1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)
[NAME REDACTED] )       ISCR Case No. 12-10042
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Chris Morin, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Jon Levin, Esq.
Brad English, Esq.
Andy Watkins, Esq.
______________
Decision
______________
MALONE, Matthew E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant, a naturalized U.S. citizen, mitigated the security concerns about his
ties to and interests in Israel. He also mitigated the security concerns about his
possession and use of an Israeli passport. Clearance is granted.
On March 6, 2012, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for
Investigations Processing (e-QIP) to obtain or renew a security clearance required for
his work as an employee of a defense contractor. A review of the results of the ensuing
background investigation, which included Applicant’s responses to interrogatories from
adjudicators for the Department of Defense (DOD), showed that it was not clearly
consistent with the national interest for Applicant to have access to classified
 Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and by DoD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), as amended.1
 The adjudicative guidelines were implemented by the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. These2
guidelines were published in the Federal Register and codified through 32 C.F.R. § 154, Appendix H (2006).
 A copy of Department Counsel’s letter forwarding the Government’s exhibits to Applicant in advance of3
hearing is included in the record as Hearing Exhibit (Hx.) 1. Also, an index listing each exhibit is included in
the record as Hx. 2.
 Included in the record as Hx. 3.4
 Hx. 4 is an email from Department Counsel forwarding Ax. D, and waiving objection thereto.  Ax. D is three5
pages long and consists of information showing the transfer of funds from Applicant’s foreign bank account
to his U.S. checking account.
2
information.  On February 11, 2014, DOD issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons1
(SOR) alleging facts which raise security concerns addressed in the adjudicative
guidelines  about foreign influence (Guideline B) and foreign preference (Guideline C).2
Applicant timely responded to the SOR (Answer) and requested a hearing. The
case was assigned to me on May 13, 2014, and I convened the requested hearing on
June 18, 2014. Department Counsel for the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
(DOHA) presented Government Exhibits (Gx.) 1 and 2.  The Government also3
requested that I take administrative notice of general information germane to the issues
in this case contained in 12 documents presented as enclosures to a legal
memorandum.  Applicant proffered Applicant’s Exhibits (Ax.) A - C. All exhibits were4
admitted without objection, and I granted Department Counsel’s administrative notice
request. Two witnesses also testified for Applicant. 
Additionally, I held the record open after the hearing to receive from Applicant
additional relevant information. The record closed on July 7, 2014, when I received
Applicant’s post-hearing submissions. They have been included in the record without
objection as Ax. D.  DOHA received the transcript of hearing (Tr.) on June 25, 2014.5
Findings of Fact
Under Guideline B, the Government alleged that Applicant’s mother (SOR 1.a),
father (SOR 1.b), two brothers (SOR 1.c), and two sisters-in-law (SOR 1.d) are citizens
of and reside in Israel. It also was alleged that Applicant maintains contact with two
friends who are citizens of and reside in Israel (SOR 1.e); that he maintains weekly
contact with a business associate who is a dual citizen of Israel and Thailand (SOR 1.f);
and that Applicant has an Israeli bank account containing about $13,000 (SOR 1.g).
Under Guideline C, the Government alleged that Applicant possessed and used an
Israeli passport after becoming a U.S. citizen; and that, although he had surrendered
the foreign passport to his company security officer in February 2012, he retrieved it and
used it for travel in May 2013. (SOR 2.a)
3
Applicant admitted, with explanations and arguments, all of the SOR allegations.
Based on my review of the pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the following
additional findings of fact.
Applicant is 36 years old. He was born and raised in Israel, and immigrated to the
United States in 2005. Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen on August 1, 2011.
He received a U.S. passport on December 8, 2011. It expires in December 2021. At the
time he became a U.S. citizen, Applicant held an Israeli passport that was issued May
20, 2004 and expired on May 19, 2014. As of the hearing, he was still in possession of
the expired Israeli passport. (Answer; Gx. 1; Ax. A; Tr. 100 - 101)
Applicant and his wife have been married since September 2007. She is a U.S.
citizen by birth, as are their two children, ages four and two. Applicant was hired in
February 2012 by a defense contractor. Applicant has not yet started work for the
contractor pending the outcome of his clearance adjudication. Applicant has an
excellent reputation in the community for honesty, volunteering, and reliability. (Gx. 1;
Gx. 2; Ax. C; Tr. 20 - 28, 92 - 99)
After graduating from high school in 1995, Applicant served three years in the
Israeli military, as is required of all Israeli males once they reach age 18. He has had no
ongoing contact with the Israeli military and has no continuing military obligations in
Israel. After he left military service, Applicant worked in Israel in the hotel industry, then
went to school to learn information systems technology (IT). This led him to work for a
bank as an IT specialist for about five years. During that time, Applicant enrolled in
college but did not finish his degree. A cousin who owned a jewelry business in the
United States offered Applicant a job in the U.S. Applicant accepted and, after he
completed training in Israel, he moved to the United States in 2005 on a business visa.
(Ax. 1; Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Tr. 29 - 36)
Applicant lived and worked for his cousin’s company in State A until 2006, when
he was hired by a different jewelry company and moved to State B, where he met his
future wife in 2007. In 2009, Applicant left his job to follow his wife to State C, their
current residence, after she accepted a job there. In September 2009, after a few
months of unemployment, Applicant started his own jewelry business that still serves as
his principal source of income. Applicant employs four salespersons and estimates his
business is worth about $500,000. (Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Tr. 36 - 39)
 As part of Applicant’s jewelry business, he travels to annual international
jewelers’ shows in Thailand and Hong Kong every February. There he meets with
prospective partners for manufacturing as well as gem suppliers. In 2013, he met an
individual with whom he is now associated for manufacturing of Applicant’s products. As
alleged in SOR 1.f, that person is a dual citizen of Israel and Thailand. However, their
relationship is strictly through arms-length business dealings. Applicant last saw this
person at the 2014 jewelry show in Thailand. (Answer; Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Tr. 42 - 44, 82 - 84)
4
When Applicant was a child, his parents opened a savings account for him in
Israel. When he disclosed it on his EQIP, he estimated it had a balance of about
$13,000. At hearing, he testified he had learned the balance was actually about
$27,000. Applicant has never drawn from that account, and has had the funds
transferred to his bank in the United States. He will likely use it to benefit his two young
children. Applicant has no other financial interests in Israel. He estimates his net worth
in the United States to be about $30,000 excluding the value of his jewelry business and
the funds recently transferred from Israel. Applicant and his wife bought a condo when
they lived in State B. In 2009, they used the proceeds from the sale of their condo to
purchase their current residence in State C for about $217,000. (Answer; Gx. 1; Gx. 2;
Ax. B; Ax. D; Tr. 57 - 60, 70 - 72, 81 - 82)
Applicant’s parents, two brothers, and his brothers’ wives are all Israeli citizens.
They all live and work in Israel. Applicant’s father is retired. His mother was a
kindergarten teacher, but now works only as a substitute teacher. Applicant’s mother
draws retirement benefits equivalent to a social security payment, but his father draws
retirement income from his former employer and from insurance annuities the couple
purchased as part of their retirement planning while they still worked full time. Neither of
Applicant’s parents have ever worked for the Israeli government. (Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Tr. 49 -
53)
Applicant’s brothers also served for three years in the Israeli army as required.
One brother works at a telephone company, where the brother’s wife also works. The
other brother owns a landscaping company. His wife works as a bank teller. Neither of
Applicant’s brothers or his sisters-in-law are employed by or in any way connected with
the Israeli government or military. (Gx. 2; Tr. 53 - 57)
As alleged in SOR 1.e, Applicant also has two friends from high school with
whom he stays in contact. Both are employed in private businesses. Aside from
mandatory military service around the same time as Applicant, neither friend has any
connection with the Israeli government or military. Applicant speaks with them a few
times each year. (Answer; Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Tr. 77 - 80)
Applicant last saw his parents in January 2014, when they visited him in the
United States. He has traveled back to Israel several times since 2005. All of his travel
to Israel has been for family visits. Applicant speaks by telephone with his parents about
once a week. He has monthly contact with his brothers and their families. He rarely
uses email to communicate with his family.  (Answer; Gx. 1; Gx. 2; Tr. 66, 72, 74)
Before he became a U.S. citizen, all of Applicant’s travel included use of his
Israeli passport. Applicant’s first visit to Israel after his naturalization occurred in
February 2012. When he entered Israel he used his Israeli passport instead of his U.S.
passport. I regarded as credible his testimony that he did so without thinking and did not
consider that he should have used his U.S. passport instead. When he returned to the
U.S., he relinquished his Israeli passport to his facility security officer (FSO). He next
traveled to Israel in June 2012 and did not take his Israeli passport. When he went
 See Directive. 6.3.6
5
through customs on his way out of Israel, he was detained by authorities who wanted
him to present his Israeli passport because, despite his naturalization in the U.S., he
was still considered to be an Israeli citizen. In June 2013, when Applicant again traveled
to Israel. He retrieved his Israeli passport from his FSO and used it to enter and leave
Israel. He did so because of his previous experience with Israeli authorities. Applicant’s
Israeli passport expired in May 2014, but he did not use it again after June 2013. He
has since applied to the Israeli government to renounce his Israeli citizenship so that he
can travel to Israel solely on his U.S. passport without difficulty. He has been told that
he will relinquish his expired Israeli passport when the renunciation of his Israeli
citizenship is complete. (Answer; Gx. 2; Ax. A; Tr. 45 - 48, 65 - 69, 87)
Israel has an advanced, industrial market economy, and its government is
characterized as a multi-party parliamentary democracy. (Hx. 3, Attachment I and IV)
Since its founding in 1948, Israel and the United States have had close political,
economic, and military ties based, in large measure, on common democratic values and
mutual security interests in the Middle East. Israel has an independent judiciary and the
government’s human rights record is generally free of reports of widespread abuse by
government officials. What human rights concerns exist stem predominantly from
reports of discrimination and arbitrary detention in the course of Israeli counter-terrorism
efforts. Israel is also one of the most active countries engaged in military and industrial
espionage. Their efforts have been directed at hostile and friendly countries alike,
including the United States. Overall, however, their interests are generally aligned with
ours, especially where matters of regional security are concerned.  (Hx. 3, Attachments
II - IV)
Policies
Each security clearance decision must be a fair, impartial, and commonsense
determination based on examination of all available relevant and material information,6
and consideration of the pertinent criteria and adjudication policy in the adjudicative
guidelines (AG). Decisions must also reflect consideration of the factors listed in ¶ 2(a)
of the new guidelines. Commonly referred to as the “whole person” concept, those
factors are:
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).7
 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.8
 See Egan; AG ¶ 2(b).9
6
The presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not
determinative of a conclusion for or against an applicant. However, specific applicable
guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them as they
represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to classified
information.
A security clearance decision is intended only to resolve whether it is clearly
consistent with the national interest  for an applicant to either receive or continue to7
have access to classified information. The Government bears the initial burden of
producing admissible information on which it based the preliminary decision to deny or
revoke a security clearance for an applicant. Additionally, the Government must be able
to prove controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If the government meets its burden, it
then falls to the applicant to refute, extenuate or mitigate the Government’s case.
Because no one has a “right” to a security clearance, an applicant bears a heavy
burden of persuasion.  8
A person who has access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. Thus, the Government
has a compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgment,
reliability and trustworthiness of one who will protect the national interests as his or her
own. The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of
any reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the
Government.9
Analysis
Foreign Influence 
The facts established by Department Counsel’s information and by Applicant’s
admissions raise security concerns about Applicant’s personal relationships with Israeli
citizens, and about his financial interests in Israel. The security concern about foreign
influence is stated at AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
[f]oreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
7
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
More specifically, the following AG ¶ 7 disqualifying conditions pertain here:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation. 
Applicant has immediate family members who are citizens of and live in Israel.
He also keeps in touch with two boyhood friends who are Israeli citizens and live in
Israel. Applicant sees his parents and siblings whenever he travels to Israel, which he
does at least annually. Applicant also has a business associate who is an Israeli citizen.
As to Applicant’s family members and boyhood friends, available information, including
his frequent trips to Israel for family visits, shows that his foreign contacts are close and
frequent. This is not the case regarding his business associate, with whom Applicant
has infrequent contact limited to arms-length business communications. Nonetheless,
the record requires consideration of AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b). To be fully applicable, there
must be “a heightened risk of foreign  exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion.” Israel is an open democratic society with a good human rights record and
close ties to the U.S. based on generally similar political, military and cultural interests.
However, in pursuit of its own interests, Israel is also known to aggressively engage in
industrial and economic espionage targeted against, inter alia, the United States. Thus,
it must be acknowledged that such a heightened risk exists. AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b) apply.
By contrast, the security significance of Applicant’s association with Israeli
citizens is mitigated through application of the following AG ¶ 8 mitigating conditions:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
8
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
None of Applicant’s family or friends is associated with the Israeli government.
Applicant’s father is retired from private industry and his mother is a part-time substitute
teacher. Applicant’s brothers and his high school friends work in private industry, and
none of Applicant’s family or friends in Israel are aware of Applicant’s potential
employment as a part-time translator. Further, Applicant has established a life in the
United States that shows he is likely to act in the best interests of this country. He is
married to a U.S. citizen and has two children born here. He also is a homeowner who
has established a business in the United States that will continue to support him and his
family even when he is working for a defense contractor. All of Applicant’s financial
assets are now in the United States and he has established a solid reputation in his
community. The foregoing supports application of AG ¶¶ 8(a) and (b).
As to Applicant’s financial interests in Israel, available information shows it was a
savings account set up by his mother when he was young and that Applicant did not
rely on its contents or contribute to it. The $27,000 balance is not insignificant when
compared to Applicant’s estimated net worth in the United States of about $30,000.
Accordingly, AG ¶ 7(e) applies. But the funds are being transferred to his bank account
in the United States, thus eliminating Applicant’s only financial interest abroad. In
addition to his personal net worth, Applicant also owns a small business in the United
States estimated to be worth about $500,000. All of the information about his financial
interests supports application of AG ¶ 8(f). On balance, I conclude that Applicant has
mitigated the security concerns about foreign influence that were raised by the
Government’s information.
Foreign Preference
Available information about Applicant’s possession and use of a foreign passport
after obtaining U.S. citizenship is sufficient to raise a security concern about possible
foreign preference. That concern is expressed at AG ¶ 9, as follows:
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of
the United States. 
9
More specifically, available information requires application of the disqualifying
condition at AG ¶ 10(a):
exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member. This includes but is not limited to: (1) possession of a current
foreign passport.
Applicant used his Israeli passport twice after he became a U.S. citizen and had
acquired a U.S. passport. In February 2012, during one of his frequent trips to Israel,
Applicant used his Israeli passport to enter and exit Israel. He credibly testified that he
did so without thinking because he had only recently acquired his U.S. passport. When
he returned from Israel, he relinquished his Israeli passport to his FSO. When he next
traveled to Israel later in 2012, he left his Israeli passport with his FSO and traveled
solely on his U.S. passport. Despite his U.S. citizenship, however, Israeli authorities
detained Applicant at the airport when he was to return to the U.S. They demanded he
present an Israeli passport because Israel still considered him an Israeli citizen. After
returning to the U.S., Applicant retrieved his Israeli passport from his FSO before he
traveled to Israel in June 2013. AG ¶ 10(a)(1) applies. 
Applicant did not use his Israeli passport again. It is still in Applicant’s possession
but is now expired, and Applicant has begun the process with the Israeli government to
renounce his Israeli citizenship. Once that process is complete, Applicant will be able to
relinquish the passport to the Israeli government. This information supports the following
AG ¶ 11 mitigating conditions:
(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship;
and 
(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant
security authority, or otherwise invalidated.
Under the Guideline C mitigating conditions, an applicant is not required to
actually relinquish his foreign citizenship. Here, the process to renounce Applicant’s
Israeli citizenship has begun. Also, his foreign passport has expired and is not likely to
be renewed because of Applicant’s renunciation action. Available information supports
application of both AG ¶¶ 11(b) and 11(e). Applicant is not likely to exercise his rights as
an Israeli citizen and has demonstrated a clear preference for the interests of the United
States. I conclude Applicant has mitigated the security concerns raised by the
Government’s information under Guideline C. 
10
Whole-Person Concept
I have evaluated the facts presented and have applied the appropriate
adjudicative factors under Guidelines B and C. I have also reviewed the record before
me in the context of the whole-person factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a). Applicant is a mature,
responsible married father of two. Although Applicant has family and friends in Israel, he
has established his life and loyalties in the United States. He is a successful
businessman and father. He has a reputation in the workplace and his community for
integrity and reliability. Applicant recognizes the security implications of his ties to Israel
and his use of a foreign passport. To address the Government’s concerns, he has been
open and candid about his foreign ties, and he has taken the extraordinary step of
renouncing his Israeli citizenship. The record supports a fair and commonsense
determination that he has mitigated the disqualifying information in his background.
Formal Findings
Formal findings on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section
E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a - 1.g: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the foregoing, it is clearly consistent with the national interest for
Applicant to have access to classified information. Applicant’s request for a security
clearance is granted.
MATTHEW E. MALONE
Administrative Judge