1Item 5.
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                               DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
                DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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)       ISCR Case No. 14-03527
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Alison O’Connell, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
July 9, 2015
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Decision
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GOLDSTEIN, Jennifer I., Administrative Judge:
Applicant mitigated the drug and personal conduct security concerns that arose
out of her infrequent marijuana use from October 2010 to August 2013. Applicant has
been candid with the Department of Defense about her illegal marijuana use, and does
not intend to use any illegal drugs, including marijuana, in the future. Eligibility for
access to classified information is granted. 
Statement of the Case
Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA) on February 24,
2014.1 On August 13, 2014, the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications
Facility (DoD CAF) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, detailing
2Item 1.
3Item 4. 
4Department Counsel submitted six Items in support of the SOR allegations. 
5Item 5.
6Item 5.
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security concerns under Guidelines H (Drug Involvement) and E (Personal Conduct).2
The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the adjudicative guidelines that came
into effect in the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. 
Applicant submitted a written response to the SOR on October 2, 2014, and
requested that her case be decided by an administrative judge on the written record
without a hearing.3 Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on
February 6, 2015. A complete copy of the File of Relevant Material (FORM)4 was
provided to Applicant, and she was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit
material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation within 30 days of her receipt of the
FORM.
Applicant signed the document acknowledging receipt of her copy of the FORM
on April 3, 2015. She submitted a one-page letter in response to the FORM (Response).
I received the case assignment on May 21, 2015.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is 25 years old. She earned a bachelor’s degree in 2012. She was
hired as a government contractor in August 2012. She has never married and has no
children.5
On Applicant’s SCA, she indicated she used marijuana between October 2010
and August 2013 “about 7 times total.” She also indicated that she did not intend to use
marijuana in the future because it was “[n]ot overly enjoyable” and that she wanted to
comply with security regulations.6 
Applicant’s infrequent marijuana use occurred primarily while in college, between
October 2010 and her graduation in 2012. Her boyfriend at that time provided the
marijuana. She no longer has a relationship with him, and no longer attends college.
She also used marijuana once in August 2013 with friends. Those friends have moved
away. Further, she has watched one of those friends “suffer greatly under the impacts of
continued drug use” and is committed to remaining abstinent. She has not used
marijuana since August 2013 because she does not want to jeopardize her employment
7Item 5; Item 6; Response.
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with a government contractor. She stated her solid commitment to abstain from future
drug use in writing.7 
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially
disqualifying conditions (DCs) and mitigating conditions (MCs), which are to be used in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in AG ¶ 2 describing the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s
overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. According
to AG ¶¶ 2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable
guidelines in the context of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical, and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “[t]he applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides: “[a]ny determination under this order adverse to an
applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
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permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Analysis
Drug Involvement
AG ¶ 24 expresses the security concern pertaining to Drug Involvement:
Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription drug can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because it may
impair judgment and because it raises questions about a person’s ability
or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations. 
I have considered all of the disqualifying conditions under Drug Involvement AG ¶
25, and the following is potentially applicable: 
(a) any drug abuse.
The Government presented sufficient information to support the factual allegation
under Guideline H. Applicant used marijuana approximately seven times between 2010
and 2013. The facts established through the Government’s evidence and through
Applicant’s admissions raise security concerns under the above disqualifying condition. 
I have considered the mitigating conditions under Drug Involvement AG ¶ 26, and
the following is potentially applicable:
(b) a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, such as: (1)
disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) changing or
avoiding the environment where drugs were used; (3) an appropriate
period of abstinence; (4) a signed statement of intent with automatic
revocation of clearance for any violation.
While Applicant’s illegal drug use spanned a three-year period, Applicant has
made a number of significant changes in her life during the past two years that
demonstrate her serious commitment to abstain from illegal substances. She
recognized that she was wrong to use marijuana. She ceased using all drugs prior to
applying for a security clearance. She no longer associates with drug-using friends and
associates. Applicant’s drug use occurred while she was attending undergraduate
school. She is now in the work force and no longer attends school. Thus, she has
changed her environment. While the Directive does not define what constitutes “an
appropriate period of abstinence” under AG ¶ 26(b)(3), her candor about her drug
abuse leads me to accept as credible her assertions that she has no future intent to use
any illegal substance under any circumstances. Applicant has demonstrated sufficient
intent not to use any illegal drugs in the future. She signed a statement indicating she
would not use drugs again. She has matured and understands that any illegal drug
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involvement is incompatible with her defense contractor employment. Applicant has
presented sufficient evidence to mitigate the Government’s concerns under AG ¶ 26(b).
Personal Conduct
The security concern for the Personal Conduct guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. The following disqualifying conditions is potentially applicable:
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s conduct,
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such as
(1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person’s personal,
professional, or community standing, or (2) while in another country,
engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is legal in that
country but illegal in the United States and may serve as a basis for
exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or intelligence service or
other group.
Applicant’s illegal drug use could potentially create a vulnerability to exploitation,
manipulation, or duress. AG ¶ 16(e) applies. 
AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. The following
are applicable: 
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is
so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment; and
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress.
Applicant acknowledged her illegal drug use and is committed to abstinence. She
witnessed the suffering of a friend due to her continued drug use. Future unreliable,
inappropriate, and illegal behavior is unlikely to occur. Her candor with the government
concerning her drug use makes it unlikely that she would be vulnerable to exploitation
or manipulation with respect to her prior drug use. AG ¶ 17(c) and 17(e) apply.
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Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all relevant circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the
nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s infrequent but
illegal drug use occurred seven times. She was irresponsible at the time and did not
recognize the seriousness of her actions. She has now matured. She has not used
illegal substances for almost two years after deciding that there was no room for illegal
substances in her future professional life. Her behavioral changes are permanent and
the likelihood of recurrence is extremely low. The record evidence leaves me without
questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance.
For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant is eligible to be granted a security clearance.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline H: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
JENNIFER I. GOLDSTEIN
Administrative Judge