured child and believes he owes his life to the United States. He did not contact his
father or return to Afghanistan for more than 20 years. In 2004, he returned to
Afghanistan at the behest of the United States. He owns property in the United States.
He  worked in the United States for many years. He endured dangerous conditions in
Afghanistan on behalf of the U.S. Army. He has no security violations. He credibly
testified that he would report someone to the U. S. Government if asked about classified
information. I find Applicant has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties
in America that he can be expected to resolve any potential conflict of interest in favor of
the United States. He has established application of AG ¶ 8(b).
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Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.
The Appeal Board requires the whole-person analysis address “evidence of an
applicant’s personal loyalties; the nature and extent of an applicant’s family ties to the
U.S. relative to his or her ties to a foreign country; his or her social ties within the U.S.;
and, many others raised by the facts of a given case.” ISCR Case No. 04-00540 at 7
(App. Bd. Jan. 5, 2007).
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Certain circumstances weigh against
Applicant in the whole-person analysis. First, Applicant’s father, sister, and in-laws live in
Afghanistan. Terrorists or agents of the Tal’iban could attempt to use Applicant’s father
or others to obtain information. These connections raise the possibility of foreign
influence. However, the connection is minimal. Applicant’s wife and child reside in the
United States. His child is a U.S. citizen and his wife is in the process of becoming a U.S.
citizen
A Guideline B decision concerning Afghanistan must take into consideration the
geopolitical situation and dangers there. Afghanistan is a dangerous place because of
the violence from the Taliban and terrorists. The Taliban and terrorists continue to
threaten the Afghan Government, the interests of the United States, U.S. Armed Forces,
and those who cooperate with and assist the United States. The United States and
Afghanistan are allies in the war on terrorism. The United States is committed to the
establishment of a free and independent Afghan Government. Afghanistan and the
United States have close relationships in diplomacy and trade.
SCR Case 04-02511 at 4 (App. Bd. Mar. 20, 2007).2
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Substantial mitigating evidence weighs in favor of granting Applicant has held a
security clearance. He has had no incidents of mishandling classified information. He
has worked with the U.S. Army and the State Department. Applicant spent his childhood
and adulthood in the United States after a grave injury that he suffered in Afghanistan.
He had no contact with his father for 20 years. He is a naturalized U.S. citizen. He is a
mature person who has lived in the United States and created a life for himself. He has a
strong sense of patriotism toward the United States, as witnessed by his work and
dedication to the U.S. government. There is no evidence that he has ever taken any
action that could cause potential harm to the United States. His former military advisors,
who worked with him in a war zone, praised his work in the cause of freedom in
Afghanistan. He has no desire to live in Afghanistan. He has established his life in the
United States. He owns property in the United States and wants to continue his life
serving the Government.
Applicant is a loyal U.S. citizen who has worked under dangerous conditions in
support of our national defense. He credibly testified that he would report any attempt to
use his family members to coerce him to reveal classified information. The Appeal Board
has held that “generally, an applicant’s statements, by themselves, as to what he [or she]
would do in the face of threats by a foreign government or entity are entitled to little
weight. On the other hand, an applicant’s proven record of action in defense of the
United States is very important and can lead to a favorable result for an applicant in a
Guideline B case.”2
Applicant served the United States in a dangerous, high-risk situation and his
character references establish his significant contributions to U.S. national security.
While contribution to a company is not normally to be considered a factor in granting a
clearance, the Appeal Board noted in ISCR Case. No. 05-03846 at 6 (App. Bd. Nov. 14,
2006):
As a general rule, Judges are not required to assign an applicant’s
prior history of complying with security procedures and regulations
significant probative value for purposes of refuting, mitigating, or
extenuating the security concerns raised by applicant’s more immediate
disqualifying conduct or circumstances. See, e.g. ISCR  Case. No. 01-
03357 at 4 (App. Bd. Dec. 13, 2005); ISCR Case No 02-10113 at 4 (App.
Bd. Mr. 25, 2005); ISCR Case No. 03-10955 at 2-3 (App. Bd. May 30,
2006). However, the Board has recognized an exception to that general
rule in Guideline B cases, where the applicant has established by credible,
independent evidence that his compliance with security procedures and
regulations occurred in the context of dangerous, high-risk circumstances
in which the applicant made a significant contribution to the nation’s
security. See. e.g. ISCR Case No. 04-12363 at 2 (App. Bd. July 14, 2006).
The presence of such circumstances can give credibility to an applicant’s
assertion that he can be relied upon to recognize, resist, and report to a
foreign power’s attempts at coercion or exploitation.
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After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and all facts and
circumstances in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the
security concerns pertaining to foreign influence. The complicated state of affairs in
Afghanistan places a significant burden on Applicant to demonstrate that his foreign
family members do not pose an unacceptable security risk.  He has met that burden.
 I conclude that the whole-person analysis weighs heavily toward approval of his
security clearance. Assuming a higher authority reviewing this decision determines the
mitigating conditions articulated under AG ¶ 8 do not apply, I conclude the whole-person
analysis standing alone is sufficient to support approval of a security clearance in this
case. Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. 
Formal Findings
I make the following formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set
forth in the SOR, as required by Directive ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3:
Paragraph 1, Foreign Influence: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.d: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
Noreen A. Lynch
Administrative Judge