DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)         ISCR Case No. 14-03513
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government, David F. Hayes, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
MASON, Paul J., Administrative Judge:
The foreign influence concerns raised by Applicant’s connections to Taiwan have
been mitigated. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.  
Statement of the Case
Applicant signed and certified his Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations
Processing (e-QIP) on November 24, 2013. On October 24, 2014, the Department of
Defense (DOD) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns based
on foreign influence (Guideline B). The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the
adjudicative guidelines (AG), effective in DOD on September 1, 2006.
Applicant submitted his notarized answer to the SOR on October 24, 2014. A
notice of hearing was mailed to Applicant on January 9, 2015, scheduling a hearing for
February 10, 2015. The hearing was held as scheduled. The Government’s exhibit (GE)
1 and the Applicant’s exhibit (AE) A, containing 16 exhibits, were admitted in evidence
2
without objection. Applicant testified. The transcript was received by the Defense Office
of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) on February 19, 2015, and the record closed on the
same day.
Ruling on Procedure
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of certain facts
about Taiwan. The facts which I will administratively notice appear after Findings of Fact.
The facts administratively noticed are limited to matters that are obvious to the average
person, easily verifiable, and relevant to this case. The Administrative Notice
Memorandum and list of administrative notice documents shall be marked as Hearing
Exhibit (HE) 1 and admitted into the record. (Tr. 17)  
Findings of Fact
The SOR contains three allegations under foreign influence (Guideline B).
Applicant admitted his mother (SOR 1.a), brother (SOR 1.b), and mother-in-law (SOR
1.c), are citizens and residents of Taiwan. These allegations are based on Applicant’s e-
QIP (GE 1). Considering Applicant’s admissions together with the entire record, I make
the following factual findings. 
Applicant was born in Taiwan and is 55 years old. After obtaining his bachelor’s
degree in electrical engineering from a Taiwanese college in 1982, he performed two
years of compulsory service in the Taiwanese military, then was discharged. In 1984, he
accepted a teaching assistant position at the school where he received his bachelor’s
degree. He married his current wife later in the same year. In 1986, he immigrated to the
United States and worked for a company that paid his U.S. graduate school tuition. In
August 1988, Applicant received his master’s degree in electrical engineering and then
his PhD in August 1993. In September 1995, he purchased a home where he resides
today. The mortgage is paid off. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1996. He was
investigated and received a security clearance in 2005. (GE 1 at 10, 15-16; AE A4, A12;
Tr. 34-38, 42, 49)
Applicant’s wife immigrated to the United States in 1987. She is a naturalized U.S.
citizen and housewife. His 28-year-old daughter, born in Taiwan, is a naturalized U.S.
citizen. Applicant’s 18-year-old son, born in the United States, is in college studying
electrical engineering. (Tr. 39, 41)
SOR 1.a. Applicant’s mother is 88 years old and is a citizenof Taiwan, but has
lived in the United States with Applicant since May 2009. Before she immigrated, she
was a housewife for about 64 years. When her husband (Applicant’s father) passed
away in May 2009, Applicant brought her to the United States and his wife takes care of
her at their home. Applicant’s mother obtained a U.S. permanent resident card in March
2010, and will be applying for U.S. citizenship in 2015. She never worked for the
government of Taiwan. (AE A1; Tr. 27-28)
3
SOR 1.b. Applicant’s brother, 64 years old, is a citizen and resident of Taiwan. He
worked for the Republic of China (ROC) Coast Guard before spinal and stomach
problems forced him to retire in 2012. The brother receives a pension from the ROC
Coast Guard. He lives in a house in the southern part of the country. He is no longer
employed by the government or the military. Applicant telephones him weekly. He last
saw his brother in Taiwan at their father’s funeral in May 2009. (AE A15; Tr. 42-44)
SOR 1.c. Applicant’s mother-in-law is 84 years old and has been a housewife for
60 years. Applicant’s father-in-law is deceased. Her poor health requires long-term care.
She does not receive any benefits or a pension from the Taiwanese government.
Applicant pays $10,000, about 50% of the yearly cost of his mother-in-law’s medical and
living expenses. His brother-in-law (his wife’s brother) pays the balance of the long-term
care. Applicant has not spoken with his mother-in-law since his face-to-face contact with
her at his father’s funeral in 2009. His wife speaks to her about once every two months.
Applicant’s only remaining contacts to Taiwan are his brother and mother-in-law. (GE 1
at 25; AE 1; Tr. 30-33) 
Applicant has no other siblings in Taiwan and does not maintain contact with
Taiwanese friends he met while in college. He has relatives in the Peoples Republic of
China (PRC), but has never had contact with them. He has no property interests or
accounts in Taiwan. All his accounts are in U.S. banks. He has no property or other
business interests in the country. He has no foreign contacts and is not affiliated with any
foreign business ventures or educational events. Applicant has no plans to return to
Taiwan. (GE 1 at 26-27; Tr. 42, 44-46) When asked to explain his allegiance to the
United States versus Taiwan, Applicant explained that he came to America to continue
his education, raise his family, and secure a better life for them. (Tr. 53-54)
Administrative Notice
According to the 2008 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection
and Industrial Espionage, Taiwan and seven other countries are extensively engaged in
criminal espionage and export control cases in 2008. An earlier edition of the report
indicates that Taiwan is one of the most active collectors of U.S. economic and
proprietary information and export-restricted products. There have been numerous
instances of U.S. companies involved in the illegal export or attempted export of sensitive,
dual-use technology to Taiwan. There is some evidence of Taiwanese intelligence
officials targeting U.S. citizens for protected and classified information, but there is no
evidence that indicates the Taiwanese government applies coercive tactics against its
own citizens to collect economic intelligence. The PRC, a leading collector of intelligence
related to U.S. science and technology targets, maintains intelligence activity in Taiwan
by using PRC citizens that have Taiwanese affiliations. 
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). Following the
security concern definition for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
4
disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an
applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines must be considered in the context of the nine general factors
known as the whole-person concept to enable the administrative judge to consider all
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of national security.”
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The applicant
has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security decision. 
Analysis
Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 sets forth the security concern of the foreign influence guideline:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations
as whether the foreign country is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain
protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.
AG ¶ 7 contains two potential disqualifying conditions that may be pertinent in this
case:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and individual’s desire to help a
foreign person, group, or country by providing that information. 
5
If an applicant has contact with an immediate or extended family member living in
a foreign country, this single factor may create a potential for foreign influence that is
disqualifying under the guideline. Applicant’s brother and mother-in-law are citizens and
residents of Taiwan. He contacts his brother weekly. Though he does not contact his
mother-in-law, his wife speaks to her about once every two months. He provides a
significant amount of money on a yearly basis to pay for his mother-in-law’s long-term
care. Applicant’s mother is still a citizen of Taiwan living in the United States. 
In a Guideline B case, the foreign country should be identified and evaluated to
determine whether it targets U.S. citizens for classified information and whether it is
affiliated with terrorism. Taiwan has engaged in economic espionage and continues to
target U.S. citizens for classified information. Applicant’s family ties create a heightened
risk of foreign pressure and a potential conflict of interest. However, I emphasize that
while he knows he has relatives in the PRC, Applicant has never contacted them, a
salient factor in assessing his overall vulnerability to a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation and pressure. 
The Government has presented sufficient evidence under AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(b).
The burden then moves to Applicant to present evidence under AG ¶¶ 8(a) or 8(b) that
demonstrates he is unlikely to be placed in a position of having to choose between his
family members and U.S. interests. The potential mitigating conditions are:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which
these persons are located, or the position or activities of those persons in
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual,
group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.; and 
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
minimal, or the individual has such deep and long-lasting relationships and
loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.
Applicant presented evidence that his 88-year-old mother has lived with Applicant
since May 2009, and has been a permanent resident of the United States since March
2010. She is eligible for U.S. citizenship in 2015. Because of medical problems,
Applicant’s 64-year-old brother retired from the ROC coast guard in 2012, and draws a
pension for his military service. Applicant talks to his brother weekly, but his most recent
face-to-face contact was at their father’s funeral in May 2009. Applicant has not spoken
with his 84-year-old mother-in-law since his father’s funeral in May 2009. Except for the
brother’s pension, none of the three family members have current connections to the
Taiwan government. Applicant and his wife have been in the United States for over 28
years. He has been a U.S. citizen for more than 18 years. His wife is also a naturalized
U.S. citizen. Their two children are U.S. citizens. Applicant has owned his U.S. home for
almost 30 years. He has worked for his employer since September 1995. It is unlikely that
6
he would choose the interests of his foreign family members if a conflict arose between
those interests and U.S. interests. AG ¶¶ 8(a) and 8(b) apply.
Whole-Person Concept 
I have evaluated this case under the specific disqualifying and mitigating conditions
of the foreign influence guideline. I now consider those findings in the context of the nine
general factors of the whole-person concept identified in AG ¶ 2(a): (1) the nature, extent,
and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to
include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which the
participation was voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based on careful
consideration of the specific guidelines and nine factors for the whole-person concept.
Upon receiving his bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering in 1982, Applicant
completed his two-year mandatory commitment to the Taiwan military. In 1986, he
immigrated to the United States to continue his education. His wife, who he married in
1984, joined him in 1987. He received a master’s degree at a U.S. university in 1988,
then a PhD at a U.S. university in 1993, the same year he started working for one of his
current employers. He purchased his home in 1995 and became a U.S. citizen in 1996.
His two children are U.S. citizens. Applicant has developed strong ties to the United
States. He provides a significant sum of money for the continuing medical care of his 84-
year-old mother-in-law because she has no pension and receives no other benefit from
the Taiwanese government. While the potential for foreign exploitation and pressure could
reach Applicant because of his financial help, I am convinced he would not relinquish the
longstanding relationships and loyalties he has developed in America, nor betray the
interests of the U.S. Having weighed all the evidence under the whole-person concept,
including Applicant’s credible testimony concerning his reasons for becoming an
American citizen, he has successfully mitigated the security concerns associated with the
guideline for foreign influence. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1 (Foreign Influence, Guideline B): FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.c: For Applicant
7
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance.
Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
                       
Paul J. Mason
Administrative Judge