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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)         ISCR Case No. 14-02105
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government, Alison O’Connell, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
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Decision
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MASON, Paul J., Administrative Judge:
Applicants’ evidence in mitigation is insufficient to overcome the security
concerns raised under the foreign influence guideline. Eligibility for access to classified
information is denied. 
Statements of the Case
Applicants signed and certified his Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations
Processing (e-QIP) on October 23, 2013. (Item 4) On November 4, 2013, he was
interviewed by an investigator from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) (Item
6). On July 18, 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of Reasons
(SOR) detailing security concerns under the foreign influence guideline (Guideline B).
(Item 1) The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines
(AG) implemented by the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. Applicant
submitted his answer to the SOR on August 21, 2014. He chose to have his case
 One CI screening questionnaire was completed in 2008, two in 2011, and one in October 2013. 1
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decided on the administrative record. A copy of the Government’s File of Relevant
Material (FORM), the Government’s evidence in support of the allegations of the SOR,
was sent to Applicant on December 23, 2014. In an attachment to the FORM, Applicant
was advised he could object to the information in the FORM or submit additional
information in explanation, mitigation, or extenuation. He received the FORM on
January 9, 2015. Applicant furnished a response to the FORM on January 9, 2015.
(Item 11) Department Counsel had no objection to the response to the FORM. (Item 12)
The case was assigned to me on February 5, 2015. 
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
about Afghanistan. (GE 3) Administratively noticed facts are limited to those that are
obvious to the average person, easily verifiable, and relevant to this case. 
Findings of Fact
The SOR lists seven allegations under foreign influence (Guideline B). The
allegations identify his mother, father, wife, son, three sisters, and three brothers as
citizens and residents of Afghanistan. The final allegation indicates that since 2009, he
sent about $30,000 to family members in Afghanistan. Applicant admitted all
allegations. His wife and son are now residents of the United States.
Applicant was born in Afghanistan in August 1985. He is 29 years old. He has
been married since April 2008. His son was born in Afghanistan in January 2011.
Applicant seeks a security clearance to work in a Category II linguist position with a
defense contractor. (Item 4)
In 1996 or 1997, Applicant and his family moved to Pakistan to flee the Taliban.
After the Afghan government and U.S. Army defeated the Taliban in 2001, Applicant
and his family returned to Afghanistan. He came to the United States in May 2008 on a
special immigrant visa (SIV) because he worked with the U.S. Army as a local
interpreter for more than a year. He applied for the SIV with the assistance of a retired
U.S. Army colonel, who was working as a mentor for Afghan military forces. The SIV
was issued to linguists to save their lives so they could leave Afghanistan. As a result of
the SIV, Applicant became a permanent U.S. resident when he entered this country in
May 2008. He was naturalized as a U.S. citizen in July 2013. (Items 4 and 6)
Four Counterintelligence (CI) screening questionnaires (provided by the U.S.
Army) track Applicant’s travel between the United States and Afghanistan for work or to
visit family after entering the United States in May 2008.  The CI screening1
questionnaires and his OPM interview show that he has spent significant amounts of
time in both countries. In his OPM interview, he acknowledged that between March
2009 and September 2013, he traveled to Afghanistan on seven occasions to visit his
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family, with the trips lasting from six to ten days to about six months. He has held at
least two linguist positions and several U.S. jobs, including a human relations manager
and a few retail sales positions. (Items 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9) 
Applicant’s e-QIP and his November 2013 OPM interview confirm that in July
2014, the date of the SOR, his immediate family members were citizens and residents
of Afghanistan. His contact with his 49-year-old mother, a housewife who has never
worked, was weekly by telephone. Applicant’s contact with his 51-year-old father, an
owner of a clothing store, was once a month by telephone. His father was a major with
the Afghan National Army before retiring almost 30 years ago. He has had no
connection with the Afghan government since then. As noted earlier, Applicant’s wife
and son are now residents of the United States. Applicant’s contact with his three
brothers, who are unemployed students, and three sisters, who are students, is monthly
to quarterly by telephone. His last face-to-face contact with his immediate family
members was in September 2013. (Answer to SOR; Items 4, 6, 7)
At some time in 2009, Applicant sent $10,000 to pay for his mother’s kidney
surgery and hospitalization. In 2013, Applicant sent $20,000 to pay for his wife’s
stomach surgery. An unknown portion of the money was also used for his sibling’s
school expenses. On each occasion, the money was transferred electronically from
Applicant’s bank account to his father’s account. The $30,000 was money that Applicant
had saved from his previous employment as a linguist or a role player for defense
contractors. Very little information was furnished about his linguist positions, and no
additional information was provided about his role-playing employment. (Answer to
SOR; Items 5, 6)       
According to his November 2013 OPM interview, CI interviews, and his response
to the FORM, Applicant stressed his loyalty to the United States and wants to have a
regular life in this country like everybody else. Applicant never provided financial support
to any organization that sought to harm the United States. He has always complied with
security regulations and procedures. Neither he nor his family members have ever
endorsed violence to achieve their goals. Applicant could think of no situation where he
would betray the United States. He supports U.S. military missions to wipe out the
enemies of Afghanistan. (Items 4, 6, 7) Applicant provided no character evidence. 
Administrative Notice
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan became an independent country when the
British relinquished control in 1919. A monarchy ruled the country until 1973 when it
was overthrown in a military takeover. A Marxist government was installed in 1978 and
the Soviet Union invaded the country in 1979. After the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989,
the country descended into civil war, providing an opportunity for the Taliban, and their
extreme interpretation of Islamic law, to establish a government in the 1990s. They
provided refuge for Osama Bin-Laden and other terrorist organizations. 
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Following September 11, 2001, the Taliban refused to expel Bin-Laden from
Afghanistan. The United States and a coalition of countries forced the Taliban out of the
country on November 1, 2001. Though a new democratic government was installed in
2004, terrorist and insurgent organizations, including al Qaida and a rejuvenated
Taliban continually conducted attacks against U.S. and Afghan interests, institutions,
and citizens, to destabilize the government of Afghanistan. The United States
Department of State has warned that the entire country of Afghanistan is a security
threat to American citizens. The Afghan government also faces other ongoing
challenges such as systemic government corruption and criminal activity funded by the
drug trade, which is difficult to prosecute. 
The most serious human rights problems in 2013 were torture and abuse of
detainees. Other human rights problems that continue to plague the country are
extrajudicial killing, torture and other abuse, poor prison conditions, widespread official
misconduct, ineffective government investigations of local security forces, limits of
freedom of assembly, restrictions of privacy rights, abuse of worker rights, and
restrictions on religious freedoms. 
In September 2014, the State Department renewed a warning to U.S citizens
against travel to Afghanistan. The security situation in Afghanistan remains unstable
and no province in the country should be considered safe from intentional or random
acts of criminality against U.S and other foreign nationals at any time.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an
Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines must be considered in the context of the nine general factors
known as the whole-person concept to enable the administrative judge to consider all
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b).
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.”
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
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Analysis
Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern of the foreign influence guideline:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target U.S.
citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 contains two conditions that may be applicable in this case:
AG ¶ 7(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and  
AG ¶ 7(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s
obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and individual’s
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that
information. 
The mere possession of close ties and contacts with a family member is not
disqualifying under Guideline B. On the other hand, if an applicant has contacts with a
relative or friend living in a foreign country like Afghanistan, this single factor may create
a potential for foreign influence that is disqualifying under the guideline. These contacts
potentially expose an applicant to a heightened risk of foreign exploitation by Afghan or
international criminals, insurgents, or terrorists. Given Afghanistan’s lack of security
throughout the country, and poor human rights record, Applicant’s parents, brothers,
and sisters, could be vulnerable to pressure or coercion that may expose Applicant to a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation. His connections to his immediate family
members creates a potential conflict of interest. The immigration of Applicant’s wife and
son to the United States between August 2014 and January 2015, reduces the
heightened risk of foreign influence for these two individuals. AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b).
apply.
Because of Applicant’s close ties and contacts to the country, combined with
Afghanistan’s poor human rights and country-wide problem with terrorism, he has a
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burden of presenting sufficient evidence under AG ¶¶ 8(a), 8(b), and 8(c), to
demonstrate that he is unlikely to be placed in a position of having to choose between
his immediate family members and U.S. interests. The conditions are:
AG ¶ 8(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country
in which these persons are located, or the position or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.; 
AG ¶ 8(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s
sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or
country is minimal, or the individual has such deep and long-lasting
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and
AG ¶ 8(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.
Applicant’s contacts with his immediate family members are not casual or
infrequent. His parents, three brothers, and four sisters are citizens and residents of
Afghanistan. He traveled to the country seven times between March 2009 and
September 2013, sometimes spending up to six months. Since 2009, he provided
$30,000 for his family’s medical and educational expenses in Afghanistan. Based on his
regular and immediate family contacts in Afghanistan, and the unstable security
situation in the country, Applicant could be placed in a position of having to choose
between interests of his family members and his U.S. interests. AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(c) do
not apply. 
Applicant entered the United States in May 2008 on an SIV that granted him a
permanent resident status. He was naturalized as a U.S. citizen in July 2013. However,
I find his sense of loyalty to his immediate family members in Afghanistan is not
minimal, especially when only two of Applicant’s immediate family members are citizens
and residents of the United States. I am unable to conclude that he can be expected to
decide all conflicts of interest in favor of U.S. interests. In sum, AG ¶ 8(b) does not
apply.
The record shows that since 2005, Applicant has been a linguist for three
contractors supporting the U.S. Army. Applicant indicated he was granted an SIV in May
2008 because he had worked as a linguist for more than a year. The SIV was issued to
linguists so they could leave Afghanistan to save their lives. Other than his reference to
the dangers of his Afghan position that led to his entry to the United States in May 2008,
the perils Applicant has faced since then as a linguist are unknown. Applicant has failed
to establish by credible and independent evidence that his compliance with security
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regulations made a significant contribution to the national security and that he can be
expected to resolve any conflict in favor of the United States. (See, ISCR Case No. 06-
25928 at 4 (App. Bd. Apr. 9. 2008))
Whole-Person Concept 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance must also be evaluated in the
context of nine variables known as the whole-person concept. In evaluating the
relevance of an individual’s conduct, the administrative judge should consider the
following factors: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the
frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time
of the conduct; (5) the extent to which the participation was voluntary; (6) the presence
or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9)
the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Applicant has been married since 2008. His wife and four-year-old child recently
moved to the United States in the last five months. There is no character evidence from
Applicant’s employer or the U.S. Army that sheds light on the dangers that Applicant
may have faced as a linguist and his compliance with security procedures and
regulations while he carried out his job responsibilities in Afghanistan. Given the dearth
of evidence concerning his other contacts and relationships to the United States,
Applicant’s evidence in mitigation is insufficient to overcome the security concerns
presented under the guideline for foreign influence.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1 (Foreign Influence, Guideline B): AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a, 1.b, 1.e-1.g: Against Applicant
Subparagraphs 1.c, 1.d: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
                       
Paul J. Mason
Administrative Judge