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 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS and APPEALS 
  
  
  
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 13-00565 
  ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Braden M. Murphy, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
HEINY, Claude R., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant contests the Department of Defense’s (DoD) intent to deny his eligibility 
for a security clearance to work in the defense industry. He is serving as a linguist for 
U.S. forces in Afghanistan. He has such deep and longstanding relationships and 
loyalties in the United States that he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest 
involving his connections to Afghanistan in favor of the U.S. interest. Foreign influence 
security concerns are mitigated. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
History of the Case 
 
 Acting under the relevant Executive Order and DoD Directive,1 on July 24, 2013, 
the DoD issued an SOR detailing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign 
                                                          
1 Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as 
amended; DoD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program 
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the DoD 
on September 1, 2006. 
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Influence). DoD adjudicators could not find that it is clearly consistent with the national 
interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance. On August 28, 2013, 
Applicant answered the SOR and requested a hearing. On December 30, 2013, I was 
assigned the case. On December 30, 2013, the Defense Office of Hearings and 
Appeals (DOHA) issued a Notice of Hearing for the hearing convened on January 14, 
2014. I admitted Government’s Exhibits (Ex) 1 through 9 and Applicant’s Exhibits A 
through W, without objection. Applicant, his wife, and son testified at the hearing. On 
January 23, 2014, DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.). 
 
Procedural Ruling 
 
Department Counsel requested administrative notice of facts concerning 
Afghanistan. Department Counsel provided supporting documents to show detail and 
context for those facts. Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice 
used for administrative proceedings. See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 at 4 n.1 (App. Bd. 
Apr. 12, 2007); ISCR Case No. 02-24875 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2006) (citing ISCR 
Case No. 02-18668 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 10, 2004) and McLeod v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986)). There was no objection 
about the accuracy of the materials provided, and Department Counsel’s request is 
granted. I have also taken administrative notice of the U.S. Department of State, 
Background Note: Afghanistan, Nov. 28, 2011, because it contains positive information 
about Afghanistan’s relationship with the United States, and emphasizes the U.S. 
diplomatic and military goals in Afghanistan.  
 
Findings of Fact 
 
In Applicant’s Answer to the SOR, he admitted all of the factual allegations in the 
SOR, and his admissions are incorporated herein. After a thorough review of the 
pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the following findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 52-year-old cultural advisor and linguist for the U.S. Forces in 
Afghanistan. (Ex. 1, Tr. 53) He works in counter-intelligence interviewing local Afghan 
employees, trying to filter people who would do harm to U.S. forces. (Tr. 55) He has 
also worked in the prisons interviewing Afghan inmates. (Tr. 54) He travels to various 
locations in Afghanistan for a week to a month to accomplish the mission. (Tr. 56) He 
has been working in Afghanistan since January 2013. From June 2012 through January 
2013, he was unemployed and lived off financial assistance for low income families 
provided by a state government in the United States. (Ex. 2)  
 
In May 1984, Applicant joined the Kansas Army National Guard. (Ex. 9) He 
started in the infantry and ended in helicopter avionics. (Tr. 31) In October 1991, he was 
honorably discharged at the expiration of his service obligation as a specialist (E-4). 
(Ex. 9, Ex. L) While in the National Guard, he received a certificate of achievement (Ex. 
M) and a decoration for long and faithful service. (Ex. N)  
 
Applicant has received numerous letters of appreciation and gratitude. (Ex. A – 
Ex. F) Some of those letters read in part: 
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Since coming on board, you have proven to be an invaluable member of 
our team and family. It is your commitment and drive to the men and 
women in uniform that enables [his employer] to achieve and succeed with 
our mission. Your continued display of can-do attitude, eagerness to 
participate, contributions to the team, as well as your willingness to accept 
greater responsibility, identify you as one of the exceptional employees 
whose efforts promote [his employer] as an industry leader, able to deliver 
certainty, everywhere, every time. (Ex. C)  
 
 Applicant has been working in Afghanistan since 2002. (Ex. 2, Ex. 3) From 
August 2002 through December 2004, he was a building advisor and then a public 
relations advisor working at the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development 
promoting the building of roads, schools, and wells in rural areas. (Ex. 2, Ex. 3, Tr. 41) 
From January 2005 through October 2006, he was a project officer and then a program 
officer working for the United Nations. (Ex. 2, Ex. 3) 
 
From November 2006 through February 2008, Applicant was a procurement 
specialist at the Ministry of Public Works in Afghanistan working for the World Bank. 
(Ex. 2, Ex. 3) From March 2008 through August 2008, he was a senior procurement 
advisor for a different company. From August 2008 through March 2010, he was a 
senior procurement advisor and project director. (Ex. Q) In July 2009, he traveled to 
India on business on his Afghan passport and in February 2010, he again traveled to 
India with his wife and son for medical treatment. (Ex. 2, Ex. 3) From March 2010 
through June 2012, he worked in Afghanistan for a different contractor working in an 
advisory capacity, overseeing hiring and training, and holding the position of program 
director and senior advisor. (Ex. 2, Ex. 3, Ex. S, Ex. V) 
 
In March 1961, Applicant was born in Afghanistan. His father owned the second 
largest construction company in Afghanistan. (Tr. 25) Following the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, his father was put in prison for 21 months. 
(Tr. 26) His father was later imprisoned for three months and a third time for one month. 
Applicant was living in the United States at the time of the second two imprisonments. 
(Tr. 26) 
 
Applicant attended grade school and high school in Afghanistan, graduating from 
high school in October 1979. (Tr. 23) Two months later, the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan. From March 1980 through May 1980, he attended university in 
Afghanistan. (Ex. 2) He wanted to attend medical school, but the Soviet Regime 
provided him with a scholarship to study engineering in the Ukraine. (Tr. 24) He was 
given the choice to study in the Ukraine or go to prison. (Tr. 26) He chose to flee to 
Pakistan, where he stayed as a refugee from November 1980 through July 1981. (Ex. 2) 
In July 1981, he immigrated to the United States as a refugee. (Ex. 1, Ex. 2) He chose 
to come to the United States for better opportunities and freedoms.  
 
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From August 1987 through July 1992, Applicant attended a state university in the 
United States. (Tr. 68) In July 1992, he obtained a Bachelor’s degree in electrical 
engineering. (Ex. 2, Ex. K) The G.I. bill paid part of his educational costs. (Tr. 30) In 
January 1988, Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen. (Ex. 1, Ex. 2, Ex. 7) 
Following graduation, at age 30, he was getting pressure from his father to return home 
and get married. (Tr. 32) He returned to Afghanistan after being gone almost 13 years. 
(Tr. 38) In January 1993, he married his wife, an Afghan citizen, in Afghanistan. (Ex. 1, 
Tr. 17) At that time, his family was living in Pakistan because the civil war and the 
collapse of the communist regime made their home in Afghanistan a dangerous place 
due to fighting and rocket attacks. (Tr. 32)  
 
Following Applicant’s marriage, it was his intent to remain in Afghanistan three 
months before bringing his wife to the United States. (Tr. 33) From August 1993 through 
October 1996, he lived in Afghanistan. (Ex. 2) He was unemployed for six months 
before opening a small pharmacy store. (Ex. 2, Tr. 35) During this dangerous time, 
Applicant was struck by a bullet that did no serious damage. (Tr. 34) During this same 
period, many people were killed including some of his relatives. (Tr. 35)  
 
From October 1997 through December 1997, Applicant accompanied his father-
in-law to India, where his father-in-law obtained medical treatment. He traveled to India 
on an Afghan passport. (Ex. 2) While he was in India, the Taliban came to power. (Tr. 
35) He was unable to return to Afghanistan due to the Taliban uprising. At that time, his 
family and his wife’s family moved to Pakistan. (Tr. 36) From January 1997 through 
June 1997, he lived with his wife’s family who had fled to Pakistan. From June 1997 
through March 2000, he lived by himself in the United States. (Ex. 2) 
 
From March through August 2000, Applicant visited his wife’s family in Pakistan. 
From August 2000 through October 2001, he was a pizza shop manager in England for 
a shop owned by his brother. (Ex. 2) He returned to live with his wife and her family in 
Pakistan before his wife and family moved back to Afghanistan in March 2002. 
Applicant has lived and worked in Afghanistan since April 2002. (Ex. 2) In July 2004, he 
voted in an Afghan presidential election. 
 
Applicant has held Afghan passports, the most current of which expires in June 
2014. He used that Afghan passport in 2009, when his employer requested he use his 
Afghan passport, and in 2011, when he took his wife to Pakistan for medical treatment. 
(Tr. 72) In February 2013, he surrendered his passport to the Facility Security Officer 
(FSO). (Ex. 6) He has owned real estate in Afghanistan since become a naturalized 
U.S. citizen. (Ex. 2) He has never served in a foreign military and has no requirement to 
do so. (Ex. 2)  
 
In 2005, Applicant opened a bank account in Afghanistan, which, as of February 
2013, had a balance of $4,000 to $5,000, which is his salary for two weeks. (Ex. 2, Tr. 
52, 90) In 2011, he opened another bank account in Afghanistan so his wife could have 
her own account. (Ex. 2) The balance, as of February 2013, was $800. (Ex. 2) He has 
closed one of the accounts. (Tr. 52, 89) He cannot close the other account without 
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physically going to the bank to complete the paperwork. (Tr. 52) While located in 
Afghanistan, Applicant is prevented from leaving the area controlled by U.S. forces. (Tr. 
52) He maintains bank accounts in the United States that have balances of $8,000 to 
$9,000. (Tr. 53)  
 
Applicant’s wife owed an apartment in Afghanistan where they lived until June 
2012, when the house was sold and the family moved to the United States. In 2004, 
Applicant purchased a lot for $4,400 on which he hoped to build a house. (Tr. 49) This 
never happened. Applicant sold the lot, valued at $9,000 to his brother. (Ex. 2, Ex. O, 
SOR Response) From 1997 through 2000, Applicant sent his father $300 every two 
weeks when his wife, mother, father, and siblings were living as refugees in Pakistan. 
(Ex. 2) The money was used to pay living expenses.  
 
In late 2007 or early 2008, Applicant began the immigration process to sponsor 
his wife to become a U.S. citizen. (Tr. 41) The original application was lost. However, in 
January 2012, a new application was approved for permanent resident alien status and 
in June 2012, his wife and three children moved to the United States. (Ex. 2) His wife 
was born in Afghanistan. She currently lives in the United States. Applicant’s mother, a 
housewife, was born in Afghanistan. While living in Afghanistan, he had contact with her 
three times a week. (Ex. 2) Since June 2012, when living in the United States, he has 
had weekly telephone contact with her. His father died in July 2008. He was a retired 
business man. His father-in-law, who had been the general treasurer of the Afghanistan 
National Bank until the arrival of the Taliban, died in December 2010. (Ex. 2, Ex. 4, Tr. 
82, 86) His mother-in-law died in 1984. (Ex. 2, Ex. 4) 
 
Applicant has eight brothers and six sisters. (Tr. 51) He is the oldest of his 
siblings. (Tr. 95) Since returning to Afghanistan, after selling his home in June 2012 and 
moving his family to the United States, he has not talked to his mother, and he talks to 
only two of his siblings living in Afghanistan. (Tr. 56) While working in Afghanistan, he is 
not permitted to leave the area controlled by U.S. forces. (Tr. 57) Except for his sister 
and youngest brother, all of his relatives believe he is in the United States. (Tr. 58, 79) 
In the past year, he has talked to these two five times. (Tr. 79) He has not told his 
mother, who is in poor health, and lives a few miles away, that he is in country. (Tr. 59)  
 
Applicant’s six sisters are Afghan citizens. One sister, a housewife, has resided 
in Germany since 2000. (Ex. 2, Ex. 4) Applicant has telephone contact with her every 
two months. His brother-in-law is a used car salesman in Germany. (Ex. 2, Ex. 4) He 
had yearly telephone contact with another sister, a housewife, who has resided in the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) since 1998, but has not talked with her in three years. (Tr. 
81) Two of his sisters are unemployed and take care of their mother, who is very ill. (Tr. 
50) His mother lives with two of his brothers, two of his sisters, their spouses, and their 
children. Another brother lives six or seven kilometers away. (Tr. 27, 28) He has yearly 
telephone contact with two other sisters, housewives, who are citizens and residents of 
Afghanistan. (Ex. 2, Ex. 4)  
 
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Applicant has one sister who lives in Russia whose husband, a resident but not a 
citizen of Russia, runs a clothing shop. (Tr. 64, SOR Response) His sister married in 
2012, and Applicant has yet to meet her husband. He has not seen a picture of her 
husband. (Tr. 63, 75)  
 
Applicant has six brothers who were born in Afghanistan. One brother is a 
naturalized U.S. citizen living in the United States. (Ex. 2, Ex. 4, Tr. 64) This brother 
works as a linguist at a U.S. military installation in the United States. (Tr. 65) Another 
brother lives in Canada with his wife and three children, and he works in a pizza shop. 
(Tr. 65)  
 
Every three or four months, Applicant has telephone communication with one 
brother who runs a travel agency in England and is a United Kingdom citizen. (Tr. 76) 
He has no contact with another brother who owes a pizza shop in England. (Ex. 2, Ex. 
4) Applicant has no contact with a brother, a shoe salesman, who is a citizen and 
resident of Afghanistan. (Tr. 61) Every three months Applicant contacts his brother who 
is a student in Afghanistan. (Ex. 2, Ex. 4) Applicant has yearly contact with a brother 
who is a partner in a clothing store in the Ukraine, but does not live in the Ukraine. (Tr. 
61) This brother is a citizen and resident of Afghanistan. Applicant has no contact with 
another brother, citizen and resident of Afghanistan, who is unemployed. (Ex. 2, Ex. 4) 
His youngest brother is part owner of a shop that sells china and electrical appliances. 
(Tr. 61)  
 
Applicant has talked to his in-laws a couple of times. (Tr. 80) His wife has four 
brothers who live in Germany, United Kingdom, and Afghanistan. (Tr. 83) His wife’s 
brother, a taxi driver, is a citizen of the Netherlands who has resided in England since 
2005. His brother-in-law has been gone from Afghanistan for 15 years. (Tr. 82) 
Applicant has contact with him every three months. Applicant has monthly contact with 
another brother-in-law, who works for a university and is a United Kingdom citizen living 
in England. He has monthly contact with his wife’s sister, a housewife, who is a citizen 
and resident of the United Kingdom. He talked to his oldest brother-in-law, who is an 
Afghan citizen living in Germany, the week before the hearing and 11 months before 
that. (Tr. 80) His brother-in-law in Afghanistan used to work for the Red Cross and now 
works for an Afghan program supported by the United States that supports projects in 
rural areas building bridges, roads, and schools. (Tr. 83, 84) This brother-in-law is a 
second lieutenant who has been in the Afghan Ministry of Defense for two years. (Tr. 
86) Applicant has had no contact with this individual. (Tr. 86) This brother-in-law had 
inaccurately been described as a member of the Afghan State Intelligence Agency. 
 
In 2008, upon his father’s death, Applicant and his 13 siblings inherited a five 
bedroom home in Afghanistan. (Ex. 3, Tr. 51) It is currently being rented for $150. (Tr. 
51) His father also had some undeveloped land. His father also had a seven bedroom 
home in Afghanistan estimated to be worth $100,000 where his mother, five of his 
siblings, their spouses, and their children live. (Ex. 3)  
 
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Two of Applicant’s children were born in Afghanistan, and two of his children 
were born in Pakistan. All of his children were born after he became a naturalized U.S. 
citizen. His children were born in 1995, 1997, 2001, and 2005. (Ex. 4, Tr. 45) His three 
youngest children live in the United States. (Tr. 45) His three youngest children have 
adapted well to living in the United States. (Tr. 45) Applicant owns a home in the United 
States with a fair market value of $160,000. (Ex. W, Tr. 51, 91)  
In January 1995, Applicant’s daughter was born abroad to a U.S. citizen. His 
daughter holds a U.S. passport. In September 2011, his daughter, who was then 16 
years old, ran away from home while Applicant was living in Afghanistan, and Applicant 
has not had any contact with her since then. (Tr. 46) He has since learned she has 
married.  
  
Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan is a country in Southwestern Asia. It is approximately the size of 
Texas (249,935 square miles). Pakistan borders it on the east and the south. Iran 
borders it on the west and Russia to the north. It is a rugged and mountainous country 
which has been fought over by powerful nations for centuries. In 2009, the population 
was about 28 million people with about 3,000,000 Afghans living outside Afghanistan.  
 
Afghanistan is presently an Islamic Republic with a democratically elected 
president. Afghanistan has had a turbulent political history, including an invasion by the 
Soviet Union in 1979. After an accord was reached in 1989, and the Soviet Union 
withdrew from Afghanistan, fighting continued among the various ethnic, clan and 
religious militias. By the end of 1998, the Taliban rose to power and controlled 90% of 
the country, imposing aggressive and repressive policies.  
 
In October 2001, U.S. forces and coalition partners led military operations in the 
country, forcing the Taliban out of power by November 2001. The new democratic 
government took power in 2004 after a popular election. Despite that election, terrorists 
including al-Qaeda and the Taliban continue to assert power and intimidation within the 
country. Safety and security are key issues because these terrorist organizations target 
United States and Afghan interests by suicide operations, bombings, assassinations, 
car-jacking, assaults, or hostage taking. At this time, the risk of terrorist activities 
remains extremely high. The country’s human rights record remains poor and violence 
is rampant. Insurgents continue to plan attacks and kidnappings of Americans and other 
Western nationals. Travel warnings are ongoing. No section of Afghanistan is safe or 
immune from violence.  
 
The United States-Afghan relationship is summarized as follows: 
 
After the fall of the Taliban, the U.S. supported the emergence of a broad-
based government, representative of all Afghans, and actively encouraged 
a [United Nations] role in the national reconciliation process in 
Afghanistan. The U.S. has made a long-term commitment to help 
Afghanistan rebuild itself after years of war. The U.S. and others in the 
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international community currently provide resources and expertise to 
Afghanistan in a variety of areas, including humanitarian relief and 
assistance, capacity-building, security needs, counter-narcotic programs, 
and infrastructure projects. 
 
During his December 1, 2009 speech at West Point, President Barack 
Obama laid down the core of U.S. goals in Afghanistan: to disrupt, 
dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to 
prevent their return to Afghanistan. . . . [T]he United States plans to 
remain politically, diplomatically, and economically engaged in 
Afghanistan for the long term.  
 
U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Afghanistan, Nov. 28, 2011 at 13. The 
United States currently has thousands of combat troops deployed to Afghanistan. The 
U.S. Government plans to withdraw U.S. combat troops from Afghanistan in the next 
two years. On May 2, 2012, the United States and Afghanistan signed the Enduring 
Strategic Partnership Agreement. This agreement demonstrates the United States’ 
long-term commitment to strengthen Afghanistan’s sovereignty and stability, in support 
of the goal of suppression of terrorism. The United States’ extraordinary commitment to 
Afghanistan is balanced against the inherent dangers of the ongoing conflict in 
Afghanistan to citizens and residents of Afghanistan and Afghan Government problems 
developing and complying with the rule of law.  
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the interests of security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 
2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
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Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order (EO) 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in 
terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty 
of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple 
prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).  
 
Analysis 
 
Foreign Influence 
 
  AG ¶ 6 explains the security concern about “foreign contacts and interests” 
stating: 
 
[I]f the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, [he or 
she] may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, 
organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is 
vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication 
under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign 
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, 
including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign 
country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected 
information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
AG ¶ 7 indicates three conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying in this case: 
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
 
10 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and 
 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign 
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which 
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or 
exploitation.  
 
Applicant’s mother and seven siblings live in Afghanistan. Additional siblings live 
in Russia, the UAE, two in the United Kingdom, one in Canada, and one in the United 
States. In the past 11 months, he has contacted his sister and brother living in 
Afghanistan five times. He also maintains an Afghan bank account which contains 
$4,000 to $5,000, which represents his salary for two weeks. He transferred a piece of 
property to his brother and may receive some inheritance that would be divided with his 
13 siblings. 
 
There is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for, or 
obligation to, their immediate family members. See generally ISCR Case No. 01-03120, 
2002 DOHA LEXIS 94 at *8 (App. Bd. Feb. 20, 2002). Applicant has ties of affection and 
obligation to his siblings. Influence, pressure, or coercion applied to Applicant’s siblings 
living in Afghanistan could result in a security concern. Applicant’s communications with 
his siblings living in Afghanistan are minimal. His communications with his in-laws living 
in Afghanistan are almost nonexistent. His ongoing communications over the years with 
siblings living in Afghanistan are sufficient to create “a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.” His relationship with his 
siblings living in Afghanistan creates a concern about Applicant’s “obligation to protect 
sensitive information or technology” and his desire to help siblings living in Afghanistan. 
For example, if terrorists in Afghanistan wanted to expose Applicant to coercion, they 
could exert pressure on his siblings living in those countries. Applicant would then be 
subject to coercion and classified information could potentially be compromised. 
 
Applicant’s possession of close family ties with his siblings living in dangerous 
countries, such as Afghanistan, is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline 
B. However, if an applicant or their spouse has a close relationship with even one 
relative, living in a foreign country, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential 
for foreign influence and could potentially result in the compromise of classified 
information. See Generally ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); 
ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).  
 
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and 
its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family 
members are vulnerable to government coercion or inducement. The risk of coercion, 
persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian 
government, a family member is associated with or dependent upon the government or 
11 
 
the country is known to conduct intelligence collection operations against the United 
States. The relationships of Afghanistan with the United States, places a significant, but 
not insurmountable burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his 
relationships with his siblings living in those countries do not pose a security risk. 
Applicant should not be placed into a position where he might be forced to choose 
between loyalty to the United States and a desire to assist his siblings living in 
Afghanistan, which is a dangerous country for anyone with a close link to the U.S. 
Government and classified material.  
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United 
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information 
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, 
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to 
those of the United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States 
over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security. Finally, 
we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, 
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. See ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 
2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  
 
While there is no evidence that intelligence operatives or terrorists from 
Afghanistan seek or have sought classified or economic information from or through 
Applicant, his spouse, his siblings, or his in-laws living in Afghanistan, nevertheless, it is 
not possible to rule out such a possibility in the future. International terrorist groups are 
known to conduct intelligence activities as effectively as capable state intelligence 
services, and Afghanistan has a significant problem with terrorism. Applicant’s 
relationships with family members living in Afghanistan create a potential conflict of 
interest because these relationships are sufficiently close to raise a security concern 
about his desire to assist family members in those countries by providing sensitive or 
classified information.  
 
AG ¶ 8 lists six conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security concerns 
including: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
U.S.; 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country 
is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding 
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected 
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;  
12 
 
 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; 
 
(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or 
are approved by the cognizant security authority; 
 
(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency 
requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from 
persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and 
 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property 
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not 
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
  
The Appeal Board concisely explained Applicant’s responsibility for proving the 
applicability of mitigating conditions as follows: 
 
Once a concern arises regarding an Applicant’s security clearance 
eligibility, there is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance 
of a security clearance. See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991). After the Government 
presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the 
applicant to rebut or mitigate those concerns. See Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The 
standard applicable in security clearance decisions is that articulated in 
Egan, supra. “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for 
access to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national 
security.” Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b). 
 
ISCR Case No. 10-04641 at 4 (App. Bd. Sept. 24, 2013). 
 
AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(c) have limited applicability. Applicant had contact with his 
sister and youngest brother living in Afghanistan and less frequent contact with his 
mother and other siblings living in Afghanistan. His contact with his sister in Russia is 
limited. He has yet to see a picture of her husband and has not had any contact with her 
in three years. His contact with his in-laws, including his brother-in-law who is a junior 
officer in the Afghan Ministry of Defense, has been very limited to non-existent. His 
loyalty and connections to his family living in Afghanistan are positive character traits. 
However, for security clearance purposes, those same connections negate the 
possibility of mitigation under AG ¶ 8(a), and Applicant failed to fully meet his burden of 
showing there is “little likelihood that [his relationships with relatives living in 
Afghanistan] could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.”  
 
AG ¶ 8(b) applies. A key factor in the AG ¶ 8(b) analysis is Applicant’s “deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.” Applicant has significant 
13 
 
connections to the United States including home ownership. Following the October 
1979 Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in, Applicant was given the choice to study 
engineering in the Ukraine or go to prison. He chose to flee to Pakistan. His father was 
imprisoned three times by the Soviets. In July 1981, he immigrated to the United States 
as a refugee. In January 1988, Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen. While in the 
United States, he obtained his Bachelor’s degree from a state university in the United 
States. He was also a member of the state Army National Guard. Three of his children 
live with him and his wife in the United States. He has not had any contact with his 
oldest daughter who has lived in Afghanistan since September 2011, when she ran 
away from home at age 16. All of his children are U.S. citizens. 
 
Applicant is now 52 years old. As part of his naturalization as a U.S. citizen he 
took an oath and swore allegiance to the United States. When he volunteered to serve 
in Afghanistan in a combat zone as a linguist, he manifested his patriotism, loyalty, and 
fidelity to the United States over all other countries.  
 
Applicant’s relationship with the United States must be weighed against the 
potential conflict of interest created by his relationships with his family living in 
Afghanistan. He has communicated five times in the last 11 months with his sister and 
youngest brother living in Afghanistan, less frequently with other siblings living in 
Afghanistan, and has had no contact with some of his siblings. There is no evidence, 
however, that terrorists, criminals, the Afghanistan Governments, or those conducting 
espionage have approached or threatened Applicant, his spouse, or their family to 
coerce Applicant for classified or sensitive information.2 As such, there is a reduced 
possibility that Applicant or his spouse’s family living in Afghanistan would be 
specifically selected as targets for improper coercion or exploitation. Of course, the 
primary risk to his family living in Afghanistan is from terrorists and other lawless 
elements and not the Afghanistan Government. 
 
While the U.S. Government does not have any burden to prove the presence of 
such evidence, if such record evidence were present, Applicant would have a heavier 
evidentiary burden to mitigate foreign influence security concerns. It is important to be 
mindful of the United States’ sizable financial and diplomatic investment in Afghanistan. 
Applicant’s family in Afghanistan will become potential targets of terrorists because of 
Applicant’s support for the United States, and Applicant’s potential access to classified 
information could theoretically add some risk to Applicant’s family from lawless 
elements in Afghanistan.  
 
AG ¶¶ 8(d) and 8(e) do not apply. The U.S. Government has not encouraged 
Applicant or his spouse’s involvement with family members living in Afghanistan. 
Applicant is not required to report his contacts with citizens or residents of Afghanistan. 
 
                                                          
2There would be little reason for U.S. enemies to seek classified information from an applicant before that 
applicant has access to such information or before they learn of such access. 
  
14 
 
Applicant’s Afghan bank account and the possible inheritance of some property 
in Afghanistan is of minimal concern. It is not a substantial business, financial, or 
property interest as referenced in AG ¶ 7(e). If it were, then AG ¶ 8(f) would apply 
because the value of that foreign financial or property interest is such that they are 
unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, 
or pressure the individual. The property transferred to his brother is used for his 
mother’s medical expenses.  
 
In sum, Applicant’s connections to his siblings and in-laws living in Afghanistan 
are significant. He is close to his siblings and continues to communicate with some of 
them. Applicant’s connections to the United States are strong. His spouse and three 
children live in the United States. These connections to the United States, including 
home ownership, are sufficient to outweigh his connections to his family in Afghanistan. 
Foreign influence security concerns are mitigated under Guideline B. Even if security 
concerns are not mitigated under Guideline B, they are mitigated under the whole-
person concept, infra.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my comments 
under Guideline B in my whole-person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were 
addressed under this guideline, but some warrant additional comment. 
 
The factors weighing against approval of Applicant’s security clearance are less 
substantial than the factors weighing towards its approval. Applicant has siblings who 
are residents and citizens of Afghanistan. Even though he lives and works within a few 
miles of his ill mother and other siblings, he has not told them he is working and living in 
Afghanistan. He has told one brother and one sister he is in Afghanistan. His 
connections to his family in Afghanistan make Applicant more vulnerable as a target of 
15 
 
coercion by lawless elements in those countries. His family in those countries will be at 
a greater risk if his clearance is granted.  
 
A Guideline B decision concerning Afghanistan must take into consideration the 
geopolitical situation and dangers there.3 Those countries are dangerous places 
because of violence from terrorists and other lawless elements. Terrorists continue to 
threaten the Afghanistan Government, the interests of the United States, and those who 
cooperate and assist the United States. The Afghanistan Government does not fully 
comply with the rule of law or protect civil liberties in many instances. The United States 
and Afghanistan Governments are allies in the war on terrorism. Afghanistan and the 
United States have close relationships in diplomacy and trade. Afghanistan and the 
United States occasionally have profound policy disputes.  
 
Applicant’s connections to the United States warrant greater weight than his 
connections to his siblings living in Afghanistan. There is no evidence that Applicant has 
engaged in criminal activity, abused illegal drugs, or committed any security violations. 
When he was naturalized as a U.S. citizen, he swore allegiance to the United States. 
His spouse and three children reside in the United States. He volunteered to serve as a 
linguist with U.S. forces in Afghanistan. There is no evidence that terrorists or other 
foreign elements have specifically targeted Applicant or his family living in Afghanistan.  
 
I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 
U.S. 518 (1988), Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, and the AGs, to the facts and 
circumstances in the context of the whole person. I conclude Applicant has carried his 
burden and foreign influence concerns are mitigated. Eligibility for access to classified 
information is granted. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:  
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B:    FOR APPLICANT 
 
Subparagraphs 1.a to 1.k:  For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
                                                          
3 See ISCR Case No. 04-02630 at 3 (App. Bd. May 23, 2007) (remanding because of insufficient 
discussion of geopolitical situation and suggesting expansion of whole-person discussion). 
  
16 
 
_______________________ 
CLAUDE R. HEINY II 
Administrative Judge