1The Government submitted ten items in support of its case.
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
         
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 12-09340
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Richard Stevens, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
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LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
On September 7, 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny Applicant a
security clearance, citing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2,
1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented in
September 2006. 
Applicant received the SOR and requested an administrative determination in lieu
of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted a File of Relevant Material (FORM), dated
August 27, 2013. Applicant received the FORM on September 23, 2013.1 He submitted
additional documentation in a timely manner. The case was assigned to me on October
17, 2013. Based on a review of the file, I find Applicant has mitigated the security
2Two brothers are citizens and residents of Germany.
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concerns raised under Guideline B.  Eligibility for access to classified information is
granted.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
The Government, through Department Counsel, requested that I take
administrative notice of certain facts relating to Afghanistan. The request and the
attached documents are included in the record file. The facts administratively noticed are
set out in the Findings of Fact, below.
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations under
Guideline B in ¶¶ 1.a-1.f.  His admissions are incorporated in my findings of fact. I make
the following findings:
Applicant is 45 years old and was born in Afghanistan. He came to the United
States in 1987, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in March 2001. In 1992, Applicant
married his wife who was born in Afghanistan. She became a naturalized citizen in
March 2001. As a result of the marriage, they have three children, who are United States
citizens. 
Applicant is an employee of a defense contractor and is currently deployed to
Afghanistan working with U.S. Armed Forces as a Category II linguist. Applicant’s
security clearance application notes that he had applied for a security clearance in
December 2011 while working in Afghanistan. (Item 4) 
Applicant’s parents, two brothers, and four sisters are naturalized U.S. citizens
and reside in the United States. They left Afghanistan in 1983 and fled to Pakistan as
refugees. Applicant fled to avoid serving in the Afghan military. (Item 5) While in
Pakistan, after fleeing from Afghanistan, he had to join a group that was supported by
the United States. He was informed that this group was in favor of U.S. interests and was
told to sign up. Applicant needed an identification card so that he could remain in
Pakistan. (Item 5) When he left Pakistan, he had no more involvement with this group.
He has no ties or contacts with anyone in the group.2
The SOR alleges security concerns based on Applicant’s extended family in
Afghanistan. His one brother, aunt, cousin and friend are citizens and residents of
Afghanistan. Applicant traveled to Afghanistan in 2011 (April to July). The SOR further
alleges that  Applicant was a member of HUM in Pakistan (1983r).  Finally, the SOR
alleges that Applicant will inherit his parents’ property in Afghanistan.
Applicant outlined the extent of his contacts with his family in Afghanistan.
Applicant estimates that he has over 100 relatives remaining in Afghanistan, but he has
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infrequent contacts with a few of them. (Item 10) He contacts his aunt, who is a teacher,
and a friend by phone on a monthly basis. (Item 6) Applicant  traveled to Afghanistan for
his brother’s wedding in 2011. (Item 4) He had not seen his aunt since 1983.  None of
the family members have contact with the government. The cousin is the son of his aunt.
He occasionally speaks to him if he calls his aunt. 
Applicant’s brother, who is a naturalized U.S. citizen worked in Afghanistan as a
linguist. He has been a naturalized citizen since 1996. He now lives in the United
States. (Item 10)
Applicant considers the United States as his homeland. He is not interested in
living in Afghanistan. He and his family has lived in the United States for many years,
working, going to school, paying taxes, and have sworn to protect the interests of the
United States. He explained in a security screening questionnaire that he has never
been threatened or blackmailed by anyone, and if he was, he would “call the police right
away.”
Applicant worked for the military as a cultural advisor before taking the job as
linguist in Afghanistan. From 2003 until 2008, he was employed on a part time basis as a
foreign language role player supporting U.S. defense operations. (Item 12-13). He
realizes that he has peace, security, and human rights in the United States. His loyalty is
to the United States.
As to inheriting any property from his parents, he has no interest in that. He is one
of ten children. He knows that his parents have two parcels of land of unspecified value,
one of which is improved with a house. (Item 5)
There is no evidence in the record that Applicant breached any security policies or
procedures while in Afghanistan. 
Administrative Notice
I take administrative notice of the following facts about Afghanistan, including the
fact that Afghanistan has been an independent nation since August 19, 1919, after the
British relinquished control. A monarch ruled from 1919 until a military coup in 1973.
Following a Soviet-supported coup in 1978, a Marxist government emerged. In
December 1979, Soviet forces invaded and occupied Afghanistan. Afghan freedom
fighters, known as mujaheddin, opposed the communist regime. The resistance
movement eventually led to an agreement known as the Geneva Accords, signed by
Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union which ensured Soviet
forces withdrew by February 1989.
The mujaheddin were not a party to the negotiations for the Accords and refused
to accept them. As a result, civil war continued after the Soviet withdrawal. In the mid
1990s, the Taliban rose to power largely due to the anarchy and warlordism that arose
after the Soviet withdrawal. The Taliban sought to impose an extreme interpretation of
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Islam on the entire country and committed massive human rights violations. The Taliban
also provided sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden, Al Qa’ida, and other terrorist
organizations.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, demands to expel Bin Laden and
his followers were rejected by the Taliban. U.S. forces and a coalition partnership
commenced military operations in October 2001 that forced the Taliban out of power by
November 2001. A new democratic government took power in 2004. Despite progress
made since the Taliban was deposed, Afghanistan still faces many daunting challenges.
Among these challenges are defeating terrorists and insurgents, recovering from over
three decades of civil strife, and rebuilding a shattered physical, economic, and political
infrastructure.
The Taliban, Al-Qa’ida, other insurgent groups, and anti-Coalition organizations
continue to operate in Afghanistan, resulting in numerous attacks and deaths. Insurgents
have targeted non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Afghan journalists, government
workers, and UN workers. Instability along the Pakistan-Afghan frontier continued to
provide al-Qa’ida with leadership mobility and the ability to conduct training and
operational planning, targeting Western Europe and U.S. interests in particular. Kabul, in
particular, has seen a rise in militant attacks, including rocket attacks, vehicle borne
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and suicide bombings.
At this time, the risk of terrorist activities remains extremely high. The country’s
human rights record remains poor and violence is rampant. According to recent reports
from the U.S. Department of State, insurgents continue to plan attacks and kidnappings
of Americans and other Western nationals. Travel warnings are ongoing. Overall, the
State Department has declared that the security threat to all American citizens in
Afghanistan remains critical as no part of Afghanistan is immune from violence.
The United States supports the efforts of the Afghan Government to establish a
vibrant civil society, one that emphasizes democratic principles through a rule of law and
creates accountable and transparent forms of government. The United States and its
international partners remain committed to helping Afghans realize their vision for a
country that is stable, democratic, and economically successful, and to an Afghan
Government committed to the protection of women’s rights, human rights, and religious
tolerance.
On May 2, 2012, the United States and Afghanistan signed the Enduring Strategic
Partnership Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United
States of America, a 10-year-strategic partnership agreement (SPA) that demonstrates
the United States’ enduring commitment to strengthen Afghanistan’s sovereignty,
stability, and prosperity and continue cooperation to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates.
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Policies
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . .
control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  Id. at 527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of
Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information
“only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec.
Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as
amended and modified.  
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon an applicant meeting the
criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines (AG). These guidelines are not inflexible
rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines
are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person,
past and present, favorable and unfavorable.
The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the
possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of
potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant concerned.”  See Exec. Or.
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is not necessarily a
determination of the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication the applicant has
not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance
Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify an applicant from
being eligible for access to classified information.  The Government has the burden of
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).  The guidelines
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.  See ISCR Case No. 95-0611
at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  
Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial
evidence, the burden shifts to an applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the
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facts.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).  “[S]ecurity clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Egan, 484 U.S. at 531;
see AG ¶ 2(b).
Analysis
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The security concern under Guideline B is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”  AG ¶ 7(a).  A disqualifying condition
also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information.” AG ¶ 7(b). 
Applicant admits that his aunt, cousin, and friend, are citizens and residents of
Afghanistan. Applicant has some limited contact with them. He saw them in 2011 at the
wedding.  However, under either disqualifying condition, security concerns could arise in
connection with the potential that hostile forces might seek protected information from
Applicant by threatening harm to his family members or friend in Afghanistan. Based on
this evidence, AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b) are raised.
Since the Government produced evidence to raise the disqualifying conditions in
AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut, explain,
extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of
proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the
government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 
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 Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those
of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.
Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States,
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-0317,
2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the nature of
a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human rights
record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are
vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is
significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family
member is associated with or dependent upon the government, the country is known to
conduct intelligence operations against the United States, or the foreign country is
associated with a risk of terrorism.
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a). The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). Similarly, AG 8(b) “there is no conflict of interest, either because the
individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or
country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of
interest in favor of the U.S. interest” applies.
Applicant presented sufficient information to mitigate the security concerns given
his relationships and frequency of contact with his relatives in Afghanistan. His work as a
linguist supporting the U.S. military in Afghanistan is laudable. The record shows that he
is now working in Afghanistan as a linguist and worked in the United States in a cultural
role to help the U.S. military. 
Applicant’s immediate family are citizens and residents of the United States. He
has been in the United States since 1987. He is a naturalized citizen. His children are in
the United States. His home is in the United States. Applicant had not returned to
Afghanistan until 2011, when he attended a wedding. He had not seen his Aunt since
1983. He has some contact by telephone. 
Applicant’s work as an interpreter and cultural advisor supported the U.S. military
mission in Afghanistan, not the work of those who seek to destroy the growing
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democracy in Afghanistan. The new Afghanistan government relies upon the United
States for support, both financially and militarily, as it moves forward with a new form of
government. While Afghanistan’s human rights record under the Taliban was dismal and
serious problems continue, its human rights record is slowly improving. Applicant has
worked as an interpreter with the U.S. military. There is no evidence that Applicant or his
family has been pressured by any organization to provide any type of information,
classified, or otherwise , to the United States. 
In every case where a family member lives overseas, there is a risk of pressure
on this relative and through them upon the holder of a security clearance. Under the
facts of this case, a heightened risk for exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion is not substantial. Applicant has significant ties to the United States and few
ties to Afghanistan. Applicant has no financial or property interests in Afghanistan. He
has no interest in his family’s property. He wants to help the United States in its role in
the redevelopment of Afghanistan. Applicant’s ties with the United States are much
stronger than his ties with Afghanistan. 
Applicant’s response to the FORM emphasized that his children were born and
raised in the United States. They are his family. His father, mother, sisters, and brothers
are United States citizens. Neither, he nor his family are interested in going back to
Afghanistan to live. He has worked, paid taxes, and sworn to protect the United States.
He intends to do so. I find Applicant has deep and longstanding relationships and
loyalties  in America. He can be expected to resolve any potential conflict of interest in
favor of the United States.  He has established mitigation of the foreign influence security
concerns. 
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.
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The Appeal Board requires the whole-person analysis address “evidence of an
applicant’s personal loyalties; the nature and extent of an applicant’s family ties to the
U.S. relative to his or her ties to a foreign country; his or her social ties within the U.S.;
and, many others raised by the facts of a given case.” ISCR Case No. 04-00540 at 7
(App. Bd. Jan. 5, 2007).
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Certain circumstances weigh against
Applicant in the whole-person analysis. First, Applicant’s aunt, cousin, and friend live in
Afghanistan. Terrorists or agents of the Taliban could attempt to use Applicant’s family or
others to obtain information. These connections raise the possibility of foreign influence.
However, the foreign connection is minimal in this case. Applicant’s immediate family are
all U.S. citizens and residents in the United States. His children are in the United States.
Applicant supplemented the record to submit sufficient mitigating information. 
A Guideline B decision concerning Afghanistan must take into consideration the
geopolitical situation and dangers there. Afghanistan is a dangerous place because of
the violence from the Taliban and terrorists. The Taliban and terrorists continue to
threaten the Afghan Government, the interests of the United States, U.S. Armed Forces,
and those who cooperate with and assist the United States. The United States and
Afghanistan are allies in the war on terrorism. The United States is committed to the
establishment of a free and independent Afghan Government. Afghanistan and the
United States have close relationships in diplomacy and trade.
Substantial mitigating evidence weighs in favor of granting Applicant a security
clearance. He is a naturalized U.S. citizen and has served the U.S. Army as a linguist in
Afghanistan. He is a mature person who has lived in the United States and created a life
for himself.  He has no desire to live in Afghanistan. He wants to continue his life serving
the Government.
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, and all the facts and
circumstances in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has  mitigated the
security concerns pertaining to foreign influence. The complicated state of affairs in
Afghanistan places a significant burden on Applicant to demonstrate that his foreign
family members do not pose an unacceptable security risk. Applicant has met that
burden.
I conclude that the whole-person analysis weighs heavily toward approval of his
security clearance. Assuming a higher authority reviewing this decision determines the
mitigating conditions articulated under AG ¶ 8 do not apply, I conclude the whole-person
analysis standing alone is sufficient to support approval of a security clearance in this
case. 
 
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Formal Findings
I make the following formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set
forth in the SOR, as required by Directive ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3:
Paragraph 1, Foreign Influence: FOR  APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a-1.f: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
_________________
Noreen A. Lynch
Administrative Judge