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                              DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
               DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 13-01359
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Daniel F. Crowley, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: William Savarino, Esquire
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Decision
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WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant’s decisions concerning her visit to China, and possibly North Korea, on
a nine-day church-sponsored 2008 trip entailed some risk. The evidence is sufficient to
mitigate resulting security concerns. Based upon a review of the pleadings, testimony,
and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
Statement of the Case
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SF-86) on July 24, 2012.
On February 5, 2014, the Department of Defense issued a Statement of Reasons
(SOR) to Applicant, detailing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). The action was taken under Executive Order
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information,
effective within the Department of Defense after September 1, 2006. 
Applicant and her counsel affirmatively waived the right to 15-days formal notice afforded by the Directive,1
having been involved in earlier negotiation with Department Counsel to arrange a mutually agreeable date,
and expressed that they had sufficient time to be prepared for the hearing as scheduled. See Tr. 9-10. 
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Applicant answered the SOR in writing on March 25, 2014 (AR), and requested a
hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed
on September 5, 2014. The case was assigned to me on September 12, 2014. The
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Notice of Video
Teleconference Hearing on October 2, 2014, and I convened the hearing, as scheduled,
on October 16, 2014.  Applicant, her counsel, and the court reporter attended the1
hearing in person. Department Counsel participated from DOHA Headquarters by video
teleconference. The Government offered Exhibits (GE) 1 through 9, which were
admitted without objection; and Hearing Exhibits (HE) I through III, a Government
exhibit list and two requests for administrative notice concerning South Korea and
China. Applicant had no objection to my taking administrative notice of the facts set
forth in HE II and HE III. I granted those requests, and the facts set forth therein
concerning the countries involved are hereby incorporated as findings of fact by
reference. Applicant offered Exhibits (AE) A through D, which were also admitted
without objection, and testified on her own behalf. I granted Applicant’s request to leave
the record open until October 23, 2014, to permit submission of additional evidence.
Applicant timely submitted AE E, which was also admitted without objection. DOHA
received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on October 27, 2014.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 35-year-old employee of a defense contractor, and former
employee of other U.S. Government contractors. She is recently married and has a
young child. She earned a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science in 2004, and has
taken additional postgraduate engineering classes. She has never served in the armed
forces, and was first granted a security clearance in 2005 while working for a different
employer. In 2011, another Government agency found her to be ineligible for access to
classified information based on some of the facts discussed below. (GE 1; GE 2; GE 9;
Tr. 43-44.) 
In her response to the SOR, Applicant admitted the truth of some factual
allegations in the SOR and denied others, with explanations. Applicant’s admissions,
including her statements in response to DOHA interrogatories (GE 2), are incorporated
in the following findings.
Applicant was born in South Korea and moved to the United States with her
parents and two sisters in late 1992 at age 13. She attended high school and college
here. Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in December 2004, as did her parents
and sisters during 2005 or 2006. She surrendered her foreign passport and formally
renounced her South Korean citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen, because she
was applying for jobs that required a security clearance. She reported that none of her
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immediate family members retain their former South Korean citizenship either. Her
husband and son are both natural-born U.S. citizens. (GE 1; GE 2; Tr. 42-46, 61-63.)
Applicant’s cousin, who is alleged to be a citizen and resident of South Korea in
SOR ¶ 1.a, now lives in a major U.S. city with his wife and two children. Applicant said
that he is presently in the United States on a non-resident visa, but hopes to obtain
permanent resident status and ultimately U.S. citizenship. This cousin is an
architect/designer with no connection to the Korean government. He was in a volunteer
faculty status at the Chinese university to which Applicant traveled in 2008. They have
not met in person since one brief meeting during that visit, and have subsequently
communicated only a few times when Applicant contacted him to obtain information
about his status so she could complete security inquiries accurately. She did not
consider inviting him to her recent wedding, and has only casual and infrequent contact
with him. (AR; Tr. 46-52, 60-61, 64-66, 117-118.)
Applicant joined a church group on a 2008 visit to an international science and
technology university in China. The leader of this group was someone she met when he
came to give a training session to personnel at her previous employer. The visit to
China lasted nine days, a week of which was spent at the university, and involved
teaching several technical classes to university students. Her travel was 90% funded by
her and 10% funded by the sponsoring church The university is located in a city near
North Korea that has a mixed Chinese and Korean ethnic population. Contrary to the
allegation in SOR ¶ 1.b, she did not live with or have close personal interaction with
Chinese nationals while there. Instead she stayed in a private room on a floor of a
dormitory designated for visiting faculty, as did the other members of her group with
whom she socialized almost exclusively. She had no contact with Chinese citizens other
than providing lectures and casual interactions around the campus, with the exception
of the brief visit to another technical school described below. She has had no
subsequent contact or communication with any students or faculty from China or Korea
whom she met during that trip. She did not take a computer with her to China, and did
not discuss either her work or possession of a security clearance with anyone during the
trip. (AR; GE 2; GE 3 through 5; GE 9; AE A through AE D; Tr. 68-73, 82-88, 101-106.) 
When the trip to the Chinese university was first described to Applicant, the
group leader anticipated that they might make a day trip to North Korea to attend the
scheduled opening of an affiliated science and technology university in Pyongyang. In
order to permit attendance at that event, Applicant applied for and received a double-
entry visa from China, which would permit her entrance from the United States and
again upon returning from North Korea. Although she knew the nature of the North
Korean regime and that the trip might be dangerous, she was willing to participate in
this visit. At some point before the trip to China commenced, the possible day trip to
North Korea was cancelled and she never applied for a visa to enter North Korea. Since
she held a security clearance at the time, she informed her Facility Security Officer
(FSO) about the pending foreign travel. She was advised that she had no further
reporting obligations unless someone attempted to obtain information from her. She
thinks that she informed the FSO about the potential side trip to North Korea, but is not
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certain about the timing of the trip’s cancellation in relation to her discussions with the
FSO and may not have told her about it. Applicant sent the FSO an email to confirm her
proposed travel, but neither of them had a copy of that communication anymore.
Applicant did not intentionally conceal the potential visit to North Korea from her FSO
while the possibility existed that she might go there. (AR; GE 2; GE 9; Tr. 76-82, 129-
130, 138-142.)
Applicant was aware that proselytizing, or otherwise attempting to convert people
to join her religion, was forbidden in China. She was fully informed about that, and the
Chinese university had policies prohibiting such activity by visiting faculty members. She
understood there to be a distinction between such activities and merely discussing her
own religious views and experiences with someone else when asked to do so.
Nevertheless, she recognized that discussing religion was potentially risky. During her
week in China, she went on an evening visit to a vocational academy for Chinese
Christian students. She was not aware of whether the Chinese government knew of this
school’s religious affiliation, but suspected that it was “underground.” During the
evening, she and four other U.S. citizens from her group each spoke about their
personal religious experiences and faith with a group of students from the school. The
visit lasted about a half hour, but she was concerned that it could cause legal problems
for her if the Chinese government became aware of it. Nothing further happened as a
direct result of this visit, but Applicant reported this as being potentially risky conduct
while in a foreign country during subsequent security investigations. Combined with
several statements in 2010 that she then was interested in returning to China and
possibly North Korea to visit, and that practicing her religion was at least as important to
her as obtaining a security clearance, another Government agency denied her security
clearance and access in 2011. Due to her changed life circumstances, Applicant’s
present intention is never to travel to China or Korea again. (AR; GE 2; GE 9; Tr. 73-76,
88-104, 121-122, 125-128, 131-137.)
   Applicant submitted letters from a university official and a fellow guest lecturer
involved with her 2008 visit to China confirming many of the foregoing facts and
expressing their confidence that she did not proselytize or engage in any other improper
or illegal behavior during that trip. (AE A; AE B.) Her supervisor also wrote to express
his high opinion of her character, integrity, dependability, and accountability. He said
that she works well with other team members and always follows important company
rules and procedures, including those concerning protection of sensitive information.
(AE E.) Applicant has no financial interests, property, or income source in any foreign
country, and listed her net worth as approximately $150,000 in U.S. assets in November
2013. (GE 2.)
South Korea has a history of collecting protected U.S. information, and has been
ranked among the seven most active countries engaged in foreign economic collection
and industrial espionage against the United States. The People’s Republic of China has
an authoritarian government pursuing comprehensive modernization of its armed
forces. The Chinese are the world’s most active perpetrators of economic espionage
and other intelligence activities against the United States in support of their military
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procurement and modernization. China’s government engages in repression, coercion,
and human rights abuses against its citizens, and often places foreign visitors under
surveillance. The other facts set forth in HE II and HE III are incorporated herein by
administrative notice. (Tr. 29-33.)
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions (DCs) and mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶¶ 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “[t]he applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides: “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
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permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. The SOR allegations and evidence in this case raised potential security
concerns under three foreign influence DCs: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and
(i) conduct, especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make
the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign
person, group, government, or country. 
Applicant has many friends and associates of Korean descent in the United
States, but no ongoing contact with anyone in Korea. The SOR alleged that her cousin
is a resident citizen of Korea, which was true in the past. He remains a Korean citizen,
but now lives in a major U.S. city and intends to obtain permanent U.S. residence and,
ultimately, U.S. citizenship. He is an architect/designer with no demonstrated interest in
anything related to Applicant’s professional work or connection to the Korean
government. Applicant visited China for nine days in 2008 and had casual academic
contact with students and faculty of Chinese and Korean ethnicity while there. She has
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had no subsequent contact or communication with any of them, except briefly with her
cousin, since then. I do not find substantial evidence to support security concerns under
either AG ¶¶ 7(a) or (b). Applicant’s conduct in connection with her 2008 China trip
raises security concerns under AG ¶ 7(i), which will be discussed below in connection
with parallel concerns under Guideline E. 
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Those with
potential application in mitigating AG ¶¶ 7 (a), (b), or (i) security concerns in this case
are:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation; and
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property
interest is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be
used to effectively influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
Applicant’s relationship with her cousin, combined with his present location and
intentions, clearly establish mitigation under AG ¶¶ 8(a) and (c), with respect to that
relationship. Her family, social, and financial connections are entirely within the United
States, not in Korea or China, so AG ¶¶ 8(b) and (f) provide further mitigation of any
potential security concerns under AG ¶¶ 7(a) or (b). Mitigation of concerns under AG ¶
7(i) will be discussed below.
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
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and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
AG ¶ 16 describes two conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying with relation to the allegations in this case:
(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning
relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent
medical authority, or other official government representative; and
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s conduct,
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such
as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person’s
personal, professional, or community standing, or (2) while in another
country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country, or that is
legal in that country but illegal in the United States and may serve as a
basis for exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or intelligence
service or other group.
With respect to AG ¶ 16(b), the SOR alleged failure to disclose Applicant’s
possible contemplated travel to North Korea during her group trip to China in 2008 to
her security officer. Applicant never said that she deliberately provided false or
misleading information concerning this potential visit, but rather candidly admitted that
she could not remember or prove whether she had done so. There would be no rational
reason for her to disclose the China trip but not the North Korean visit to her FSO, if the
potential visit to North Korea had not yet been cancelled by the time she reported her
intended foreign travel. Accordingly, I conclude that security concerns under AG ¶ 16(b)
were not substantiated by the evidence. 
Applicant freely admits that her decision to visit the Christian vocational academy
in China could have adversely affected her personal standing and safety in China and,
whether or not technically illegal, subjected her to potential exploitation or pressure by
Chinese officials. Furthermore, she acknowledged similar risks involved in the potential
visit to North Korea in connection with her missionary trip. She obtained a double-entry
visa to China to facilitate that potential visit, and would have participated in it had it not
been cancelled for reasons beyond her control. She acknowledged that these decisions
reflected bad judgment, but was willing to undertake the risks in pursuit of what she
considered religious purposes when only her own well-being was at risk. She did not
contemplate these risks in context of her security responsibilities, however, and took all
appropriate measures to avoid security compromise during her travels. Nevertheless,
these decisions implicate questionable judgment and exposure to exploitation or duress,
raising security concerns under AG ¶¶ 7(i) and 16(e). 
AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate these judgment-based security
concerns. Four have potential applicability to the security concerns raised by the facts in
this case:
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(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission,
concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable,
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur; and
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress.
To the extent uncertainty about Applicant’s disclosure of the potential visit to
North Korea may support security concerns, AG ¶ 17(a) provides mitigation because
the only reason this issue became known was her voluntary disclosure of the
information during subsequent security interviews. She has been frank and candid
about these facts, and about her inability to positively remember having told her FSO
about the possible trip or whether it had already been canceled. 
Applicant’s potentially risky choices in 2008 were not “offenses,” but in the spirit
of this guideline the questionable conduct was minor, occurred one time more than six
years ago, and took place before she had family responsibilities. She has been
forthright in providing information about the choices she made in 2008, eliminating any
ongoing potential for exploitation or duress. She persuasively declared her current
intention not to travel to foreign locations involving any personal risk in the future. Her
previously declared willingness to undertake such risks in pursuit of world knowledge or
religious pursuits has been changed by family responsibilities, in addition to her
enhanced understanding of resulting security concerns. Thus, sufficient mitigation was
established under AG ¶¶ 17(c), 17(d), and 17(e) to be confident in her current reliability,
trustworthiness, and good judgment and conclude the recurrence is unlikely.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
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which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept.   
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant testified in a sincere
and honest manner. Her decisions of security significance occurred more than six years
ago, in connection with a church-sponsored trip to China and possibly North Korea. She
had sufficient confidence in the institutions involved to consider the risks as being
outweighed by the potential for achieving good works. She complied with related
security procedures to the best of her knowledge at the time. 
Applicant is an educated and mature individual. Her conduct of security concern
was voluntary, and she honestly considers herself to be accountable for her decisions
and actions. She convincingly demonstrated changes in both her personal attitudes and
family circumstances that support findings of permanent behavioral change, and that
recurrence of questionable judgment is unlikely. Her voluntary disclosure of these
matters eliminated susceptibility to resulting coercion or duress. Overall, the record
evidence creates no question or doubt as to Applicant’s present eligibility and suitability
for a security clearance.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
 
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge