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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 [Redacted] )  ISCR Case No. 14-05270 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: David F. Hayes, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Richard L. Morris, Esq., and Mercedes Culpepper, Esq. 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: 
 
This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines J (Criminal 
Conduct) and F (Financial Considerations). Eligibility for access to classified information 
is denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application on May 5, 2014. On 
November 6, 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) sent him a Statement of 
Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns under Guideline J and F. The DOD acted 
under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry 
(February 20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel 
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on September 1, 2006.  
 
 Applicant received the SOR on November 10, 2014; answered it on December 
17, 2014; and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department Counsel 
was ready to proceed on January 16, 2015, and the case was assigned to me on 
January 23, 2014. It was reassigned to another administrative judge on February 3, 
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2015, to consolidate the docket, and reassigned back to me on March 4, 2015, due to 
the assigned administrative judge’s unavailability. The Defense Office of Hearings and 
Appeals (DOHA) issued a notice of hearing on March 4, 2015, scheduling the hearing 
for March 24, 2015. I convened the hearing as scheduled. Government Exhibits (GX) 1 
through 6 were admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified, presented the 
testimony of three witnesses, and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) A through P, 
which were admitted without objection. I kept the record open until April 15, 2015, to 
enable Applicant to submit additional documentary evidence. He timely submitted AX Q 
through V. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on April 2, 2015. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted SOR ¶¶ 1.a-1.e, 1.g-1.i, and 2.c-2.f. 
He admitted SOR ¶¶ 1.f and 1.j in part. He denied SOR ¶¶ 2.a and 2.b. His admissions 
in his answer and at the hearing are incorporated in my findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 47-year-old shipboard electrician employed by a federal contractor 
at a naval shipyard since September 2013. He received a security clearance in April 
2009. His clearance was revoked in October 2012. (GX 1 at 45-46.) 
 
 Applicant attended high school from January 1983 to June 1986 but did not 
receive a diploma. He received his general educational development certificate in April 
1995. He attended a technical school from November 2005 to August 2008 and 
received an associate’s degree in computer networking in September 2008. He worked 
in the private sector from December 1999 to February 2008. He worked for a federal 
contractor from February 2008 until November 2012, when he was fired as a result of 
being incarcerated. He was unemployed from November 2012 to April 2013. He worked 
in the private sector from April 2013 until he began his current job. 
 
 Applicant was charged with grand theft of an auto in October 1987 and convicted 
of unauthorized use of an auto in December 1987. He was placed on probation for two 
years. He testified that his parents had promised to buy him a car when he graduated 
from high school, but they did not buy the car (probably because he did not graduate). 
He went to the dealership, found the car with the key in it, and drove around in it for four 
days. (Tr. 94-95.)  
 
 In September 1993, Applicant was charged with driving on a suspended license. 
He was convicted and sentenced to 30 days in jail. (GX 3 at 5.)  
 
 In March 1997, Applicant was charged with possession of marijuana. He was 
convicted and his driver’s license was suspended. (GX 2 at 3; GX 3 at 7.)  
 
 In February 1998, Applicant was charged with driving on a suspended license. 
His license had been suspended because of the marijuana conviction. (GX 3 at 4.) He 
was convicted, fined, and his license was suspended for 30 days. (Tr. 93.) 
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 In December 1998, Applicant was charged with making a false statement in 
connection with a firearm purchase, a felony. (GX 3 at 3.) He testified that the charge 
arose when he attempted to purchase a firearm, not knowing that his 1987 felony arrest 
for grand theft barred him from possessing a firearm. After he explained the situation to 
the judge, the charge was dismissed. (Tr. 90-92.) 
 
 In February 1999, Applicant was charged with assault and battery of his live-in 
girlfriend. He was convicted in March 1999. (GX 2 at 3.) There is no evidence reflecting 
the sentence imposed. The charges arose when Applicant and his girlfriend pushed 
each other during an argument, and she called the police. At the hearing, Applicant 
denied that there was physical contact during this incident. (Tr. 132.) 
 
 In August 2000, Applicant was charged with assault and battery of the same 
girlfriend, violating a protective order, and destruction of property. (GX 2 at 3.) These 
charges arose from an argument between Applicant and his girlfriend, during which he 
punched a door and broke a few items in the house. (Tr. 86.) He testified that during this 
incident his girlfriend hit him with a phone and he destroyed the phone. (Tr. 132.) He 
was convicted and required to complete a 16-week anger-management class. A one-
year protective order was imposed. 
 
 In April 2006, he was charged with improper control of an automobile resulting in 
an accident, a misdemeanor, after he swerved to avoid another vehicle that had cut him 
off, lost control of his vehicle, and hit a retaining wall. He was with the girlfriend that he 
subsequently married in 2010. (Tr. 84-85.) He was convicted and sentenced to six 
months in jail, suspended. He was placed on probation for 12 months and his driver’s 
license was suspended for 30 days. (GX 3 at 1.) 
 
 Applicant and his ex-wife began living together in 2005, and they married in 
January 2010. They have an eight-year-old daughter. Applicant also has two daughters, 
ages 25 and 23, from previous relationships.  
 
In July 2012, Applicant was arrested for assault and battery of his wife. In his 
answer to the SOR, he stated that his arrest arose from an argument about his wife’s 
infidelity. He denied having any physical contact with her during the argument.  
 
 In September 2012, Applicant was arrested for assault and battery of his wife 
after another argument about her infidelity. In his answer to the SOR, Applicant stated 
that his wife punched and scratched him and he grabbed her wrists to stop her. He and 
his wife separated after this incident, and they divorced in February 2013. At the 
hearing, he testified that their altercation consisted of pushing and shoving, but no 
slapping or punching. He admitted that he knocked his wife to the ground during the 
altercation. (Tr. 135.) A warrant for his arrest was issued. He turned himself in on advice 
of counsel and was incarcerated for seven days. (Tr. 77-78.)  
 
In December 2012, Applicant appeared in court for both the July and September 
2012 incidents, and he pleaded guilty. He was required to complete an 18-week 
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intensive group-therapy course for domestic violence. He completed the course in 
October 2013. (AX I.) He was placed on probation for two years, which ended in 
February 2015. (GX 1 at 33; Tr. 77-79.) 
 
 Applicant testified that the court-ordered counseling taught him to relax, decide 
what is really important, and decide whether an issue requires a negative or angry 
response. As a result, he has not lost his temper for two years. (Tr. 114-15.) 
 
 Applicant’s credit bureau report (CBR) for June 2014 reflected three medical 
debts: a $130 debt referred for collection in June 2011 (SOR ¶ 2.a), a $56 debt referred 
for collection in June 2011 (SOR ¶ 2.b), and a $285 debt referred for collection in 
January 2013 (SOR ¶ 2.c). (GX 5 at 6.) Applicant’s CBRs for January and February 
2015 reflected that the debts alleged in SOR ¶¶ 2.a and 2.b were paid, but the debt in 
SOR 2.c was unsatisfied. (GX 6 at 1; AX A at 9-11.) On March 25, 2015, he received a 
receipt from the collection agency for payment of $400.71 on “multiple accounts,” 
reflecting a zero balance due. (AX Q.) The three medical debts are resolved. 
 
 Applicant’s June 2014 CBR also reflected three student loans placed for 
collection for $8,332 (SOR ¶ 2.c), $1,063 (SOR ¶ 2.e), and $8,863 (SOR ¶ 2.f). (GX 5 at 
7.) All three student loans were referred for collection in March 2012. Applicant’s 
January 2015 CBR reflected that the three student loans had been transferred or sold. 
(GX 6 at 3.) His February 2015 CBR reflected three student loans, now held by another 
creditor, charged off for $8,643; $1,124; and $9,398. (AX A at 2-3.) In November 2014, 
Applicant’s request for forbearance on paying his student loans was approved. (AX U.) 
In March 2015, Applicant received an offer to settle all three student loans for $19,267. 
(AX V.) On March 31, 2015, he made an initial payment on each loan pursuant to a 
repayment agreement, in the amounts of $113.93; $12.76; and $107.11. (AX R, S, and 
T.)  
 
 Applicant and his wife filed a joint federal income tax return in 2011, reporting 
gross income of $72,685 (AX D.) They filed a joint return for 2012, reflecting gross 
income of $67,077, of which $31,531 was Applicant’s income. (AX C.) When Applicant 
filed his separate federal income tax return for 2013, he reported gross income of 
$21,926. (AX B.) At the hearing, he submitted a personal financial statement (PFS) 
reflecting monthly net income of $1,674, expenses of $1,655, and a net monthly 
remainder of $19. His PFS does not include payments on the student loans. He testified 
that he calculated his income on the PFS based on working 60 hours every two weeks. 
When his request for forbearance on the student loans was approved in November 
2014, he was working 120 hours every two weeks. (Tr. 105.)  
  
 Applicant’s ex-wife, who was involved in the domestic incidents in 2012, 
submitted a statement describing him as a devoted father, hardworking, loyal, dutiful, 
and trustworthy. (AX K.) Applicant’s younger brother, who is also employed by a 
defense contractor, considers him hardworking, honest, and a devoted father. (AX P.) A 
Navy chief warrant officer, who has known Applicant for seven years as a neighbor and 
friend, describes him as a caring and generous person, a great father, and a person of 
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integrity. He believes Applicant took his conviction for domestic violence seriously, 
complied with the court’s orders, “and is a better man for doing so.” (AX N.) A martial 
arts instructor, who has known Applicant for about eight years and shares Applicant’s 
interest in martial arts, considers him a person of integrity, honesty, and compassion. 
(AX O.) 
 
The co-owner and vice-president of a former employer describes Applicant as 
dependable, honest, trustworthy, and devoted to his family. (AX L.) A Navy lieutenant 
junior grade, who became acquainted with Applicant when the ship underwent 
extensive repairs and upgrades, described Applicant as hardworking, reliable, and calm 
under pressure. (AX M.) A co-worker, who has known Applicant for 35 years, describes 
him as “one of the best single fathers I have ever met.” Applicant lived with this co-
worker after he was charged with domestic violence. When the co-worker was away 
from home, he trusted Applicant with his child and his house. (Enclosure to Answer to 
SOR.) 
 
 Another co-worker, who has worked with Applicant for about eight years, testified 
that he considers him “one of the most reliable people that I’ve ever known.” He would 
trust Applicant with his children. He has found Applicant blunt but very honest. Applicant 
does not drink alcohol and does not party while on temporary duty assignments. 
Applicant is energetic but very peaceful. He is very frugal, but good-hearted and 
generous. (Tr. 23-30.) He testified that Applicant was very remorseful about the 
domestic violence incidents. (Tr. 34.) While Applicant was unemployed, he found short-
term temporary jobs, gave his wife whatever money he could earn, and was very 
concerned about his daughters. (Tr. 32.) At the time of the hearing, Applicant was living 
with one of his adult daughters. (Tr. 38.) 
 
 Applicant’s facility security officer testified that he has been honest and forthright 
about his finances and criminal history. He testified that Applicant frequently talks about 
his youngest daughter and his hopes for her future. He described Applicant’s demeanor 
as “hyper but peaceful,” always trying to keep busy. (Tr. 43-48.) 
 
 Applicant’s brother-in-law, a paralegal in a Navy Judge Advocate General’s 
Corps Office, has known Applicant for 28 years. He is aware of Applicant’s incidents 
involving domestic violence but not his earlier criminal history. He testified that Applicant 
was devastated by the incidents with his wife, because he did not experience domestic 
violence in his home while he was growing up. He believes that Applicant matured more 
slowly than most other men of the same age. He testified that Applicant is a much 
calmer person from what he was when they first met. Applicant is very involved with his 
youngest daughter’s education and religious upbringing. He testified that Applicant does 
not consume alcohol, is not a “flashy” person, and is very careful with his money. (Tr. 
56-68.) 
 
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Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.   
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, 
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these 
guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative 
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the 
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. 
Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the 
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense 
have established for issuing a clearance. 
 
 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in 
the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant 
from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden 
of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the 
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 
at 3, 1993 WL 545051 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993).   
 
 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, 
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and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-
31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
 
An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 
01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, 
if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline J, Criminal Conduct 
 
 The SOR alleges two domestic violence incidents in 2012 involving Applicant’s 
ex-wife (SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b), a traffic accident in 2006 resulting from Applicant losing 
control of his vehicle (SOR ¶ 1.c), two domestic violence incidents in 1999 and 2000 
involving Applicant’s then live-in girlfriend (SOR ¶¶ 1.d and 1.e), a false statement in 
connection with a firearm purchase in 1998 (SOR ¶ 1.f), driving on a suspended license 
in 1998 and 1993 (SOR ¶¶ 1.g and 1.i), possession of marijuana in 1997 (SOR ¶ 1.h), 
and grand theft of an automobile in 1989 (SOR ¶ 1.j). Applicant admitted all the 
allegations except SOR ¶¶ 1.f and 1.j.  
 
 The evidence reflects that Applicant attempted to purchase a firearm in 1998, not 
realizing that his arrest for a felony precluded the purchase, but there is no evidence 
that he made any false statement during his attempt. Thus, SOR ¶ 1.f is not established 
by substantial evidence. 
 
The concern raised by criminal conduct is set out in AG ¶ 30: “Criminal activity 
creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very 
nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules 
and regulations.” Applicant’s admissions and the documentary evidence admitted in 
evidence at the hearing establish two disqualifying conditions under this guideline: AG ¶ 
31(a) (“a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses”) and AG ¶ 31(c) (“allegation or 
admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged, 
formally prosecuted, or convicted”). 
 
The following mitigating conditions under this guideline are potentially applicable: 
 
AG ¶ 32(a): so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior 
happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is 
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment; and  
 
AG ¶ 32(d): there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not 
limited to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, 
remorse or restitution, job training or higher education, good employment 
record, or constructive community involvement.  
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The first prong of AG ¶ 32(a) focuses on whether the criminal conduct was 
recent. There are no Abright line@ rules for determining when conduct is Arecent.@ The 
determination must be based on a careful evaluation the evidence. See ISCR Case No. 
02-24452 at 6 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2004). If the evidence shows Aa significant period of 
time has passed without any evidence of misconduct,@ then an administrative judge 
must determine whether that period of time demonstrates Achanged circumstances or 
conduct sufficient to warrant a finding of reform or rehabilitation.@ Id.  
 
 Almost six years elapsed between the domestic violence incident in August 2000 
and the traffic offense in 2006. Although Applicant described the traffic accident in terms 
of a mere loss of control, he admitted that he swerved after being cut off by another 
driver. This admission, coupled with the relatively severe sentence imposed (six months 
in jail, suspended, probation for 12 months, and suspension of a driver’s license for 30 
days) indicates that more than mere negligence was involved. Although more than six 
years passed between the traffic accident and the two domestic violence incidents in 
2012, the incidents in 2012 were a recurrence of the behavior in 1999 and 2000. At the 
hearing, Applicant claimed that no physical contact was involved in the June 2012 
incident and only mutual shoving was involved in the September 2012 incident. 
However, he pleaded guilty to both incidents, and he admitted at the hearing that he 
shoved his wife with sufficient force to knock her to the ground. Based on all the 
evidence, I conclude that insufficient time has passed to establish AG ¶¶ 32(a). 
 
 Applicant has expressed remorse for the domestic violence incidents. He 
appears to have benefited from the court-ordered therapy. He is deeply involved with 
his youngest daughter and is respected by his co-workers. Nevertheless, he was on 
probation until February 2015, and I am not convinced that sufficient time has passed to 
warrant application of AG ¶ 32(b). 
 
Guideline F, Financial Considerations 
 
 The SOR alleges three delinquent medical debts placed for collection (SOR ¶¶ 
2.a-2.c) and three delinquent student loans placed for collection (SOR ¶¶ 2.d-2.f.). The 
concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 18:  
 
Failure or inability to live within one=s means, satisfy debts, and meet 
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or 
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise 
questions about an individual=s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to 
protect classified information. An individual who is financially 
overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate 
funds. 
 
 This concern is broader than the possibility that an individual might knowingly 
compromise classified information in order to raise money. It encompasses concerns 
about an individual’s self-control, judgment, and other qualities essential to protecting 
classified information. An individual who is financially irresponsible may also be 
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irresponsible, unconcerned, or negligent in handling and safeguarding classified 
information. See ISCR Case No. 11-05365 at 3 (App. Bd. May 1, 2012). 
 
 Applicant’s admissions, corroborated by his CBRs, establish two disqualifying 
conditions under this guideline: AG ¶ 19(a) (“inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts”) 
and AG ¶ 19(c) (“a history of not meeting financial obligations”). 
 
 The following mitigating conditions under this guideline are potentially applicable: 
 
AG ¶ 20(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or 
occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not 
cast doubt on the individual=s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good 
judgment; 
 
AG ¶ 20(b): the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were 
largely beyond the person=s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business 
downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or 
separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances; 
 
AG ¶ 20(c): the person has received or is receiving counseling for the 
problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being 
resolved or is under control; and 
 
AG ¶ 20(d): the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue 
creditors or otherwise resolve debts. 
 
 AG ¶ 20(a) is not established. The three medical debts were not resolved until 
March 2015, the student loans are not yet fully resolved, and the debts were not 
incurred under circumstances making them unlikely to recur. 
 
 AG ¶ 20(b) is not established for the medical debts in SOR ¶¶ 2.a and 2.b, which 
were referred for collection before Applicant was fired in November 2012. However, the 
medical debt in SOR¶ 2.c and the three student loans in SOR ¶¶ 2.d-2.f became 
delinquent after he was fired, which was a condition beyond his control. Although the 
domestic violence in 2012 was mutual and not a condition beyond Applicant’s control, 
his marital breakup and the resulting reduction in family income were conditions beyond 
his control. He did not act responsibly regarding the medical debts, because he did not 
address them until shortly before the hearing, even though he has been employed since 
September 2013. He acted responsibly regarding the student loans by requesting and 
obtaining forbearance, negotiating a payment plan, and making the first payments under 
the payment plan. 
 
 AG ¶ 20(c) is not fully established. There is no evidence that Applicant sought or 
received counseling. However, his medical debts are resolved. It is too soon to 
determine whether his student loans are under control, because he has made only one 
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payment and has virtually no discretionary funds available after paying his living 
expenses.  
 
 AG ¶ 20(d) is established for the medical debts. It is not yet fully established for 
the student loans, because he has made only one payment under his payment 
agreement and is in a precarious financial situation that raises doubt about his ability to 
comply with his payment agreement. 
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole-
person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a 
security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant 
circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process 
factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines J and F in my whole-person 
analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under those guidelines, but 
some warrant additional comment. 
 
 Applicant was sincere, remorseful, and credible at the hearing. He has matured, 
made progress in anger management, and is beginning to get his finances under 
control. However, it is too soon to conclude that he will continue to avoid angry, 
impulsive behavior, and he has not yet established a track record of financial 
responsibility. 
 
 After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines J and 
F, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude 
Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns raised by his criminal conduct and 
financial problems. Accordingly, I conclude he has not carried his burden of showing 
that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him eligibility for access to 
classified information. 
 
11 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline J (Criminal Conduct):  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a-1.e:    Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 1.f:     For Applicant 
  Subparagraphs 1.g-1.j:    Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline F (Financial Considerations) AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 2.a-2.c:    For Applicant 
  Subparagraphs 2.d-2.f:    Against Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant 
Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information 
is denied. 
 
 
 
 
LeRoy F. Foreman 
Administrative Judge