1
 
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 13-01317
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Stephanie C. Hess, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se  
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Decision
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HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings and exhibits, Applicant’s eligibility for
access to classified information is denied.
Statement of the Case
Applicant completed and certified an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations
Processing (e-QIP) on August 14, 2013. The Department of Defense (DOD) issued
Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on February 4, 2014, detailing security
concerns under Guideline H, drug involvement. The action was taken under Executive
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960),
as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance
Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative
Guidelines For Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (AG),
implemented on September 1, 2006. 
 
Item 3.1
Item 4.2
Item 4.3
Item 4.4
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Applicant received the SOR in February 2014. He submitted a notarized, written
response to the SOR allegations dated February 14, 2014, and he requested a decision
on the written record in lieu of a hearing. 
Department Counsel prepared a file of relevant material (FORM) and mailed
Applicant a complete copy on March 31, 2014. Applicant received the FORM on April
18, 2014. He had 30 days from receipt of the FORM to file objections and submit
material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation. He did not submit a response. DOHA
assigned this case to me on June 9, 2014, and I received it on June 17, 2014. The
Government submitted four exhibits, which have been marked as Items 1-4 and
admitted into the record. Applicant’s response to the SOR has been marked and
admitted as Item 3. The SOR has been marked as Item 1.
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a-1.c
of the SOR with explanations.  His admissions are incorporated herein as findings of1
fact. He also provided additional information to support his request for eligibility for a
security clearance. After a complete and thorough review of the evidence of record, I
make the following findings of fact.  
Applicant, who is 28 years old, works as an analyst for a Department of Defense
contractor. He began his current employment in February 2013. He worked in private
industry as an analyst from August 2011 until January 2013, as a public school teacher
for two years, and as a research analyst in college. Applicant received a bachelor’s
degree in 2009 and a master’s degree in 2011. Applicant is single.2
Applicant completed his e-QIP on August 14, 2013. Applicant provided
information about his education, work history, travel history, family, personal contacts,
military status, foreign activities and contacts, police record, alcohol consumption, drug
use, association membership, and financial information. All information he provided was
not a security concern, except his drug use.  3
On his e-QIP, Applicant admitted to using marijuana with friends five to seven
times between March 2008 and July 2012, to trying cocaine with friends three or four
times between July 2010 and August 2012, and to recreational use of MDMA (ecstasy)
four or five times at concerts between May 2011 and December 2012. He also stated
that he had no desire to use these drugs in the future, that he is over “the party scene”,
and that he has “gotten all of those actions out of his system.”4
Item 4.5
3
On his e-QIP, Applicant denied receiving treatment for drug use; undergoing
counseling; or any misuse of prescription drugs. He also denied using any drugs or
controlled substance while holding a security clearance. He indicated that the
government has not previously investigated his eligibility for a security clearance,
granted him a security clearance, denied him a security clearance, or debarred him from
government employment.5
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” An
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
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permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline H, Drug Involvement
AG ¶ 24 expresses the security concern pertaining to drug involvement:
Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription drug can raise questions
about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because it may
impair judgment and because it raises questions about a person's ability
or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.
(a) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and include:
(1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds
identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of
1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis,
depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens), and
(2) inhalants and other similar substances;
(b) drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a
manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
AG ¶ 25 describes the disqualifying conditions that could raise security concerns.
I have considered all the conditions, and the following are potentially applicable: 
(a) any drug abuse (see above definition);
(c) illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture,
purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; and
(g) any illegal drug use after being granted a security clearance.
Applicant admitted to sporadic use of marijuana, cocaine, and MDMA between
March 2008 and December 2012. To use these drugs, he needed to possess the drugs
and possibly he also possessed drug paraphernalia associated with marijuana and
cocaine use. A security concern is established under AG ¶¶ 25(a) and 25(c).
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Applicant admitted to last using any drugs in December 2012, two months before
he began his current employment in February 2013 and nine months before he applied
for a security clearance. Since he has not previously held a security clearance and the
record lacks any evidence that he did, a security concern is not established under AG ¶
25(g).
The drug involvement guideline also includes examples of conditions that can
mitigate security concerns. I have considered the following mitigating factors AG ¶ 26(a)
through ¶ 26(d):
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt
on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, such as: 
(1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;
(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; 
(3) an appropriate period of abstinence; and,
(4) a signed statement of intent with automatic revocation of
clearance for any violation;
(c) abuse of prescription drugs was after a severe or prolonged illness
during which these drugs were prescribed, and abuse has since ended;
and,
(d) satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program,
including but not limited to rehabilitation and aftercare requirements,
without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified
medical professional.
Applicant denies any abuse of prescription drugs and treatment or counseling for
drug abuse, and the record lacks any evidence of such treatment. AG ¶¶ 26(c) and
26(d) are not applicable.
Applicant indicated that he stopped his use of any illegal drugs after December
2012. He also stated on his e-QIP that he had no intent to use drugs in the future.
However, his current association with drug users and his location of use is either
unknown or unclear. Although he stated that he did not intend to use drugs in the future,
his statement on his e-QIP lacks an acknowledgment that his clearance will
automatically be revoked if he does. It has been approximately 18 months since his last
drug use. Given the variety of his drug use, it is insufficient time to conclude that he will
not use drugs in the future. AG ¶¶ 26(a) and 26(b) are partially applicable. 
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Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. The decision to grant or
deny a security clearance requires a careful weighing of all relevant factors, both
favorable and unfavorable. In so doing, an administrative judge must review all the
evidence of record, not a single item in isolation, to determine if a security concern is
established and then whether it is mitigated. A determination of an applicant’s eligibility
for a security clearance should not be made as punishment for specific past conduct,
but on a reasonable and careful evaluation of all the evidence of record to decide if a
nexus exists between established facts and a legitimate security concern. 
In reaching a conclusion, I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating
conditions in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s
drug use first began while he was still in college. He described his use as experimental
and infrequent. He used several different drugs for almost four years. He chose not to
appear at a hearing, leaving a void in the record because his credibility about his future
drug use cannot be assessed. At this time, the record lacks sufficient evident to assess
his past and future drug use and his judgment.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions or doubts as to Applicant’s
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance at this time. For all these reasons, I
conclude Applicant has not mitigating the security concerns arising from his drug
involvement under Guideline H.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline H: AGAINST APPLICANT
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Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge