The Government submitted nine items for the record.      1
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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 13-00938
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Eric Borgstrom,  Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
                                                                            
______________
Decision
______________
LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
On March 13, 2014, the Department of Defense  (DOD) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) listing security concerns arising under Guideline B (Foreign Influence),
Guideline E (Personal Conduct), and Guideline F (Financial Considerations). The action
was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within
Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DoD) Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2,
1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG), implemented in
September 2006. 
Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested a review based on the written
record in lieu of a hearing. The case was assigned to me on April 27, 2015.
Department Counsel submitted a File of Relevant Material (FORM), dated January 22,
2015 . Applicant received the FORM on February 28, 2015. Applicant timely submitted1
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a response  to the FORM. Based on a review of the case file, eligibility for access to
classified information is denied.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
relating to Russia. The request and the attached documents are included in the record
as HE 1. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact.
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant denied the SOR allegations under
Guidelines B, E, and F  and provided explanations. 
Applicant is 50 years old. He graduated from high school in 1984, and he
attended college, but did not receive a degree. He received a technical degree in 2005.
Applicant has served in the Army inactive reserve from 2005 to the present. Applicant is
divorced from his first wife and has four children.  He has been employed with his
current employer since 2010 and lives abroad. (Item 3)
After Applicant’s first divorce in 2010, when he was working and living in South
Korea, he dated a Russian citizen who lived in South Korea. They married in January
2011, and divorced in August 2011. Applicant cites the reason for divorce as a
suspicion that his wife had borrowed money (when they were separated) from someone
who he believed had potential ties with the black market. He later learned that it was a
mistaken notion. However, he reported it on his security clearance application. (Item 5)
After their divorce, Applicant continued to co-habit with his second wife for a
period of time, including a vacation of one month in 2012. Applicant states that he is
trained to report perceived or real threats. He has not seen nor spoken to her since
2013. He does not know how to contact her. He has no intention of having any contact
with her. (Response to FORM)
Applicant disclosed on his 2011 security clearance application details concerning
his Russian ex-wife. He also noted that his Russian ex-wife had borrowed money to
purchase a café. He did not have any knowledge of details about the investment. They
kept business details separate from their marriage.
During his 2012 investigative interview Applicant acknowledged that he filed for
divorce when he thought that his marriage to his Russian wife would jeopardize his
security clearance. He reported his wife’s actions regarding the above mentioned
money issues. The interview notes that Applicant told his Russian wife that he lived
under strict rules due to his security clearance. Applicant stated that in November 2012,
he no longer cohabited with his ex-wife and lived alone. (Item 5)
Applicant remarried last May and has reported that information to his security
officers.  
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Financial
The SOR alleges five delinquent debts, including collection accounts totaling
about $6,000. (Item 5) It also alleges failure to file federal income tax returns for tax
years 2010 and 2011.
Applicant incurred delinquent debts as a result of his 2010 divorce. Before his
divorce he had no financial difficulties. He also attributes his failure to file his federal
income tax returns for 2010 and 2011 to his 2010 divorce.
Applicant admitted that he did not file his federal income tax returns for tax years
2010 and 2011 as required. (SOR 3.a) He partially bases the delay on the fact that
living in South Korea for the last four years, he could not sit down with an English
speaking CPA. He projected that he would not owe money. He believed he would
receive a refund. He stated that he chose to file late, but correctly, rather than file
incorrectly, but on time. (Answer to FORM)
He submitted excerpts of tax filings for the years 2010 and 2011, dated April 6,
2014. (Item 2) He also attached the receipt for mailing and receipts from HR Block.
As to the debt alleged in SOR 3.b for $46, Applicant cannot confirm or deny its
accuracy. It appears on his credit report.
Applicant submitted receipts for the debts in SOR 3.d ($269); 3.e ($250) and 3.f
($250). The receipts confirm that these accounts are now paid in full. 
Applicant submitted a sheet for the debt in SOR 3.c to show that he has been
paying on the debt. The original amount was $5,257. The receipt that he provided was
dated and showed the remaining balance was $3,655. He intends to continue
payments, but he did not provide any more documentation in response to the FORM. 
A recent credit report shows two additional delinquent accounts. (Item 6) The
debts have been delinquent since 2012 and 2013. There is no evidence of payment or
a payment plan. 
Administrative Notice
Russian intelligence services continue to target U.S. and allied personnel by
accessing sensitive computer network information. As of 2014, the leading state
intelligence threats to U.S. interests continue to be Russian and China. The Director of
National Intelligence explains that Russia has sophisticated foreign intelligence entities
and will continue to employ human and cyber means to collect national security
information. Russia seeks data on advanced weapons systems and proprietary
information from U.S. companies and research institutions that deal with energy,
finance, the media, defense, and dual use technology.
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).      2
 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).      3
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      4
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Beyond collection activities and espionage directed at the United States, Russia
has provided various military and missile technologies to other countries of security
concern, including China, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. Putin’s return to the presidency in
2012 is unlikely to bring immediate, substantive reversals in Russia’s approach to the
United States. Continuing concerns about U.S. missile defense plans will reinforce
Russia’s reluctance to engage in further nuclear arms reductions, and Russia is unlikely
to support additional sanctions against Iran. 
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, an
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions. These guidelines are not inflexible
rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, they are applied
in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process. An administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the “whole-person concept.” An administrative judge must consider all
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. 
The U.S. Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts
alleged in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other
evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven
by Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a2
preponderance of evidence.  The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant.  3 4
A person seeking access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government based on trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The Government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified information. Such
 See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive      5
information), and EO 10865 § 7.
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).      6
 Id.      7
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decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation of potential, rather
than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.”  “The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance5
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Any reasonable doubt6
about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be
resolved in favor of protecting such information.  The decision to deny an individual a7
security clearance does not necessarily reflect badly on an applicant’s character. It is
merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President
and the Secretary of Defense established for issuing a clearance.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
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protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information;
(c) counterintelligence information, that may be classified, indicates that
the individual's access to protected information may involve unacceptable
risk to national security;
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation;
(f) failure to report, when required, association with a foreign national;
(g) unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent, associate,
or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
(h) indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are
acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and,
(i) conduct, especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make
the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign
person, group, government, or country.
Applicant married a Russian citizen while living in South Korea. Applicant held a
security clearance at the time. Applicant suspected that his Russian wife might have
criminal business dealings with entities or persons in Russia. They separated and
divorced in August 2011. He later learned that his notion was not correct. He reported
his marriage to the security officials. He later cohabited with her for a limited time while
on vacation. He spent limited time with her after the divorce on vacation. AG ¶¶ 8(a),
(b), and (d) apply.
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
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(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country
is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation;
(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or
are approved by the cognizant security authority;
(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency
requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from
persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country; and,
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not 
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
Applicant divorced his Russian wife in August 2011. He no longer maintains
contact with her. He has no intention of seeing her again and he does not consider her
a friend. He has remarried. He followed procedure and contacted his security personnel
when he had a suspicion about her business dealings. He has mitigated the foreign
influence security concerns. All of the mitigating conditions apply except 8(d) and (f).
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect
classified information.
AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; and
(d) credible adverse information in an adjudicative issue area that is not
sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline,
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but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-person
assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability,
lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other
characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard
protected information.
In this case, the facts relate to foreign influence and not personal conduct. The
government has not established a case under personal conduct. The issue is resolved
under personal conduct for the same reasons it is mitigated under the foreign influence
guideline.
Guideline F, Financial Considerations
The security concern for financial considerations is set out in AG ¶ 18:
Failure or an inability to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise
questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to
protect classified information.” It also states that “an individual who is
financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to
generate funds.
Applicant admitted that he had delinquent debts. He also failed to timely file his
2010 and 2011 federal tax returns. Consequently, Financial Considerations
Disqualifying Conditions (FC DC) AG ¶ 19(a) (inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts),
and FC DC AG ¶ 19(c) (a history of not meeting financial obligations) apply. FC DC
AG¶I 19(g) (failure to file taxes as required or the fraudulent filing of same) also applies.
With such conditions raised, it is left to Applicant to overcome the case against him and
mitigate security concerns.  
The nature, frequency, and relative recency of Applicant’s financial difficulties
make it difficult to conclude that it occurred “so long ago.” Applicant still has unresolved
debts. While he attributes his delinquent debts and late filing of taxes to his divorce, he
provided no nexus with regard to the failure to file his taxes until 2014.Consequently,
Financial Considerations Mitigating Condition (FC MC) AG ¶ 20(a) (the behavior
happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it
is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment) does not apply.
Financial Considerations Mitigating Condition (FC MC) AG ¶ 20(b) (the
conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g.,
loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death,
divorce or separation) and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances)
does not apply. Applicant cited to his divorce but I  find that he failed to act responsibly.
He has known about the debts and tax issues since at least 2011, however, he just filed
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his 2010 and 2011 tax returns in 2014. He provided receipts for some small accounts,
but I cannot find that he acted responsibly under the circumstances. 
FC MC AG ¶ 20(d), (the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue
creditors or otherwise resolve debts) has some application. Applicant’s statements that
he is making progress are supported by documentary evidence. FC MC AG ¶ 20(c) (the
person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and/or there are  clear
indications that the problem is being resolved, or is under control) partially applies.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. As noted above, the
ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant seeking a security clearance. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the whole-person factors.
Applicant is a 50 year old employee, holding a security clearance. He lives in South
Korea. Applicant divorced his first wife in 2010. After that divorce, he dated and later
married a Russian citizen living in South Korea. He reported this to his security office
and it is reflected on his 2011 security clearance application. He also reported issues of
possible suspicious business dealings that his Russian wife may have had. Applicant
divorced his Russian wife in 2011. He no longer has any contact with her; nor does he
have any desire to do so. He has remarried. 
Applicant did not timely file his federal tax returns for the tax years 2010 and
2011. He stated that this was partially due to his 2010 divorce and the fact that he was
living abroad. He submitted excerpts from his tax returns that he filed in April 2014.
There is no evidence that he had an extension of time for the filing. The tax returns
were past-due by three and two years respectively. This is not responsible behavior. He
has paid other debts and produced some evidence that he has a payment plan for one
debt. He did not provide sufficient information concerning the payment plan with the
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account that he stated that he is repaying. He submitted some documentation for the
small accounts. Recent credit reports show that Applicant has other delinquent debts. 
Applicant did not persuade me that he refuted or mitigated the Government’s
case concerning the financial considerations security concerns. Any doubts must be
resolved in the Government’s favor. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B : FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E : FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 3.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 3.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 3.e: For Applicant
Subparagraph 3.f: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance.
Clearance is denied.
                                                     
NOREEN A. LYNCH.
Administrative Judge