Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and by DOD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), as amended.1
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
                DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)
[NAME REDACTED] )       ISCR Case No. 14-00797
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: David F. Hayes, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
MALONE, Matthew E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns raised by a longstanding credit
card debt he deliberately incurred with no intention of repaying. Also, security concerns
about possible foreign influence owing to his family ties to the Republic of Korea remain
unresolved. Applicant’s request for a security clearance is denied.
Statement of the Case
On January 4, 2013, Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for
Investigations Processing (eQIP) to obtain or renew a security clearance required for his
job with a defense contractor. After reviewing the completed background investigation,
Department of Defense (DOD) adjudicators could not determine that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest for Applicant to have access to classified
information.1
 See Directive, Enclosure 2. See also 32 C.F.R. § 154, Appendix H (2006).2
 See Directive, Enclosure 3, Section E3.1.7. The FORM included nine documents (Items 1 - 9) proffered in3
support of the Government’s case.
 See Directive, Enclosure 3, Section E3.1.7.  4
2
On April 28, 2014, DOD issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts that
raise security concerns addressed under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline
F (Financial Considerations).  Applicant timely responded to the SOR and requested a2
decision without a hearing. On November 21, 2014, Department Counsel issued a File
of Relevant Material (FORM)  in support of the SOR. Applicant received the FORM on3
December 31, 2014. The record closed on February 10, 2015, when Department
Counsel waived objections to admission of Applicant’s timely submission of information
in response to the FORM.  The case was assigned to me on March 16, 2015.4
Findings of Fact
Under Guideline F, the Government alleged that Applicant owes a total of
$35,267 for a delinquent mortgage debt (SOR 1.a) and a delinquent credit card account
(SOR 1.b). Applicant denies responsibility for the SOR 1.a debt; and he admitted only
that the SOR 1.b debt was charged off as a business loss. Under Guideline B, the
Government alleged that Applicant’s wife (SOR 2.a) and mother-in-law (SOR 2.b) are
citizens of and reside in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Applicant admitted both
allegations. (Items 1 and 4). In addition to his admissions, I make the following findings
of fact.
Applicant is a 52-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He has worked for
his current employer since May 2008, and he has worked as a defense contractor since
2004, when he retired from active duty in the U.S. Air Force after 24 years. His last duty
assignment was in the ROK and began in 2002. He has remained there continuously for
his civilian work. (FORM, Items 5 and 6; Response to FORM)
Applicant was married to his first wife, a citizen of the ROK, from 1984 until 2009,
when their divorce was finalized. Applicant and his ex-wife separated in 2006. She was
a permanent resident alien living with him in the United States, where they raised two
children, who are now independent adults. His ex-wife passed away in August 2010. As
required by their divorce decree, Applicant transferred their marital residence to his ex-
wife by a quit claim deed in November 2009. The court ordered that she be responsible
for all mortgage payments. Although title to the house was transferred, no
documentation of any changes to the mortgage was produced by Applicant. The
mortgage was foreclosed after they divorced, as shown by a notice Applicant received
in November 2012 regarding a settlement between Applicant’s state of residence and
his mortgage lender. That notice was sent to Applicant because his name was still listed
on the mortgage, and he has made a claim for his share of the funds from that
settlement. (FORM, Item 4)
 The alleged balance due is $17,613, but credit reports, along with Applicant’s Answer and a summary of his5
personal subject interview show the actual balance due as $21,639.
3
When Applicant separated from his ex-wife, he obtained a credit card in her
name and ran up a balance of more than $20,000. He has never paid or otherwise
resolved that debt, which is alleged at SOR 1.b.  In a personal subject interview in5
October 2013, he told an investigator he had no intention of repaying the debt, which is
alleged at SOR 1.b, even though he is able to do so. Both of the debts alleged in the
SOR appeared on Applicant’s credit report in January 2013; however, credit reports
obtained by the Government in February and November 2014 do not list the debts.
While the mortgage was resolved through foreclosure, the credit card was not paid and
likely was removed from Applicant’s credit history after the seven-year statute of
limitations imposed by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Applicant has not otherwise shown
that he paid this debt. (FORM, Items 5 - 9)
Applicant and his current wife met in January 2009 and were married in
December 2009 in the ROK. She is a citizen of the ROK who has always resided there.
She and Applicant have lived together in the ROK since they were married. Applicant
averred in his response to the FORM that he has recently applied to the U.S.
Department of State for a visa for his wife so she can travel with him to the United
States at some future date. However, she has never had any citizenship or other ties to
the United States. Applicant’s wife’s mother also is a citizen of and lives in the ROK.
Applicant sees her periodically when he and his wife visit her at her home about 200
miles away. Applicant’s wife and mother-in-law do not have any official ties to the ROK
government. (FORM, Items 4 - 6; Applicant’s Response to FORM)
In addition to the documentary evidence supporting SOR allegations 2.a and 2.b,
Department Counsel asked that I take administrative notice of information about the
Republic of Korea. (FORM at 4 - 8) Specifically, in support of that request, Department
Counsel referred to 13 documents identified as exhibits I - XIII. (FORM at 6 - 8) Based
on that information, I take notice of the following facts:
The political, economic, diplomatic, and military interests of the ROK government
are generally aligned with those of the United States. The two countries have strong ties
dating to the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1949 and the armistice that ended the
Korean War in 1953. Much of their alliance is focused on a mutual defense treaty
regarding security against the threat of invasion by the Communist government of the
Democratic Peoples Republic of (North) Korea (DPRK). The ROK government is
modeled after western democratic countries. It is comprised of a representative
legislature elected from open, multi-party voting in nine provinces; a chief of state and
prime minister head the executive branch; and an independent judiciary rules on
matters of Korean law derived from western and traditional Chinese ideologies. The
ROK has a good human rights record, but its interpretation of national security laws and
enforcement thereof has raised questions about aggressive detention, arrest, and
restrictions on citizens’ rights of free speech and assembly.
 Directive. 6.3.6
4
The ROK is one of the United States’ largest trading partners. Its economy has
grown significantly in the past several decades, especially in the automotive and
electronics sectors. One aspect of that growth has been an aggressive approach by the
ROK in obtaining foreign technological, economic, and industrial information. The ROK
is known to target U.S. sources of information in the information technology (IT)
systems, aerospace, intelligence, and nuclear industries. ROK citizens have engaged in
numerous criminal acts of economic espionage against the U.S., and attempts to
circumvent U.S. restrictions on the export of sensitive technology.
Applicant served with distinction in the United States Air Force for more than 23
years. His performance evaluations for most of his career were superior, and he
received numerous personal and command awards for his work in civil engineering and
other logistics missions. Applicant retired with an honorable discharge as a master
sergeant (paygrade E-7). His current work in the defense industry focuses on chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear safety work in the ROK. Applicant also deployed to
Iraq as a civilian contractor between July and December 2007. He has completed
numerous technical and military training requirements over the past 20 years. Applicant
also has held a security clearance for most of his military and civilian careers. (FORM,
Items 5 and 6; Response to FORM)
Policies
Each security clearance decision must be a fair, impartial, and commonsense
determination based on examination of all available relevant and material information,6
and consideration of the pertinent criteria and adjudication policy in the adjudicative
guidelines. Decisions must also reflect consideration of the factors listed in ¶ 2(a) of the
new guidelines. Commonly referred to as the “whole-person” concept, those factors are:
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
The presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not
determinative of a conclusion for or against an applicant. However, specific applicable
guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them as they
represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to classified
information.
 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).7
 Directive, E3.1.14.8
 Directive, E3.1.15.9
 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.10
 See Egan; Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 2(b).11
5
A security clearance decision is intended only to resolve whether it is clearly
consistent with the national interest  for an applicant to either receive or continue to7
have access to classified information. Department Counsel must produce sufficient
reliable information on which DOD based its preliminary decision to deny or revoke a
security clearance for an applicant. Additionally, Department Counsel must prove
controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  If the Government meets its burden, it then falls8
to the applicant to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the case for disqualification.  9
Because no one is entitled to a security clearance, applicants bear a heavy
burden of persuasion to establish that it is clearly consistent with the national interest for
them to have access to protected information.  A person who has access to such10
information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the Government based on trust and
confidence. Thus, there is a compelling need to ensure each applicant possesses the
requisite judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness of one who will protect the nation’s
interests as his or her own. The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard
compels resolution of any reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability for access to
classified information in favor of the Government.11
Analysis
Financial Considerations
Available information is sufficient to support allegations that Applicant owes in
excess of $35,000 for a delinquent mortgage and a delinquent credit card. This
information raises a security concern addressed, in relevant part, at AG ¶ 18 as follows:
Failure or inability to live within one's means, satisfy debts, and meet
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise
questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to
protect classified information. An individual who is financially overextended
is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds.
More specifically, available information requires application of the disqualifying
conditions at AG ¶¶ 19(a) (inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts) and 19(c) (a history
of not meeting financial obligations). Unresolved indebtedness raises the possibility that
a person might resort to illegal acts involving sensitive information in their charge to
generate funds. More broadly, it also shows a potential defect in one’s judgment and
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reliability that may translate to an inability or unwillingness to properly protect sensitive
information. In this case, Applicant deliberately incurred more than $17,000 in
delinquent credit card debt, alleged at SOR 1.b, that he had no intention of repaying.
That debt remains unresolved eight years later even though Applicant admits he is able
to repay the account.
As to the delinquent mortgage alleged at SOR 1.a, there is conflicting information
about the issue of Applicant’s responsibility to pay this debt. However, it appears more
likely than not that this debt is no longer his responsibility, as the property was
foreclosed and was resold in 2012. Further, there is no information showing Applicant is
liable for any remainder after resale of the house. Nonetheless, the nature of the
unresolved credit card account continues to support a security concern under Guideline
F.
I have also considered the following pertinent AG 20 mitigating conditions:
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment; 
(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely
beyond the person's control (e.g. loss of employment, a business
downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or
separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;
(c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem
and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is
under control; 
(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or
otherwise resolve debts; and
(e) the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the
past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides
documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides
evidence of actions to resolve the issue.
None of these factors apply. The debt at SOR 1.b is current and ongoing, as it
has been delinquent for more than eight years. It is still Applicant’s responsibility,
despite the fact the account is no longer on his credit report. The circumstances causing
the debt were not beyond his control. Applicant deliberately incurred the delinquency
and still refuses to pay it despite his ability to do so. Concurrently, he does not dispute
the debt but has not made any attempt, in good-faith or otherwise, to pay it. While his
current credit is good on paper, Applicant’s refusal to resolve his debt undermines
confidence in his judgment and reliability. He has not mitigated the security concern
raised by these facts.
7
Foreign Preference
Applicant’s wife and mother-in-law are citizens and residents of the Republic of
Korea. By definition, these are persons to whom Applicant is closely bound by affection.
Applicant lives with his Korean wife in South Korea, where he works for a defense
contractor. His contact with his mother-in-law is occasional. But that fact does not
lessen the strength of his ties to her, which is derived from his close affection for his
wife. Because the ROK is known to aggressively pursue economic and technology
information from the United States, these relationships reasonably raise a heightened
risk of foreign influence. The resulting security concern is articulated at AG ¶ 6, as
follows:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
More specifically, the record requires application of the following disqualifying
conditions under AG ¶ 7:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and 
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. 
I have also considered the following pertinent AG ¶ 8 mitigating conditions:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.; and
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(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and 
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
The Government met its burden of producing information that supported
application of the disqualifying conditions cited above. The burden to mitigate the
Government’s security concerns then fell to Applicant. The information he produced
does not support application of any of the pertinent mitigating conditions under this
guideline. The burden of establishing any of the mitigating conditions herein is never to
be placed on the Government. Here, Applicant has close and continuing ties to his wife,
a foreign national, while living in her native country. He also has contact with his wife’s
mother, who is presumed, by virtue of his marital relationship, to be a tie of affection.
Applicant did not present information that counterbalances the security concern about
these relationships. Neither Applicant’s wife or her mother has any connections in the
United States. Only recently has Applicant acted to obtain a change in his wife’s status
that might establish such connections. 
Applicant’s current marital status and his maintenance of a security clearance is
distinguishable from his former marriage to a foreign national. Applicant and his first
wife lived in the United States. Ostensibly, she established ties and loyalties within their
community that could be relied upon in case conflicting interests arose. Here, however,
Applicant and his current wife have never lived together anywhere but the ROK. Aside
from his current employment, neither person appears to have any ties to the United
States. Applicant did not show, for example, that he owns property or has other financial
interests in the United States, or that he intends to return to the United States to live.
Combined with the complete absence of U.S. interests for his wife and mother-in-law,
this record presents an unacceptable security risk that has not been mitigated by the
Applicant’s information.
On balance, Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns about his unpaid
debt and his ties to foreign citizens. In addition to my evaluation of the facts and
application of the appropriate adjudicative factors under Guidelines B and F, I have
reviewed the record before me in the context of the whole-person factors listed in AG ¶
2(a). In particular, I note the significance and quality of Applicant’s military service.
However, the information produced through his most recent background investigation
about his current personal circumstances and his financial decisions raises doubts
about his suitability for continued access to classified information. Applicant did not
sufficiently address those doubts. Because the Government’s compelling interest in
protecting classified information is the focal point in these adjudications, remaining
doubts about suitability for access to such information must be resolved against the
Applicant.
9
Formal Findings
Formal findings on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section
E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a - 2.b: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all available information, it is not clearly consistent with the national
interest for Applicant to have access to classified information. Applicant’s request for a
security clearance is denied.
                                                    
MATTHEW E. MALONE
Administrative Judge