Department Counsel submitted five Items in support of the SOR allegations. Item 5 is inadmissible and will1
not be considered or cited as evidence in this case. It is the summary of an unsworn interview of Applicant
conducted by an interviewer from the Office of Personnel Management on March 14, 2014. It was never
1
                                                             
                       DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
        DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
-------------- )       ISCR Case No. 14-02427
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Robert J. Kilmartin, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
May 28, 2015
______________
DECISION
______________
ROSS, Wilford H., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted her Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing
(e-QIP), on February 19, 2014. (Item 4.) On September 11, 2014, the Department of
Defense issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under
Guidelines B (Foreign Influence) and C (Foreign Preference) concerning Applicant.
(Item 1.) The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines (AG)
effective within the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on October 14, 2014, and requested a
decision without a hearing by an administrative judge from the Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). (Item 3.) Department Counsel submitted the
Government’s File of Relevant Material (FORM) to Applicant on December 10, 2014.1
adopted by Applicant as her own statement, or otherwise certified by her to be accurate. Under Directive ¶
E3.1.20, this Report of Investigation summary is inadmissible in the absence of an authenticating witness.
2
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the FORM on December 21, 2014. She was given 30
days from receipt of the FORM to submit any additional documentation. Applicant
elected not to submit any additional information. The case was assigned to me on
March 12, 2015. Based upon a review of the pleadings and exhibits, eligibility for access
to classified information is granted.
Procedural Ruling
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to the Republic of China (Taiwan). (FORM at 3.) The request
and the referenced documents were not admitted into evidence but were included in the
record. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below. 
Findings of Fact
Applicant is 54, married, and has a master’s degree. She is employed by a
defense contractor and seeks a security clearance in connection with her employment
in the defense industry. Before beginning employment with her current company in
January 2014 Applicant had never had her background investigated for a security
clearance. (Item 4 at Sections 13 and 25.)
Applicant admitted all the allegations in the SOR. Those admissions are findings
of fact. She also submitted additional information in support of her request for access to
classified information. 
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence)  
The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for
clearance because she has foreign contacts and interests that could lead to the
exercise of poor judgment, unreliability or untrustworthiness on her part, or make her
vulnerable to pressure or coercion.
Applicant was born in Taiwan in 1960. She came to the United States in 1988.
She received her master’s degree from an American university in 1997. Applicant
became an American citizen in July 1999. Her husband is also an American citizen.
They have a 24-year-old native-born American daughter. (Item 4.)
Applicant’s husband was a dual citizen of Taiwan and the United States. At one
time he held both American and Taiwanese passports. The Taiwanese passport has
been surrendered to Applicant’s employer’s facility security officer (FSO). Item 3 at page
Applicant lives in one state and her company is headquartered across the country in another state.2
Applicant’s mother passed away in 1995, her father in 2012. Her mother-in-law and father-in-law are also3
deceased. (Item 4 at Section 18.)
3
4 is a letter from the FSO confirming that the husband’s passport has been surrendered
to her.2
Applicant has two siblings. Her brother is also an American citizen. Her sister is a
citizen and resident of Taiwan. From 2002 to 2007 she lived with Applicant and her
husband while going to school here in the United States. (Item 3 at 5-6.) She then
returned to Taiwan. Applicant stated in Item 3 at page 1:
The reason she [Applicant’s sister] didn’t stay in US after the graduation
and pursuit [sic] citizenship is considering my father’s wellbeing [sic]. At
that time, my mother already passed away and we were busy building our
life in US. Since we didn’t have close relatives within our family, my father
would be all alone and live by himself. Considering his age and health, my
sister decided to move back to Taiwan and lived with my father.3
Applicant admits having a bank account in Taiwan, which holds approximately
$20,000. Applicant obtained the account for two reasons. First, so she had available
funds in Taiwan for travel there. Second, Applicant and her siblings were going to move
her parents’ remains to a new location. However, it turned out the cost to move her
parents was too great and the plan was abandoned. She goes on to state:
So the account was no longer needed since all my affairs regarding my
father in Taiwan had ended. I talked to the bank in Taiwan and tried to
close [the] account then wired [sic] the money back to US and found out it
only could be done while the owner of the account was present. I am
planning [to] fly back to Taiwan [to] close the account soon. (Item 3 at 2.)
Paragraph 2 (Guideline C - Foreign Preference)  
The Government alleges in this paragraph that Applicant is ineligible for
clearance because she has acted in a way that shows a preference for another country
ahead of the United States. 
Applicant has a current and valid United States passport issued to her in March
2010. (Item 4 at Section 8.) 
Applicant at one time had a Taiwanese passport. It was issued to her in June
2008. Applicant surrendered her Taiwanese passport to her company’s FSO on January
30, 2014. (Item 4 at Section 10.)
Allegation 2.b of the SOR states that a concern of the Government is that
Applicant used her Taiwanese passport after becoming an American citizen. She made
4
four trips to Taiwan between 2008 and 2012, as well as two trips to the People’s
Republic of China in 2011 and 2013. As stated, Applicant’s father’s health began to
decline in 2007. She obtained the passport to travel to Taiwan more easily, and
especially to stay there for extended periods of time. In 2010 Applicant quit her then job
to spend even more time with him. She went to Taiwan in August 2012 to stay with him
during his final illness. He died on November 27, 2012. She stayed until June 2013,
stating, “I had to continue stay in Taiwan to arrange the funeral and follow his wish,
finding new home for his cats.”  (Item 4 at Section 10.)
Applicant suffers from high blood pressure. After an emergency call from her
father in August 2012 Applicant flew to Taiwan so quickly that she was unable to obtain
sufficient blood pressure medication for herself. She was able to obtain a two week
supply in Taiwan because she held a Taiwanese passport. This $30 prescription is the
only foreign benefit she has ever received since becoming a U.S. citizen. (Item 4 at
Section 20A.)
Because of her birth in Taiwan, she was a citizen there. However, Applicant
states, “I . . . no longer can enter Taiwan as citizen since I no longer have the
Taiwanese passport. Currently the only citizenship I own is US only.” (Item 4 at Section
10.)
Administrative Notice
Applicant has contacts with Taiwan. Accordingly, it is appropriate to look at the
current situation concerning Taiwan. Taiwan is a multiparty democracy, whose
authorities generally respect the human rights of its citizens. Taiwan is an active
collector of industrial information and engages in industrial espionage, as shown by the
administrative notice documents in the record. However, the record does not
demonstrate that the government of Taiwan targets US intelligence information. Further,
the record does not demonstrate that it seeks to exert pressure on US citizens to collect
information from family members residing in country or abroad. Finally, it is worth noting
that the US Government, and the Defense Department in particular, have a close and
continuing relationship with Taiwan and its military, in accordance with the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979, which has governed policy in the absence of diplomatic relations
or a defense treaty with Taiwan. In 2011 the principal assistant secretary of defense for
Asian and Pacific security affairs testified to Congress, “Today, the United States has a
deep security relationship with Taiwan, as indicated by the administration’s strong
record on arms sales. . . . We will continue to make available to Taiwan defense articles
and services to enable it to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” (Tyrone C.
Marshall Jr. American Forces Press Service, Official Cites Importance of Stability in
Taiwan Strait, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65543 (October 4,
2011).)
5
Policies
Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum. When evaluating an
applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge must consider
the adjudicative guidelines. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each
guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying conditions and
mitigating conditions, which are to be used as appropriate in evaluating an applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2(a) describing the adjudicative process. The administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision.
According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of
variables known as the “whole-person concept.” The administrative judge must consider
all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision. In addition, the administrative judge may also rely on
his or her own common sense, as well as knowledge of the law, human nature, and the
ways of the world, in making a reasoned decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that, “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.”
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Security clearance decisions include, by
necessity, consideration of the possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or
inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a
certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk
of compromise of classified information.
 
Finally, as emphasized in Section 7 of Executive Order 10865, “Any
determination under this order adverse to an applicant shall be a determination in terms
of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
6
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
It is the Government's responsibility to present substantial evidence to support
the finding of a nexus, or rational connection, between the applicant's conduct and the
holding of a security clearance. If such a case has been established, the burden then
shifts to the applicant to go forward with evidence in rebuttal, explanation or mitigation,
which is sufficient to overcome or outweigh the Government's case. The applicant bears
the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving that it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant him or her a security clearance.
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence)
The concern under Guideline B is styled as follows at AG ¶ 6:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
The following Disqualifying Conditions apply to this case under AG ¶ 7 based on
the fact that Applicant has family and financial connections to Taiwan: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or
exploitation.
7
Applicant has provided compelling evidence to show that the following Mitigating
Conditions under AG ¶ 8 also apply to this particular case, given her particular situation:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.; 
(b) There is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest; and 
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial or property
interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not
be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
Applicant has lived in the United States for more than half of her life, and her
husband is also an American citizen, as is their daughter. Her husband has surrendered
his Taiwanese passport, and only considers himself an American. The bank account in
Taiwan was opened for a particular purpose. Now that Applicant has decided that it is
too expensive to move her parents’ remains, she expresses a credible intent to close
the account and move the money to the United States. Applicant has shown that her
loyalties are to the United States. Based on my analysis of the available information,
Applicant has overcome the adverse inference arising from contacts with Taiwan.
Guideline B is found for Applicant.
Paragraph 2 (Guideline C - Foreign Preference) 
In this case the Government has met its initial burden of proving by substantial
evidence that Applicant is a dual citizen of Taiwan and the United States, that she had a
valid Taiwan passport, and that she obtained blood pressure medication in Taiwan on a
one-time emergency basis.
Applicant has mitigated the Government’s concerns about the above conduct.
The concern is stated thus under this Guideline at AG ¶ 9:
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of
the United States.
8
Disqualifying Condition AG ¶ 10 applies to the facts of this case: 
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include: 
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family
member. This includes but is not limited to:
(1) possession of a current foreign passport; and
(3) accepting . . . medical . . . benefits from a foreign country.
Applicant used her Taiwan passport when she went to Taiwan between 2008 and
2012, ending with the death of her father. It is worth noting that Applicant was not
working in the defense industry at that time and had no knowledge of security
requirements. Almost immediately after starting work for her current employer, and
finding out that her Taiwanese passport was a potential security issue, she sent her
passport to the FSO. Accordingly, “the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the
cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated,” as required by Mitigating
Condition AG ¶ 11(e). 
At the beginning of her last trip to Taiwan, Applicant ran out of her blood pressure
medication. She accepted Taiwanese medical benefits to obtain $30 worth of medicine.
This minimal activity has no security significance.
Applicant has stated that she only considers herself an American citizen and is
willing to renounce her Taiwan citizenship. Mitigating Condition ¶ 11(b) applies to this
case, “the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.”
Mitigating Condition AG ¶ 11(a) also applies as her “dual citizenship is based solely on
parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign country.”  Guideline C is found for Applicant.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of
whether to grant eligibility for a security clearance must be an overall commonsense
judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person
concept. The administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors
listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
9
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.      
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. My Guideline B and C analysis is
applicable to the whole-person analysis as well. I have also specifically examined the
intelligence activities of Taiwan. The evidence shows that Applicant has been an
American citizen since 1999. Her job, husband and daughter are all in the United
States. With the death of her father in 2012, her sister became the only relative in
Taiwan. Applicant’s actions on entering the defense industry, and finding out the
security concerns of her Taiwanese passport, show someone who is concerned about
her security responsibilities and willing to take affirmative action to fulfill them. I find that
there is little or no “potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress” as set forth
in AG ¶ 2(a)(8). Using the whole-person standard, Applicant has mitigated the security
significance of her alleged foreign preference and foreign connections, and is eligible for
a security clearance. 
On balance, it is concluded that Applicant has successfully overcome the
Government's case opposing her request for a DoD security clearance. Accordingly, the
evidence supports a finding for Applicant as to the factual and conclusionary allegations
expressed in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Government's Statement of Reasons.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.c: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a through 2.c: For Applicant
10
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
WILFORD H. ROSS
Administrative Judge