1
                                                                     
                              DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 12-10611
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Pamela Benson, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant was born and raised in Pakistan. He served in the Pakistani Air Force
for nine years, then was medically discharged. In 1986 he immigrated to seek U.S.
employment on a tourist visa, then became a temporary U.S. resident in 1988 after
qualifying as a “seasonal agricultural worker.” He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in
1999, and has been a taxi driver in a major city since then. His mother, three brothers,
five sisters, and many in-laws are all resident citizens of Pakistan. His wife and two
daughters are resident citizens of Pakistan, despite having been granted U.S.
permanent resident status that has since lapsed. He failed to mitigate resulting security
concerns. Based upon a review of the pleadings and exhibits, eligibility for access to
classified information is denied. 
Item 5.1
Item 1.2
Item 4. He answered DOHA interrogatories (Item 7) at the same time.  Pages 25-30 of Item 7 are misfiled3
additional pages of Applicant’s SOR answer that should be attached to Item 4. 
The Government submitted eight Items in support of the SOR allegations. 4
Item 5; Item 12.5
Item 4; Item 7.6
Item 6; Item 7.7
2
Statement of the Case 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SF 86) on August 1, 2011.1
On February 13, 2013, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under Guidelines B (Foreign
Influence) and C (Foreign Preference).  The action was taken under Executive Order2
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
effective within the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. 
Applicant answered the SOR in an undated writing, and requested that his case
be decided by an administrative judge on the written record without a hearing.3
Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on June 7, 2013. A
complete copy of the File of Relevant Material (FORM)  was provided to Applicant, and4
he was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation,
extenuation, or mitigation within 30 days of his receipt of the FORM. Applicant received
his copy of the FORM on July 4, 2013. He submitted no additional evidence, made no
objection to consideration of any contents of the FORM, and did not request additional
time to respond. I received the case assignment on August 22, 2013.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 63-year-old employee of a defense contractor, where he was hired
to work as a linguist two years ago. He has never held a U.S. security clearance. He
completed high school in Pakistan in 1965. In 1966 he enlisted in the Pakistani Air
Force, and served for nine years as a radio operator until being medically discharged for
color blindness. He is married, and has three children ages 32, 22, and 20.  Applicant5
admitted all of the factual allegations set forth in the SOR, with explanations.6
Applicant’s admissions, including those made in his response to DoD Interrogatories
and during counterintelligence screening,  are incorporated in the following findings.7
Item 5; Item 7.8
Item 5; Item 6; Item 7.9
Item 5; Item 7.10
3
Applicant was born and raised in northwest Pakistan. His father, who passed
away in 1996, served in Pakistan’s army as a signal operator for almost 20 years. At the
time, it was under British control. In 1958 he left the army and worked as a salesman for
a tea company until about 1975. Applicant’s mother did not work outside their home.
She lives in the family home in Pakistan with Applicant’s youngest brother, who owns a
small phone shop, and his wife. Applicant has three other brothers. One of them has
become a naturalized U.S. citizen, and has worked as a contract linguist for U.S. forces
in Afghanistan. In August 2011, Applicant said that the other two brothers had gone to
the United Arab Emirates to work as truck drivers, but still considered themselves
resident citizens of Pakistan. Applicant’s five sisters are married resident citizens of
Pakistan who do not work outside their homes. In his response to the SOR, Applicant
said that his three brothers and five sisters are citizens of Pakistan and reside there
because, “They are better off and happy to live there in our own native town.”
Applicant’s brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, and son-in-law, are also citizens of Pakistan
and reside there. Applicant maintains regular contact with his mother and brothers, but
only contacts his sisters and in-laws in case of a family problem or during his visits to
Pakistan. None of his living relatives have any connection to Pakistani military or
intelligence services.8
About a year after Applicant was discharged from the Pakistani air force in 1975,
he moved to Oman to seek better employment opportunities. He worked there for ten
years as a tradesman, truck driver, and restaurant manager. In 1986 he decided to
move to the United States, and obtained a tourist visa on which he immigrated. He
successfully applied to become a temporary U.S. resident in 1988 after qualifying as a
“seasonal agricultural worker.” He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1999, and has
been a taxi driver in a major city since then.    9
Applicant and his wife entered into an arranged marriage in 1978. Shortly
thereafter, he returned to Oman to work. His wife stayed in Pakistan. Applicant first
sponsored her and their three children to enter the United States in about January 2002.
After three months, his wife and two daughters decided to return to Pakistan. His son
remained with Applicant and has since become a naturalized U.S. citizen. One of his
daughters married a medical doctor in Pakistan in 2006, and lives there with him. Her
U.S. permanent resident status has since lapsed. Applicant again sponsored his wife
and other daughter for permanent resident visas in 2007, but they again returned to
Pakistan after about three months and his wife’s U.S. resident status has lapsed. This
daughter is attending medical school in Pakistan. Applicant said that she obtained U.S.
citizenship and plans to return to live in the United States after she finishes her medical
education. However, it is not clear when or how she could have qualified for or been
granted U.S. citizenship during her short periods of actual residence here.  10
Item 5; Item 6; Item 7.11
Item 7.12
Applicant did not object to the Administrative Notice request or dispute any facts set forth therein. 13
4
Applicant and his wife purchased a home in Pakistan where his wife and their
student daughter still live. He said that the home is owned solely in his wife’s name,
although she has never worked outside their home or earned income. Applicant
regularly sends funds to his wife and daughter to pay their living and medical school
expenses in Pakistan, and lives in their home while visiting there. Applicant lives in a
rented apartment with his son in the United States. He had some relatively small
delinquent debts in 2011 that he could not afford to repay, and offered no evidence of
any assets in the United States.11
Applicant visited his wife and family in Pakistan, using his U.S. passport, for
periods ranging from several weeks to several months in 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and
2011. During the last of those visits he obtained a Pakistani National Identification Card
that is valid for seven years. The card allows him to enter and visit Pakistan without
obtaining a visa, but does not confer any other rights or benefits to him. He considers
himself solely a citizen of the United States, and surrendered his Pakistani passport
upon obtaining U.S. citizenship.12
Applicant did not submit any evidence concerning the quality of his professional
performance, the level of responsibility his duties entail, or his track record with respect
to handling sensitive information and observation of security procedures. There is no
evidence that he has served with U.S. forces overseas. He submitted no character
references describing his judgment, morality, trustworthiness, integrity, or reliability. I
was unable to evaluate his credibility, demeanor, or character in person since he
elected to have his case decided without a hearing. 
I took administrative notice of the facts set forth in Department Counsel’s request
concerning the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which are incorporated herein by
reference.  Of particular significance are the poor human rights situation; and the active13
and hostile presence of Al Qaida, the Taliban, and other militant extremist groups that
generate instability and openly attack police, security, and military forces; as well as the
local populace and U.S. persons and interests.   
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions (DCs) and mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
5
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶¶ 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “[t]he applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides: “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
6
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Department Counsel persuasively argued that substantial evidence in this
case established three of them: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation. 
Pakistan has significant internal anti-western terrorism threats that operate
openly contrary to U.S. interests. Accordingly, his close family connections in that
country have more potential to generate a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion under AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (e), than would
similar connections in many other countries.
Applicant’s mother, wife, two daughters, eight siblings, and many in-laws are
resident citizens of Pakistan. His wife and daughter, who are financially dependent on
him, live in the home they own in northwest Pakistan - an area particularly susceptible
to militant, insurgent, and terrorist presence and activity. He has an entirely legitimate,
serious interest in the welfare of his family members in Pakistan, creating the potential
for conflict of interest under AG ¶ 7(b). Although the value of the home is not
established in the record, it is Applicant’s immediate family’s only significant asset and
accordingly constitutes a substantial foreign interest for purposes of AG ¶ 7(e).
These facts meet the Government’s burden of production by raising all three of
the aforementioned disqualifying conditions. Applicant’s contacts, relationships, and
connections with Pakistan through his relatives who are citizens and residing there shift
a heavy burden to him to prove mitigation under applicable Appeal Board precedent. 
7
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Those with
potential application in mitigating AG ¶¶ 7 (a), (b), and (e) security concerns are:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation; and
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.  
Considered in light of the substantial anti-western terrorism threat and impending
departure of most NATO military forces from the region, Applicant did not demonstrate
that it is unlikely he could be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual or government and those of the U.S. due to his family
ties there. He has close relationships with family members now living in Pakistan, and a
strong interest in protecting his mother, wife, daughters, siblings, and in-laws there. His
communication and contact with his Pakistan-resident family members since he came to
the U.S. are neither casual nor infrequent, and he has regularly visited there for
extended periods. Accordingly, he failed to establish the mitigating conditions set forth
in AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(c).
The evidence also fails to establish significant mitigation under AG ¶¶ 8(b) or 8(f).
Applicant provided no evidence of longstanding relationships or loyalty to the United
States. He came here to earn more money to support his family than he could earn in
Pakistan or Oman. He twice tried to convince his wife and daughters to join him here as
permanent residents, but they returned to live in Pakistan after only a few months. Their
only substantial family assets are in the family home in Pakistan. He neither claimed nor
established that he has endured life-threatening conditions or made a significant
contribution to the national security, which would sufficiently demonstrate deep or
longstanding U.S. relationships or loyalties under Appeal Board precedent.
8
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
AG ¶ 9 expresses the security concern regarding foreign preference:
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of
the United States.
AG ¶ 10 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Department Counsel unpersuasively argued that substantial evidence in
this case established one of them: 
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member. This includes but is not limited to:
     (3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare, or other
such benefits from a foreign country.
The SOR allegation under this guideline involves Applicant’s acquisition of a
Pakistani identity card that permits him to enter Pakistan as a U.S. citizen without
having to obtain a separate visa for each visit. The card affords him no right, privilege,
or benefit of Pakistani citizenship. Its existence, and his ongoing possession of it, do not
establish any security concerns under the asserted DC or any other provision in AG ¶¶
9 or 10. 
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.   
9
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s conduct is not in
question here. He is a mature and experienced individual, who is seeking to provide
service to U.S. military forces deployed overseas. However, the inherent potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress from the presence of Applicant’s family
members and home in Pakistan remains unmitigated. Placing Applicant in a position
wherein it is foreseeable that he could be forced to choose between the security
interests of the United States and the interests of his family is the harm to be avoided
under Appeal Board precedent. He failed to show that such potential is diminished to
any reasonable extent. His willingness and desire to serve in support of deployed
coalition military units is commendable, but does not justify placing him or his relatives
at risk of exploitation due to his access to classified information. He did not demonstrate
sufficient connections to the United States to outweigh the heightened risks and
potential conflicts under these circumstances. 
Overall, the record evidence creates substantial doubt as to Applicant’s present
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. He failed to meet his burden to mitigate
the security concerns arising from foreign influence considerations.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.f: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge