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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 13-01065
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Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Melvin A. Howry, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
June 25, 2014
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Decision
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MOGUL, Martin H., Administrative Judge:
On December 13, 2013, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guidelines
B and E for Applicant. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
adjudicative guidelines (AG), effective within the Department of Defense for SORs
issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant replied to the SOR (RSOR) in writing on January 4, 2014, and he
requested a hearing before an Administrative Judge. The case was assigned to this
Administrative Judge on March 17, 2014. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on March
31, 2014, and I convened the hearing as scheduled on April 15, 2014. The Government
offered Exhibits 1 through 8, which were received and admitted without objection.
Applicant testified on his own behalf and submitted Exhibits A through G, which were
also admitted without objection. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr) on
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April 23, 2014. Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and the testimony of
Applicant, eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
relating to the Republic of Lebanon. The request and the attached documents were
admitted into evidence as Exhibit 8. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the
Findings of Fact, below. 
Findings of Fact
After a complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, including
Applicant's RSOR, the admitted documents, and the testimony of Applicant, and upon
due consideration of that evidence, I make the following findings of fact: 
Applicant is 55 years old. He was born in Beirut, Lebanon in 1958, and he moved
to the United States in 1984. He became a United States citizen in 1990. (Tr at 50-52.)
Applicant is a dual citizen of the United States and Lebanon. (Exhibit 5.) 
Applicant has been married to his present wife since 1996, and he was
previously married to his first wife from 1985 to 1993. He has three children. He
received an Associate of Arts degree in Philosophy in Lebanon in 1984. (Tr at 52-56.)
Applicant is employed as a linguist by a defense contractor, and he seeks a DoD
security clearance in connection with his employment in the defense sector.
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence) 
The SOR lists eight allegations regarding Foreign Influence, under Adjudicative
Guideline B: 
1.a. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant’s wife is a dual citizen of the United
States and Lebanon and resides in the United States. Applicant admitted this allegation
in his RSOR. Applicant testified that his wife lives with him. She is employed as an
assistant teacher. (Tr at 63.) 
1.b. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant’s mother is a citizen and resident of
Lebanon. Applicant denied this allegation in his RSOR. Applicant testified that his
mother has a “green card” from the United States, and she lives in Lebanon for part of
the year and in the United States for the other part of the year. When she is in the
United States, he talks to his mother every day. Applicant’s mother is a housewife. (Tr
at 58- 61.)  
1.c. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant has three brothers who are citizens
and residents of Lebanon. Applicant denied this allegation in his RSOR. Applicant
testified that he speaks to his brothers approximately once a year. None of them has
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ever worked for the Lebanese Government. Currently one is retired, one works for a
bakery, and the third brother lives off of his savings. (Tr at 60-63.) 
1.d. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant has one brother who is a dual citizen
of the United States and Lebanon and resides in the United States. Applicant admitted
this allegation in his RSOR. Applicant testified that this is his older brother, and this
brother takes care of his two children who are both autistic. (Tr at 63-64.) 
1.e. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant has four sisters who are citizens and
residents of Lebanon. Applicant admitted this allegation in his RSOR.  He testified that
all of his sisters are housewives, and he speaks to them approximately once a year.  (Tr
at 64.)
1.f. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant has one sister who is a dual citizen of
the United States and Lebanon and resides in the United States. Applicant admitted this
allegation in his RSOR. Applicant testified that this sister is also a housewife. (Tr at 65.) 
1.g. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant’s father-in-law and mother-in-law are
citizens and residents of Lebanon.  Applicant admitted this allegation in his RSOR. He
testified that they are both retired, and while his wife speaks to them regularly, Applicant
never does. (Tr at 66.) 
Applicant testified about an incident that occurred when he was at the airport in
Lebanon after being stationed there. Because he had missed his flight, Applicant was
eating at a restaurant at the airport with his nephew. Applicant received a telephone call
from a United States Army colonel, who was the commanding officer of the base, telling
Applicant that he wanted to have him picked up at the airport. Applicant stated that he
did not want to bring attention to himself by being picked up in a military vehicle so he
refused the colonel’s command.  (Tr at 85-87.)
Applicant testified that the colonel continued calling him several times, and he got
more angry demanding that he be available to be picked up, but Applicant continued to
refuse the colonel’s order. Applicant told the colonel that he would leave Lebanon on
the next day, but he would not make himself available to picked up. Finally, as the
colonel continued to call him, Applicant simply turned off his phone. Ultimately he
returned the next day, and partially because of this event, the colonel told him he
wanted him removed from the contract. Applicant conceded that it was his responsibility
to follow the orders of the colonel, but he was afraid that it could be problematic to his
family who lived in Lebanon, if people in Lebanon were aware that he was working for
the United States military. (Tr at 87-95.) Applicant refused the direct order of a colonel
because of his concern for his family’s welfare.
Paragraph 2 (Guideline E - Personal Conduct) 
The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for
clearance because he engaged in conduct that exhibited questionable judgement,
unreliability, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, and untrustworthiness.  
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2.a. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant was deemed as “Persona Non Grata”
by the commanding officer of an overseas location due to an unauthorized leave of
absence; falsification of information to a foreign military official; and, for accusations of
collecting sensitive information without permission or authority from the United States
Government. Applicant denied this allegation in his RSOR. In his Subject Interview,
Applicant conceded that he was informed that he was being terminated because he
provided a false name to a foreign military colonel, he took unauthorized leave, and he
obtained intelligence in an inappropriate manner. He immediately returned to the United
States and was terminated from his employment. (Exhibit 5.) 
2.b. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant was terminated from his employment
with a United States government contracted company on November 24, 2010, due to
the information set forth in subparagraph 2.a., above.  Applicant denied this allegation in
his RSOR. Applicant testified that the colonel had threatened to terminate his position
because of his failure to respond to his order. However, Applicant claimed that his
manager in the field told him that he was going to be moved to a different area, rather
than be terminated. Applicant testified that because his company lost its contract, he
was ultimately lost his position. (Tr at 89-100.) An Incident History was submitted that
established Applicant was released from further employment for the following reasons:
“conducting himself in an unprofessional manner which jeopardized the success of an
ongoing exercise,” “unauthorized leave,” “provided falsified information to foreign
military officials, creating distrust between [foreign] govt and US,” and “accused of
actively collecting sensitive information without permissions [sic] or authorities, with
regard to private [foreign] state manner.” (Exhibit 4.) 
2.c. It is alleged in the SOR that Applicant failed to provide truthful and candid
answers to subsection 2 of Question 13A on a Security Clearance Application (SCA)
that he executed on November 1, 2011. (Exhibit 1.) The question asked whether
Applicant, during his job history in the last seven years, had ever been Fired; Quit after
being told he would be fired; Left by mutual agreement following charges or allegations
of misconduct; or Left by mutual agreement following notice of unsatisfactory job
performance. Applicant answered, “No,” and it is alleged in the SOR that Applicant,
deliberately failed to disclose the information set forth in paragraph 2.a., and 2.b.,
above. Applicant denied this allegation in his RSOR. He testified that he did not intend
to misrepresent information to the United States Government. (Tr at 95-100.) 
In his Personal Subject Interview, Applicant stated that he did not indicate on his
SCA that he was terminated because he did not think he did anything wrong. (Exhibit 5.)
I find that Applicant was terminated as reviewed in 2.b., above, and whether or not he
believed that the termination was justified, he should have answered, “Yes,” to this
question and explained that his conduct had resulted in his termination.  
Mitigation
Applicant submitted two positive character letters in which his work as a linguist
was highly praised. Applicant also submitted a citation that he received for superior
performance of his duties as an interpreter. (Exhibit 4.) Additionally, Applicant
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introduced additional positive letters of recommendation (Exhibit B), Certificates of
Appreciation (Exhibit D), pictures of coins and patches that he received from his
Commanding Officer because of the good work that he did (Exhibit E) (Tr at 30-33), and
pictures of Applicant performing his job. (Exhibit F.)  I reviewed and considered all of the
mitigating material submitted by Applicant. 
Current Status of Lebanon
I take administrative notice of the following facts regarding Lebanon. Lebanon
became an independent country in November 1943. Its history since independence has
been marked by periods of political turmoil interspersed with prosperity. The country’s
1975 to 1990 civil war was followed by years of social and political instability. 
Neighboring Syria has long influenced Lebanon’s foreign policy and internal
policies, with its military forces in Lebanon from 1976 to 2005. After Syria’s withdrawal,
the Lebanon-based Hizballah militia and Israel continue to engage in attacks and
counterattacks against each other and fought a brief war in 2006. Syria, designated by
the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism, has provided political and weapons
support to Hizballah, a U.S. designated “Foreign Terrorist Organization” in Lebanon. 
United States citizens have been the target of numerous terrorist attacks in
Lebanon in the past, and the threat of anti-Western terrorist activity continues to exist in
Lebanon. Hizballah and other para-military groups have at times detained U.S. citizens
or other foreigners for interrogation. 
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c),
the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the
“whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a
decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
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the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information). 
Analysis
Paragraph 2 (Guideline B -  Foreign Influence)
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding Foreign Influence: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be
manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or
government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this
Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in
which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to
target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is
associated with a risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Those that could be applicable in this case include the following: AG ¶ 7
(a) “contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or
other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
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coercion.” Applicant’s family members, who are citizens and residents of Lebanon,
make AG ¶ 7(a) a concern to the Government. Applicant showed by his direct and wilful
failure to follow the orders of a United States Army Colonel and his commanding officer
as a result of his fear of the safety of his family in Lebanon, that he is at “a heightened
risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.” 
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. I do not find
that AG ¶ 8(b) “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal,
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest,” is applicable to this Applicant because, as reviewed above, Applicant failed to
follow the direct order of his Commanding Officer because of the apprehension that if he
followed that order it could potentially cause harm to his family if he did so.  
I also find that no other mitigating condition under AG ¶ 8 can be applied.  As a
result of the disqualifying condition considered with the lack of any applicable mitigating
circumstances, I conclude Guideline B against Applicant.
Paragraph 2 (Guideline E - Personal Conduct)
The security concern relating to the guideline for Personal Conduct is set out in
AG ¶ 15:  
      Conduct involving questionable judgement, lack of candor, dishonesty,
or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for
clearance because he engaged in conduct that exhibited questionable judgement,
unreliability, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, and untrustworthiness.  
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise security concerns and
could potentially apply in this case.  Because Applicant was deemed to be “Persona
Non Grata” by an overseas United States commanding officer, he was terminated from
his employment for cause, and he failed to provide the information about his termination
on a security clearance questionnaire, I find that Applicant’s conduct supports
Disqualifying Conditions ¶ 16(a) and 16(d) respectively; “deliberate omission,
concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire,
personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine
employment qualifications . . . determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness
. . .,” and “a whole-person assessment of questionable judgement, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations.” I do not
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find any mitigating condition under ¶ 17 is applicable.  I, therefore, resolve Guideline E
against Applicant.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The Administrative Judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and
recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
(5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the
conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Under AG ¶ 2 (c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.      
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case under Guidelines B and E. Based on
all of the reasons cited above as to why the disqualifying condition apply and why the
mitigating conditions are not applicable under either Guideline, I find that the evidence
leaves me with significant questions and doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and
suitability for a security clearance under the whole-person concept. For all these
reasons, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns under the whole-
person concept. 
Formal Findings
         Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
                   Paragraph 1, Guideline B:             AGAINST APPLICANT
                            Subparagraphs 1.a. - 1.g.:              Against Applicant
                   Paragraph 2, Guideline E:            AGAINST APPLICANT
                           Subparagraphs 2.a . - 2.c.:            Against Applicant
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Conclusion
           In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
Martin H. Mogul
Administrative Judge