KEYWORD: Guideline C
DIGEST: There is a presumption of good faith and regularity on the part of DOHA judges as
they decide cases.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 14-02025.a1
DATE: 05/12/2015
DATE: May 12, 2015
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 14-02025
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Personal Representative (Redacted)
The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance.  On July
11, 2014, DoD issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that
decision—security concerns raised under Guideline C (Foreign Preference) of Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested that the case
be decided on the written record.  On February 12, 2015, after the close of the record, Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) Administrative Judge Richard A. Cefola denied
Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant appealed, pursuant to the Directive ¶¶
E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.  
Applicant raises the following issue on appeal:  whether the Judge’s decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.  For the following reasons, the Board affirms the Judge’s unfavorable
security clearance decision. 
The Judge made the following findings:  Applicant immigrated to the United States from
Scotland in 1965.  He enlisted in the United States Air Force and served honorably for 20 years.  He
became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1986.  He is a dual national of the United States and the United
Kingdom.  In 2009 he renewed his expired British passport.  Applicant avers that he would only use
his British passport should an emergency arise while his daughter is in Scotland as he wants to be
able to get to her as quickly and as efficiently as possible.  In his response to the government’s File
of Relevant Material, he states that he has no intention of using the passport.  Applicant’s British
passport expires in 2019.
The Judge reached the following conclusions: Where an individual has expressed a
willingness to renounce dual citizenship, that factor is mitigating.  However, Applicant expressed
no such willingness.  The destruction of a foreign passport, or surrendering it to a cognizant security
authority or otherwise invalidating it is also mitigating.  Applicant has expressed no such willingness
to destroy, surrender, or invalidate his British passport.  The record evidence establishes doubts as
to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance.
Applicant argues that the Judge did not adequately address the whole-person factors listed
in the Directive, and did not consider a number of factors in Applicant’s background other than his
20 years of U.S. military service, such as his continued service to the U.S. government after military
retirement, the fact that his wife and daughter were born in the United States, and the fact that
Applicant is a citizen of Scotland by birth only.  Applicant fails to establish error on the part of the
Judge.
There is a presumption in favor of regularity and good faith on the part of DOHA judges as
they engage in the process of deciding cases.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 99-0019 at 5 (App. Bd. Nov.
22, 1999).  Moreover, the Judge specifically listed the nine general adjudicative factors listed at ¶
2(a) of the Directive in his decision.  He was not required to apply specifically each factor to the
facts of the case.  There is also a presumption that the Judge has considered all the evidence in the
record unless he specifically states otherwise.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 07-00196 at 3 (App. Bd.
Feb 20, 2009).  The Board finds no reason to believe that the Judge did not properly weigh the
evidence or that he failed to consider all the evidence of record.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 11-06622
at 4 (App. Bd. Jul. 2, 2012).  Contrary to Applicant’s argument on appeal, his possession of a foreign
passport is an exercise of foreign citizenship.  See Directive, Enclosure 2, ¶ 10(a)(1). 
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The Board does not review a case de novo.  The favorable evidence cited by Applicant is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g.,
ISCR Case No. 06-11172 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep. 4, 2007).  After reviewing the record, the Board
concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for
the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The
general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests
of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore,
the Judge’s ultimate unfavorable security clearance decision is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge is AFFIRMED.
Signed; Michael Ra’anan          
Michael Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed; Jeffrey D. Billett           
Jeffrey D. Billett
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody              
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
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