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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 11-11740
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Braden Murphy, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Alan V. Edmunds, Esq.  
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, Applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
Statement of the Case
Applicant completed and certified an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations
Processing (e-QIP) on February 1, 2011. The Department of Defense (DOD) issued
Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on April 22, 2013, detailing security concerns
under Guideline H, drug involvement, and Guideline E, personal conduct. The action
was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within
Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended
(Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines For Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Information (AG), implemented on September 1, 2006. 
 
GE 1; AE D - AE F; AE H: Tr. 17, 19.1
GE 1; GE 4; Tr. 17-18, 24-25.2
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Applicant received the SOR on May 8, 2013, and she answered it on May 21,
2013. Applicant requested a hearing before an administrative judge with the Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). Department Counsel was prepared to proceed
on July 19, 2013. DOHA assigned the case to another administrative judge on July 25,
2013. For workload considerations, DOHA reassigned the case to me on August 6,
2013. DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on September 16, 2013 for a hearing
scheduled on October 8, 2013. Due to the Federal Government shutdown, DOHA
cancelled the hearing. DOHA issued a second Notice of Hearing on October 30, 2013,
and I convened the hearing as scheduled on November 19, 2013. The Government
offered exhibits (GE) marked as GE 1 through GE 4, which were received and admitted
into evidence without objection. Applicant testified. She submitted exhibits (AE) marked
as AE A through AE C, which were received and admitted into evidence without
objection. I held the record open until November 26, 2013, for Applicant to submit
additional matters. Applicant timely submitted AE D - AE H, which were received and
admitted without objection. The record closed on November 27, 2013, and DOHA
received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on November 27, 2013. 
Findings of Fact
In her Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted all the factual allegations in the
SOR. Her admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a complete and
thorough review of the evidence of record, I make the following findings of fact.  
Applicant, who is 37 years old, works as a electrical test engineer for a DOD
contractor. She began working for her employer in January 2000, and she began her
current position in February 2008. Her last three performance evaluations reflect that
she performs at or above the successful level in various aspects of her job. Her
supervisor describes her as a highly competent lead engineer and attests to her
trustworthiness and honesty in the job.1
Applicant graduated from college in 2000 with a bachelor’s degree in
mathematics, and in December 2004 with a masters degree in business administration.
She is single. Her hobbies include kick ball, golf, snow boarding, and sky diving.2
Applicant often traveled out-of-state to participate in sky diving events. During
some of these trips between 2005 and 2009, Applicant attended parties thrown by other
sky diving participates at the end of a sky diving event, usually at an individual’s home.
People brought various drugs to the parties. Applicant often refused to use the drugs,
but on several occasions in response to peer pressure, she decided to experiment with
drugs. Over four years, she smoked a marijuana joint once, she ingested hallucinogenic
mushrooms twice, and she snorted cocaine on four occasions. Her first use occurred in
2005, her second use occurred one to two years later, and her last use a year later in
GE 1 - GE 3; Tr.  188-20, 41, 43, 45.3
Her employer rarely conducts random drug tests. Tr. 324
AE A; AE B; Tr. 20-21, 43, 45-46.5
AE C; Tr. 24, 38-39. 6
GE 1; GE 4.7
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2009. She did not purchase these drugs nor did she manufacture or sell these drugs.
Applicant held a security clearance at the times she used illegal drugs.3
Applicant has not been tested for drugs at work.  She submitted to a drug test at4
her own expense on September 23, 2013. The test results are negative. She met with a
licensed psychologist on September 30, 2013. The psychologist conducted a thorough
investigative interview, a mental status exam, and an addiction severity index life
assessment. The psychologist found Applicant forthcoming, nonevasive in her answers,
and willing to give detailed answers to questions. Applicant’s cognition and responses
were consistent with a person free from mind-and mood-altering chemicals. The
addiction severity index results showed no substance dependence or abuse. Finally, the
psychologist noted that Applicant submitted hair follicles for drug testing. Hair follicle
drug tests can detect the presence of substances in the body up to 120 days. The
psychologist concluded that Applicant did not have a drug problem and that she should
be granted her security clearance. The psychologist did not recommend drug treatment
or counseling. Applicant does not believe that she is addicted to drugs or in need of
counseling.5
Applicant submitted a notarized statement of intent not to use illegal drugs in the
future or to associate with anyone who uses drugs. She agreed to the automatic
revocation of her security clearance if she used illegal drugs. She does not associate
with drug users, and she has not been sky diving for two years.6
Applicant completed and signed a Standard Form 86 (SF-86) on August 11,
2009. She denied any prior drug use in her answers to questions a and b in Section 23,
which asks an applicant about prior drug use in the last seven years. When she met
with an investigator for the Government in 2009 or 2010, she did not disclose her drug
use from 2005 to 2009.7
 
During a pre-polygraph interview in late 2010 or early 2011, Applicant revealed
her drug use to the polygraph examiner without being confronted about her drug use.
Her revelation resulted in the loss of a high-level clearance and a new DOD
investigation. When Applicant completed her e-QIP on February 1, 2011, she detailed
her drug use from 2005 until 2009. She also acknowledged that her security clearance
GE 1; Tr. 21, 26, 35-37, 38-40.8
GE 1 - GE 4; Tr. 21.9
GE 2; GE 3; AE G; Tr. 37-38.10
Tr. 26, 41-42, 44.11
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had been revoked in January 2011. She stated that she was unsure of the reasons
because she had not received a letter of explanation.  8
The SOR alleges that Applicant intentionally falsified her answers about her drug
use on her August 11, 2009 SF-86 and during her 2009 or 2010 personal subject
interview. (¶¶ 2.a, 2.b, 2.c) In her March 2011 affidavit, during her personal subject
interview in 2011, in her response to the SOR, and at the hearing, Applicant admitted
that she intentionally falsified her 2009 SF-86 and that she intentionally falsified facts
about her past drug use during her 2009 or 2010 personal subject interview.9
In addition to the above falsification allegations, the SOR also alleges that
Applicant intentionally denied the reasons for the revocation of her security clearance
when she completed her e-QIP on February 1, 2011. While she admitted this allegation
in her response to the SOR, she never acknowledged falsifying this information in her
March 2011 affidavit or in her 2011 personal subject interview. At the hearing, she
denied knowledge as to the specific reason for the revocation because she had not
received the letter of revocation, although she admitted that she was “fairly certain” as
to why her clearance had been revoked. Her facility security officer (FSO) told her and
her supervisor about the revocation in a January 2011 meeting, but did not give her a
reason for the revocation. Her FSO prepared a letter of revocation dated January 25,
2011, which states that Applicant’s security clearance was being revoked because of
her illegal drug use while holding a security clearance and her deliberate falsification of
these facts during her 2010 security processing. This letter is post marked January 31,
2011, and it was mailed to her home address by restricted delivery with a return receipt
requested. The exact date of delivery of this letter is unknown as the return receipt was
not part of the record.10
Applicant regrets her behavior. She states that she would never do anything to
compromise national security. If someone approached her to provide classified
information, she would refuse and report the incident to her FSO.11
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
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These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” An
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline H, Drug Involvement
AG ¶ 24 expresses the security concern pertaining to drug involvement:
Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription drug can raise questions
about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because it may
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impair judgment and because it raises questions about a person's ability
or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.
(a) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and include:
(1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds
identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of
1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis,
depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens), and
(2) inhalants and other similar substances;
(b) drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a
manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
AG ¶ 25 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) any drug abuse (see above definition); 
(c) illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture,
purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; and
(g) any illegal drug use after being granted a security clearance.
Applicant experimented with marijuana, hallucinogenic mushrooms, and cocaine
approximately seven times over a four-year period of time. During this time, she held a
security clearance. To use these drugs, she possessed them. The psychological report
indicates that she is not a drug abuser or drug dependent. A security concern is raised
under AG ¶¶ 25(a), 25(c), and 25(g).
The Drug Involvement guideline also includes examples of conditions that can
mitigate security concerns. I have considered mitigating factors AG ¶ 26(a) through ¶
26(d), and the following are potentially applicable:
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt
on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
and
(b) a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, such as: 
(1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;
(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; 
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(3) an appropriate period of abstinence; and,
(4) a signed statement of intent with automatic revocation of
clearance for any violation.
Applicant last used drugs four years ago. She has changed her friends and no
longer associates with individuals who use drugs. She has not been sky diving in two
years and has no immediate plans to resume this activity. She has agreed to the
revocation of her security clearance should she use illegal drugs in the future. She has
mitigated the security concerns raised in SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c.
However, Applicant has not fully mitigated the security concerns raised under this
guideline because she experimented with illegal drugs while holding a security
clearance. When she did this conduct, she betrayed a sacred trust given to her by
United States government. She exercised poor judgment when she decided to use
illegal drugs in her thirties. She did so when she knew it was against the rules at work
and would impact her eligibility for a security clearance. The SOR allegation in ¶ 1.d is
found against Applicant.
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; and
(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning
relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent
medical authority, or other official government representative.
The Government alleges two incidents of falsification by Applicant when she
completed her 2009 SF-86, one incident of falsification when she met with the security
clearance investigator in 2009 or 2010, and one incident of falsification when she
See ISCR Case No. 03-09483 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov.17, 2004)(explaining holding in ISCR Case No. 02-2313312
at 5 (App. Bd. Jun. 9, 2004)).
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completed her 2011 e-QIP. For AG ¶ 16(a) to apply, Applicant’s omissions must be
deliberate. The Government established that Applicant omitted material facts from her
2009 security clearance application when she answered “no” to questions about her
drug use. She also omitted material facts about her drug use during her 2009 or 2010
personal subject interview, and about the reasons for the revocation of security
clearance in her 2011 e-QIP. This information is material to the evaluation of Applicant’s
trustworthiness and honesty. Applicant admitted the falsification of her 2009 SF-86 and
her failure to provide information about her drug use during her 2009 or 2010 personal
subject interview. At the hearing, she denied intentionally withholding information about
the reason for the revocation of her security clearance in January 2011. 
When the allegation of falsification is controverted, the Government has the
burden of proving it. Proof of an omission, standing alone, does not establish or prove
an applicant’s intent or state of mind when the omission occurred. An administrative
judge must consider the record evidence as a whole to determine whether there is
direct or circumstantial evidence concerning an applicant’s intent or state of mind at the
time the omission occurred.12
Applicant readily admitted intentional falsification of her 2009 SF-86 and her
intentional failure to provide information about her drug use to the security investigator
during her 2009 or 2010 personal subject interview. A security concern is established
under AG ¶¶ 16(a) and 16(b) as to SOR allegations 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c.
When she completed her e-QIP on February 1, 2011, Applicant acknowledged
that her security clearance had been revoked, then stated that she had not received the
letter explaining the reasons for the revocation. She met with her supervisor and FSO in
January 2011, and they told her that her security clearance had been revoked, but did
not give her further information. At the hearing, she acknowledged she was “fairly
certain” as to why her clearance had been revoked, but since she did not have the
reasoning, she answered “uncertain”. Following the January 2011 meeting, her FSO
prepared a letter explaining the reasons for the revocation of her security clearance on
January 25, 2011, but did not mail it until January 31, 2011. He mailed the letter to
Applicant’s home address. She could not have received this letter before she completed
her e-QIP, particularly since he requested a return receipt to show that she received
the letter. As an engineer, Applicant is trained to be precise. Her hearing testimony
about her “uncertain” answer reflects that she needed a precise explanation before she
gave a conclusive reason on her e-QIP. She did not intentionally falsify her answer on
her 2011 e-QIP. SOR allegation 2.d is found in favor of Applicant.
 
The Personal Conduct guideline also includes examples of conditions that can
mitigate security concerns. I have considered mitigating factors AG ¶ 17(a) through ¶
17(g), and the following are potentially applicable:
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(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission,
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable,
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; and
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress.
Applicant admitted her illegal drug use in her 2011 e-QIP. Without her admission,
the Government would not have learned about it. Her admission came about 18 months
after the completion of her 2009 SF-86 and months after her personal subject interview,
which can not be considered prompt. Once she came forward about her conduct, she
has been honest and forthright about what she did. She acknowledged and continues to
acknowledge her lies. Her recent openness about her illegal drug use reflects positive
steps taken by her to mitigate the security concerns raised by her intentional falsification
of her 2009 SF-86 and her failure to be honest during her 2009 or 2010 personal
subject interview. She partially mitigated the security concerns raised by her personal
conduct. However, the security concerns raised by her personal conduct cannot be fully
mitigated for reasons discussed under the whole-person analysis, infra.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. The decision to grant or
deny a security clearance requires a careful weighing of all relevant factors, both
favorable and unfavorable. In so doing, an administrative judge must review all the
evidence of record, not a single item in isolation, to determine if a security concern is
established and then whether it is mitigated. A determination of an applicant’s eligibility
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for a security clearance should not be made as punishment for specific past conduct,
but on a reasonable and careful evaluation of all the evidence of record to decide if a
nexus exists between established facts and a legitimate security concern. 
In reaching a conclusion, I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating
conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant  is
well-educated and a highly productive employee. Her work performance and her
supervisor’s letter of recommendation reflect her employer’s favorable view of her work.
She generally complies with the law and the rules of the work place. During a four-year
period of time, she experimented with three different illegal drugs after succumbing to
peer pressure. She not only used illegal drugs, but she deliberately falsified her 2009
SF-86 answers about drug use, and she deliberately decided not to tell the security
clearance investigator about her drug use during her 2009 or 2010 personal subject
interview. Her decision to lie reflects on her ability to be trusted and to be honest. Her
decision to use drugs while holding a security clearance reflects negatively on her
judgment and reliability. When viewed as a whole, her lies to the Government and her
use of illegal drugs while holding a security clearance raise questions about her
trustworthiness, her exercise of good judgment in the management of classified
information, and her ability to withstand pressure from outside sources.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions or doubts as to Applicant’s
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude
Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns arising from her drug involvement and
personal conduct.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline H: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a-2.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.d: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge