DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
                                                                      )                                                          
           ----------------------------------                  )     ISCR  Case No.  12-01122           
                                                              )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Ray Blank, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
 Decision
______________
WESLEY, Roger C., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I conclude that
Applicant mitigated the security concerns covering foreign preference and foreign
influence. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
Statement of Case
On July 10, 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) detailing reasons why the DOD could not make the affirmative
determination of eligibility for granting a security clearance, and the DOD
recommended referral to an administrative judge to determine whether a security
clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked. The  ac t i on  was  t a ken
under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry
(February 20, 1960), as amended, Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as
amended (directive), and the Adjudicative Guidelines (AGs) implemented by the
Department of Defense on September 1, 2006.  
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Applicant responded to the SOR on August 1, 2013, and requested a hearing.
The case was assigned to me on September 6, 2013, and was scheduled for hearing on
September 25, 2013. The hearing was convened on that date. At hearing, the
Government's case consisted of two exhibits (GEs 1-2). Applicant relied on one witness
(himself) and five exhibits (AEs A-E). The transcript (Tr.) was received on October 3,
2013.  
Besides the exhibits offered by the parties, I took administrative notice of 14
documents cited in the Government’s Administrative Notice: Annual Report to Congress
on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage - 2008, Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive (July 2009); Annual Report to Congress on Foreign
Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage-2000, Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive (undated); Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets
in Cyberspace, Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial
Espionage, 2009-2011, Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive  (October
2011); Summary of Major U.S. Espionage, Economic Espionage, Trade Secret and
Embargo-Related Criminal Cases, January 2007 to the Present (Feb. 2013); High Tech
Firms/Executives Sentenced in Export Case, U.S. Department of Commerce
(November 2005);  Chyron Corporation Settles Charges of Unlicensed Export to India,
U.S. Department of Commerce (August 2004); Berkeley Nucleonics Corporation Settles
Charges of Unlicensed Exports, U.S. Department of Commerce (June 2004); Sentry
Settles Charges of Unlicensed Exports, U.S. Department of Commerce (June 2004);
Background Note: India, U.S. Department of State (April 2012); Country Specific
Information, India, U.S. Department of State (January 2013); 2011 Country Reports on
Terrorism, Chapter 2-Country Reports, U.S. Department of State (July 2012); 2008
Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 2-Country Reports, U.S. Department of State
(April 2009); Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012: India, U.S.
Department of State (2012); CRS Report for Congress: India-U.S. Relations: Strategic
Issues, Congressional Research Service (January 2013).
Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for
administrative proceedings. Administrative notice is appropriate for noticing facts or
government reports that are well known.  See Stein, Administrative Law, Section 25.01
(Bender & Co. 2006). For good cause shown, administrative notice was granted with
respect to the above-named background reports addressing the geopolitical situation in
India, consistent with the provisions of Rule 201 of Fed. R. Evid. 
Procedural Issues
Before the close of the hearing, Applicant requested leave to supplement the
record to document: (a) his wife’s renunciation of her Indian citizenship upon acquisition
of citizenship of another country; (b) copies of his wife’s Indian passport with
cancellation notice; and (c) a copy of a verification screen substantiating his wife’s U.S.
security clearance verification.  For good cause shown, Applicant was granted seven
days to supplement the record; Department Counsel was afforded two days to respond.
Within the time permitted, Applicant submitted copies of his wife’s Indian citizenship
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verification, passport cancellation, security clearance verification, and an endorsement
email from his senior manager. Applicant’s exhibits were received without objection, and
were admitted as AEs F-I.
For good cause shown, I granted Applicant an additional seven days to
supplement the record to document his election to surrender his Person of India Origin
(PIO) card or retain the card. The Government was afforded two days to respond. After
exploring other surrender options, Applicant elected to voluntarily surrender his PIO
card to his employer’s facility security officer (FSO). Applicant’s documented surrender
was admitted without objection as AE J. 
Summary of Pleadings
Under Guideline B, Applicant allegedly has (a) a mother-in-law, father-in-law,
brother-in-law, and sister-in-law who are citizens and residents of India; (b) extended
family members who are citizens and residents of India; and (c) a spouse’s uncle who
worked for the government of India (capacity unknown). Under Guideline C, Applicant
allegedly obtained a Person of Indian Origin (PIO) card for himself, his wife, and his two
children. 
In his response to the SOR, Applicant admitted each of the allegations. He
claimed he has been consistently up-front about his wife’s having family members, who
are citizens and residents of India.  He claimed he showed no preference for India when
he obtained a PIO card for himself and his immediate family. He claimed he obtained
the PIO card to enable him and his wife (a naturalized U.S. citizen) to gain expedited
access for himself and his wife to enter and exit India. Applicant claimed he sought the
advice of his employer about whether his obtaining a PIO card would affect his security
clearance and was told it would not. He claimed that were his possession of a PIO card
to create security concerns, he would take the necessary steps to freely renounce the
card and return it to the Indian government. 
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 47-year-old engineer for a defense contractor who seeks a security
clearance. The allegations covered in the SOR and admitted by Applicant are
incorporated and adopted as relevant and material findings. Additional findings follow.
Background
Applicant, a U.S. citizen by birth, met his wife in 1990 while attending college,
and married her six months later in August 1990. (GE 1; Tr. 57-58) He has two children
from this marriage. (GE 1) Applicant’s spouse was born and raised in India to parents of
Indian descent. She immigrated to the United States in 1989 and became a naturalized
U.S. citizen in 1999.  (GEs 1 and 2; Tr. 58) 
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Both of Applicant’s children are U.S. citizens by birth and have no dual
citizenship with any other country. (GEs 1 and 2) Applicant earned a bachelor’s degree
from an accredited university in May 1989.  (GE 1)  He claims no military service.
 When Applicant’s wife became a naturalized U.S. citizen, she believed she
implicitly renounced her Indian citizenship. (GE 2) Later, she learned that she needed to
submit a completed form to the Indian consulate (GE 2 and AEs F-G) In September
2013, she completed a form renouncing her Indian citizenship and obtained the
signature of an Indian consulate who transmitted the form to the Indian government for
recording. (AE F) Applicant’s wife earned a master’s degree in computer programming
and currently holds a security clearance in her work as a computer programmer for a
defense contractor. (AE H; Tr. 71-72) His wife’s loyalties extend only to the United
States, and not to India. (GE 2 and AEs B, F, and G)
Applicant and his wife applied for a PIO card through the Indian consulate
located in their community in September 2010. (GE 2; Tr. 82) Applicant was interested
in obtaining a visa for himself and his wife to travel to India.  From consulate officials he
learned that a PIO card had a longer use life than a visa permit, was less expensive,
and avoided the need for signing up for a visa every five years. (GE 2; Tr. 82)  Applicant
and his wife were approved for PIO cards, which entitled them to expedited customs
processing without the need for visas when entering India. (GE 2 and AE E) Possession
of the card did not entitle Applicant or his wife to any special benefits and privileges,
such as voting in Indian elections, owning property in India, or holding political office in
India. (GE 2)  
Following the hearing, Applicant documented his wife’s renouncing of her Indian
citizenship (AE F) He also documented his wife’s Indian passport cancellation notice
(undated)  based on her acquiring U.S. citizenship. (AE G) Afforded an opportunity to
surrender his PIO card, Applicant documented his surrender of his card to his
employer’s FSO. (AE J)
Applicant’s father-in-law and mother-in-law are citizens and residents of India.
(GE 2; Tr. 59) His father-in-law owned an import-export business, concentrating on rugs
and semi-precious gemstones, before he retired a few years ago. (Tr. 59-60) His
mother-in-law is a homemaker. (Tr. 59) Neither of Applicant’s wife’s parents have ever
been affiliated with the Indian government or military. (GE 2)  Applicant communicates
with his wife’s parents every two to three months (Tr. 72), and provides them occasional
financial assistance. (GE 2; Tr. 61-62, 76-77) His wife has more frequent contacts with
her parents; she talks with them twice a week. (Tr.  60-62) Neither Applicant nor his wife
have any business or property interests in India, or plans to relocate to India. (GE 2)
Besides her parents, Applicant’s wife has a sister and brother-in-law, as well as
cousins, aunts, and uncles who are citizens and residents of India. (GEs 1 and 2; Tr.
64-65) His sister-in-law is a homemaker, and her husband operates a small business
that has not been “overly successful.” (Tr. 64) Applicant’s brother-in-law relies on his
father-in-law for financial assistance. (GE 2) His brother-in-law is currently out of work
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and receives financial assistance from Applicant’s wife’s parents. (GE 2 and AE A)
Applicant maintains contact with his sister-in-law every six months, and less with her
husband. (Tr. 69-70) 
Because of Applicant’s brother-in-law’s financial reliance on his father-in-law,
Applicant harbors some concerns over how this brother-in-law might approach Applicant
once his father-in-law is no longer available to assist him. (GE 2). None of Applicant’s
wife’s family members have any known affiliations with the Indian government or
military. (GE 2 and AE A)
Applicant’s travels to India
Since 1990, Applicant and his wife have traveled to India on a number of
occasions (seven trips in all) to visit her family. He made family-related visits to India in
1993, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2001, and in 2010 and 2012. (GE 2 and AE C; Tr. 62-63, 73-
74)  In turn, his wife’s parents have visited Applicant and his wife on three occasions
since 1989 (i.e., 1990, 1997, and 2000). 
Consistently, Applicant has informed his security department of his travels and
any foreign contacts he encountered. (AEs B and D) Both Applicant and his program
manager expressed assurances of Applicant’s commitments to keep his security
department alerted to any foreign travels, contacts, and money transfers in the future.
(AE 1; Tr. 81-82) Applicant’s assurances are credible and are accepted.
Country information on India
Considered the world’s largest democratic republic, India is also a very diverse
country, in population, geography, and climate. (Background Note, India, supra, at 2-4)
India is the world’s second most populous country and the world’s seventh largest
country in area. (Id.)
India is a constitutional democracy, whose Constitution defines it as a “sovereign,
socialist, secular democratic republic.” (Background Note: India, supra) It is a
“multiparty, federal, parliamentary democracy with a bicameral parliament” and it has an
historical reputation for respecting the rights of its citizens. See id.  However, there have
been reports of extrajudicial killings of persons in custody, disappearances, torture and
rape by police and security forces, who generally enjoy de facto impunity. (2010 Human
Rights Reports, India, supra, at 2-12) The basic problem stems from the lack of clear
accountability, which too often has resulted in cited human rights violations going
unpunished. (Id., at 1) Police and security officials reportedly use torture and threaten
violence during interrogations to extort money and summarily punish prisoners. (Id. at 6-
8)
Since gaining its independence from Great Britain in 1947, India has been
involved in wars with Pakistan in 1947, 1965, and 1971, and has had to defend itself
against a 1999 intrusion of Pakistani-backed forces into Indian-held territory that nearly
turned into full-scale war. (CRS Report for Congress: India-U.S. Relations, supra, at 7;
6
Background Note: India, supra, at 3-4)  India survived a 1975 declaration of a state of
emergency that carried a suspension of many civil liberties. (Id. at 3) The country has
experienced two assassinations of its leaders: Prime Minister Indira Ghandi in October
1984 and Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi in May 1991. (Id)  In recent years, India has been
confronted with sporadic outbreaks of religious riots that resulted in numerous deaths
and casualties, and violent attacks by separatist groups in various parts of the country.
See id.  
Before its demise in the early 1990s, the Soviet Union was India’s principal and
most reliable trading partner, and an important source of economic and military
assistance. (Background Note: India, supra, at 8-9) U.S. efforts to strengthen its ties
with India have been hampered some by U.S. differences over India’s nuclear weapons
programs, its cooperation with the Iranian military, its lack of a negotiated resolution of
the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan, and the pace of India’s efforts to achieve long-
planned economic reforms. (CRS Report for Congress: India-U.S. Relations, supra, at
11, 22-23, and 45) 
Important U.S. concerns have been raised, too, over reported cases involving
government-sponsored entities and their illegal export, or attempted illegal export, of
U.S. restricted dual use technology to India, including: (1) high-tech testing equipment
that posed potential risks of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction program; (2)
dual use equipment that can be used in military and civilian aircraft to extract engine
vibration information; (3) equipment that can be used to manufacture material that
improves the accuracy of strategic ballistic missiles with nuclear capabilities; (4) an
animation system that can be diverted to weapons of mass destruction technology; (5)
nuclear pulse generators to two Indian entities capable of mounting diversion to the
development of weapons of mass destruction or missiles; and (6) heat treating
containers to an Indian entity capable of mounting diversion to the development of
weapons of mass destruction or missiles. See Administrative Notice, supra, at 5, and
the specific cases referenced, supra.    
Recommended travel restrictions do exist for U.S. citizens visiting India. The
State Department cautions U.S. citizens to avoid travel in general (with several noted
exceptions) to the state of Jammu & Kashmir. (Country Specific Information, supra, at 2-
8)
Endorsements
Applicant has good character references from a life-long friend and program
manager who know Applicant and are familiar with his demonstrated character. His
friend served as Applicant’s best man and characterizes him as a person who can be
trusted to be faithful to his duties. (AE B) 
Applicant’s program manager described him as always “extremely vigilant in his
concerns regarding security issues and compliance.” (AE I) He credited Applicant with
being serious about his integrity and sensitive to security matters. (AE I)
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Policies
         The AGs list guidelines to be used by administrative judges in the decision-making
process covering Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) cases. These
guidelines take into account factors that could create a potential conflict of interest for
the individual applicant, as well as considerations that could affect the individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information. 
These guidelines include "[c]onditions that could raise a security concern and
may be disqualifying” (disqualifying conditions), if any, and many of the "[c]onditions that
could mitigate security concerns.” They must be considered before deciding whether or
not a security clearance should be granted, continued, revoked, or denied. The
guidelines do not require administrative judges to place exclusive reliance on the
enumerated disqualifying and mitigating conditions in the guidelines in arriving at a
decision. Each of the guidelines is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person in
accordance with AG ¶ 2(c) 
In addition to the relevant AGs, administrative judges must take into account the
pertinent considerations for assessing extenuation and mitigation set forth in AG ¶ 2(a) .
AG ¶ 2(a) is intended to assist the judges in reaching a fair and impartial commonsense
decision based upon a careful consideration of the pertinent guidelines within the
context of the whole person. The adjudicative process is designed to examine a
sufficient period of an applicant’s life to enable predictive judgments to be made about
whether the applicant is an acceptable security risk. 
When evaluating an applicant’s conduct, the relevant guidelines are to be
considered together with the following AG ¶ 2(a) factors: 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral chances; (7) the
motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion,
exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.
       Viewing the issues raised and evidence as a whole, the following adjudication policy
factors are pertinent herein:
Foreign  P  r  eference  
The Concern: When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate preference  for
a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide
information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.  See
AG ¶  9.
8
Foreign Influence
     
The Concern: Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided  loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.
Adjudication under the this Guideline can and should considered the identity of the foreign
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.   See AG ¶ 6.
                Burd e  n    o  f  P roof
Under the AGs, a decision to grant or continue an applicant's security clearance
may be made only upon a threshold finding that to do so is clearly consistent with the
national interest. Because the Directive requires administrative judges to make a
commonsense appraisal of the evidence accumulated in the record, the ultimate
determination of an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance depends, in large part,
on the relevance and materiality of that evidence. See United States, v. Gaudin, 515
U.S. 506, 509-511 (1995). 
As with all adversarial proceedings, the judge may draw only those inferences
which have a reasonable and logical basis from the evidence of record.  Conversely, the
judge cannot draw factual inferences that are grounded on speculation or conjecture.
The Government's initial burden is twofold: (1) it must prove by substantial
evidence any controverted facts alleged in the SOR, and (2) it must demonstrate that the
facts proven have a material bearing to the applicant's eligibility to obtain or maintain a
security clearance. The required materiality showing, however, does not require the
Government to affirmatively demonstrate that the applicant has actually mishandled or
abused classified information before it can deny or revoke a security clearance. Rather,
the judge must consider and weigh the cognizable risks that an applicant may
deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information.
Once the Government meets its initial burden of proof of establishing admitted or
controverted facts, the evidentiary burden shifts to the applicant for the purpose of
establishing his or her security worthiness through evidence of refutation, extenuation, or
mitigation.  Based on the requirement of  Exec. Or. 10865 that all security clearances be
clearly consistent with the national interest, the applicant has the ultimate burden of
demonstrating his or her clearance eligibility. 
“[S]ecurity-clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.” See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988). And because
all security clearances must be clearly consistent with the national interest, the burden of
persuasion must remain with the Applicant.
9
Analysis  
Applicant is an engineer for a U.S.-based defense contractor. He is a U.S. citizen
by birth and is married to a woman of Indian descent who immigrated to the United
States in 1989 and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1999. While his wife’s parents,
siblings and extended family are citizen/residents of India, his own family, friends, and
business associates reside in the United States with U.S. citizenship. Trust concerns
relate to foreign preference based on Applicant’s obtaining a PIO card for himself, his
wife, and his two children that entitles them to expedited entry and exit in India and
foreign influence relative to his wife’s having immediate family members who are citizens
and residents of India. Additional trust concerns relate to Applicant’s wife’s having
immediate and extended family members who are citizens and residents of the India.
Foreign Preference 
Preference concerns necessarily entail allegiance assessments and invite critical
considerations of acts indicating a preference for the interests of the foreign country
(India) over the interests of the United States. By electing to obtain a PIO card for
himself, his wife, and their children that entitle them to special access privileges when
entering and exiting India, he demonstrated some disposition for a split preference for
India and the United States.
Since obtaining a POI card, Applicant has taken two trips to India with his wife and
children using his POI card. These exercises of travel privileges reflect some active
indicia of Indian preference. Since the hearing, Applicant’s wife documented her
renouncing of her Indian citizenship (assuming she did not implicitly renounce it when
she became a naturalized U.S. citizen) and relinquished her Indian passport. And
Applicant has since surrendered his PIO card to his FSO. 
Because Applicant elected to obtain and use his Indian PIO card after his wife
became a naturalized U.S. citizen, he acquired travel privileges not available to other
U.S. citizens. The Government may apply certain provisions of disqualifying condition
(DC) ¶ 10(a) of AG ¶ 9, “exercise of any right, privilege or obligations of foreign
citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member.  This DC includes but is not limited to:
(1) possession of a current foreign passport;
(2) military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country; 
(3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare, or other such           
           benefits from a foreign country; 
(4) residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements; 
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(5) using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another     
          country;
(6) seeking or holding political office in a foreign country; and
(7) voting in a foreign election. 
Specifically, DC ¶ 10(a)(3) has some application to the established facts and
circumstances herein. By obtaining and using his PIO card, which replaces the need for
a foreign visa for travel to India in 2010 and 2012, Applicant was able to achieve travel
privileges and conveniences not available to other U.S. citizens. 
Still, Applicant has since surrendered his PIO card to his FSO and has no other
special access privileges with India. As a result, he no longer has any material privileges
that can realistically create split preferences between India and the United States.
Whole-person precepts are  helpful to Applicant in surmounting the Government’s
preference concerns herein. The positive trust impressions he has forged with his
program manager and long-time friend corroborate his claims of undivided loyalty and
preference for the United States.
Overall, Applicant is able to persuade that his current preference is solely with the
United States. Because he made limited use of Indian privileges associated with his
obtaining and retaining an Indian PIO card, he manifested some initial preference for
India under the criteria established by the Appeal Board. Applicant absolves himself,
though, of foreign preference concerns associated with the presented issue of whether
he retains a preference or split preference for his wife’s birth country (India), or his own
birth country (the United States). Favorable conclusions warrant with respect to the
allegations covered by Guideline C.
Foreign Influence
Applicant’s wife and family have deep roots in India, a country rich in history and
socio/political traditions, constitutional government and institutional respect for human
rights, intermixed with periodic reports of abuses by police and government authorities.
Despite encouraging efforts in the development of strategic partnerships between India
and the U.S. in recent years, there have been cited instances of illegal and damaging
export practices by Indian firms associated with the Indian government to create dual
use diversion risks.  
The Government urges security concerns over risks that Applicant’s wife’s parents
and family members residing in India, might be subject to undue foreign influence by
Indian government authorities to access classified information in Applicant’s possession
or control. Because Applicant’s wife has family members who have Indian citizenship by
birth and reside currently in India, they present potential heightened security risks
covered by disqualifying condition  (DC) ¶ 7(a), “contact with a foreign family member,
11
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion,” of the AGs for foreign influence. The
citizenship/residence status of these family members and cited friend in India pose some
potential concerns for Applicant because of the risks of undue foreign influence that
could potentially impact the privacy interests subject to Applicant’s control. 
Because neither Applicant’s wife nor her family members residing in India have
any identified Indian government or military service affiliation, no consideration of DC  ¶
7(b), “connection to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a
potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive
information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or
country by providing that information,” or  DC  ¶ 7(d), “sharing living quarters with a
person aor persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a
heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion,” have some
potential application. To be sure, neither Applicant’s wife nor her immediate and
extended family members residing in India have any history of being subjected to any
coercion or influence, or appear to be vulnerable to the same.  No more than partial
application of these disqualifying conditions are warranted. 
The AGs governing collateral clearances do not dictate per se results or mandate
particular outcomes for applicants with relatives who are citizens/residents of foreign
countries in general.  What is considered to be an acceptable risk in one foreign country
may not be in another. The AGs take into account the country’s demonstrated relations
with the U.S. as an important consideration in gauging whether the particular relatives
with citizenship and residency elsewhere create a heightened security risk. The
geopolitical aims and policies of the particular foreign regime involved do matter. 
While the reports of illegal exporting of potential dual-use technology to India is a
matter of some security concern to the United States, India’s emergent status as a
strategic partner of the United States in controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons is
an important political development that serves to promote political solidarity, and reduce
security risks and concerns between the two nuclear powers.
Based on his case-specific circumstances, MC ¶ 8(a), “the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the
persons or activities of these persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the
individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
United States,” is available to Applicant. Neither Applicant’s wife’s parents, siblings, or
extended family members residing in India pose heightened security risks that could
subject them to potential pressures and influence from Indian government and military
officials. 
Another mitigating condition available to Applicant is MC ¶ 8(b): “there is no
conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the
12
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual
can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.”
Applicant’s demonstrated loyalty and professional commitments to the United States are
well demonstrated and sufficient under these circumstances to neutralize any  potential
conflicts that are related to his relationships with his immediate and extended family. MC
¶ 8(c), “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that
there is little likelihood that it could create risk for foreign influence or exploitation,” has
some applicability, too, based on Applicant’s infrequent contacts with his wife’s family
members residing in India.   
 
One other mitigating condition has mixed application to Applicant’s situation.  MC
¶ 8(e), “the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements
regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or
organizations from a foreign country,” applies as well. Both Applicant and his program
manager express confidence in Applicant’s stated commitment to continue to report any
foreign contacts with members of his family to his employer’s security department. 
Whole-person assessment is available also to minimize Applicant’s exposure to
potential conflicts of interests with his wife’s Indian family members. Most importantly,
Applicant is not aware of any risks of coercion, pressure, or influence that any of his
wife’s family members might be exposed to. So, in Applicant’s case, the potential risk of
coercion, pressure, or influence being brought to bear on him, or any of his wife’s
respective family members is minimal and mitigated. 
Overall, potential security concerns over Applicant's wife’s having family members
in India are sufficiently mitigated to permit safe predictive judgments about Applicant's
ability to withstand risks of undue influence attributable to his wife’s  familial relationships
in India. Favorable conclusions warrant with respect to the allegations covered by
Guideline B as well.
   
Formal Findings
In reviewing the allegations of the SOR and ensuing conclusions reached in the
context of the findings of fact, conclusions, conditions, and the factors listed above, I
make the following formal findings:
GUIDELINE B (FOREIGN INFLUENCE): FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.d: For Applicant
GUIDELINE C (FOREIGN PREFERENCE): FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance.
Clearance is granted.
                                          
Roger C. Wesley
Administrative Judge