1
 
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 13-00619
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Melvin A. Howry, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se  
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings and exhibits, Applicant’s eligibility for
access to classified information is granted.
Statement of the Case
Applicant completed and certified an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations
Processing (e-QIP) on January 28, 2013 and August 17, 2010. The Department of
Defense (DOD) issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on September 12,
2013, detailing security concerns under Guideline B, foreign influence, and Guideline C,
foreign preference. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2,
1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines For Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (AG), implemented on September 1, 2006.
 
The information submitted included seven Department of Justice press releases concerning cases involving1
the export of controlled goods to Iran without obtaining the proper licenses. This information contains no
reference to Applicant or classified information. None of the cases involves Applicant personally, involve
espionage, or involve espionage through any familial relationship. The information does reflect that certain
individuals are willing to ship controlled goods abroad without complying with U.S. law. These documents do
not show any involvement of the Afghan or Iranian governments in these incidents, although Iran would benefit
from the goods received. See Admin VII-XI, XIII, XIV.  The press releases reflect  indictment of individuals and
corporations on charges of conspiracy to export controlled items and exportation of controlled items in violation
of Title 18, U.S.C. § 371 and Title 50, U.S.C. § 1702. There is no evidence that the Governments of
Afghanistan and Iran were involved in, or sanctioned, this criminal activity. Id.
 
One press release discusses a criminal case concerning a murder-for-hire plot involving individuals
in an Iranian organization which conducts sensitive covert operations outside Iran. Applicant is not personally
involved nor does the case involve espionage or classified information. Admin IV. Three documents from the
Department of State relate to the detention of United States and Canadian citizens and free expression arrests
in Iran. These documents do not indicate that classified information or espionage is involved, but do highlight
the risks to U.S. citizens traveling in Iran. Admin XVI-XVIII.
2
Applicant received the SOR on October 4, 2013. She submitted a notarized,
written response to the SOR allegations dated October 5, 2013, and she requested a
decision on the written record in lieu of a hearing. 
Department Counsel prepared a file of relevant material (FORM) and mailed
Applicant a complete copy on November 25, 2013. Applicant received the FORM on
December 20, 2013. She had 30 days from receipt of the FORM to file objections and
submit material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation. She submitted a response dated
December 23, 2013. DOHA assigned this case to me on February 20, 2014. The
Government submitted 12 exhibits, which have been marked as Government Exhibits
(Gov E) 1-12 and admitted into the record. Applicant’s response to the SOR has been
marked and admitted as Gov E 3, and the SOR has been marked as Gov E 1. Her
written response to the FORM is admitted into the record as Applicant Exhibit A (AE A).
       
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a request that I take administrative notice of
certain facts relating to Afghanistan and Iran. The request and the attached documents
were not admitted into evidence, but were included in the record as Administrative
Notice (Admin) 1, I-XXVII. The facts administratively noticed are limited to matters of
general knowledge and matters not subject to reasonable dispute, and they are set out
in the Findings of Fact below.1
Findings of Fact
In her Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a
and 1.b of the SOR. Her admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. She
W hen  SOR allegations are controverted, the Government bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient2
to prove controverted allegations. Directive, ¶ E3.1.14. “That burden has two components. First, the
Government must establish by substantial evidence that the facts and events alleged in the SOR indeed took
place. Second, the Government must establish a nexus between the existence of the established facts and
events and a legitimate security concern.” See ISCR Case No. 07-18525 at 4 (App. Bd. Feb. 18, 2009),
(concurring and dissenting, in part) (citations omitted). The guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection
between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See
ISCR Case No. 08-06605 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 4, 2010); ISCR Case No. 08-07290 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 17,
2009).
Gov E 10 - Gov E 12.3
Gov E 8; Gov E 10; Gov E 12.4
Gov E 9 - Gov E 12. 5
3
denied the factual allegations in ¶¶ 2.a and 2.b of the SOR.  She also provided2
additional information to support her request for eligibility for a security clearance. After
a complete and thorough review of the evidence of record, I make the following findings
of fact.  
 Applicant, who is 58 years old, seeks employment as a linguist for a DOD
contractor. Her current employer hired her in January 2013, pending the grant of a
security clearance. She worked as a linguist in Afghanistan for her employer from
August 2010 until May 2012. In 2009 and 2010, she worked as a role player for a DOD
contractor on a periodic basis. Between 2004 and 2010, she worked with her husband
in a jewelry business, which he no longer operates.3
Applicant was born and raised in Afghanistan. Her father, father-in-law, and
mother-in-law are deceased. Her mother, three brothers, four sisters, and their spouses
are citizens and residents of the United States. Applicant married in 1978. Her husband
was born in Afghanistan and is now a citizen and resident of the United States. Her 34-
year-old daughter was born in Afghanistan, but is now a resident and citizen of the
United States. Her son and 21-year-old daughter were born in the United States and
reside in the United States. Her husband’s three brothers are also residents and citizens
of the United States.  4
Applicant’s husband owned a shoe factory in Afghanistan. After the Russians
invaded Afghanistan in late 1979, the Russians threatened her husband’s life because
of his business. With her husband’s family, she, her husband and their baby daughter
fled Afghanistan to Iran in March 1980. Applicant had an Afghan passport which
included her baby daughter, but her husband did not have a passport. Once they
obtained a passport for her husband, she, her husband, and baby daughter moved to
Germany in June 1980. The United States granted them refugee status, and they
moved to the United States in November 1980. They have lived in the United States
since 1980. Applicant became a U.S. citizen in March 1990.5
Gov E 3; Gov E 8; Gov E 12.6
Gov E 3; Gov E 10; Gov E 12.7
Gov E 3; Gov E 9; Gov E 10; Gov E 12; AE A.8
Id.9
4
 The SOR raises a security concern about Applicant’s husband’s uncle and
stepbrother, who are citizens of Afghanistan, residing in Iran. Her husband talks with his
uncle by telephone once a year. Her husband last spoke with his stepbrother two years
ago. Her husband saw his uncle and stepbrother in August 2007. Applicant does not
talk with her husband’s family members when her husband talks with them. Applicant
has one cousin, who is a citizen and resident of Afghanistan. The cousin owns a shop in
Afghanistan. Applicant last talked with her cousin by telephone more than one year ago,
and she last visited with him in August 2007. Her telephone conversations with him are
about family.6
 
Applicant obtained her first U.S. passport in March 1991. She renewed her U.S.
passport in May 2001 and April 2010. She continues to have an active U.S. passport. In
2007, Applicant’s mother requested a trip to Iran to see her dying sister, Applicant’s
aunt. Because her mother could not travel alone, Applicant applied for a visa with her
U.S. passport, but her application was denied. She contacted the Embassy of
Afghanistan and obtained an Afghan passport for herself, her mother, her husband, and
one daughter in May 2007. The family used their Afghan passports to obtain an entry
visa for Iran. Applicant took her elderly mother to Iran to visit her dying sister,
Applicant’s aunt, in July 2007. Applicant has not returned to Iran. Her aunt died in
2008.7
Applicant’s Afghan passport expired in May 2010, and she has not renewed it.
She gave her expired passport to her facility security officer. In October 2013, she
formally renounced her Afghan citizenship. In her e-QIP, she stated that she had no
plans to renounce her U.S. citizenship. In her response to the FORM, Applicant stated
that she would chose her U.S. citizenship over any other citizenship. She considers
herself hardworking and honest, and a loyal U.S. citizen.8
Applicant considers herself a citizen of the United States only. In her CI
Screening questionnaire, Applicant stated that if she was captured while working in
Afghanistan, she would not say anything, even if threatened with death. She considers
herself honest and hard-working. She owns property in the United States, and her
assets are in the United States. She does not have a criminal record, and her finances
are good. Her family was not active in politics in Afghanistan when they lived there.  9
Afghanistan
I take administrative notice of the following adjudicative facts. Afghanistan is an
Islamic Republic and emerging democracy. With the support of the United States and
HE 1.10
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other nations, its new government endeavors to build a new system of government and
to rebuild the country’s infrastructure. Its Army and police force are well trained. It
continues to face significant challenges from the insurgency and terrorist organizations
supported by the ousted Taliban and Al Qa’ida. Security and violence remain a serious
issue. The government is not complacent about the terrorist threat, the insurgency, or
security issues; rather it actively seeks to eliminate all with the assistance of the United
States and NATO. The new government is working to reverse a long legacy of serious
human rights abuses, but serious problems remain. Afghanistan is now an active
member of the international community, has signed a “Good Neighbor” declaration with
six nations bordering it, and promotes regional cooperation. The United States supports
the emergence of a broad-based government in Afghanistan and has made a long-term
commitment to help Afghanistan rebuild itself. Sometime ago, the leaders of both
countries concluded a strategic partnership agreement committing to a long-term
relationship between both countries, which was signed on May 2, 2012. Despite its
differences with the United States, Afghanistan continues to seek U.S. support as it
moves forward towards democracy and stability. None of the documents offered in
support of the request for administrative notice indicate whether Afghanistan is an active
collector of U.S. intelligence information.10
Iran
I also take administrative notice of the following facts about Iran. In 1979, the
Iranian Revolution occurred, which ended the rule of the Shah of Iran. In December
1979, Iranian rulers prepared a new constitution which defines the political, economic
and social order of this Islamic Republic. Iran is now an authoritarian, constitutional,
theocratic republic, dominated by Shi’a Muslim clergy. Although human rights violations
are prohibited by law, the Iranian government does not enforce the law. Human rights
violations continue, particularly against journalists who speak out against Iran’s current
government, minority religions, such as the Baha’i faith, and political activists, who
oppose the current ruling regime. Serious mistreatment of prisoners occurs. Because
Iran does not recognize dual citizenship, Iranian-born, naturalized U.S. citizens are
considered solely Iranian citizens by the Iranian authorities, and are required to enter
and exit Iran on an Iranian passport. While traveling or residing in Iran, they are subject
to surveillance, search, harassment, arrest, and imprisonment. More recently, Iran has
prevented a number of Iranian-American citizens from leaving Iran, and in some cases,
Iran has charged individuals with espionage and being a threat to the regime, including
American citizens, not of Iranian birth or descent.
Iran’s government is hostile to the United States, and the United States does not
have a diplomatic relationship with Iran. Current U.S. concerns about Iran are based on
its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, support for
and involvement in international terrorism, and support of violent opposition to the
Middle East peace process and efforts towards democracy. Iran has provided guidance,
training, and weapons to Shia political and militant groups in Iraq and other Middle East
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countries. It also provides encouragement, training, funding, and weapons to anti-Israeli
terrorist groups and other terrorists groups in its efforts to undermine the Arab-Israeli
peace process, as well as advocating the destruction of Israel. The United States has
designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. In 1979 in Executive Order 12170, the
President declared a national emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to the
International Emergency Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706). The national emergency
continues. The United States continues to have significant concerns about Iran’s plans
to develop nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Iran actively seeks to
obtain dual use technologies from the United States. Iran has dramatically increased the
depth and complexity of its intelligence operations, including cyber capabilities, against
the United States in recent years. Iran has shown more interest in recent years in
attacking the United States at home.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” An
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
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Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
AG ¶ 10 describes the disqualifying conditions that could raise security concerns.
I have considered all the conditions, and the following are potentially applicable: 
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member.  This includes but is not limited to:
(1) possession of a current foreign passport; and
(b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an
American citizen.
Applicant applied to the Afghanistan Embassy and received an Afghanistan
passport in May 2007.  With the passport, she applied for and received a visa for a visit
to Iran. She and some of her family members visited Iran in 2007. To obtain the Afghan
passport, she took an action which gave recognition to her past Afghan citizenship. She
also exercised a privilege of her Afghan citizenship. A security concern is establish
under AG ¶¶ 10(1)(a) and 10(b).
The foreign preference guideline also includes examples of conditions that can
mitigate security concerns. I have considered mitigating factors AG ¶ 11(a) through ¶
11(f), and the following are potentially applicable:
(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship; and
(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant
security authority, or otherwise invalidated.
Applicant’s Afghan passport expired nearly four years ago, and she has not
renewed the passport. She travels on her U.S. passport. She voluntarily gave the
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expired Afghan passport to her facility security officer. She has no intent to obtain
another Afghan passport. She also formally renounced her Afghan citizenship to the
Afghanistan Embassy in a letter dated October 2013, even though she had long
believed herself to be only a U.S. citizen. Applicant’s preference is to the United States,
her adopted country. Her actions in 2007 do not show a preference to Afghanistan or
Iran, only an effort to take her elderly mother to see her mother’s dying sister in Iran.
She has mitigated the security concerns about her foreign preference under AG ¶¶
11(b) and 11(e).
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
. (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.
Applicant’s husband, children, mother, three brothers, four sisters, her siblings’
spouses, and her three brothers-in-law are citizens and residents of the United States.
Thus, no security concern is raised by these family members. Applicant’s husband’s
uncle and stepbrother are citizens of Afghanistan and residents of Iran. Her cousin is a
citizen and resident of Afghanistan. Her family relationships are not per se a reason to
deny Applicant a security clearance, but her husband’s contacts with his stepbrother
and his uncle and her contacts with her cousin must be considered in deciding whether
ISCR Case No. 09-06457 (App. Bd., May 16, 2011).11
Id.12
9
to grant Applicant a clearance.  The Government must establish that these family11
create a risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion by
terrorists or would create a potential conflict of interest between her obligations to
protect sensitive information and her desire to help her cousin and husband’s uncle and
stesp-brother, who may be threatened by terrorists. 
In determining if such a risk exists, I must look at Applicant’s relationships and
contacts with her extended family, as well as the activities of the Governments of
Afghanistan and Iran and of terrorist organizations within Afghanistan and Iran. The risk
that an applicant could be targeted for manipulation or induced into compromising
classified information is real, not theoretical. Applicant’s relationship and contacts with
her extended family in Afghanistan and Iran raise a heightened risk and a security
concern because of the terrorists activities in Afghanistan and the activities of the
Iranian government. The evidence of record fails to show that the Afghan Government
targets U.S. citizens in the United States or in Afghanistan by exploiting, manipulating,
pressuring, or coercing them to obtain protected information. Thus, the concern that the
Afghan Government will seek classified information is moderate. The same cannot be
said about Iran or the terrorists organizations operating in Afghanistan, whose goals are
to destroy or prevent the growth of a stable, central government. To the extent there are
terrorist organizations in Iran, a concern is raised as the goal of such organizations is to
harm the United States.  12
Under the guideline, the potentially conflicting loyalties must be weighed to
determine if an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of U.S.
interests. In determining if Applicant’s contacts in Afghanistan and Iran cause security
concerns, I considered that Afghanistan and the United States have a relationship,
which includes working together on international security issues and trade and that the
United States and Iran do not have a working relationship. There is no evidence that the
Afghan Government targets U.S. citizens for protected information; however, Iran has
detained U.S. citizens for periods of time. The human rights issues in Afghanistan and
Iran continue to be a concern. While none of these considerations by themselves
dispose of the issue, they are all factors to be considered in determining Applicant’s
vulnerability to pressure or coercion because of her cousin in Afghanistan and her
husband’s uncle and stepbrother in Iran. These contacts raise a heightened risk under
AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b).
The foreign influence guideline also includes examples of conditions that can
mitigate security concerns. I have considered mitigating factors AG ¶ 8(a) through ¶ 8(f),
and the following are potentially applicable:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
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persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;    
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
Applicant’s contacts with her cousin and her husband’s limited and casual
contacts with his uncle and stepbrother are not likely to place Applicant in a position of
having to chose between the interests of the United States and of Afghanistan or Iran.
She does not talk or otherwise communicate with her husband’s family members in Iran.
Her contacts with her cousin are casual and infrequent. Thus, her foreign contacts are
not likely to create a risk of foreign influence or exploitation. There is no evidence that
these extended family members are involved with the Governments of Afghanistan or
Iran. Applicant and her family members recognize the obligations they have to the
United States. Applicant and her family are also loyal to the United States. In reviewing
the record evidence, I find that Applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict of
interest in favor of the United States. She has mitigated the Guideline B security
concerns under AG ¶¶ 8(a)-(c).
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
11
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. The decision to grant or
deny a security clearance requires a careful weighing of all relevant factors, both
favorable and unfavorable. In so doing, an administrative judge must review all the
evidence of record, not a single item in isolation, to determine if a security concern is
established and then whether it is mitigated. A determination of an applicant’s eligibility
for a security clearance should not be made as punishment for specific past conduct,
but on a reasonable and careful evaluation of all the evidence of record to decide if a
nexus exists between established facts and a legitimate security concern. 
The evidence in support of granting a security clearance to Applicant under the
whole-person concept is more substantial than the evidence in support of denial. In
reaching a conclusion, I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating
conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Following the
invasion of Afghanistan by Russia and threats to her husband and his family’s well-
being, Applicant, her husband, their baby daughter, and her husband’s family fled
Afghanistan to Iran. From Iran, they moved to Germany. In November 1980, they
immigrated to the United States after being granted refugee status. They continue to
live in the United States. Applicant and her family have immersed themselves in their
life in the United States. They became citizens, obeyed the laws, and developed assets
in the United States. For more than 30 years, their life has been in the United States.
Applicant has no desire to return to Afghanistan. Her decision to obtain an Afghan
passport was motivated by her mother’s request to see her mother’s dying sister in Iran,
not out of a preference or affiliation with Iran. She has no intent to return to Iran. She
prefers her U.S. citizenship to any other country. Her strongest family connections are
now in the United States, not Afghanistan. Her family connections to Iran have never
been strong. Neither of these past connections could be a source pressure, coercion,
exploitation, or duress today as she would place the interests of the United States first.
In reviewing and weighing the evidence of record, I find that Applicant has mitigated any
security concerns raised.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I
conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from her foreign influence
and foreign preference under Guidelines B and C.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
12
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted          .
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge