DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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--------------------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 14-02135
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Jeff A. Nagel, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
January 22, 2015
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Decision
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LOKEY ANDERSON, Darlene D., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing
(e-QIP), on June 15, 2012.  (Government Exhibit 2). On July 1, 2014, the Department of
Defense (DOD) pursuant to Executive Order 10865 (as amended), and Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to the Applicant, which detailed the reasons why DOD could not make
the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the Applicant and
recommended referral to an Administrative Judge to determine whether a clearance
should be denied or revoked.
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on July 16, 2014, and requested a hearing
before an Administrative Judge. The case was assigned to the undersigned
Administrative Judge on September 30, 2014.  A notice of hearing was issued on
October 1, 2014, scheduling the hearing for December 3, 2014.  The Government
offered four exhibits, referred to as Government Exhibits 1 through 4, which were
received without objection.  The Applicant presented five exhibits, referred to as
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Applicant’s Exhibits A through E, which were admitted into evidence without objection.
He also testified on his own behalf.  The transcript of the hearing (Tr.) was received on
December 15, 2014.  Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony,
eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following Findings of Fact are based on Applicant's Answer to the SOR
testimony and the exhibits.  The Applicant is 39 years of age and has a Doctorate
Degree in Optics.  He is employed as a Program Manager by a defense contractor and
seeks to obtain a security clearance in connection with his employment in the defense
industry.
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence).  The Government alleges in this
paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for clearance because he has foreign contacts
that could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of
classified information.
Applicant admitted all of the allegations set forth under this guideline, except 1(e),
as the situation has changed.  Applicant was born in Istanbul, Turkey in 1975.  He grew
up, attended school, and obtained his undergraduate degree there.  He moved to the
United States in 1996, at the age of 21, to pursue higher education, namely a graduate
degree in physics.  After attending several universities in the United States, he  obtained
his Ph.D in Optics, a Masters Degree in Physics, and a Masters Degree in Business.
Applicant has worked for his current employer since May 2011, and has held a security
clearance since June 2011.   
In 1996 soon after moving to the United States, Applicant decided that he wanted
to make it his permanent home.  He became a permanent resident in June 2006, and a
naturalized United States citizen in November 2009.  At that time he was a dual citizen of
both the United States and Turkey.  Applicant testified that he has no plans of ever
returning to live in Turkey permanently.  (Tr. p. 41.)  He has no feelings of affection
toward Turkey, as in his opinion, he does not see it as a good place to live.  He
voluntarily renounced his Turkish citizenship on January 6, 2012.  He surrendered his
Turkish passport to his employer’s security officer when he applied for a security
clearance in June 2011.
Applicant is currently unmarried, but engaged.  His fiance is a native-born
American citizen, with whom he lives, and has lived since October 2014.  (Applicant’s
Exhibit D.)  They plan on getting married in April 2015.  She is employed as an ESL
teacher.  In 2012, Applicant purchased a condominium in the United States, and has
settled and firmly established his life in the United States.  All of his financial interests,
work, social life, and his future family (fiancé), are in the United States.  He states that
his current net worth in the United States, including his 401(K), currently totals
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approximately $700,000 to $750,000.  (Tr. p. 35.)  He has no financial interests of any
kind in Turkey.                 
Applicant’s mother and father are citizens and residents of Turkey.  He is not
close to any of his family members in Turkey, except his mother.  His parents divorced
about ten years ago, and they do not talk to each other.  (Tr. p. 43.)  His father is a
retired lawyer who was in private practice with no connections to the Turkish
government.  (Tr. p. 45.)  Applicant’s mother is a retired housewife, who at one time
owned and ran a pre-school.  She owns her own home and two condo units that she
rents out.  She also receives retirement income that she lives on.  (Tr.p. 47.)  Applicant
contacts his father by telephone about once a month to see how he is doing.  (Tr. p. 44.)
He contacts his mother about once a week.  The conversations are casual and related to
her health and the family status.  (Tr. p. 47.)  Applicant’s parents know that he works for
a defense contractor, but nothing more. 
Applicant has one younger brother who is a citizen of Turkey who currently
resides in the United States under a student visa.  He has a doctorate degree but is not
happy with the area of discipline.  He is currently studying for his Masters degree.
Applicant has weekly contact with him to see how he is doing.  (Tr. p. 58.)  Applicant also
has other extended family members and friends in Turkey who are citizens and residents
there, however, gradually over the years he has become distant from them.  He has
contact with his cousins about once a year, when he comes to visit his mother.  (Tr. p.
60.)  He also has a friend, a past coworker, who is a U.S. citizen, who was born in
Turkey.  Applicant travels to Turkey once a year to visit his mother, and follows all DoD
foreign travel requirements by reporting these trips to his security department.  Applicant
provides no financial support to any of his family or friends in Turkey.    
At one time, the Applicant’s mother was a second credit card holder on one of the
Applicant’s credit cards.  The reason he added her to his credit card was in case of an
emergency and for convenience.  Since learning that this could pose a potential security
problem, Applicant cancelled the credit card.  He provides no financial support for his
mother or anyone else who is a foreign national.  Furthermore, by renouncing his Turkish
citizenship he relinquished any potential inheritance he might have received from his
parents.  Applicant testified that he is willing to give up his financial windfall since he is in
good financial shape in the United States.  (Tr. pp. 48-49.)  He further testified that he
would never do anything to harm the interests of the United States, our military or our
national secrets.  
Letters of recommendation from a Vice President and a Chief Scientist from
Applicant’s employer indicates that Applicant is considered to be intelligent, ambitious,
trustworthy, an individual with a strong work ethic and outstanding character.  He has
worked on various classified programs and has maintained high security standards at all
times.  He is said to demonstrate a high level of devotion to the U.S. seldom equaled by
many of our own natural citizens.  (Applicant’s Exhibits B and C.) 
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A letter from the Applicant’s fiancé states that Applicant is a loyal U.S. citizen who
plans to stay in the United States.  They plan to raise their children here.  (Applicant’s
Exhibit D.)
I have considered the information provided by the Government on the Republic of 
Turkey.  The current political conditions in Turkey are dangerous, and U.S. citizens are
reminded to maintain a high level of vigilance, and to take appropriate steps to increase
their security awareness.  There have been violent attacks in Turkey, and the possibility
of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and interests from both transnational and
indigenous groups remain high.  The Kurdistan People’s Congress better known as the
Kurdistan Worker’s Party or PKK has been the most active terrorist organization in
Turkey.  An indigenous terrorist organization known as the Revolutionary People’s
Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) attacked the U.S. Embassy In Ankara using a suicide
bomber on February 1, 2013.  In July 2011, Turkish authorities arrested 15 terrorists
claiming association with al-Qaida for gathering explosives materials in preparation for
an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Ankara.  In addition to terrorist activities, there have
been instances of religious violence targeting individuals in Turkey working as religious
missionaries or viewed as having proselytized for a non-Islamic religion.  Threats and
actual instances of crime have targeted Christian and Jewish individuals, groups, and
places of worship in Turkey, including several high-profile murders of Christians over the
last decade.  (Government Exhibit 4.)
POLICIES
Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum.  Accordingly, the
Department of Defense, in Enclosure 2 of the 1992  Directive sets forth policy factors
and conditions that could raise or mitigate a security concern; which must be given
binding consideration in making security clearance determinations.  These factors should
be followed in every case according to the pertinent criterion.  However, the conditions
are neither automatically determinative of the decision in any case, nor can they
supersede the Administrative Judge’s reliance on her own common sense.  Because
each security clearance case presents its own unique facts and circumstances, it cannot
be assumed that these factors exhaust the realm of human experience, or apply equally
in every  case.  Based on the Findings of Fact set forth above, the factors most
applicable to the evaluation of this case are:
Foreign Influence
6.  The Concern.  Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.
Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
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States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism. 
Conditions that could raise a security concern:
7. (a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate,
friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact
creates a heightened risks of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion; 
7. (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create
a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive
information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or
country by providing that information. 
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
8. (a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country
are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose
between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the
interests of the U.S.;
8. (b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal,
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest; and
8. (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent
that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.
In addition, as set forth in Enclosure 2 of the Directive at pages 18-19, in
evaluating the relevance of an individual’s conduct, the Administrative Judge should
consider the following general factors:
a.  The nature, extent and seriousness of the conduct;
b. The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation;
 c.  The frequency and recency of the conduct;
d.  The individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
e.  The extent to which participation is voluntary;
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f.  The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavior
changes;
g.  The motivation for the conduct; 
h. The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation or duress; and
i.  The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
The eligibility criteria established in the DoD Directive identify personal
characteristics and conduct which are reasonably related to the ultimate question, posed
in Section 2 of Executive Order 10865, of whether it is “clearly consistent with the
national interest” to grant an Applicant’s request for access to classified information.
The DoD Directive states, “The adjudicative process is an examination of a
sufficient period of a person’s life to make an affirmative determination that the person is
eligible for a security clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is
predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines.  The
adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the
whole-person concept.  Available, reliable information about the person, past and
present, favorable and unfavorable should be considered in reaching a determination.
The Administrative Judge can draw only those inferences or conclusions that have
reasonable and logical basis in the evidence of record.  The Judge cannot draw
inferences or conclusions based on evidence which is speculative or conjectural in
nature.  Finally, as emphasized by President Eisenhower in Executive Order 10865, “Any
determination under this order . . . shall be a determination in terms of the national
interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the Applicant
concerned.”
The Government must make out a case under Guideline B (foreign influence) that
establishes doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.  While a
rational connection, or nexus, must be shown between Applicant's situation and his
ability to effectively safeguard classified information, with respect to sufficiency of proof
of a rational connection, objective or direct evidence is not required.
Then, the Applicant must remove that doubt with substantial evidence in
refutation, explanation, mitigation or extenuation, which demonstrates that the Applicant
presently qualifies for a security clearance.
An individual who has foreign connections may be prone to provide information or
make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.  Foreign influence
can raise questions as to whether the Applicant can be counted upon to place the
interests of the United States paramount to that of another nation. The Government must
be able to place a high degree of confidence in a security clearance holder to abide by
all security rules and regulations, at all times and in all places.
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CONCLUSIONS
Having considered the evidence of record in light of the appropriate legal
standards and factors, and having assessed the Applicant's credibility based on the
record, this Administrative Judge concludes that the Government has established its
case as to all allegations in the SOR.   
Under Foreign Influence, Disqualifying Conditions 7.(a) contact with a foreign
family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a
citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 7.(b)
connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential
conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or
technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by
providing that information apply.  However, Mitigating Conditions 8.(a) the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the
positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the
individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.; 8.(b)
there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or
obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the
individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that
the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest; and 8.(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or
exploitation also apply.
It is acknowledged that the Applicant’s parents and extended family are citizens of
and reside in Turkey.  The Applicant has limited contact with his father, and little or no
contact with his extended family, except when he visits once a year to  see his mother.
Although he speaks to his mother about once a week, their conversation is simply about
her well being.  He provides no monetary support to his mother or any other foreign
national.      
It is noted that the current political situation in Turkey elevates the cause for
concern in this case.  In this case, the Applicant has everything to lose and nothing to
gain by engaging in any improper foreign contact with Turkey.  Everything that he has
worked for and everything that he stands for will be destroyed.  Applicant has resided in
the United States for the past eighteen years.  He has worked hard to achieve his
education, his work, his house, his fiancé, and his social life and friends.  His long
standing ties and deep relationships are here.  All of his financial assets are here.  He is
planning on getting married soon to a native American citizen, and they plan to establish
their family in the United States.  Applicant has adopted the American culture and its
values.  Under the particular facts of this case, the possibility of foreign influence does
not exist, nor could it create the potential for conduct resulting in the compromise of
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classified information.  I find that the Applicant is not vulnerable to foreign influence.
Accordingly, I find for the Applicant under Guideline B (Foreign Influence).
I have also considered the “whole-person concept” in evaluating the Applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information.  Under the particular facts of this case, the
totality of the conduct set forth under all of the guidelines viewed as a whole, support a
whole-person assessment of good judgement, trustworthiness, reliability, candor, a
willingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that
the person may properly safeguard classified information.  The Applicant is an intelligent,
senior engineer with an excellent work record for the Defense Department.  His favorable
evidence, including the letters of recommendation from the Vice President and the Chief
Scientist that know him well, in addition to his overall intelligence and integrity gleaned
from his own testimony, all demonstrate his trustworthiness.  He has presented sufficient
evidence in mitigation to demonstrate that he is not a  security risk.
     
Considering all the evidence, the Applicant has met the mitigating conditions of
Guideline B of the adjudicative guidelines set forth in Enclosure 2 of the Directive.
Accordingly, he has met his ultimate burden of persuasion under Guideline B.  
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal Findings For or Against the Applicant on the allegations in the SOR, as
required by Paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are:
Paragraph 1: For the Applicant.
Subpara. 1.a.: For the Applicant
Subpara. 1.b.: For the Applicant
Subpara. 1.c.: For the Applicant
Subpara. 1.d.: For the Applicant
Subpara. 1.e.: For the Applicant
DECISION
In light of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interests to grant or continue a security clearance for the
Applicant.
Darlene Lokey Anderson
Administrative Judge
 
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