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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 12-02702
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Fahryn Hoffman, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Nicole A. Smith, Esq.
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Decision
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CURRY, Marc E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant mitigated the security concerns generated by her family members who
are citizens and residents of India. Clearance is granted.
Statement of the Case
On September 10, 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD)  issued a Statement
of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guideline B, foreign influence.
The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the adjudicative guidelines (AG).
Applicant answered the SOR on October 5, 2013, admitting all of the allegations
and requesting a hearing. On November 21, 2013, the case was assigned to me. On
December 4,  2013, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice
Applicant consented to the hearing date, waiving her right to 15-days notice of hearing. (DODD 5220.6,1
January 2, 1992, E3.1.7)
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of hearing scheduling the case for December 16, 2013.  I held the hearing as scheduled1
and received four Government exhibits, marked as Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through
4, and three Applicant exhibits, marked as Applicant’s Exhibits (AE) A through C. The
transcript was received on December 24, 2013. 
Evidentiary Rulings
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of facts about
India encapsulated within 14 documents marked as Hearing Exhibits (HE) I through XIV.
I took administrative notice of the facts in HE I through IV and VIII through XIV. At the
hearing, I did not take administrative notice of the facts set forth in HE V through VII. (Tr.
29-33) However, upon reconsideration, I have decided to take administrative notice of
the facts set forth in HE V through VII.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 26-year-old single woman. She has a bachelor’s of science degree
in information technology and a bachelor’s degree in finance. Currently, she is working
towards a master’s degree in information technology. (AE A) She lives with her parents.
Since March 2010, Applicant has worked for a government contractor as a
technology consultant. Her job duties involve systems integration. Applicant is highly
respected on the job. According to her immediate supervisor, her professional
accomplishments are “highly valued.” (AE C at 3) According to her “feedback provider,”
she has a strong work ethic and an impressive technical background, together with a
keen ability to manage change. (AE B at 3) She has also contributed significantly to firm
initiatives involving social causes and community outreach. (AE C at 3) 
Applicant was born in India. Her family immigrated to the United States in 1993,
when Applicant was six years old. (Tr. 40) Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in
2006. (GE 1 at 7) All of her immediate family members are also naturalized U.S. citizens
and live in the United States. Her father is a retired restauranteur and her mother is an
occupational therapist. (Tr. 41) Her brother is an investment banker.
Applicant has several relatives who are Indian citizens and relatives including a
grandmother, four uncles, three aunts, and two cousins. None of her relatives except her
cousins speaks English. Instead, they speak either Hindi or Punjabi. Applicant speaks no
Punjabi, and minimal Hindi. She characterizes efforts to engage in any conversations
with her relatives beyond the exchange of rudimentary pleasantries as “hilarious.”(Tr. 46-
47) Before completing the security clearance application, Applicant did not know the
names of her grandmother, aunts, or uncles, and had to ask her mother for assistance to
complete the section requiring the disclosure of relatives. (Tr. 47)
I will refer to successive uncles discussed later in the Decision as U2, U3, and U4. Similarly, I will reference2
other extended family members in this manner. (i.e., aunts– A1 through A3; and cousins–C1 and C2)
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Applicant’s grandmother is a homemaker. Applicant talks with her approximately
twice per year. (Tr. 50) Because her grandmother only speaks Punjabi, their
communication is extremely limited.
Applicant’s uncle (U1) is a family doctor.  They talk approximately twice per year.2
These conversations occur if U1 calls Applicant’s mother, and Applicant happens to be
at home. (Tr. 52)
U2 owns a small business that manufactures wheels for chairs. (Tr. 55) Before
completing the security clearance application, Applicant did not know his occupation.
Because of their language differences, communication is rare. (Tr. 55)
U3 works for an Indian consulate in the United States. Applicant does not know
his job title or what his work entails. (Tr. 58) 
U4 is retired. (Tr. 59) His occupation before retiring is unknown from the record.
Applicant talks with him once or twice per year.
Applicant’s aunt (A1) is a retired secretary. Applicant is acquainted with her
through social media. (Tr. 56) Because of their language barrier, their social media
contact is limited to the exchange of pictures online. Applicant had to ascertain A1's
occupation from her mother. (Tr. 56)
Applicant’s other two aunts (A2 and A3) are her father’s sisters. Her contact with
these relatives is less frequent than her contact with her maternal relatives. Applicant
does not know A2's occupation. She has not talked to her since 2002. (Tr. 61) A3 is a
homemaker. Applicant talks with her approximately once or twice per year. (Tr. 62) 
Both of Applicant’s cousins speak English, and they are of Applicant’s generation.
Consequently, she communicates with them more often than she does with her older
relatives. C1 is in dental school. During a U.S. visit, she  stayed with Applicant’s family.
(Tr. 63) C1 and Applicant exchange e-mail messages once per week. (Tr. 63) C2 is a
culinary student. She communicates with him through social media approximately once a
month. Their conversation is typically limited to exchanging questions about food and
pictures of food online.  (Tr. 65)
Applicant last visited India in 2012. She attended a cousin’s wedding and visited
all of her relatives except her paternal aunts. (Tr. 68-69) She had previously travelled to
India as a teenager in 2002.
Applicant has approximately $25,000 invested in a 401k account, and less than
$20,000 in a savings account. (Tr. 43, 72, 74) Her finances are all based in the United
States. (Tr. 74) 
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Administrative Notice
India is a multiparty, parliamentary, secular democracy with a population of 1.2
billion. (HE IX at 7). United States and Indian relations have strengthened during the past
ten years. (Item IX at 15) Before then, their relationship was strained because India had
developed nuclear weapons in contravention of international conventions.(HE XI at 15)
In 2006, Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde United States - India Peaceful Atomic
Cooperation Act, which allows India to buy U.S. nuclear reactors and fuel for civilian use.
(HE IX at 16) 
The U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
maintains an Entity List composed of end-users who have been determined to present
an unacceptable risk of diversion to programs for the development of weapons of mass
destruction or their means of delivery. (15 C.F.R. § 744.11(b)) The BIS also regulates
dual-use technologies that may have military applications such as electronic sensors.
U.S. firms seeking to conduct business with organizations on the Entity List must obtain
licenses from the BIS and cannot export such technologies to businesses on the Entity
List without prior authorization. There is a “presumption of approval” for license
applications to sell dual-use technologies to the Indian entities on the list. (15 C.F.R., Pt.
744, supp. 4)
Between 1999 and 2002, a U.S.-based company exported technology without
prior authorization to an Indian company that required prior authorization. (HE VIII) On
November 14, 2011, an employee of a U.S. company was arrested and charged with
stealing proprietary information from his employer and providing it to a relative in India
who was setting up a competing company. (HE IV at 3) In March 2008, the owner of an
international electronics company pleaded guilty in a U.S. court to conspiring to illegally
export 500 controlled microprocessors and other electronic components to government
entities in India that participate in the development of ballistic missiles, space launch
vehicles, and combat jets. As part of the conspiracy, the defendant was working with an
Indian government official. (HE IV at 7) On September 9, 2008, a U.S. grand jury indicted
an Indian national and an Indian corporation on charges of illegally supplying the Indian
government with controlled goods and technology without the required licenses. (HE IV
at 11) 
India is one of the most terror-afflicted countries in the world (HE XII at 2). In
2011, India increased its counterterrorism capacity and cooperation with the international
community. (HE XI at 2) The Indian government has proposed a new agency to create
national-level capability to investigate and prosecute terrorism. Also, it has amended
some existing laws to strengthen security and law enforcement agencies in fighting
terrorism. (HE XII at 2)
India is a multiparty, federal, parliamentary democracy with a bicameral
parliament. (HE XIII) The Indian government is troubled by a lack of accountability
because of weak law enforcement and an underfunded court system. There is a history
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of arbitrary arrests and detention. The most recent presidential elections were
considered free and fair. (HE XIII)
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied together with the factors
listed in the adjudicative process. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a
conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-person concept.”
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of national security.” 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
Under this guideline, “foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if
the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in the United States interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign
interest.” Moreover, “adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the
identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located,
including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known
to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with
a risk of terrorism.” (AG ¶ 6)
India is a United States ally with shared democratic values. The relationship
between the two countries has grown significantly over the past ten years. However, the
United States remains concerned about India’s ability to keep dual-use technology from
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falling into the wrong hands. Moreover, there have been episodes over the past five
years of businessmen exporting sensitive technology to India in circumvention of U.S.
law governing transfer of such technology. In one case, an unindicted co-conspirator was
an Indian government official. Consequently, Applicant’s relatives who are Indian citizens
and residents trigger the application of AG ¶ 7(a), “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or a
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.” 
When Applicant and her family moved from India, she was six years old. Before
completing the security clearance application, she did not know either her grandmother,
aunts or uncles in India by name. Her minimal understanding of Hindi and Punjabi limits
her ability to communicate with her foreign relatives. Their conversations are restricted to
an exchange of pleasantries, at most, twice per year. AG ¶ (c), “contacts or
communication with foreign relatives is so casual or infrequent that there is little
likelihood that it could create a risk of foreign influence or exploitation,” applies.
Although Applicant’s relationship with her cousins is casual, it is not infrequent.
Nevertheless, considering the innocuous nature of their communication, the depth of
Applicant’s contacts in the United States, and the length of time Applicant has lived in the
United States, I am persuaded that AG ¶ 8(b), “there is no conflict of interest, either
because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group,
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest,” applies. Applicant has mitigated the
foreign influence security concern. 
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
In reaching my decision, I considered Applicant’s dedication to community service
and her favorable employment references.
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Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.d: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance.
Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                             
MARC E. CURRY
Administrative Judge