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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
 [Redacted] )  ISCR Case No. 14-02537 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Philip J. Katauskas, Esq., Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
FOREMAN, LeRoy F., Administrative Judge: 
 
This case involves security concerns raised under Guidelines J (Criminal 
Conduct), H (Drug Involvement), and E (Personal Conduct). The concerns raised by 
Applicant’s drug involvement are mitigated, but concerns raised by his criminal conduct 
and personal conduct are not mitigated. Eligibility for access to classified information is 
denied. 
 
Statement of the Case 
 
Applicant submitted a security clearance application on January 24, 2014. On 
February 13, 2015, the Department of Defense (DOD) sent him a Statement of Reasons 
(SOR) alleging security concerns under Guidelines J, H, and E. The DOD acted under 
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 
20, 1960), as amended; DOD Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security 
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) implemented by the DOD on September 1, 2006.  
 
 Applicant answered the SOR on March 4, 2015, and requested a hearing before 
an administrative judge. Department Counsel was ready to proceed on May 6, 2015, 
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and the case was assigned to me on May 8, 2015. On the same day, the Defense 
Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) notified Applicant that the hearing was 
scheduled for June 3, 2015. I convened the hearing as scheduled. Government Exhibits 
(GX) 1 through 7 were admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified and 
submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) A through G, which were admitted without objection. 
I kept the record open until June 10, 2015, to enable Department Counsel to submit a 
memorandum of law on an issue of collateral estoppel that arose during the hearing. He 
timely submitted Hearing Exhibit I. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on June 12, 2015. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted all the allegations. His admissions 
in his answer and at the hearing are incorporated in my findings of fact.  
 
 Applicant is a 50-year-old information technology specialist employed by a 
defense contractor since April 2011. He has worked continuously for defense 
contractors since May 1997. He worked as a marine electrician at a naval shipyard from 
July 1985 to January 1988. He has held a security clearance since January 1988. (GX 2 
at 13.) 
 
 Applicant married in March 1994 and divorced in June 2000, due to his wife’s 
infidelity. He remarried in March 2001. In a sworn statement executed in January 2004, 
he stated he and his wife had separated due to his wife’s abuse of alcohol and 
prescription drugs. His wife filed a petition for divorce, which was granted in March 
2007. (GX 2 at 5; GX 3 at 1-2.) He cohabited with a domestic partner from 2009 to 
2013. He has a 21-year-old son from his first marriage. 
 
 In his January 2004 statement, Applicant admitted that he used marijuana about 
twice a year from about 1996 or 1997 until December 2001. He stated that he stopped 
using marijuana because he wanted to be a good role model for his son. He stated that 
he would not use marijuana or a controlled substance again. (GX 3 at 3.) When he 
submitted his SCA in January 2014, he disclosed that he used marijuana about 12 
times between January 1998 and January 2001, a shorter period than what he 
disclosed in 2004. (GX 1 at 29.)  
 
In a personal subject interview (PSI) in February 2014, Applicant stated that he 
used marijuana for stress relief about 12 times between January 1998 and January 
2001, while he was going through the divorce from his first wife and trying to get full 
custody of his son. A friend, with whom he no longer associates, gave him the 
marijuana. (GX 2 at 12.) In his answer to the SOR, he stated that he used marijuana 
instead of a drug that had been prescribed for him as a sleep aid, because the 
prescribed drug had undesirable side effects such as grogginess and upset stomach. 
 
 Applicant has a history of arrests and convictions for domestic violence. In 
October 1990, he was arrested for assault and battery. According to Applicant, he and 
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his wife were arguing, she threw a pair of pliers at him, and he shoved her. The charges 
were dismissed. (GX 3 at 3.) 
 
 In April 1999, Applicant was arrested for spousal abuse and assault and battery. 
The spousal-abuse charges were dismissed in May 1999 upon request of the 
complainant. In July 1999, the prosecutor declined to prosecute the assault and battery. 
 
 On October 2001, Applicant was arrested for an assault and battery. His wife 
came home intoxicated about 1:00 a.m., while he was asleep. She became angry 
because she was locked out. When Applicant awakened and unlocked the door, she 
began hitting him. He told her that he would punch her in the nose if she hit him again. 
She hit him and he punched her. In May 2002, he pleaded guilty and disposition was 
deferred. He agreed to attend an 18-week anger management and domestic violence 
prevention program and maintain good behavior for one year. He complied with his 
agreement, and the charges were dismissed in June 2003. (GX 3 at 2; GX 4 at 4; GX 
6.) 
 
 On September 2004, Applicant was arrested for domestic assault and battery. He 
pleaded not guilty in juvenile and domestic relations court but was convicted and 
sentenced to a year in jail and a $1,500 fine. (Tr. 29.) He appealed to the circuit court in 
December 2004. In November 2005, before the circuit court, he pleaded guilty and was 
sentenced to 12 months in jail (suspended) and fined $100. (GX 4 at 3; GX 6.) Although 
the court records reflect a guilty plea before the circuit court, he testified that, pursuant 
to a plea agreement, he entered an “Alford plea,” not admitting his guilt but admitting 
that there was sufficient evidence to convict him.1 (Tr. 43.) 
 
 On November 3, 2006, Applicant was arrested for domestic assault. His wife 
accused him of spitting on her and elbowing her in the nose. In May 2007, he pleaded 
guilty and was sentenced to six months in jail (with all but one day suspended). (GX 4 at 
1; GX 6.) 
 
 On November 16, 2006, Applicant was arrested for violating a protective order. 
The violation occurred when Applicant used his garage-door opener so that his son 
could enter the house where his wife lived. In May 2007, Applicant entered an “Alford 
plea.” He was sentenced to 30 days in jail (with 29 days suspended), and placed on 
unsupervised probation for two years. (GX 4 at 2.) 
 
 In January 2014, Applicant was arrested for assault and battery. He pleaded not 
guilty but was convicted and sentenced to 180 days in jail, with 160 days suspended, 
and placed on unsupervised probation for 2 years. (GX 5; GX 6.) He testified that he 
received ten days of credit for good behavior and spent only ten days in jail. (Tr. 30.) He 
served his sentence on weekends. (Tr. 37.) In his PSI and answer to the SOR, 
Applicant stated that this incident occurred when his former cohabitant got on top of him 
in bed. He was not interested in having sex with her, and he pushed her off the bed with 
sufficient force that she hit her head on a dresser and injured her ear. (GX 2 at 8; 
                                                          
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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Answer to SOR.) At the hearing, he testified that the incident was “horseplay” and he 
did not intend to inflict injury. (Tr. 30.) He testified that he broke off the relationship a few 
days later, but she did not file a complaint until three or four weeks later. He testified 
that his former cohabitant is a wealthy woman, was bitter about their breakup, and “you 
don’t do those kinds of things to [her].” (Tr. 35, 54.)  
 
All of Applicant’s arrests and convictions were for misdemeanors. He asserted 
that his former cohabitant and two ex-wives are good friends and have colluded to harm 
his reputation by filing domestic violence complaints against him. (Tr. 72.) 
 
 Applicant testified that he has coached youth sports for 20-plus years. He was 
required to disclose his criminal record in order to be a coach, and the parents trusted 
him with their children. (Tr. 32.) 
 
 Applicant’s deputy project manager has known him for 14 years and has been 
his supervisor since October 2003. He regards Applicant as an “invaluable asset” to the 
program and the U.S. Government. He does not believe Applicant should have been 
convicted of the last two incidents of domestic violence. He has no reservations about 
Applicant’s character and trusts him “without question.” (AX A.) 
 
 One of Applicant’s colleagues submitted a statement attesting to his good 
character, patience, kindness, enthusiasm, dedication, and honesty. (AX B.) Another 
colleague regards Applicant as highly skilled, dedicated, and trustworthy. This colleague 
is aware of some of the issues regarding Applicant’s off-duty conduct, but states that he 
has never witnessed any issues or hostilities with his co-workers. (AX C.) A third 
colleague, who has known Applicant for ten years, considers him skillful, level headed, 
and responsible. (AX D.) in January 2013 and April 2014, Applicant was a member of 
team that received a “team excellence” award from the rear admiral in command of the 
organization for which Applicant provides support. (AX F; AX G.) 
 
Collateral Estoppel 
 
 On my own motion, I raised the issue whether collateral estoppel applied to 
Applicant’s testimony regarding the criminal conduct alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.e-1.h, and I 
requested Department Counsel to submit a memorandum of law on the issue. His 
submission is attached to the record as Hearing Exhibit I.  
 
 The doctrine of collateral estoppel generally applies in DOHA hearings and 
precludes applicants from contending that they did not engage in criminal acts for which 
they were convicted. ISCR Case No. 95-0817 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Feb. 21, 1997). There 
are exceptions to this general rule, especially with respect to misdemeanor convictions 
based on guilty pleas. Relying on federal case law, the Appeal Board has adopted a 
three-part test to determine the appropriateness of applying collateral estoppel to 
misdemeanor convictions. First, the applicant must have been afforded a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue in the criminal trial. Second, the issues presented for 
collateral estoppel must be the same as those resolved against the applicant in the 
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criminal trial. Third, the application of collateral estoppel must not result in “unfairness,” 
such as where the circumstances indicate lack of incentive to litigate the issues in the 
original trial. Federal courts recognize that an individual may not have an incentive to 
fully litigate a misdemeanor offense because there is less at stake or because a plea 
bargain creates a disincentive to litigate the issues. ISCR Case No. 04-05712, 2006 WL 
354122 (App. Bd. Oct. 31, 2006) (citations omitted). 
 
 The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not preclude applicants from explaining 
their conduct and presenting it in a meaningful context, in an effort to mitigate the 
security concerns raised by it. ISCR Case No. 11-00180 at 7 (App. Bd. Jun. 19, 2012). 
In this case, Applicant explained the circumstances of each criminal offense to which he 
pleaded guilty. He did not deny the acts that resulted in his criminal convictions. Thus, I 
conclude that the collateral estoppel does not apply to his testimony. 
 
Policies 
 
 “[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has the authority to 
“control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an 
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access to such information.” Id. at 527. The 
President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants 
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified 
Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended.   
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the AG. These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, 
recognizing the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge applies these 
guidelines in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative 
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision. An 
administrative judge must consider all available and reliable information about the 
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable. 
 
 The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk that the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation about potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. 
 
Clearance decisions must be made “in terms of the national interest and shall in 
no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. 
Or. 10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is merely an indication the 
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense 
have established for issuing a clearance. 
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 Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in 
the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant 
from being eligible for access to classified information. The Government has the burden 
of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). The guidelines 
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the 
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability. See ISCR Case No. 92-1106 
at 3, 1993 WL 545051 at *3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993).   
 
 Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, 
and the burden of disproving it never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-
31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
 
An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent 
with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 
01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, 
if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline J, Criminal Conduct 
 
The SOR alleges eight arrests between October 1990 and January 2014, all for 
misdemeanors arising from domestic conflicts. (SOR ¶¶ 1.a-1.h). The concern raised by 
criminal conduct is set out in AG ¶ 30: “Criminal activity creates doubt about a person's 
judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a 
person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations.”  
 
Applicant’s admissions in his January 2004 statement, his SCA, his February 
2014 PSI, and at the hearing, along with the documentary evidence submitted by 
Department Counsel, establish that Applicant was found guilty of domestic assault in 
October 2001 but the charges were dismissed after he completed a diversion program. 
The evidence also establishes that he was convicted of domestic violence on four 
subsequent occasions, and that he is on probation for the latest conviction. His record 
of arrests, convictions, and sentences establishes the following disqualifying conditions 
under this guideline: AG ¶ 31(a) (“a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses”), 
AG ¶ 31(c) (“allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the 
person was formally charged, formally prosecuted, or convicted”), and AG 31(g) (“the 
individual is currently on probation”).  
 
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The following mitigating conditions are potentially applicable: 
 
AG ¶ 32(a): so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior 
happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is 
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment;  
 
AG ¶ 32(c): evidence that the person did not commit the offense; and 
 
AG ¶ 32(d): there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not 
limited to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, 
remorse or restitution, job training or higher education, good employment 
record, or constructive community involvement.  
 
AG ¶ 32(a) is not established. Applicant’s most recent incident of domestic 
violence is less than two years old, and he is still on probation for it. His convictions are 
numerous, the underlying conduct did not occur under circumstances making it unlikely 
to recur.  
 
 AG ¶ 32(c) is established for the arrests and charges in SOR ¶¶ 1.b and 1.c. 
Applicant admitted these arrests, but claimed that the charges were false and made by 
his first wife in an effort to gain advantage in the custody battle over their son. His claim 
is corroborated by dismissal of the charges in SOR ¶ 1.b and the prosecutor’s decision 
not to prosecute the charges in SOR ¶ 1.c. It is not established for SOR ¶ 1.a. 
Application of this mitigating condition to SOR ¶¶ 1.e-1.f is precluded by collateral 
estoppel.  
 
 AG ¶ 32(d) is not fully established. In spite of his domestic problems, Applicant 
has been actively involved in his community for many years. He has complied with court 
orders for counseling and has not violated his probation. He is well respected among his 
supervisors and co-workers. However, he has not expressed remorse. Instead, he has 
portrayed himself of a victim of three dysfunctional relationships and collusion among 
the women involved. 
 
Guideline H, Drug Involvement 
 
The SOR alleges that Applicant used marijuana on at least 12 occasions 
between 1998 and 2001, while holding a security clearance (SOR ¶ 2.a). The concern 
under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 24: AUse of an illegal drug or misuse of a 
prescription drug can raise questions about an individual's reliability and 
trustworthiness, both because it may impair judgment and because it raises questions 
about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.@ 
Drugs are defined in AG ¶ 24(a)(1) as A[d]rugs, materials, and other chemical 
compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended 
(e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens).”  
 
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Applicant’s admissions in his January 2004 statement, his most recent SCA, his 
February 2014 PSI, and at the hearing establish the following disqualifying conditions 
under this guideline: 
 
AG ¶ 25(a): any drug abuse, defined in AG ¶ 24(b) as “the illegal use of a 
drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved 
medical direction”;  
 
AG ¶ 25(c): illegal drug possession [incidental to his use of marijuana]. . . ; 
and  
 
AG ¶ 25(g): any illegal drug use after being granted a security clearance.  
 
 The following mitigating conditions are potentially relevant: 
 
AG ¶ 26(a): the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or 
happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not 
cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good 
judgment; and 
 
AG ¶ 26(b): a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, 
such as: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts; (2) 
changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; (3) an 
appropriate period of abstinence; and (4) a signed statement of intent with 
automatic revocation of clearance for any violation. 
 
 The first prong of AG ¶ 26(a) (Ahappened so long ago@) focuses on whether the 
drug involvement was recent. There are no Abright line@ rules for determining when 
conduct is Arecent.@ The determination must be based on a careful evaluation of the 
totality of the evidence. If the evidence shows Aa significant period of time has passed 
without any evidence of misconduct,@ then an administrative judge must determine 
whether that period of time demonstrates Achanged circumstances or conduct sufficient 
to warrant a finding of reform or rehabilitation.@ ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 6 (App. Bd. 
Aug. 4, 2004). The evidence establishes that Applicant’s drug use is not recent. He 
voluntarily stopped using marijuana about 14 years ago, in order to set a good example 
for his son. He voluntarily disclosed his drug use in January 2004, but was allowed to 
retain his clearance. While his drug use while holding a security clearance was a 
serious breach of trust and occurred multiple times for a period of at least three years, 
the security concerns raised by it are mitigated by the passage of time. 
 
 AG ¶ 26(b) is established. In his January 2004 statement, Applicant promised 
that he would not use marijuana or controlled substances again, and he has complied 
with his promise. He no longer associates with the friend who gave him marijuana. The 
pressures caused by his first divorce and the custody battle are gone, and he has 
abstained from drug use for more than 14 years. 
 
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Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
 The SOR cross-alleges the criminal conduct and drug involvement under this 
guideline (SOR ¶ 3.a). The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 15: “Conduct 
involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply 
with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, 
trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. . . .”  
 Applicant’s record of domestic violence and his drug use while holding a security 
clearance establish the following disqualifying conditions under this guideline: 
AG ¶ 16(c): credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue 
areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other 
single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a 
whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, 
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and 
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not 
properly safeguard protected information; 
AG ¶ 16(d): credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered 
under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an 
adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available 
information supports a whole-person assessment of questionable 
judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to 
comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that 
the person may not properly safeguard protected information. This 
includes but is not limited to consideration of . . . a pattern of dishonesty or 
rule violations; and  
AG ¶ 16(e): personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's 
conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or 
duress, such as . . . engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the 
person's personal, professional, or community standing.  
 The following mitigating conditions are potentially relevant: 
 
AG ¶ 17(c): the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the 
behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique 
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the 
individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment; 
 
AG ¶ 17(d): the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained 
counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to 
alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused 
untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such 
behavior is unlikely to recur; and 
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AG ¶ 17(e): the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate 
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress. 
 
 AG ¶ 17(c) is not fully established. While Applicant’s domestic violence 
convictions were misdemeanors, they demonstrate a pattern of unacceptable violence. 
The incidents were not infrequent and did not occur under unique circumstances 
making them unlikely to recur. 
 
 AG ¶ 17(d) is not fully established. Applicant has acknowledged his behavior, 
and he has alleviated the factors that caused his inappropriate behavior by terminating 
his relationships with all three women involved. However, he demonstrated at the 
hearing that he is not remorseful for his conduct and is reluctant to accept responsibility 
for it. Instead, he has blamed the women involved and claimed that he is the victim of 
collusion among them. 
 
 AG ¶ 17(e) is established for Applicant’s drug involvement, because he 
voluntarily disclosed it in 2004. It is not fully established for his domestic violence 
incidents. While his convictions are a matter of public record, he has portrayed himself 
as a victim of collusion among the three women involved.  
 
Whole-Person Concept 
 
 Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a 
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. In applying the whole-
person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an applicant’s eligibility for a 
security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all relevant 
circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process 
factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):  
 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable 
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to 
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of 
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation 
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  
 
 I have incorporated my comments under Guidelines J, H, and E in my whole-
person analysis. Some of the factors in AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed under those 
guidelines, but some warrant additional comment. 
 
 Applicant has worked in support of national defense and held a security 
clearance since 1988. He is highly regarded by his supervisors and peers. He is a 
devoted father and involved in community youth activities. However, his long track 
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record of domestic violence raises serious doubts about his judgment, reliability, and 
trustworthiness. 
 
 After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines J, H, 
and E, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude 
Applicant has mitigated the security concerns raised by his drug involvement, but he 
has not mitigated the security concerns raised by his criminal conduct and personal 
conduct. Accordingly, I conclude he has not carried his burden of showing that it is 
clearly consistent with the national interest to continue his eligibility for access to 
classified information. 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 I make the following formal findings on the allegations in the SOR: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline J (Criminal Conduct):  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraphs 1.a-1.c:    For Applicant 
  Subparagraphs 1.d-1.h:    Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline H (Drug Involvement)  FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 2.a:     For Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 3, Guideline E (Personal Conduct):  AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 3.a:     Against Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to continue 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified 
information is denied. 
 
 
 
 
LeRoy F. Foreman 
Administrative Judge