1 
 
 
                                                                         
                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE    
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
 
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
) 
   )    ISCR Case No. 13-00676 
 ) 
) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Robert J. Kilmartin, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
MATCHINSKI, Elizabeth M., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant is an engineer with a record of four security violations. He left a 
classified tape on a bench in a laboratory in November 2006. In June 2012, he failed to 
secure a lock on a classified closed area. In October 2012, he left six classified hard 
drives unsecured in a closed area that was secured but not approved for open storage. 
In December 2012, he installed unapproved software on a classified information system. 
Applicant has since established routines to remind him of his security responsibilities, but 
his negligence in fulfilling his security responsibilities continues to cast doubt about his 
security worthiness. Clearance denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
On August 23, 2013, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications 
Facility (DOD CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing the 
security concerns under Guideline K, Handling Protected Information, and explaining 
why it was unable to find it clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or 
continue a security clearance for him. The DOD CAF took the action under Executive 
 
 
2 
 
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), 
as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and 
the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the DOD on September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant responded to the SOR allegations on September 6, 2013, and on 
September 12, 2013. He requested a hearing before a Defense Office of Hearings and 
Appeals (DOHA) administrative judge, and on January 14, 2014, the case was assigned 
to me to conduct a hearing to consider whether it is clearly consistent with the national 
interest to grant or continue a security clearance for him. On January 17, 2014, I 
scheduled a hearing for February 11, 2014. 
 
I convened the hearing as scheduled. Three Government exhibits (GEs 1-3) and 
three Applicant exhibits (AEs A-C) were admitted into evidence without objection. 
Applicant also testified, as reflected in a transcript (Tr.) received on February 20, 2014. 
At the Government’s request and with Applicant’s agreement, the SOR was amended to 
conform to the evidence. SOR 1.a was amended to correctly reflect where the incident 
occurred. SOR 1.b was amended to indicate that Applicant failed to secure the lock on 
the door to a classified laboratory. 
 
On February 21, 2014, I took action to reopen the record for Applicant to clarify 
his hearing testimony indicating that he may have performed classified work after his 
security clearance had been suspended by the DOD. Applicant’s response of March 5, 
2014, was admitted as a hearing exhibit (HE 1) without objection. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 The amended SOR alleges under Guideline K that Applicant committed four 
security violations while working for his current employer in a classified laboratory.1 
Specifically, in November 2006, he left a classified backup tape on a bench in the 
laboratory (SOR 1.a). In June 2012, he failed to secure the lock on the door to the 
classified laboratory (SOR 1.b). In October 2012, he left six, Secret-classified hard 
drives in the closed area overnight without properly storing them in an approved storage 
container (SOR 1.c). Then, in December 2012, he installed unapproved software on a 
classified information system (SOR 1.d).  Applicant does not contest that his conduct 
was in violation of the rules and regulations for protecting classified information, 
although he denies any deliberate noncompliance. After considering the pleadings, 
exhibits, and transcript, I make the following findings of fact. 
 
                                                 
1 
The SOR placed Applicant on notice of the conduct of security concern under Guideline K, but not of the 
security regulation, practice, or procedure that he allegedly violated by his conduct. At the hearing, 
Department Counsel similarly did not cite to the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual 
(NISPOM) or any security procedures of Applicant’s employer implementing the provisions of the 
NISPOM. Applicant does not contest that he committed the conduct alleged or that he thereby violated 
the rules and regulations for protecting classified information. Consistent with my obligation as the finder 
of fact, I reviewed the NISPOM to determine whether Applicant in fact violated any security requirements.  
3 
 
Applicant is a 32-year-old, married electrical engineer with two young children. 
He holds a master’s degree awarded to him in January 2011. He earned his 
undergraduate degree in May 2004. From July 2004 to November 2005, he was 
employed as a research engineer for a defense contractor. He was granted a Secret 
clearance for his duties with that company in June 2005. (Tr. 27.) In December 2005, 
Applicant went to work for his current defense contractor employer, as a member of its 
technical staff. His Secret clearance eligibility was transferred for his current 
employment. (GE 1.) 
 
Applicant’s work required access to a closed area computer laboratory approved 
for classified work to the Secret level but not approved for open storage of classified 
material (e.g., hard drives, tape drives, backup tapes, and documents). (GE 3; Tr. 23, 
26.) Applicant received security briefings on the company’s classified information 
system and classified computer laboratory, which included proper conduct in the lab 
and the protection of classified information. (Tr. 28.) Applicant also received annual 
security awareness refresher briefings, primarily consisting of Power Point 
presentations advising employees of the security procedures they are to follow. (Tr. 40.) 
 
Around November 2006, Applicant left a classified backup tape unsecured on a 
bench in the computer laboratory. The computer lab itself was properly secured by lock 
(X-09 cipher lock) and alarm, and Applicant presumed that the lab had been approved 
for open storage of classified information. (Tr. 26.) Applicant was disciplined by his 
employer for not securing the tape in an approved storage container within the 
computer lab. (GE 1.) 
 
 Starting around 2011, Applicant became the lead hardware engineer and senior 
systems integration engineer on a program where he has had to work independently, 
often as the only engineer in his office assigned to the program. His duties included the 
development, debugging, and testing of hardware and firmware, primarily in the 
classified secure environment of the closed area computer lab. Applicant worked closely 
with the security staff at his facility to coordinate the classified development environment 
for the program. (AE A.) 
 
 On June 29, 2012, Applicant forgot to spin the X-09 dial lock on the door to 
computer lab. (GEs 1-3; Tr. 35-36.) Applicant speculates that he was focused on the 
project at hand. It was a stressful time for him in that there were design issues to work 
through, which required him to access the lab several times a day. (Tr. 23, 29.) 
Whereas the computer lab was alarmed and secured by a card reader, his employer 
determined there was no compromise or loss of classified material. (GEs 1-3.) Applicant 
was given a refresher briefing for closed area procedures by his employer in July 2012 
because of this security violation. (GE 3.) The facility security officer (FSO) implemented 
a program requiring each employee with access to the computer laboratory to wear a 
red badge reminding him or her of the procedures to open and close the lab. (Tr. 23-
24.) 
 
4 
 
Applicant completed annual security refresher training in August 2012. (GE 3.) In 
mid-October 2012, he left six hard drives unsecured on a bench in the closed area 
overnight. Applicant indicates that the drives did not contain classified data, but he 
admits that they should have been protected as Secret information. (GE 1.) In reporting 
the infraction, his employer indicated that the hard drives were classified Secret. (GE 3.)  
The closed area was secured by lock and alarm, but the hard drives were not in an 
approved storage container. (GEs 1-3.) Applicant’s employer determined that there had 
been no loss or compromise of classified information, but Applicant received a written 
reprimand and information systems refresher training in October 2012 for his second 
security violation. (GE 3; Tr. 32.) Applicant believes that the incident likely happened 
when he was leaving work late at night, and he “needed to get home.” He failed to see 
the drives on the lab bench while he was busy securing everything else in the lab. (Tr. 
24.)  
 
In December 2012, Applicant installed unapproved compact disk (CD) burner 
software on a classified information system at work. He obtained the software from the 
Internet.2 He assumed that there was no problem with installing the software because 
he had seen the software on unclassified work stations. (Tr. 25, 39.) Applicant made no 
effort to check with security or information technology personnel about whether the 
software was authorized for use on a classified information system. (GEs 1-3; Tr. 25.) 
No compromise or loss of classified material occurred, but because of Applicant’s 
pattern of three security violations since late June 2012, his employer submitted an 
individual culpability report to the DOD on January 2, 2013. (GE 3.) In response to the 
incident, Applicant printed a list of the rules pertaining to classified information systems 
and posted it in the lab as a reminder of what constitutes acceptable use of the 
information system. (Tr. 39.) After the security infraction, Applicant continued to work in 
the classified lab. He obtained an escort for him to enter the lab, but the escort 
otherwise left him to perform his classified work until he needed the exit the lab. The 
escort would then ensure that he properly secured the lab. (Tr. 31-32.) 
 
                                                 
2 
When asked to explain why he thought it was okay to install software obtained from the Internet when he 
could not guarantee its security, Applicant responded: 
 
Well, I understand the concern, but a lot of the software that we use is obtained through 
the Internet, you know, simple software that’s used. Like, for example, Adobe Reader, 
that’s obtained from the Internet and we use that on all our classified PCs. I believe the 
Microsoft Office Suite, I think you can get that through hard CDs, but at some point the 
hard CDs, I think you can install updates from the Internet, so a lot of our software is 
used and it’s okay to do that. You just have to make sure that you let them know, let them 
know your intent and say, hey, I got this software, this is what I want to do with it. And 
then they basically bless it and say it’s okay to do that . . . After that incident, I do 
remember my FSO, she wasn’t quick to call this a violation. She wanted to make sure 
that our headquarters in [state name omitted] that this was an approved [software] and 
that news just hadn’t made it to our office yet. So she actually did check and the person 
who she spoke to actually did say—she named the name of the software and the guy 
said, oh, this is—this is approved software, but let me double check. And it turned out, 
after some research, that it was not in fact approved, but I think that shows that this 
software was used widely at [employer omitted]. It just hadn’t crossed that threshold into 
approved software yet. (Tr. 37-38.) 
5 
 
On January 28, 2013, Applicant completed and certified to the accuracy of an 
Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-QIP). Applicant disclosed his 
four security violations since November 2006 in response to whether, in the last seven 
years, he had received a written warning, been officially reprimanded, been suspended, 
or been disciplined for misconduct in the work place, including for a violation of security 
policy. Applicant also answered “Yes” to the following: 
 
In the last seven (7) years have you introduced, removed, or used 
hardware, software, or media in connection with any information 
technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by 
rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations or attempted any of the 
above? 
 
Applicant explained that he received a written reprimand from his FSO for installing “CD 
burner SW that is used on unclassified systems at [employer], but wasn’t yet approved 
for classified systems.” (GE 1.) Applicant submits that the new procedures in the 
laboratory, which include the wearing of a lanyard with reminders of one’s security 
responsibilities, have helped him maintain security compliance. (Tr. 25.) 
 
 On March 7, 2013, Applicant was interviewed by an authorized investigator for 
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), partially about his security violations in 
2012. Concerning the incident in June 2012, Applicant admitted that he neglected to 
spin the lock to a neutral position on the door to the computer laboratory, although he 
had armed the alarm. A co-worker, who opened the laboratory the next day, discovered 
the violation and reported it to security.  Applicant also admitted that he received a 
written warning from security after he left six hard drives on a bench in the computer lab 
in October 2012. He “just forgot” to secure the hard drives before he left the lab that 
day. As for the December 2012 violation, Applicant had downloaded CD burner 
software obtained from an unsecured Internet site onto a work computer “to complete a 
trusted download briefing for work.” He transferred the software to a CD that he then 
used to install the software to a classified workstation. Applicant denied knowing that 
the software was not approved because he had seen the program on other 
workstations. He admitted that he had not consulted with security at work before 
inputting the CD. (GE 2.) 
 
 In April 2013, the DOD suspended Applicant’s security clearance eligibility 
because of his violations of security procedures in 2012. (Tr. 43.) He was reassigned to 
a program that does not require a security clearance, but he also testified that he was 
“able to do classified work with somebody else on [his] program.” He also indicated that 
he “accessed classified systems.” (Tr. 41-42.) In response to my post-hearing request 
for clarification, Applicant explained that on about 50 occasions after his clearance was 
suspended, he was allowed to continue to work in the classified laboratory, but only 
when accompanied by a cleared escort, who alerted those employees working on 
classified materials to the presence of an uncleared individual. Applicant did not view 
any classified material. He accessed classified work stations to program and debug a 
product using standard software tools that did not visually display classified 
6 
 
information.3 On occasion, he needed to operate the software tools to view debugging 
information or program the product if it was not operating correctly, “simply because [he 
is] more of a subject matter expert on the product than [his] escort.”  Applicant’s 
understanding was that he could not access any classified documents on screens, but 
accessing classified hardware (product, programming cables, and hard drives) was 
acceptable with an escort because the classified hardware was not visually classified. 
(HE 1.) 
 
 Reinstatement of Applicant’s security eligibility is endorsed by the general 
manager/vice president of his company’s local operations (AE C); by the onsite 
supervisor tasked with issuing Applicant’s performance reviews while not directly 
overseeing Applicant’s work (AE B); and by the senior program manager for a family of 
encryption products, who interacts with Applicant long distance (AE A.) Applicant has 
shown his general manager that he understands his responsibilities associated with 
working with classified programs. This manager considers Applicant an asset and he 
would not hesitate to hire him again to support such programs. (AE C.) The onsite 
supervisor has known Applicant since 2005, when they both started with the company. 
Applicant has demonstrated dedication and focus at work, such that he is regularly 
praised “for both his attention to details as well as his ability to keep big picture ideas in 
perspective.” This supervisor is aware of the three security incidents. He was surprised 
by the June 2012 infraction and considered it uncharacteristic of Applicant’s attention to 
detail. Following the third incident, Applicant impressed the supervisor with his 
commitment to establishing new routines to ensure there would be no future infractions. 
In hindsight, the supervisor considers it “disappointing” that Applicant did not take 
similar measures after the second infraction, but he is convinced that Applicant can be 
trusted with access to sensitive information.  “[Applicant’s] dedication to fixing mistakes 
and his determined, focused mentality will help him be vigilant against any future 
incidents.” (AE B.) 
 
Policies 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion the Executive 
Branch has in regulating access to information pertaining to national security,  
emphasizing that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy 
v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a 
                                                 
3 
Applicant explained his access to classified work stations as follows: 
 
They did not allow me to view classified material after my clearance was suspended. 
However, to continue with my debugging work in the classified lab, our product needed to 
be opened (cover removed) to allow access to test connectors. This alone makes the 
product classified, but it is not visually classified. Classified debug software images 
needed to be programmed into the product from the workstation. However, what makes 
them classified is that they are not encrypted. I did not view any classified source code. 
The programming tool does not show any classified information. The programming 
cables are connected to the classified workstation and are therefore marked classified, 
but again not visually classified. Finally, debugging required hard drives that were marked 
classified since they were connected to our open (now classified) product. No classified 
data was actually stored on the hard drive. (HE 1.) 
7 
 
security clearance, the administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. 
In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative 
guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are 
required to be considered in evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified 
information. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overall adjudicative 
goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire 
process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole-
person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable 
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a 
decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government 
must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under 
Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other 
evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven 
by Department Counsel. . . .” The applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to 
obtain a favorable security decision. 
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in 
terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty 
of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple 
prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information). 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline K, Handling Protected Information 
 
 The security concern for Handling Protected Information is articulated in AG ¶ 33: 
 
Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for 
protecting classified or other sensitive information raises doubt about an 
8 
 
individual’s trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability 
to safeguard such information, and is a serious security concern. 
 
 The evidence establishes that Applicant committed four security infractions after 
he started with his current employer in December 2005. In November 2006 and again in 
October 2012, he left classified material unsecured in the computer lab overnight. As of 
February 28, 2006, the NISPOM (DOD 5220.22-M, ¶ 5-303) mandated supplemental 
controls, such as a safe, steel file cabinet or safe-type steel file container with an 
automatic unit locking mechanism, or a steel file cabinet secured by a rigid metal lock 
bar and an approved key operated or combination padlock, for the storage of Secret 
material in closed areas. Even if Applicant believed in good faith that classified 
information could be left in the open in a properly secured closed area in November 
2006, he was disciplined by his employer for the infraction. Therefore, he knew as of 
October 2012 that the information on the hard drives had to be protected to the level of 
Secret before he left the computer lab. He violated ¶ 5-100 of the NISPOM, which 
clearly states that individuals are responsible for safeguarding classified information 
entrusted to them. In June 2012, Applicant failed to properly secure the computer lab by 
failing to spin the X-09 lock, so although he had armed the alarm, the closed area was 
not fully secured. He violated ¶ 5-306 of the NISPOM in that during non-working hours 
and during working hours when a closed area is unattended, admittance is to be 
controlled by locked entrances and exits secured by either an approved built-in 
combination lock or an approved combination or key-operated padlock. Then, in 
December 2012, Applicant violated his responsibilities under ¶ 8-105 of the NISPOM as 
a user of a classified information system. He failed to ensure the integrity of a classified 
information system when he downloaded onto the classified system software obtained 
from an unsecure Internet site without authorization. Three disqualifying conditions 
under AG ¶ 34 are implicated: 
 
(b) collecting or storing classified or other protected information at home or 
in any other unauthorized location; 
 
(g) any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or other 
sensitive information; and 
 
(h) negligence or lax security habits that persist despite counseling by 
management. 
 
AG ¶ 34(b) applies in that the classified lab was not approved for open storage, so the 
classified backup tape in November 2006 and the six Secret hard drives in October 
2012 were found in an unauthorized location. AG ¶ 34(g) applies in that he failed to 
protect classified information, and in the case of the unapproved introduction of 
software, a classified information system. AG ¶ 34(h) is shown by his pattern of three 
security infractions within six months in 2012. 
 
 Under AG ¶ 35, Applicant’s failure to fully comply with the rules and regulations 
for protecting classified information could be mitigated by the following: 
9 
 
 
(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened so 
infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to 
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
(b) the individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial security 
training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of 
security responsibilities; and 
 
(c) the security violations were due to improper or inadequate training. 
 
 Two of the violations (the November 2006 and October 2012 security incidents) 
were similar in that they involved the improper storage of classified information. The 
recurrence and recency of his security infractions preclude favorable consideration of 
AG ¶ 35(a). Concerning AG ¶ 35(b), it is difficult to conclude that Applicant responded 
favorably to remedial security training, given that the October 2012 improper storage of 
classified material and the December 2012 loading of unapproved software onto a 
classified system occurred after he received security refresher training, including his 
annual refresher briefing in August 2012. 
 
 Applicant has posted the rules for protecting classified information systems and 
the classified laboratory in his work area, and he wears the lanyard established by his 
employer to remind him of his security responsibilities. Applicant’s improved focus on 
security measures, which has been observed by an onsite manager, do not fully 
mitigate the security concerns, especially those raised by his downloading of 
unapproved software from the Internet onto a classified network. Applicant made 
assumptions inconsistent with his security obligations. Applicant testified that he now 
realizes that he has to check with his FSO first to see whether he can install software on 
a classified system (Tr. 25), but concerns persist that he lacks appropriate security 
awareness. Applicant testified that he was allowed to perform classified work after his 
clearance was suspended by the DOD in April 2013, provided he was escorted. When 
asked about this potentially unauthorized access, Applicant responded, “I think they 
deemed it okay, I guess, maybe because this was pending investigation.” He admitted 
he did not know whether the practice was consistent with the NISPOM (Tr. 41), and he 
apparently took no steps on his own to determine whether his work was security 
compliant. Applicant clarified after the hearing that his “classified work” involved 
escorted access to classified hardware that was not visually classified. He operated 
software tools to view debugging information or to program the product “simply because 
[he is] more of a subject matter expert on the product than [his] escort.” (HE 1.) 
Assuming Applicant’s work was not classified,4 he should have recognized that 
describing his work as classified to the Government in February 2014 was inappropriate 
and could raise security flags. 
                                                 
4
See ¶ 8-304 of the NISPOM, which authorizes maintenance by uncleared personnel with an 
appropriately cleared and technically qualified escort who monitors and records the activities of the 
uncleared person in a maintenance log. 
10 
 
 Concerning AG ¶ 35(c), Applicant has not blamed his violations on inadequate 
security training. The June 2012 and October 2012 violations are attributable to 
Applicant being so focused on his work that he failed to pay due attention to his security 
responsibilities. The December 2012 infraction was due to Applicant not realizing the 
potential security risks of installing software from an unsecured Internet site onto a 
classified network. By that time, Applicant had worked primarily in a classified 
environment for seven years and could reasonably be expected to have understood that 
classified systems have different security requirements than non-classified systems. At 
a minimum, he should have checked with security or information technology personnel 
about whether the software could safely be downloaded in the classified environment. 
AG ¶ 35(c) does not apply. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of his conduct 
and all relevant circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors listed at 
AG ¶ 2(a).5 
 
Applicant did not set out to circumvent security regulations. Yet, three security 
violations in six months in 2012 casts serious doubt about his judgment and reliability 
with regard to the handling of classified information. Applicant’s onsite manager has 
been impressed by Applicant’s renewed commitment to executing his security 
responsibilities perfectly since then, and he recommends reinstatement of Applicant’s 
security clearance. Should Applicant’s clearance be reinstated, he may well resume his 
classified duties, which have often required that he work independently and without 
direct oversight. The Government must be assured that he possesses the security 
knowledge and awareness to recognize any potential security issue so that he can seek 
security guidance if appropriate. His evidence falls short in this regard. It is well settled 
that once a concern arises regarding an applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is 
a strong presumption against the grant or renewal of a security clearance. See 
Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990). Based on the facts and 
circumstances before me, I do not find it clearly consistent with the national interest to 
reinstate Applicant’s security clearance eligibility at this time.  
                                                 
5 
The factors under AG ¶ 2(a) are as follows: 
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding 
the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the 
conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other 
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for 
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or 
recurrence. 
11 
 
Formal Findings 
 
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the 
amended SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline K:  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
Subparagraph 1.a:  Against Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.b:  Against Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.c:  Against Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.d:  Against Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant eligibility for a 
security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
________________________ 
Elizabeth M. Matchinski 
Administrative Judge