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 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS and APPEALS 
  
  
  
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 14-03922 
  ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Julie R. Mendez, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
HEINY, Claude R., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant contests the Department of Defense’s (DoD) intent to deny his eligibility 
for a security clearance to work in the defense industry. He has regular and frequent 
contact with his two brothers and three sisters who are citizens and residents of 
Afghanistan. The foreign influence security concerns are not mitigated. Clearance is 
denied.  
 
History of the Case 
 
 Acting under the relevant Executive Order and DoD Directive,1 on October 31, 
2014, the DoD issued an SOR detailing security concerns. DoD adjudicators could not 
                                                          
1 Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as 
amended; DoD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program 
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG) effective within the DoD 
on September 1, 2006. 
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find that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s 
security clearance due to foreign influence security concerns.  
 
 On November 14, 2014, Applicant answered the Statement of Reasons (SOR) 
and elected to have the matter decided without a hearing. Defense Office of Hearings 
and Appeals (DOHA) Department Counsel submitted the Government's case in a File of 
Relevant Material (FORM), dated February 4, 2015. The FORM contained eight 
attachments (Item). On March 9, 2015, Applicant responded to the FORM. Department 
Counsel did not object to the response, which was admitted into the record. On April 8, 
2015, I was assigned the case.  
 
Procedural Rulings 
 
Department Counsel requested administrative notice of facts concerning the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghanistan), and provided supporting documents to 
show detail and context for those facts. (Item 8) Applicant did not object or agree to the 
administrative notice request.  
 
Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for 
administrative proceedings. See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 at 4 n.1 (App. Bd. Apr. 12, 
2007); ISCR Case No. 02-24875 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2006) (citing ISCR Case No. 
02-18668 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 10, 2004)); McLeod v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986)). The most common basis for administrative 
notice at ISCR proceedings, is to notice facts that are either well known or from 
government reports. See Stein, Administrative Law, Section 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006) 
(listing fifteen types of facts for administrative notice). (Exhibits I to VI) 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
In Applicant’s Answer to the SOR, he admitted his parents were citizens of 
Afghanistan residing in the United States, his two brothers are citizens and residents of 
Afghanistan, his three sisters are citizens and residents of Afghanistan, and he provides 
financial assistance to his family in Afghanistan. I incorporate Applicant’s admissions to 
the SOR allegations. After a thorough review of the pleadings and exhibits, I make the 
following additional findings of fact: 
 
 Applicant is a 29-year-old linguist who has worked for a defense contractor since 
November 2009 and seeks to obtain a security clearance. Applicant called no witnesses 
and produced no work or character references. He provided a three-page response to 
the SOR and a three-page response to the FORM. No additional documents were 
received from Applicant. 
 
 In 1985, Applicant was born in Afghanistan. From January 2002 to March 2003, 
he was a high school student. From April 2003 through October 2007, he was an 
interpreter working with the U.S. Army in Afghanistan. (Item 7) He entered the United 
States under a special immigration program for individuals who had performed services 
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for the U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan. (Item 7) In November 2007, he became a 
naturalized U.S. citizen. From March 2010 to the present, his primary residence has 
been in Afghanistan. (Item 7) He visits the United States twice a year spending time at 
his sister’s home and his brother’s home, who are citizens and residents of the United 
States. (Item 7) 
 
 Applicant’s father and mother are citizens of Afghanistan residing in the United 
States. His mother has never been employed outside the home. His father is currently 
unemployed. Previously, he was the owner of a pharmacy in Afghanistan. Twenty five 
years ago he left the Afghan Army where he had been a civil engineer and colonel. 
(Item 7)  
 
 Applicant has five siblings who are citizens and residents of Afghanistan. One 
brother is a civil engineer working for a private company and his other brother is in 
medical school. (Item 3) He and one of his brothers living in Afghanistan have a joint 
bank account in Afghanistan. His three sisters are doctors. One works for a public 
hospital, one works in a clinic, and the third sister is looking for work. (Item 3) 
 
In the past, Applicant has provided his siblings in Afghanistan support of $300 to 
$700. In his November 2014 SOR response he states he uses “a nearby ATM machine 
and I give them cash an amount of $300.00 monthly or sometimes a bit more. . .” (Item 
3) 
 
Applicant states: 
 
I do admit that I have strong familial ties in a foreign country which is [sic] 
consists of regular contacts with financial support. I do understand that 
Afghanistan has a weak and corrupt government, convergence of terrorist 
groups gains momentum and dissolves periodically, Taliban and Haqqani 
Network is a big threat to development of the country, human rights 
violations exists, however, my family lives in Capital Kabul where there is 
much better security than that of the rest of the country. My siblings are 
educated people who understand their rights and there is no and in fact 
zero possibility that they could be coerced, exploited, pressured or 
manipulated. (FORM Answer) 
 
Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan is a country in Southwestern Asia. It is approximately the size of 
Texas (249,935 square miles). Pakistan borders it on the east and the south. Iran 
borders it on the west and Russia to the north. It is a rugged and mountainous country, 
which has been fought over by powerful nations for centuries. In 2009, the population 
was about 28 million people, with about 3,000,000 Afghans living outside Afghanistan.  
 
Afghanistan is presently an Islamic Republic with a democratically elected 
president. Afghanistan has had a turbulent political history, including an invasion by the 
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Soviet Union in 1979. After an accord was reached in 1989, and the Soviet Union 
withdrew from the country, fighting continued among the various ethnic, clan and 
religious militias. By the end of 1998, the Taliban rose to power and controlled 90% of 
the country, imposing aggressive and repressive policies.  
 
In October 2001, U.S. forces and coalition partners led military operations in the 
country, forcing the Taliban out of power by November 2001. The new democratic 
government took power in 2004 after a popular election. Despite that election, terrorists, 
including al-Qaida and the Taliban, continue to assert power and intimidation within the 
country. Safety and security are key issues because these terrorist organizations target 
United States and Afghan interests by suicide operations, bombings, assassinations, 
car-jacking, assaults, or hostage taking. At this time, the risk of terrorist activities 
remains extremely high. The country’s human rights record remains poor and violence 
is rampant. According to recent reports from the U.S. Department of State, insurgents 
continue to plan attacks and kidnappings of Americans and other Western nationals. 
Travel warnings are ongoing. No section of Afghanistan is safe or immune from 
violence.  
 
After the fall of the Taliban, the U.S. supported the emergence of a broad-based 
government, representative of all Afghans, and actively encouraged a [United Nations] 
role in the national reconciliation process in Afghanistan. The U.S. has made a long-
term commitment to help Afghanistan rebuild itself after years of war. The U.S. and 
others in the international community currently provide resources and expertise to 
Afghanistan in a variety of areas, including humanitarian relief and assistance, capacity-
building, security needs, counter-narcotic programs, and infrastructure projects. 
 
The United States is willing to support fully the ambitious agenda set out by the 
recently re-elected Afghan president, focusing on reintegration, economic development, 
improving relations with Afghanistan regional partners, and steadily increasing the 
security responsibilities of the Afghan security forces.2 The United States has combat 
troops deployed to Afghanistan. This commitment to Afghanistan is balanced against 
the inherent dangers of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan to citizens and residents of 
Afghanistan. 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief 
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially 
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which must be considered in 
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching 
                                                          
2 U.S. Department of State, Afghanistan, November 5, 2014. 
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adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the interests of security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 
2(b) requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based 
on the evidence contained in the record.  
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable security decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order (EO) 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in 
terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty 
of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple 
prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).  
 
Analysis 
  
  Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all 
appropriate legal precepts, factors, and conditions, I conclude the relevant security 
concerns are under Guideline B (foreign influence).  
 
 Foreign Influence 
 
  AG ¶ 6 explains the security concern about “foreign contacts and interests” 
stating: 
 
[I]f the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, [he or 
she] may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, 
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organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is 
vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication 
under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign 
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, 
including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign 
country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected 
information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
 
AG ¶ 7 indicates two conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying in this case: 
 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a 
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information. 
 
AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b) apply. Applicant has five siblings who are citizens and 
residents of Afghanistan. He has frequent contact with them. He provides financial 
support to his family living in Afghanistan, and he cares about their welfare. He obtains 
money from the ATM machine and gives the cash to them. He acknowledges he has 
strong familial ties and regular contact with his siblings. He also acknowledges that the 
government of Afghanistan is weak and corrupt, that human rights violations exist in the 
country, and there are terrorist groups operating in the country.  
 
The mere possession of close family ties with a family member living in 
Afghanistan is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if an 
applicant has a close relationship with even one relative, living in a foreign country, this 
factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially 
result in the compromise of classified information. See generally ISCR Case No. 03-
02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).  
 
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and 
its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an Applicant’s family 
members, even though well educated, are vulnerable to government coercion or 
inducement. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater if the 
foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated with or 
dependent upon the government or the country is known to conduct intelligence 
collection operations against the United States. There is a significant, but not 
insurmountable, burden of persuasion on Applicant to demonstrate that his relationships 
with his family members living in Afghanistan do not pose a security risk. Applicant 
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should not be placed into a position where he might be forced to choose between 
loyalty to the United States and a desire to assist a family member living in Afghanistan.  
 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States. “The United 
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information 
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, 
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to 
those of the United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States 
over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security. Finally, 
we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, 
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields. See ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 
2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  
 
While there is no evidence that intelligence operatives or terrorists from 
Afghanistan seek or have sought classified or economic information from or through 
Applicant or his family, nevertheless, it is not possible to rule out such a possibility in the 
future. International terrorist groups are known to conduct intelligence activities as 
effectively as capable state intelligence services, and Afghanistan has an enormous 
problem with terrorism. Applicant’s relationship with family members living in 
Afghanistan creates a potential conflict of interest because this relationship is 
sufficiently close to raise a security concern about his desire to assist family members in 
Afghanistan by providing sensitive or classified information. The concern is not to put an 
individual in the unenviable position of choosing between family members and 
protecting security. Applicant’s contacts with his family living in Afghanistan raises the 
issue of potential foreign pressure or attempted exploitation. AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b) apply, 
and further inquiry is necessary about potential application of any mitigating conditions.  
 
AG ¶ 8 lists six conditions that could mitigate foreign influence security concerns 
including: 
 
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in 
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those 
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be 
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign 
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the 
U.S.; 
 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of 
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country 
is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding 
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected 
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;  
 
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(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and 
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation; 
 
(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or 
are approved by the cognizant security authority; 
 
(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency 
requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from 
persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and 
 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property 
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not 
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
  
AG ¶ 8(a) has limited applicability. Applicant’s loyalty, connections, and financial 
support provided to his siblings are positive character traits. However, for security 
clearance purposes, those same connections to his family living in Afghanistan negate 
the possibility of mitigation under AG ¶ 8(a), and Applicant failed to fully meet his 
burden of showing there is “little likelihood that [his relationships with his relatives who 
are Afghanistan citizens] could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.” His 
statement that they live in the capitol, which has better security than the rest of the 
country and that his siblings are educated people that are unlikely to be pressured, 
coerced, influence, manipulated, or exploited is insufficient for ¶ 8(a) to apply. 
 
AG ¶ 8(b) partially applies. A key factor in the AG ¶ 8(b) analysis is Applicant has 
been working with the U.S. Army since 2003, when he graduated from high school. In 
2007, he became a naturalized U.S. citizen. However, he has spent the majority of his 
life living outside the United States. 
 
Because Applicant chose to have this matter handled administratively, I am 
unable to evaluate his demeanor, appearance, or credibility. From the record, I am 
unable to find Applicant was sincere, open, and honest. And based on the record as 
presented, I do not find he has “deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the 
U.S.” I do note he has offered to continue to risk his life to support the United States’ 
goals in Afghanistan. He has shown his patriotism, loyalty, and fidelity to the United 
States.  
 
Applicant’s relationship with the United States must be weighed against the 
potential conflict of interest created by his relationships with his family living in 
Afghanistan, and indirectly, his family’s relationships with other Afghan citizens living in 
Afghanistan. He frequently communicates with his family living in Afghanistan. There is 
no evidence, however, that terrorists, criminals, the Afghan Government, or those 
conducting espionage have approached or threatened Applicant or his family in 
Afghanistan to coerce Applicant or his family for classified or sensitive information.  
 
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While the Government does not have any burden to prove the presence of such 
evidence, if such record evidence were present, Applicant would have a heavier 
evidentiary burden to mitigate foreign influence security concerns. It is important to be 
mindful of the United States’ huge investment of manpower and money in Afghanistan, 
and Applicant has supported U.S. goals and objectives in Afghanistan. Applicant and 
his siblings living in Afghanistan are potential targets of terrorists and the Taliban 
because of Applicant’s own activities and support for the United States, and Applicant’s 
potential access to classified information is likely to add some risk to Applicant and his 
family from lawless elements in Afghanistan.  
 
AG ¶¶ 8(d) and 8(e) do not apply. The U.S. Government has not encouraged 
Applicant’s involvement with his siblings living in Afghanistan. Applicant is not required 
to report his contacts with family members living in Afghanistan. 
 
AG ¶ 8(f) has limited application. He maintains a small joint bank account with his 
brother in Afghanistan. This mitigating condition can only fully mitigate the disqualifying 
condition under AG ¶ 7(e), which provides, “a substantial business, financial, or property 
interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, 
which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.” 
The record is silent as to his assets in the United States. The size of the funds provided 
to his siblings in Afghanistan is small enough as to not pose a security concern.  
 
In sum, Applicant’s connections to siblings living in Afghanistan are very 
significant and greater than his connections to the United States. His parents reside in 
the United States and his brother and sister are U.S. citizens and residents. His parents 
and the brother and sister living in the United States do not pose security concerns. 
Even with his family members living in the United States, his connections to the United 
States taken together are insufficient to fully overcome the foreign influence security 
concerns under Guideline B.  
 
Whole Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
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Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. I have incorporated my comments 
under Guideline B in my whole person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were 
addressed under this guideline, but some warrant additional comment. 
  
There are substantial factors weighing towards the granting of a security 
clearance; however, those factors are insufficient to warrant the granting of a security 
clearance. There is no evidence that Applicant has engaged in criminal activity, abused 
alcohol or illegal drugs, or committed any security violations. Applicant is living and 
working in Afghanistan, serving with U.S. Armed Forces as a linguist and translator. He 
is willing to continue to risk his life as part of his duties on behalf of the U.S. combat 
forces in Afghanistan. He is fully aware of the risks to himself, and he is also aware that 
other family members in Afghanistan are at risk from terrorists and the Taliban.  
 
The circumstances tending to support approval of a clearance for Applicant are 
less significant than the factors weighing towards denial of his clearance. There is no 
evidence he owns property in the United States. When he was naturalized as a U.S. 
citizen in 2007, he swore allegiance to the United States. He did not provide any 
documents as to his duty performance as a translator. There were no past evaluations, 
certificates, letters, or recommendations document as to his outstanding performance 
as a translator 
 
There are substantial unmitigated security concerns arising from Applicant’s 
siblings continued Afghan citizenship and residence in Afghanistan. Applicant and his 
siblings were born in Afghanistan. His Afghan connections are weighed against his 
connections to the United States. I find he frequently communicates with his siblings 
and has visited them while he and they were in Afghanistan. His family is at significantly 
greater risk due to Applicant’s position as a linguist and he will receive access to more 
sensitive and classified information if his clearance is reinstated, further increasing the 
risk to his family. 
  
A Guideline B decision concerning Afghanistan must take into consideration the 
geopolitical situation and dangers there.3 Afghanistan is a very dangerous place 
because of violence from the Taliban and terrorists. The Taliban and terrorists continue 
to threaten the Afghan Government, the interests of the United States, U.S. Armed 
Forces, and those who cooperate and assist the United States. Applicant recognizes his 
work with the U.S. Armed Forces will endanger his family living in Afghanistan, and will 
be personally dangerous. The United States and Afghan Governments are allies in the 
war on terrorism. The United States is committed to the establishment of a free and 
independent Afghan Government. Afghanistan and the United States have close 
relationships in diplomacy and trade.  
 
                                                          
3 See ISCR Case No. 04-02630 at 3 (App. Bd. May 23, 2007) (remanding because of insufficient 
discussion of geopolitical situation and suggesting expansion of whole person discussion). 
  
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In requesting an administrative determination, Applicant chose to rely on the 
written record. In so doing, however, he failed to submit sufficient information or 
evidence to supplement the record with relevant and material facts regarding his 
circumstances, articulate his position, and mitigate the foreign influence security 
concerns. By failing to provide such information, and in relying on only a few pages of 
explanation in his SOR Answer and FORM Answer, the foreign influence security 
concerns remain. He has failed to carry his burden of mitigating the foreign influence 
security concerns. 
 
I have carefully applied the law, as set forth in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 
U.S. 518 (1988), Exec. Or. 10865, the Directive, and the AGs, to the facts and 
circumstances in the context of the whole person. I conclude foreign influence concerns 
are not mitigated. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:  
 
Paragraph 1, Foreign Influence:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
Subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b:  For Applicant 
Subparagraphs 1.c and 1.d:  Against Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.e:    For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance. 
Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.  
 
 
 
_______________________ 
CLAUDE R. HEINY II 
Administrative Judge