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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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[NAME REDACTED] )       ISCR Case No. 12-03929
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Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Ray T. Blank, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
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Decision
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MALONE, Matthew E., Administrative Judge:
Security concerns about Applicant’s contacts with Australia and his acquisition of
Australian citizenship are outweighed by his significant ties and loyalties to the United
States, and by the lack of a heightened risk of exploitation. His request for a security
clearance is granted.
Statement of the Case
On August 2, 2011, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for
Investigations Processing (eQIP) to obtain or renew a security clearance required for his
job with a defense contractor. After reviewing the results of the ensuing background
investigation, which included his responses to Department of Defense (DOD)
 See DOD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), as amended, Section E3.1.2.2.1
 Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended. See also Directive, Section E3.1.1.2
 See Directive, Enclosure 2. See also 32 C.F.R. § 154, Appendix H (2006).3
 See Directive, Enclosure 3, Section E3.1.7. The FORM included six documents (Items 1 - 6) proffered in4
support of the Government’s case.
 Applicant attended the Naval Academy and was commissioned in 1964. (FORM, Item 5)5
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interrogatories,  DOD adjudicators could not determine that it is clearly consistent with1
the national interest for Applicant to have access to classified information.2
On November 25, 2013, DOD issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR)
alleging facts that raise security concerns addressed by Guidelines B (Foreign
Influence) and C (Foreign Preference).  Applicant timely responded to the SOR and3
requested a decision without a hearing. On February 20, 2014, Department Counsel for
the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a File of Relevant Material
(FORM)  in support of the SOR. Applicant received the FORM on March 26, 2014, and4
was notified that he had 30 days to file a response to the FORM. The record closed
after Applicant failed to submit any additional information within the time allowed. The
case was assigned to me on May 13, 2014.
Findings of Fact
Under Guideline B, the Government alleged that Applicant owns real property in
Australia worth in excess of one million dollars (SOR 1.a); that he has an account in an
Australian bank with an estimated balance of $50,000 (SOR 1.b); that he receives about
$55,000 each year from an annuity from an Australian company (SOR 1.c); and that his
wife is a dual citizen of the United States and Australia, who resides part-time in
Australia (SOR 1.d). Under Guideline C, the Government alleged that Applicant, who is
a U.S. citizen by birth, obtained Australian citizenship in March 2008 (SOR 2.a); and
that in March 2008, Applicant obtained an Australian passport, which does not expire
until March 2018 (SOR 2.b). (FORM, Item 1) Applicant admitted all of the allegations.
(FORM, Item 2) In addition to the facts established by Applicant’s admissions, I make
the following findings of fact.
Applicant is 71 years old and works as a consultant to a large defense contractor.
He requires a security clearance for his work. Applicant served in the U.S. Navy
between 1960  and 1984, when he retired as a captain (paygrade O-6). He is a combat5
veteran of the Vietnam War, and served in various military intelligence missions during
and after the war. While on leave in Australia during the war, he met his future wife.
They have been married since October 1968. She was born in Australia, but has been a
naturalized U.S. citizen since 1974. They have two adult children together. (FORM,
Items 2, 4, and 6)
 Elsewhere in the FORM, the Government claimed that Applicant’s “deep longstandiing connections and6
financial holdings [in Australia] create a security concern,” while acknowledging that “...there is nothing to
suggest the nation of Australia creates a heightened risk...” (FORM at page 6)
 I reviewed the Department of State Australia Fact Sheet at 7 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2698.htm, which
also contains a link to the 2013 human rights report on Australia. I also consulted the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) W orld Factbook, located at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook.
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Applicant first received a security clearance after he was commissioned. He also
has held security clearances as part of his defense contracting work since his
retirement. Most recently, he has held a top secret clearance with eligibility for access to
sensitive compartmented information (SCI) since at least August 2006. Although the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) investigated his clearance eligibility, the record
is silent as to what agency granted his access. (FORM, Item 4)
Applicant received a master’s degree in 1982. He lived and worked in Australia
from 1984 until 1994. Also, between December 2002 and June 2004, he was the chief
operating officer of a large financial and consulting firm in Australia. When he left that
position, he was vested in an annuity that pays him about $50,000 each year. He
previously worked for his current employer from June 1999 until December 2002,
holding a top secret security clearance for that position. (FORM, Items 2, 4, and 6)
In 1988, Applicant bought a house in Australia. He and his wife lived full time in
that house while he was employed there. They now either rent it out or use it
themselves when they visit Australia. The property is worth more than one million
dollars. Applicant also maintains a bank account in Australia to use when he visits that
country. The account has an estimated balance of $50,000. Applicant claims, and
Department Counsel agrees, that Applicant has sufficient assets in the United States to
overcome the loss of his Australian assets. (FORM at page 7; FORM, Items 2, 5, and 6)
Because he and his wife travel to Australia several times a year, and because
Applicant may choose to retire there, he obtained Australian citizenship and passport in
March 2008. The passport expires in 2018, and Applicant has used it as a matter of
convenience to enter Australia. At all other times, he uses his U.S. passport. When
Applicant was advised by DOD adjudicators that possession of a foreign passport could
jeopardize his eligibility for a security clearance, he arranged to relinquish the passport
to his facility security officer (FSO). Applicant is willing to relinquish his Australian
citizenship and passport if failing to do so would keep him from getting a security
clearance. (FORM, Items 2, 4, and 5)
In the FORM, Department Counsel argued that Applicant’s Australian
connections present a heightened risk that Applicant or his wife could be coerced to
compromise U.S. interests.  Department Counsel based that argument on “the evidence6
and administrative notice information.” (FORM at page 6) However, no administrative
notice information about Australia was included in the FORM. I referred sua sponte to
publicly available sources  of information about Australia and its relationship with the7
 Directive. 6.3.8
 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).9
 Directive, E3.1.14.10
 Directive, E3.1.15.11
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United States. Australia is one of our closest allies in every regard. Culturally, politically,
economically, and militarily, there is little difference between the two countries. Australia
is governed democratically through an openly-elected bicameral legislature. Australia
boasts an independent judiciary, and there are few significant complaints about human
rights abuses in Australia.
Policies
Each security clearance decision must be a fair, impartial, and commonsense
determination based on examination of all available relevant and material information,8
and consideration of the pertinent criteria and adjudication policy in the adjudicative
guidelines. Decisions must also reflect consideration of the factors listed in ¶ 2(a) of the
new guidelines. Commonly referred to as the “whole-person” concept, those factors are:
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
The presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not
determinative of a conclusion for or against an applicant. However, specific applicable
guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them as they
represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to classified
information.
A security clearance decision is intended only to resolve whether it is clearly
consistent with the national interest  for an applicant to either receive or continue to9
have access to classified information. Department Counsel must produce sufficient
reliable information on which DOHA based its preliminary decision to deny or revoke a
security clearance for an applicant. Additionally, Department Counsel must prove
controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  If the Department Counsel meets its burden, it10
then falls to the applicant to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the case for disqualification.  11
Because no one is entitled to a security clearance, an applicant bears a heavy
burden of persuasion to establish that it is clearly consistent with the national interest for
 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.12
 See Egan; Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 2(b).13
 None of the other AG ¶ 7 disqualifying conditions are pertinent to the facts and circumstances presented.14
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the applicant to have access to protected information.  A person who has access to12
such information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government based on trust
and confidence. Thus, there is a compelling need to ensure each applicant possesses
the requisite judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness of one who will protect the
nation’s interests as his or her own. The “clearly consistent with the national interest”
standard compels resolution of any reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for
access to classified information in favor of the Government.13
Analysis
Foreign Influence
The Government’s information and Applicant’s admissions support the SOR 1
allegations. Applicant has substantial financial interests in a foreign country and is
married to a foreign national. These facts are sufficient to raise the security concern
addressed by Guideline B at AG ¶ 6, as follows:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
This record also requires consideration of the following  AG ¶ 7 disqualifying14
considerations:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation.
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Foreign ties such as those presented here present possible security concerns that must
be examined when assessing an individual’s suitability to hold a security clearance.
Applicant has foreign property and other financial holdings valued in excess of one
million dollars. Also, his wife remains an Australian citizen by birth, despite more than
40 years as a naturalized U.S. citizen. However, this guideline urges consideration of
the foreign country at issue, and both AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (e) require that there be a
heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation. The Government did not present any
information about Australia to support its claim that there is such a risk. To the contrary,
Australia is a close ally and trading partner. It presents no human rights, safety, or
international terror threats to the United States. I conclude that the record does not
support application of any of the Guideline B disqualifying conditions.
In the alternative, the record supports application of the following AG ¶ 8
mitigating conditions:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.
(emphasis added); and
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest (emphasis added). 
The undeniably close relationship between the U.S. and Australia precludes a
heightened risk of exploitation. Also, Applicant has a long record of military service,
including combat during the Vietnam War. He has held a security clearance for nearly
50 years, and most of his personal and professional interests lie in the United States.
On balance, available information is sufficient to mitigate the security concerns about
possible foreign influence.
Foreign Preference
Applicant’s acquisition and exercise of foreign citizenship since 2008 are
sufficient to raise the security concern addressed by Guideline C at AG ¶ 9, as follows:
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of
the United States. 
The Government’s information and Applicant’s admissions show that he obtained
foreign citizenship in 2008 after living his whole life as a U.S. citizen. He exercised his
 None of the other AG ¶ 10 disqualifying conditions are pertinent to the facts and circumstances presented.15
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foreign citizenship by also obtaining and using a foreign passport, which is still active.
These facts support application of the following  AG ¶10 disqualifying conditions:15
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member. This includes but is not limited to:  (1) possession of a current
foreign passport; and 
(b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an
American citizen.
By contrast, Applicant has expressed a willingness to relinquish his foreign
citizenship and passport if it would keep him from getting a security clearance. To that
end, Applicant has relinquished his Australian passport to his FSO. Although he can still
retrieve the passport when he needs it, his travel using it will be noted by a cognizant
security authority. Department Counsel has asserted that Applicant has not shown “any
inclination” to renounce his foreign citizenship or his foreign passport. (FORM at page 8)
All that is required, however, is an expressed willingness to renounce, which Applicant
has done. Further, he has, in fact, acted consistent with the Government’s guidelines by
relinquishing his foreign passport to his FSO. As to Applicant’s financial interests in
Australia, the Government conceded that Applicant would not be disadvantaged if he
had to rely solely on his U.S. financial interests, and there is no information that shows
his Australian citizenship was obtained to preserve his financial interests there. 
All of the foregoing supports application of the following AG ¶ 11 mitigating
conditions:
(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship;
and 
(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant
security authority, or otherwise invalidated.
On balance, Applicant has mitigated the security concerns expressed in the SOR
under this guideline.
Whole-Person Concept
I have evaluated the facts presented and have applied the appropriate
adjudicative factors under Guidelines B and C. I have also reviewed the record before
me in the context of the whole-person factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). Department Counsel
argued under Guideline B that “[a]lthough [Applicant] states his only loyalty is to the
U.S., this is not an issue of loyalty . . .” (FORM at pages 5 - 6) I disagree. One of the
salient points of the Guideline B mitigating conditions, as expressed in AG ¶ 8(b),
requires a balancing of the individual’s loyalties. Here, all information probative of this
issue shows Applicant’s loyalties lie firmly in the United States. His wife is a naturalized
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citizen of 40 years; he served in combat as part of a 24-year Navy career; and he has
held high-level security clearances for most of the past 50 years. As to Guideline C,
Applicant has taken proper corrective action regarding his foreign passport and he
should be taken at his word that he is willing to renounce his Australian citizenship. A
fair and commonsense assessment of this record shows the Government’s security
concerns are mitigated.
Formal Findings
Formal findings on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section
E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a - 1.d: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a - 1.b: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all available information, it is clearly consistent with the national interest
for Applicant to have access to classified information. Applicant’s request for a security
clearance is granted.
                                                    
MATTHEW E. MALONE
Administrative Judge