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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 13-01078
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Alison O’Connell,  Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Nicole A. Smith, Esq.
                                                                            
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Decision
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LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
On November 7, 2013, the Department of Defense  (DOD) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) listing security concerns arising under  Guideline B (Foreign Influence.
The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
(DoD) Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines
(AG), implemented in September 2006. 
Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested a hearing before an
administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on January 17, 2014. A notice of
hearing was issued on January 30, 2014, scheduling the hearing for February 25, 2014.
Government Exhibits (GX) 1-3 were admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant
testified, presented the testimony of two witnesses, and submitted Applicant Exhibit
(AX) A-C, which were admitted without objection. The transcript was received on March
6, 2014.  Based on a review of the pleadings, testimony, and exhibits, eligibility for
access to classified information is granted.
Applicant explained that he had not been adjudicated by DOD for a clearance as a contractor. He explained      1
that in 2008, another agency had adjudicated his application.  He completed an application for DOD in 2011.
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Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
relating to Iran. The request and the attached documents are included in the record as
HE I. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Facts, below.
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the SOR allegation in ¶ 1.a with
explanations.
Applicant, who was born in Iran, is 52 years old. While in Iran, he attended
private schools which he described as “westernized.” He came to the United States in
1978 on an F-1 visa for education purposes. Applicant became a naturalized citizen in
March 2003. He graduated from undergraduate school in the United States in 2004. He
married his wife, who is a naturalized citizen, in 1998. (Tr. 56) . He has two children who
are U.S. citizens. Applicant completed his first security clearance application in 2008.
He has held a security clearance since 2009.   Applicant has been employed with his1
current employer, as a government contractor, since 2008. (GX 1)
Applicant’s mother and father are dual citizens of the United States and Iran who
reside in Iran for approximately one-half of the year. His father is 90 years old, is in poor
health, and has dementia. (AX A) He was an agriculture engineer before he retired.
Applicant’s mother is 80 years old, and has never held employment outside of the
home. They live with Applicant or his sister when they are in the United States. They
have been living between Iran and the United States for about 30 years. When traveling
to the United States, they use a U.S. passport and when traveling to Iran they use an
Iranian passport. Applicant stated that they have not encountered any difficulties. (Tr.
114)
Applicant’s father has Medicare health benefits when he is in the United States.
Applicant’s mother does not have such care as she was never employed in the United
States. She receives universal health care in Iran. (Tr. 72) Applicant’s parents receive
income from the sale of various properties in Iran.
Applicant’s parents became naturalized U.S. citizens in 2001, but they have
been traveling between Iran and the United States since the 1980s. They were
permanent residents of the United States before receiving the citizenship. (Tr. 102)
Applicant’s parents have no connection to the Iranian government. (Tr. 77) When
Applicant’s parents are in Iran, Applicant speaks to them by telephone about once a
week. His parents have no knowledge of Applicant’s work or the security clearance
process. 
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Applicant’s sisters and brothers are U.S. citizens who reside in the United States.
His mother-in-law and father-in-law are naturalized citizens of the United States. He has
many nieces, nephews, aunts, and uncles who are in the United States. (GX 2) These
family members were born in Iran.
Applicant traveled to Iran on three occasions in the past 30 years. The last visit
was in 2007 for a wedding. For those three trips, he used his Iranian passport.
Applicant has returned his Iranian passport to his FSO, and he will not return to Iran. He
has a U.S. passport. Despite his father’s wishes to be buried in Iran, Applicant will not
travel to Iran for a funeral. (Tr. 26)  He visited his family in 1997. (Tr. 58) When he
visited, he felt that he did not belong there and felt like a foreigner. (Tr. 59) After the
birth of Applicant’s first child, he visited Iran in 2002. (Tr. 60)  The last time that
Applicant traveled to Iran was in 2007 for his brother’s wedding. He went alone and was
there for about ten days. At that time, he traveled on an Iranian passport. In 2008, he
surrendered his Iranian passport to his facility security officer. (Tr. 88) Applicant will
never return to Iran. He signed documents to that effect when he surrendered his
Iranian passport. Applicant understands that he will not return to Iran for any reason,
even if his parents are ill. Applicant stated that he has brothers and sisters who live in
the United States who could return to help his parents. 
Applicant and his wife own three homes in the United States. Their net worth is
approximately $1.2 million. He and his wife have retirement accounts.  (AX B) 
Applicant has no assets or property in Iran. (GX 2)
Applicant’s current supervisor testified that Applicant is an invaluable member of
the team. He has supervised Applicant for several years and states that he works with
Applicant on a daily basis and sometimes on the weekend. Applicant has been
exemplary in his service to this company. (Tr. 21) Applicant consistently goes beyond
expectations. Applicant’s supervisor is familiar with the security concern at issue. He
states that Applicant can properly handle and safeguard classified information. (Tr. 23)
 Applicant’s friend, a retired Naval officer, who holds a security clearance,
testified that he has known Applicant since 2009. Applicant is active in the community
with Cub Scouts and sports. He is aware that Applicant was born in Iran and that his
parents are elderly. (Tr. 36) He describes Applicant as a family man.
Applicant submitted five letters of recommendation from colleagues and former
employers. Each attests to Applicant’s high degree of integrity, responsibility, and
ambition. The president of Applicant’s current employment company wrote that “he is
one of the few”inner circle” employees who I have entrusted with personnel and contact
information.”
Applicant enjoys his work and provides a service to the U.S. Government. He is
lauded for his dedication and support. He was passionate when noting that if placed in
a compromising position regarding the protection of classified information and loyalty to
his parents in Iran, he would contact authorities to solve any problem. (Tr. 93)
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Administrative Notice
Iran is a theocratic Islamic republic dominated by Shia Muslim clergy, with
ultimate political authority vested in a learned religious scholar. Current U.S. concerns
about Iran are based on its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and weapons of mass
destruction; support for and involvement in international terrorism; support for violent
opposition to the Middle East peace process; and its human rights abuses, including
summary executions, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and restrictions on civil
liberties. Iran has provided guidance, training, and weapons to Shia political and militant
groups in Iraq. It also provides encouragement, training, funding, and weapons to anti-
Israeli terrorist groups in its efforts to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process. Iran’s
intelligence operations against the United States, including cyber-intelligence
capabilities, have dramatically increased in depth and complexity during the past few
years. Iran has aggressive programs for collecting U.S. dual-use technologies and
advanced materials development, especially in the area of nanotechnology.
The current government of Iran is hostile to the United States. The United States
has designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. The United States broke diplomatic
relations with Iran in April 1980, prohibits most trade with Iran, and uses multilateral
sanctions and diplomatic pressure to contain the threat posed by Iran.
Iran does not recognize dual citizenship. Iranian-born, naturalized U.S. citizens
are considered solely Iranian citizens by the Iranian authorities, and they are subject to
surveillance, search, harassment, arrest, and imprisonment while traveling or residing in
Iran. A U.S. State Department consular information sheet advises that to enter Iran if
you are an Iranian-born citizen, regardless of any naturalization process, one must
present an Iranian passport. 
 Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions. These guidelines are not inflexible
rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, they are applied
in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. An administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the “whole-person concept.” An administrative judge must consider all
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. 
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).      2
 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).      3
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      4
 See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive      5
information), and EO 10865 § 7.
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      6
 Id.      7
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The U.S. Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts
alleged in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other
evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven
by Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a2
preponderance of evidence.  The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  3 4
A person seeking access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified information. Such
decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather
than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.”  “The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance5
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Any reasonable doubt6
about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be
resolved in favor of protecting such information.  The decision to deny an individual a7
security clearance does not necessarily reflect badly on an applicant’s character. It is
merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President
and the Secretary of Defense established for issuing a clearance.
Analysis
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The security concern under Guideline B is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
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way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.” AG ¶ 7(a). A
disqualifying condition also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group,
government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.” AG ¶
7(b). Finally, another disqualifying condition, “sharing living quarters with a person or
persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of
foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion” is applicable. AG ¶ 7(d)
Applicant’s parents are dual citizens of the United States and Iran who live in the
United States about six months in a year. The other six months are spent in Iran.
However, under either disqualifying condition, security concerns could arise in
connection with the potential that hostile forces might seek protected information from
Applicant by threatening harm to his parents. Based on this evidence, AG ¶¶ 7(a) 7(b),
and 7(d) are raised.
Since the Government produced evidence to raise the disqualifying conditions in
AG ¶¶ 7(a), (b), and (d), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut,
explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the
burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to
the government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to
those of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.
Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States,
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-
0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the
nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human
rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members
are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is
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significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family
member is associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known
to conduct intelligence operations against the United States.
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a). The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). Similarly, AG ¶ 8(b) can mitigate concerns when “there is no
conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.”).
Applicant has lived in the United States since he was 16 years of age. He was
educated in private schools in Iran. When he came to the United States, he obtained
his undergraduate degree from an American university. He is a naturalized U.S. citizen.
His wife is a naturalized U.S. citizen and his children are U.S. citizens. He has lived in
the United States since 1978.  Applicant’s family members are residents and citizens of
the United States. He has no other extended family in Iran with whom he maintains
contact, except his parents, who he talks to on a weekly basis.  His parents, who are
elderly, are dual citizens of the United States and Iran. They live in the United States for
about six months a year. The remaining six months are spent in Iran. They have been
doing this for many years and have not experienced any problems. They have no
knowledge of Applicant’s work. They have no connection to the Iranian Government.
Applicant does not support them. Applicant has substantial interests in the United
States. He has no desire to return to Iran to live.  He realizes that he will no longer be
able to go to Iran if something happens to his parents. He surrendered his Iranian
passport.He does not deny that he loves his parents, but he is committed to his
personal and professional life in the United States. There is substantial mitigation in this
case. 
Applicant spoke about his undivided loyalty to the United States.  I find Applicant
has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in America that he can be
expected to resolve any potential conflict of interest in favor of the United States. He
has established application of AG ¶ 8(b). Applicant has mitigated the concerns under
the foreign influence guideline. 
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
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(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. As noted above, the
ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant seeking a security clearance. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the whole-person factors.
Applicant is 52 years old. He is an educated man, who is a naturalized U.S. citizen. His
family is in the United States with him. Applicant’s parents are dual citizens of the
United States and Iran. They reside in the United States with their children for half the
year. His financial assets are substantial. Applicant has held a security clearance and
has had access to classified information. He has worked for his current employer since
2008.
 Applicant’s mother and father are dual citizens of the United States and Iran.
They return to Iran each year and live in retirement. They are elderly and ill. They live a
quiet life. They do not have any knowledge about Applicant’s work. Applicant is candid
in that he loves his parents, but his primary duty is to his own wife and children who are
U.S. citizens. He will not travel back to Iran at any time. He does not have his Iranian
passport. He will seek advice to resolve any issues that may arise in the future with the
help of his FSO. For all these reasons, Applicant has mitigated the security concerns
under foreign influence.  Clearance is granted.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance.
Clearance is granted.
                                                     
NOREEN A. LYNCH.
Administrative Judge