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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 13-01290
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Caroline E. Heintzelman, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se  
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the pleadings and exhibits, Applicant’s eligibility for
access to classified information is granted.
Statement of the Case
Applicant completed and certified an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations
Processing (e-QIP) on January 9, 2011. The Department of Defense (DOD) issued
Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on March 26, 2014, detailing security
concerns under Guideline B, foreign influence. The action was taken under Executive
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960),
as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance
Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative
Guidelines For Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (AG),
implemented on September 1, 2006. 
 
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Applicant received the SOR on April 14, 2014. He submitted a notarized, written
response to the SOR allegations dated  April 17, 2014, and he requested a decision on
the written record in lieu of a hearing. 
Department Counsel prepared a file of relevant material (FORM) and mailed
Applicant a complete copy on May 28, 2014. Applicant received the FORM on July 1,
2014. He had 30 days from receipt of the FORM to file objections and submit material in
refutation, extenuation, or mitigation. He submitted a response dated July 10, 2014.
DOHA assigned this case to me on July 29, 2014. The Government submitted eight
exhibits, which have been marked as Items 1-8 and admitted into the record. Applicant’s
response to the SOR has been marked and admitted as Item 4, and the SOR has been
marked as Item 1. His written response to the FORM is admitted into the record as
Applicant Exhibit A (AE A).
Procedural Ruling
       
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a request that I take administrative notice of
certain facts relating to Afghanistan. The request and the attached documents were not
admitted into evidence, but were included in the record as Hearing Exhibits I-VI. The
facts administratively noticed are limited to matters of general knowledge and matters
not subject to reasonable dispute, and they are set out in the Findings of Fact below. 
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a and
1.b of the SOR. His admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. He also
provided additional information to support his request for eligibility for a security
clearance. After a complete and thorough review of the evidence of record, I make the
following findings of fact.  
Applicant, who is 58 years old, works as a linguist for a DOD contractor. He
began working for his current employer in January 2011. As a linguist, he worked in
Afghanistan for two years. He returned to the United States on medical leave. Because
his leave lasted more than 30 days, his company required him to reapply for his
position. He is currently working in Afghanistan. His supervisor describes his
communication and translation skills as excellent. Applicant exercises diligence,
patience, and determination during his translation work. He is well respected by the
command, his peers, and the leaders of the Afghan Army. His supervisor advises that
Applicant displays a high degree of integrity, responsibility, and ambition. Applicant
served as a mentor and advisor to other linguist and military personnel. In October
2013, the Army presented him with a certificate of appreciation for his outstanding work.
Items 5-8; AE A.1
Items 5 to 8. 2
Items 4-8; AE A.3
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Prior to his linguist job, Applicant worked as a printer technician for 11 years until he
was laid off.  1
Applicant was born and raised in Afghanistan. He graduated from college with a
degree in Islamic Studies in 1987. He fled Afghanistan to Pakistan in 1989 after being
detained for one year for not supporting the communist controlled Afghan government.
In Pakistan, he met a smuggler who provided him a fake passport and smuggled him
into the United States in November 1989. Upon his arrival in the United States,
Applicant applied for and was granted political asylum. He became a United States
citizen in 2006. He holds only a United States passport. Within the last year, he
purchased a home in the United States. He does not belong to or associate with known
terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence, or foreign militaries. He did not serve in the
Afghan Army or Afghan National Police.  2
Except when working in Afghanistan, Applicant lives in the United States with his
significant other, who was born in Afghanistan and is now a citizen and resident of the
United States. His 21-year-old son is a U.S. citizen by birth and lives in the United
States. Applicant has five brothers and one sister, who are citizens and residents of
Afghanistan. He also has five sisters-in-law and one brother-in-law, who are citizens
and residents of Afghanistan. Two brothers work for a company clearing mines. This
company is funded by the United Nations. One brother is a farmer, and one brother is a
bank clerk. His last brother is a municipal judge in Afghanistan. His sister and five
sisters-in-law are housewives. His brother-in-law served in the Afghan parliament for
four years, retiring in 2012. Since he began working as a linguist, Applicant has not
seen his family members nor has he visited with them when in Afghanistan. He has not
told his siblings about his current job. He does talk with his family members by
telephone on occasion, but not more than once a month.3
Afghanistan
I take administrative notice of the following adjudicative facts. Afghanistan is an
Islamic Republic and emerging democracy. With the support of the United States and
other nations, its new government endeavors to build a new system of government and
to rebuild the country’s infrastructure. Its Army and police force are well trained. It
continues to face significant challenges from the insurgency and terrorist organizations
supported by the ousted Taliban and Al Qa’ida. Security and violence remain a serious
issue. The government is not complacent about the terrorist threat, the insurgency, or
security issues; rather it actively seeks to eliminate all with the assistance of the United
States and NATO. The new government is working to reverse a long legacy of serious
human rights abuses, but serious problems remain. Afghanistan is now an active
HE 1.4
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member of the international community, has signed a “Good Neighbor” declaration with
six nations bordering it, and promotes regional cooperation. The United States supports
the emergence of a broad-based government in Afghanistan and has made a long-term
commitment to help Afghanistan rebuild itself. Sometime ago, the leaders of both
countries concluded a strategic partnership agreement committing to a long-term
relationship between both countries, which was signed on May 2, 2012. Despite its
differences with the United States, Afghanistan continues to seek U.S. support as it
moves forward towards democracy and stability. None of the documents offered in
support of the request for administrative notice indicate whether Afghanistan is an active
collector of U.S. intelligence information.4
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, an applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” An
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion for obtaining a favorable security
decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
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Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
. (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.
Applicant’s son and significant other are citizens and residents of the United
States. Thus, no security concern is raised by these family members. Applicant’s five
brothers, one sister, five sisters-in-law, and one brother-in-law are citizens and residents
of Afghanistan. His family relationships are not per se a reason to deny Applicant a
ISCR Case No. 09-06457 (App. Bd., May 16, 2011).5
Id.6
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security clearance, but his contacts with his family members in Afghanistan must be
considered in deciding whether to grant Applicant a clearance.  Applicant’s family5
members may create a risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion by terrorists or could create a potential conflict of interest between his
obligations to protect sensitive information and his desire to help his family members,
particularly if they are threatened by terrorists. These factors must be considered when
determining if a heightened risk exists.
In determining if such a risk exists, I must look at Applicant’s relationships and
contacts with his extended family, as well as the activities of the Government of
Afghanistan and of terrorist organizations within Afghanistan. The risk that an applicant
could be targeted for manipulation or induced into compromising classified information
is real, not theoretical. Applicant’s relationship and contacts with his extended family in
Afghanistan raise a heightened risk and a security concern because of the terrorists
activities in Afghanistan, especially the Taliban. The evidence of record fails to show
that the Afghan Government targets U.S. citizens in the United States or in Afghanistan
by exploiting, manipulating, pressuring, or coercing them to obtain protected
information. Thus, the concern that the Afghan Government will seek classified
information is moderate. The same cannot be said about the terrorists organizations
operating in Afghanistan, whose goals are to destroy or prevent the growth of a stable,
central Afghan government.  6
Under the guideline, the potentially conflicting loyalties must be weighed to
determine if an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of U.S.
interests. In determining if Applicant’s contacts in Afghanistan cause security concerns,
I considered that Afghanistan and the United States have a relationship, which includes
working together on international security issues and trade. There is no evidence that
the Afghan Government targets U.S. citizens for protected information. The human
rights issues in Afghanistan continues to be a concern. While none of these
considerations by themselves dispose of the issue, they are all factors to be considered
in determining Applicant’s vulnerability to pressure or coercion because of his family
members in Afghanistan. Based on all these factors, Applicant’s contacts raise a
heightened risk under AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b).
The foreign influence guideline also includes examples of conditions that can
mitigate security concerns. I have considered mitigating factors AG ¶ 8(a) through ¶ 8(f),
and the following are potentially applicable:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
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individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;    
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
Applicant’s monthly or less frequent telephone contacts with his family members
in Afghanistan is sufficient to establish casual contacts. His sister and sisters-in-law are
housewives with no connections to the Afghan government or terrorist organizations.
One brother is a farmer and two brothers work removing mines. They are working to
support themselves and to improve life in Afghanistan, not to undermine the United
States. These siblings are not likely to place Applicant in a position of having to chose
between the interests of the United States and of Afghanistan. His brother, the bank
clerk, has no direct contact with the Afghan government and has little likelihood of being
a target for terrorist because of his position. As a municipal judge, his last brother most
likely works for the Afghan government. He also works to establish the rule of law in
Afghanistan. His position would not be high profile, making him less likely to be a target
of terrorists. His brother-in-law is no longer an elected official, making him less likely to
be a target of terrorists since he is not in a position of power.
Applicant has lived in the United States for more than 24 years. He chose to
relinquish his Afghan citizenship and become a United States citizen, the country which
granted him asylum after he fled the communist controlled Afghan government. His
family members are not likely to place Applicant in a position of having to chose
between the interests of the United States and of Afghanistan because the United
States is now his country. Since accepting his position as a linguist, Applicant has taken
precautions with contacting his family. He has not told them about his current work nor
has he contacted them since arriving in Afghanistan. He limits his contacts to telephone
calls, nor more frequent than his calls prior accepting this position in 2011. Given his
precautions, his foreign contacts are not likely to create a risk of foreign influence or
exploitation. With the exception of one brother and his brother-in-law, there is no
evidence that his family members are involved with the Government of Afghanistan or
terrorist organizations. Rather, they live and work quietly. The brother, who is a
municipal judge, seeks to improve the strength of the new Afghan government by
applying the rule of law. His brother-in-law is no longer in a position to legislate policy in
Afghan. Applicant recognizes the obligations he has to the United States. In reviewing
the record evidence, I find that Applicant can be expected to resolve any conflicts of
interest in favor of the United States. He has mitigated the Guideline B security
concerns under AG ¶¶ 8(a)-(b).
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Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. The decision to grant or
deny a security clearance requires a careful weighing of all relevant factors, both
favorable and unfavorable. In so doing, an administrative judge must review all the
evidence of record, not a single item in isolation, to determine if a security concern is
established and then whether it is mitigated. A determination of an applicant’s eligibility
for a security clearance should not be made as punishment for specific past conduct,
but on a reasonable and careful evaluation of all the evidence of record to decide if a
nexus exists between established facts and a legitimate security concern. 
The evidence in support of granting a security clearance to Applicant under the
whole-person concept is more substantial than the evidence in support of denial.
Applicant fled Afghanistan under the communist controlled government. The United
States granted him political asylum after his arrival in 1989. Applicant has since
established a life for himself in the United States. His immediate family lives in the
United States. His son is a citizen by birth. Applicant and his significant other have
chosen to become U.S. citizens, making the United States his country of choice. For
many years, Applicant worked as a printer technician. Since 2011, he has worked as a
linguist on behalf of the United States in Afghanistan. As a linguist, he interprets not
only the Afghan languages, he also must give context to the cultural nuances of the
Afghan languages. Through his job, he supports the United States mission in
Afghanistan. To do his job, he places himself in harms way because many dangers
continue to exist in Afghanistan. His family members work to provide shelter and food.
The two brothers, who work clearing mines, are placing themselves in danger every day
to the benefit of the United States and all Afghans. His one brother works to develop the
rule of law to stabilize Afghanistan’s growing democracy. His family members are
working to improve life in Afghanistan, not against the United States. Applicant’s priority
is the United States and his family’s priority to to provide a safe and stable Afghanistan.
Since undertaking his current job he has taken precautions to prevent his family from
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being placed in a position which could bring harm to them because of his work. In
reviewing all the evidence, there is little likelihood that Applicant’s family members can
be used to coerce or pressure him into providing access to classified information.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I
conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from his foreign influence
under Guideline B.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge