1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 14-03264
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Jeff Nagel, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
April 30, 2015
______________
Decision
______________
ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaire for Investigation Processing (e-
QIP), on July 17, 2013. (Government Exhibit 1.) On September 22, 2014, the
Department of Defense issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security
concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The action was taken under Executive
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960),
as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the Department of Defense for SORs
issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant submitted an Answer to the SOR, notarized on October 21, 2014, and
requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel was prepared
to proceed on January 12, 2015. I received the case assignment on January 21, 2015.
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on
January 21, 2015, and I convened the hearing as scheduled on February 26, 2015. The
Government offered Government Exhibit 1, which was received without objection.
2
Applicant testified on his own behalf, and submitted Applicant Exhibits A through H,
which were also admitted without objection. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) of the
hearing on March 6, 2015. Applicant requested that the record remain open for the
admission of additional documents. He timely submitted Applicant’s Exhibits I and J,
which were also admitted without objection. The record closed on March 16, 2015.
Based upon a review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to
classified information is granted.
Procedural Ruling
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to the Republic of China (Taiwan). (Tr. 17-19.) The request and
the attached documents were not admitted into evidence but were included in the
record. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below. 
Findings of Fact
Applicant is 40, married, and has a master’s degree. He has one native-born
American child and his wife is expecting their second. He is employed by a defense
contractor and seeks a security clearance in connection with his employment in the
defense industry. This is his first application for a security clearance. (Government
Exhibit 1 at Section 13; Tr. 28-29.)
Applicant admitted all of the allegations in the SOR. Those admissions are
findings of fact. He also provided additional information to support his request for
eligibility for a security clearance.  
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence)  
The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for
clearance because he has foreign contacts and interests that could lead to the exercise
of poor judgment, unreliability or untrustworthiness on his part, or make him vulnerable
to pressure or coercion.
Applicant was born in Taiwan in 1974. He moved with his family to the United
States in 1986, when he was 11. He received a bachelor’s degree, and his master’s
degree from American universities. (Tr. 27.) Applicant became an American citizen in
December 1994. (Government Exhibit 1 at Section 9.) His father has passed away, but
Applicant’s mother and two sisters are all American citizens. (Government Exhibit 1 at
Section 18.) Applicant views himself only as an American citizen and testified eloquently
about the importance of American citizenship to him. He states that “this is where I’ve
invested my time, my life, my work. I don’t have any loyalties outside the United States.
3
. . . So, this is where I would like to be - - to know this is where I want my legacy to be.”
Applicant’s late father wanted him and his sisters to become American citizens.
Applicant stated he would not do anything to disgrace that desire. (Tr. 40-42, 60-62.)
As part of an inheritance from his father, Applicant received a fractional interest
(1/72nd) in a plot of land in Taiwan. Applicant does not know where this property is, has
no involvement in managing the property, and has never visited it. His understanding is
that the entire parcel is owned by extended family members. He is uncertain of the
property’s value, but estimates it may be worth $15,000. Applicant would like to sell his
interest, but there are some legal difficulties with squatters on the property.
(Government Exhibit 1 at Section 20A; Applicant Exhibits C, and I; Tr. 33-40, 47-49.)
Applicant’s wife was born in Taiwan in 1980, and moved with her parents to
Australia in 1992, when she was twelve. She is a dual citizen of Taiwan and Australia.
Applicant met his wife in 2009, after she moved to the United States in 2008. They were
married in 2011. As stated, Applicant and his wife have one child, and she is expecting
their second. She owns a company in the United States with her brother, who also lives
here. She originally came to the United States on a business visa, but is currently a
permanent resident based on her marriage to Applicant. She considers herself to be
Australian. (Government Exhibit 1 at Section 17; Applicant Exhibit H; Tr. 43-46, 56-57,
64-66.)
Applicant and his wife own two houses in the US, with a combined value of
approximately $1,800,000. This, combined with savings, makes his net worth in the US
at least $2 million. (Tr. 49-50, 62-64.)
Applicant’s wife’s parents currently live in Taiwan. They are also dual citizens of
Taiwan and Australia. According to Applicant, “They [his in-laws] are not affiliated with
any political groups or interests in Taiwan or in Australia. But they are upstanding
citizens in any countries that they have resided in.” They are successful business
people in Australia and Taiwan. He is unsure of their net worth, but states they are
millionaires. They visit the United States on an annual basis to see their grandchild.
Applicant states that he is not close to his in-laws. (Tr. 43, 53-59.)
Applicant had an active bank account in Taiwan. This account was opened by
Applicant in May 2011 in relation to an engagement party that was held for Applicant
and his wife in Taiwan. There was no action on the account after the original deposit.
Applicant provided documentation showing that it was closed in February 2015. The
account had the equivalent of $660 American in it when closed. Applicant gave the
money to his in-laws. (Applicant Exhibits A, B, and J; Tr. 29-33, 50-51.)
Administrative Notice
Applicant has contacts with Taiwan. Accordingly, it is appropriate to look at the
current situation concerning Taiwan. Taiwan is a multiparty democracy, whose
authorities generally respect the human rights of its citizens. Taiwan is an active
4
collector of industrial information and engages in industrial espionage, as shown by the
administrative notice documents in the record. However, the record does not
demonstrate that the government of Taiwan targets US intelligence information. Further,
the record does not demonstrate that it seeks to exert pressure on US citizens to collect
information from family members residing in country or abroad. Finally, it is worth noting
that the US Government, and the Defense Department in particular, have a close and
continuing relationship with Taiwan and its military, in accordance with the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979, which has governed policy in the absence of diplomatic relations
or a defense treaty with Taiwan. In 2011 the principal assistant secretary of defense for
Asian and Pacific security affairs testified to Congress, “Today, the United States has a
deep security relationship with Taiwan, as indicated by the administration’s strong
record on arms sales. . . . We will continue to make available to Taiwan defense articles
and services to enable it to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” (Tyrone C.
Marshall Jr. American Forces Press Service, Official Cites Importance of Stability in
Taiwan Strait, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65543 (October 4,
2011).)
Mitigation
Applicant has never held a security clearance. However, a supervisor states,
“[Applicant] has always been very careful in handling sensitive company or program
information, and he has been respectful for people’s privacy, company rules and
restrictions. When in doubt, he has asked for clarification before proceeding.” The writer
concludes, “I recommend [Applicant] for security clearance without reservation.”
(Applicant Exhibit E.)
A former manager, who has known Applicant for over ten years, also submitted a
letter. The writer states, “He [Applicant] lives by a very high moral and ethical code of
conduct which I find to be admirable.” (Applicant Exhibit F.) A coworker and friend, who
has known Applicant for 15 years, says, “He [Applicant] has always demonstrated high
ethical standards, integrity and honesty at work.” (Applicant Exhibit G.)
Finally, Applicant submitted a letter of recommendation from the pastoral
assistant at his church. This letter is deeply laudatory, extolling Applicant’s skills over
the almost five years he has been a member of the congregation. (Applicant Exhibit D.)
Policies
Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum. When evaluating an
applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider
the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each
guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and
mitigating conditions, which are to be used as appropriate in evaluating an applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information.
5
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a) describing the adjudicative process. The administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision.
According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of
variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider
all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision. In addition, the administrative judge may also rely on
his or her own common sense, as well as knowledge of the law, human nature, and the
ways of the world, in making a reasoned decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Security clearance decisions include, by
necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or
inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a
certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk
of compromise of classified information.
 
Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any
determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms
of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
It is the Government's responsibility to present substantial evidence to support
the finding of a nexus, or rational connection, between the applicant's conduct and the
continued holding of a security clearance. If such a case has been established, the
6
burden then shifts to the applicant to go forward with evidence in rebuttal, explanation or
mitigation which is sufficient to overcome or outweigh the Government's case. The
applicant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving that it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant him or her a security clearance.
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence)
The concern under Guideline B is styled as follows at AG ¶ 6:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
The Applicant has family connections to Taiwan. He also has a small piece of
property, which may be worth $15,000. He no longer has active an active bank account
in Taiwan.
The following Disqualifying Conditions apply to this case under AG ¶ 7: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation.
Applicant proved that he is a conscientious and patriotic citizen, and member of
the defense industry. He has lived in the United States for more than half of his life. His
child is an American citizen, as are his mother and sisters. He has substantial family
and financial ties in the United States that significantly outweigh his relationship to
Taiwan. The value of the property interest he inherited in Taiwan from his father is far
outweighed by his $2 million net worth in the United States.
While his wife has family in Taiwan, Applicant has shown that his loyalties are to
the United States. It is important to note that Applicant’s wife and her parents are
citizens of both Taiwan and Australia. Australia is a very close ally of the United States,
7
and her parents citizenship in that country significantly reduces the already slim
possibility that the Taiwanese government might engage in any adverse conduct
towards them. As stated, the record does not show that the Taiwanese government
engages in such conduct, and the United States and Taiwan remain close allies as well.
That being said, it is noted that the Taiwanese government does engage in intelligence
gathering, as well as industrial espionage, thereby creating a heightened risk, which
Applicant must rebut. Applicant has done so.
Applicant has provided compelling evidence to show that the following Mitigating
Conditions under AG ¶ 8 also apply to this case, given his particular background: 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.; 
(b) There is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial or property
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
Based on my analysis of the available information, Applicant has overcome the
adverse inference arising from his wife’s family members’ presence and citizenship in
Taiwan, and the property he inherited from his father. Guideline B is found for Applicant.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of
whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense
judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person
concept. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors
listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
8
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.      
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. My Guideline B analysis is
applicable to the whole-person analysis as well. I have also specifically examined the
intelligence activities of Taiwan. The evidence shows that the Applicant is a patriotic
American citizen. Applicant eloquently testified about the importance to him of being a
citizen of the United States, and his pride in being a member of the defense industry.
Though he has never held a security clearance, he is knowledgeable about security and
understands his responsibility. I find that there is little or no “potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress” as set forth in AG ¶ 2(a)(8). Using the whole-person
standard, Applicant has mitigated the security significance of his alleged foreign
connections and is eligible for a security clearance. 
On balance, it is concluded that Applicant has successfully overcome the
Government's case opposing his request for a DoD security clearance. Accordingly, the
evidence supports a finding for Applicant as to the factual and conclusionary allegations
expressed in Paragraph 1 of the Government's Statement of Reasons.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.d: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
WILFORD H. ROSS
Administrative Judge