1  
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
 
 
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
) 
) ISCR Case No. 13-00705 
) 
Applicant for Security Clearance1 ) 
 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Richard Stevens, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: E. Kenton Foulke, Esq. 
 
 
03/27/2014 
 
 
Decision 
 
 
 
 
ANTHONY, Joan Caton, Administrative Judge: 
 
After a thorough review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, I conclude that 
Applicant failed to mitigate the Government’s security concerns under Guideline B, 
Foreign Influence. Her eligibility for a security clearance is denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
On January 16, 2003, Applicant completed a Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive 
Positions (Standard Form 95). On January 10, 2008, she completed an Electronic 
Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-QIP), and on August 31, 2012, she 
completed a second e-QIP. On September 12, 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence. DOD acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 
 
 
 
1  The case is styled using Applicant's surname in her first marriage. Her name changed when she 
remarried in [redacted] and took her new husband’s surname. (Ex. B.) 
2  
1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within 
DOD for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
On September 25, 2013, Applicant answered the SOR and requested a hearing 
before an administrative judge from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals 
(DOHA). The case was assigned to me on January 28, 2014. I convened a hearing by 
video teleconference on February 19, 2014, to consider whether it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. The 
Government called no witnesses and introduced four exhibits (Ex. 1 through Ex. 4), 
which were entered in the record without objection. The Government also offered for 
administrative notice a compilation summarizing facts about Russia, as found in ten 
official U.S. Government source documents, which were also provided. The 
Government’s summary of the source documents and the source documents were 
identified as Hearing Exhibit (HE) 2.2  In a letter dated January 13, 2014, Applicant 
objected to my taking administrative notice of the documents in HE 2 (HE 3). In a letter 
dated February 14, 2014, Applicant requested that the administrative notice documents 
offered by the Government be withdrawn. (HE 4.) At the hearing, Applicant was offered 
an opportunity to discuss in detail her objections and request for withdrawal. After 
extended colloquy between the parties on the issue, I denied Applicant’s request that 
the administrative notice documents be withdrawn, and I informed the parties that I 
would consider relevant facts about Russia, as contained in HE 2, in my Guideline B 
analysis, pursuant to guidance in the Directive. 
 
Applicant called no witnesses and testified on her own behalf. She offered 16 
exhibits, which I marked as Ex. A through Ex. P.3   The Government did not object to the 
admission of Applicant’s Ex. H, a letter from Applicant’s employer. However, the letter 
contained  an  extensive  discussion  of  the  nature  of  Applicant’s  work,  and  the 
Government opined that the writer appeared to be making a compelling need request. 
Accordingly, the Government requested that I give limited weight to those portions of 
the  letter  and  focus  instead  on  those  portions  of  the  letter  which  provided  an 
assessment of Applicant’s character. All other exhibits offered by Applicant were 
admitted without objection or further comment. 
 
The hearing was continued when the facility providing the video teleconference 
connection closed for the day. Applicant’s hearing was reconvened and concluded on 
February 24, 2014. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) of the complete hearing on 
March 5, 2014. 
Findings of Fact 
 
 
 
 
2  Department Counsel provided Applicant with a copy of the factual summary and documents, dated 
November 13, 2013, and identified as HE 2. Department Counsel also provided Applicant with a current 
edition of DoD Directive 5220.6 and the guideline applicable in this case by letter transmitted January 31, 
2014 and identified as HE 1. 
 
3 Applicant’s two exhibit lists are identified as HE 5 and HE 6. 
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The SOR contains three allegations of security concern under Guideline B, 
Foreign Influence (SOR ¶¶ 1.a. through 1.c.). In her Answer to the SOR, Applicant 
admitted SOR allegations 1.a. and 1.b. She denied SOR allegation 1.c. Applicant’s 
admissions are entered as findings of fact. 
 
After a thorough review of the record in the case, including Applicant’s testimony, 
exhibits,  relevant  policies,  and  the  applicable  adjudicative  guideline,  I  make  the 
following additional findings of fact: 
 
Applicant is [redacted] years old. She was born and raised in the Soviet Union. 
Her parents were employed by the government in work supporting the defense of the 
Soviet Union. Applicant was recognized as the best student in her high school class, 
and she received a special stipend from the government in recognition of her academic 
superiority. She then received the equivalent of an associate’s degree from a technical 
college in her community, and she also received the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree 
from a polytechnic institute, which was also located in her community. (Ex. 1; Tr. 150- 
154, 227.) 
 
After finishing with her schooling, Applicant elected to bear a child. Her only child, 
a daughter, was born in [redacted]. Applicant continued living with her parents and 
working for a government unit in her community. When the Soviet Union collapsed, 
Applicant decided to leave with her child and immigrate to the United States. After 
Russian, Applicant’s second language was German. However, she began to study 
English. Soon thereafter, she met an American physics professor through an 
internet source and began correspondence with him. After a time, he came to Russia 
to meet Applicant. He then  sponsored  her  on  a  fiancée  visa,  and  in [redacted],  
Applicant  and  her  child immigrated to the United States. Shortly thereafter, 
Applicant married the professor. (Ex. 1; Ex. 3; Tr. 70-75, 257-258.) 
 
After her marriage, Applicant began academic studies at the U.S. college where 
her husband taught. When he accepted a position at a university in another state, she 
and her daughter accompanied him. Applicant then began advanced studies in 
engineering. She earned a Master’s degree in [redacted] and a Ph.D. degree in 
[redacted]. After completing her doctorate, she remained at the university and was 
employed as a post- doctoral fellow. She was highly respected professionally and 
received numerous awards for her work. (Ex. 1; Ex. D; Ex. E; Tr. 77-86.) 
 
Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in [ r e d a c t e d ] , and she 
acquired a U.S. passport in [redacted]. She traveled to Russia to visit her parents and 
other family members in December [redacted]. She traveled in Europe on vacation in 
[redacted]. She used her U.S. passport when she traveled to Europe, although she also 
possessed a valid Russian passport. She relinquished her Russian passport before 
becoming the employee of a U.S. defense contractor in [redacted]. She does not have 
a current U.S. passport. (Ex. 1; Ex. A; Tr. 261-263.) 
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Applicant divorced her husband in [redacted]. She moved to another part of the 
United States to take a position as a government contractor. She was first awarded a 
security clearance in [redacted]. Since acquiring a security clearance, she has taken a 
position with another government contractor, which is supporting her request for access 
to classified information. (Ex. 1; Ex. H.) 
 
Applicant’s mother, father, and brother are residents and citizens of Russia. Her 
parents are retired from government-related positions in Russia, and they receive 
pensions from the Russian government. Applicant’s brother was employed by a 
government entity in Russia for 30 years. Applicant does not know if her brother’s 
worksite required restricted access. He is now employed by a utility. During his career, 
Applicant’s father, an engineer, was the head of a technology division at a Soviet 
government enterprise.  When she was completing her security clearance application, 
Applicant consulted with her parents to obtain information related to their work, her 
brother’s work, and information about other family members who are citizens and 
residents of Russia. Applicant’s parents know the name and general business of her 
former employer, a large U.S. defense contractor. They also know she was offered a 
position in Russia by another large U.S. government contractor. Applicant discussed the 
offer with her parents and they advised her to decline the job and remain in the United 
States. (Ex. 1; Tr. 124, 127, 170, 174, 182, 255, 264-265.) 
 
Applicant has two aunts and a niece who are also citizens and residents of 
Russia. The aunts and the niece live in the same community as Applicant’s parents and 
her  brother.  This  is  also  the  community  where  Applicant  was  born,  raised,  and 
educated. (Ex. 1; Ex. 4; Tr. 252-254.) 
 
Applicant communicates with her parents by digital teleconference. Because she 
is concerned about their health, she usually contacts her parents for a teleconference 
visit once a week. She asserts that she has no contact with her brother, niece, or two 
aunts. (Tr. 119-120, 254.) 
 
Applicant provided letters of character reference from professors with whom she 
worked on her advanced degrees. She also provided character references from 
managers, colleagues, and coworkers. The letters emphasized her extraordinary 
academic  and  professional  accomplishments  and  asserted  that  she  possessed 
diligence and good character. Applicant also provided documentation to show that she 
is a homeowner and a careful manager of her financial resources.   (Ex. C; Ex. D; Ex. F 
through Ex. P.) 
 
I take administrative notice of the following facts about Russia, which appear in 
official U.S. government publications and which were provided by Department Counsel 
to Applicant and to me:4 
 
 
 
 
 
4 I have omitted footnotes that appear in the quoted materials. 
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According to information compiled for the National Counterintelligence 
Executive’s 2011 Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and 
Industrial  Espionage,  Russia’s  intelligence  services  are  conducting  a 
range of activities to collect economic information and technology from US 
targets, and [Russia] remains one of the top three most aggressive and 
capable collectors of sensitive US economic information and technologies, 
particularly in cyberspace. Non-cyberspace collection methods include 
targeting of US visitors overseas, especially if the visitors are assessed as 
having access to sensitive information. Two trends that may increase 
Russia’s threat over the next several years [are] that many Russian 
immigrants with advanced technical skills who work for leading U.S. 
companies may be increasingly targeted for recruitment by the Russian 
intelligence  services;  and  a  greater  number  of  Russian  companies 
affiliated with the intelligence services will be doing business in the United 
States. 
 
Russia’s extensive and sophisticated intelligence operations are motivated 
by Russia’s high dependence on natural resources, the need to diversify 
its  economy,  and  the belief  that the global  economic  system is  tilted 
toward the U.S. at the expense of Russia. As a result, Russia’s highly 
capable intelligence services are using human intelligence (HUMINT), 
cyber,   and   other   operations   to   collect   economic   information   and 
technology to support Russia’s economic development and security. 
 
On June 28, 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the arrests 
of ten alleged secret agents for carrying out long-term, deep-cover 
assignments  on  behalf  of  Russia.  Within  weeks,  all  ten  defendants 
pleaded guilty in federal court and were immediately expelled from the 
United States. On January 18, 2011, convicted spy and former CIA 
employee Harold Nicholson, currently incarcerated following a 1997 
espionage conviction, was sentenced to an additional 96 months of 
imprisonment for money laundering and conspiracy to act as an agent of 
the Russian government for passing information to the Russian 
government between 2006 and December 2008. 
 
Beyond collection activities and espionage directed at the United States, 
Russia has provided various military and missile technologies to other 
countries of security concern, including China, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. 
[Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s return is unlikely to bring immediate, 
substantive reversals in Russia’s approach to the United States, but 
because of Putin’s instinctive distrust of U.S. intentions and his 
transactional approach towards relations, it is likely that he will be more 
confrontational with Washington over policy differences. Continuing 
concerns about U.S. missile defense plans will reinforce Russia’s 
reluctance to engage in further nuclear arms reductions and Russia is 
unlikely to support additional sanctions against Iran. Russian intelligence 
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and security services continue to target Department of Defense interests 
in support of Russian security and foreign policy objectives. 
 
Although [Russian] law allows officials to enter a private residence only in 
cases prescribed by federal law or on the basis of judicial decision, 
authorities [do] not always observe these restrictions in practice. Problems 
remain. . . due to allegations that government officials and others engaged 
in electronic surveillance without judicial permission and entered 
residences and other premises without warrants. The Russian government 
also requires that telephone and cellular companies grant the Ministry of 
Interior and the Federal Security Service (FSB) 24-hour remote access to 
their client databases, as well as requiring telecommunications companies 
and Internet service providers to provide dedicated lines to the security 
establishment, enabling police to track private e-mail communications and 
monitoring Internet activity. 
 
Policies 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the 
Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security, and 
it has emphasized that “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the 
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the 
authority to control access to information bearing on national security and to determine 
whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. 
at 527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant 
an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified. 
 
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an 
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, the administrative judge applies these guidelines in 
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s 
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According 
to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables 
known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all 
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and 
unfavorable, in making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires  that  “[a]ny  doubt  concerning  personnel  being  considered  for  access  to 
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classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record. 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion in obtaining a favorable security 
decision. 
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship   with   the   Government   predicated   upon   trust   and   confidence.   This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information). 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
 
Under Guideline B, “[f]oreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if 
the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or 
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not 
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.”  AG ¶ 
6. 
 
Additionally,  adjudications  under  Guideline  B  “can  and  should  consider  the 
identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, 
including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is 
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with 
the risk of terrorism.” AG ¶ 6. 
 
A Guideline B decision assessing the security worthiness of a U.S. citizen with 
Russian contacts must take into consideration Russia’s aggressive efforts to collect 
sensitive   U.S.   economic   and   technological   information.   American   citizens   with 
immediate family members who are citizens or residents of Russia could be vulnerable 
to coercion, exploitation, or pressure. 
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I have considered all of the disqualifying conditions under the foreign influence 
guideline.  The facts of Applicant’s case raise security concerns under disqualifying 
conditions AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b).5 
 
Applicant’s  mother,  father,  brother,  two  aunts,  and  niece  are  citizens  and 
residents of Russia. All of these relatives reside in the same Russian community. 
Applicant’s parents, both  of whom  are retired, receive pensions for work that was 
related to Russian government defense issues. As a student in the Soviet Union, 
Applicant was singled out and recognized for her brilliance and achievements. As an 
adult daughter, she has close and continuing contact with her parents. She 
communicates with them weekly by digital teleconference. When she was completing 
her security clearance application, she solicited information from them about her brother 
and other family members. Applicant’s parents are aware of the name and mission of at 
least one of her U.S. government contractor employers. Earlier in her career, she 
consulted with her parents when she was offered a position in Russia by another U.S. 
government contractor. 
 
Applicant states that she does not have continuing contact with her brother, 
aunts, and niece, and she asserts that she relies upon her parents for information about 
these relatives. Applicant’s brother also has a background as an employee of the 
Russian government. Applicant denied knowing if he worked in a facility with restricted 
access, and this fact was not established by the Government. 
 
Several mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 8 might be applicable to Applicant’s 
case.  If “the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these 
persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are 
such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose 
between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the 
interests of the U.S.,” then AG ¶ 8(a) might apply.   If “there is no conflict of interest, 
either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, 
group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and 
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected 
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest,” then AG ¶ 8(b) might 
apply.  If “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that 
there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation,” 
then AG ¶ 8(c) might apply. 
 
Applicant is a loyal and caring daughter. However, her contacts with her parents, 
and through them with her other family members, raise concerns that she could be 
 
 
5 AG ¶ 7(a) reads: “contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or 
other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of 
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.” AG ¶ 7(b) reads: “connections to a 
foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the 
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a 
foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.” 
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targeted for exploitation, pressure, or coercion by the government of Russia in ways that 
might threaten U.S. security interests. Applicant’s relationships with her father and 
mother are strong and enduring. Additionally, the record contains evidence that would 
lead a reasonable person to conclude that Applicant’s family might well come to the 
attention of Russian authorities and become a means through which she could be 
subject to coercion. It is not possible to conclude that Applicant’s relationships with her 
Russian family members would raise conflicts of interest that she would be able to 
resolve in favor of U.S. interests. 
 
Applicant failed to rebut the Government’s allegations that her relationships and 
contacts with her family members who are citizens of Russia created a heightened risk 
of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. Applicant’s 
contacts and relationships with these individuals could force her to choose between 
loyalty to them and the security interests of the United States. (ISCR Case No. 03- 
15485 at 4-6 (App. Bd. June 2, 2005); ISCR Case No. 06-24575 (App. Bd. Nov. 9, 
2007)). I conclude that the mitigating conditions identified under AG ¶¶ 8(a), 8(b), and 
8(c) do not apply to the facts of Applicant’s case. 
 
Nothing in Applicant’s answers to the Guideline B allegations in the SOR or in 
her testimony at her hearing suggested she was not a loyal U.S. citizen. Section 7 of 
Executive Order 10865 specifically provides that industrial security clearance decisions 
shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to 
the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” 
 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s 
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the 
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. 
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of the 
whole-person  concept  and  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  surrounding  this  case. 
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Applicant is a talented and valued employee of a U.S. government contractor. Since her 
student days in Russia, she has been respected for her intellectual accomplishments. 
She is a homeowner and responsible in her financial dealings. Applicant is also a 
committed and loyal daughter and family member. However, her relationships and 
contacts with family members who have Russian citizenship raise serious unmitigated 
concerns  about  her  vulnerability  to  coercion  and  her  heightened  risk  for  foreign 
influence. 
 
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions and doubts as to 
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For these reasons, I 
conclude that Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns arising under the foreign 
influence adjudicative guideline. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the 
amended SOR, as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT 
Subparagraphs 1.a. - 1.b.: Against Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.c.: For Applicant 
Conclusion 
 
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
 
 
Joan Caton Anthony 
Administrative Judge