KEYWORD: Guideline B; Guideline C
DIGEST: The Judge’s decision relied on Applicant’s good character, Applicant’s naturalization
ceremony, and Applicant’s having declined a job in Ukraine.  Her character is less at issue in this
case, in which the focus is her circumstances.  Her naturalization ceremony is not telling in a
security context.  Her decision to decline a job in Ukraine is consistent with a desire to live in the
U.S. but adds little under Guideline B.  The Decision fails to consider important aspects of the
case and runs contrary to the weight of the evidence.  Favorable decision reversed.
CASENO: 14-02563.a1
DATE: 08/28/2015
DATE: August 28, 2015
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 14-02563
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
David F. Hayes, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to grant Applicant a security clearance.  On July
28, 2014, DoD issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the basis for that
decision–security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign
Preference) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).
Applicant requested a hearing.  On May 27, 2015, after the hearing, Defense Office of Hearings and
Appeals (DOHA) Administrative Judge Francisco Mendez granted Applicant’s request for a security
clearance.  Department Counsel appealed pursuant to Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Department Counsel raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s favorable
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  The sole allegation under Guideline C was
withdrawn and, consequently, is not at issue in this appeal.  Consistent with the following, we
reverse.
The Judge’s Findings of Fact
Born in Ukraine, Applicant attended college in that country, obtaining undergraduate and
graduate degrees in English language and literature.  She worked as a translator, in support of a U.S.
sponsored program.  She worked for a U.S. citizen, who was a contractor of the U.S. Government. 
With his assistance, she obtained a fellowship and moved to the U.S., where she earned another
advanced degree, after which she went to work for a Federal contractor.  Her duties require her to
handle proprietary and sensitive information.  She enjoys an outstanding reputation for her job
performance, as well as her trustworthiness and reliability.
Applicant married her husband in the early 2000s.  He worked for the same Ukranian agency
that had employed Applicant.  Since coming to the U.S., he has worked under the auspices of an
agency of the U.S. Government.  Applicant and her husband are both naturalized U.S. citizens. 
Applicant’s naturalization ceremony was conducted in a particularly prestigious manner.  At some
point, Applicant was offered a job in Ukraine, which she turned down.  She and her husband have
lived continuously in the U.S. since coming here in the early 2000s.  They have no property or assets
in Ukraine.  Their closest friends are all U.S. citizens.  Although she used to travel for her job,
properly reporting any suspicious activity, she no longer travels.  Applicant’s connections within
Ukraine are her parents, sibling, and in-laws, who are citizens and residents there.  Applicant’s
sibling works at the agency where Applicant, her father, and husband once worked.  None of her
relatives have any connection with separatists operating in Ukraine.  They do not live or work in
areas that are flashpoints between Ukraine and Russian-backed forces.
U.S. has diplomatic ties with Ukraine.  Its policy is centered on strengthening democracy in
that country.  Ukraine is facing significant challenges, none greater than that posed by Russia’s
annexation of the Crimea and its support for separatist forces.  The situation is precarious, with
clashes between Ukranian and Russian-backed forces causing death and injury.  The Russian-backed
forces have taken on an increasingly strident anti-American tone. 
The Judge’s Analysis
2
The Judge concluded that Applicant’s circumstances raised three Disqualifying Conditions:
7(a),1 7(b),2 and 7(d).3  In addressing Applicant’s case for mitigation, the Judge stated that, while the
relationship between Ukraine and the U.S. is good, “foreign-backed forces with interests inimical
to the United States operate freely in parts of Ukraine and pose a significant threat not only to
Ukraine’s sovereignty, but also to U.S. national security interests.”  Decision at 8.  He concluded
that, under the circumstances, the concerns in Applicant’s case are similar to those in which family
members reside in a hostile country.4  Given the heightened scrutiny that is required in such cases,
the Judge concluded that only mitigating condition 8(b)5 was entitled to discussion. He cited to
evidence concerning Applicant’s naturalization ceremony, which, he said, “speaks volumes as to
the deep connections she has established in the U.S. in a relatively short time[.]” Decision at 9.  He
also cited to evidence that she had turned down a job in Ukraine “as proof that she and her husband
have fully embraced the United States as their home.”  Id.  
The Judge cited to evidence that Applicant and her husband have worked hard over the
decade that they have lived in the U.S., and that their children having been born here. He also noted
evidence that Applicant had properly handled sensitive information in the course of her job and that
she had voluntarily reported a possible “spillage” of confidential information.  Id.  
In the whole-person analysis, the Judge stated that Applicant had been candid during the
course of the adjudication of her application for a clearance.  He also stated that her demeanor at the
hearing led him to conclude that she would be “forthcoming and resolute” in her ability to resolve
any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.  
Discussion
1Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 7(a): “contact with a foreign family member . . . who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion[.]”
2Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 7(b): “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a
potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the
individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information[.]”
3Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 7(d): “sharing living quarters with a person or person, regardless of citizenship status,
if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion[.]” 
4See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 10-07436 at 3, n. 4 (App. Bd. Oct. 19, 2011) for the proposition that there is a rational
connection between an applicant’s family ties in a country whose interests are adverse to the United States and the risk
that the applicant might fail to protect and safeguard classified information.
5Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 8(b): “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty
or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is no minimal, or the individual has such deep and
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest
in favor of the U.S. interest[.]”  
3
There is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance of a security clearance.  See
Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).  After
the Government produces evidence raising security concerns, the applicant bears the burden of
persuasion concerning mitigation.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The standard applicable in security
clearance decisions “is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the
interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). 
“Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be
resolved in favor of the national security.”  Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 2(b). 
In deciding whether the Judge's rulings or conclusions are erroneous, we review the Judge's
decision to determine whether:  it does not examine relevant evidence; it fails to articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its conclusions, including a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made; it does not consider relevant factors; it reflects a clear error of judgment; it
fails to consider an important aspect of the case; it offers an explanation for the decision that runs
contrary to the record evidence; or it is so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a mere difference
of opinion.  See ISCR Case No. 03-22861 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Jun. 2, 2006).
Department Counsel argues that the Judge’s decision is unsupported by the weight of the
record evidence.  He notes the favorable evidence that the Judge discussed.  However, he argues
that, given the Judge’s finding that the geopolitical situation of Ukraine presents a significant threat
to U.S. national security,  the presence of Applicant’s close family members there poses potential
dangers that are not fully mitigated by this favorable evidence, given the “very heavy burden”
required by her circumstances.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 09-08099 at 2 (App. Bd. Sep. 14, 2012). 
Department Counsel characterizes Ukraine as “a country in turmoil” (Appeal Brief at 5), and
he points to Administrative Notice (AN) documents that describe the intense fighting between
Ukrainian forces and those backed by Russia.  Department Counsel’s brief also cites to documented
widespread corruption within Ukraine.  AN IV, Ukraine 2013 Human Rights Report, at 1.6  The
documents that Department Counsel cites underscore the Judge’s conclusion that Ukraine is
equivalent to a hostile country for purposes of Guideline B analysis.
In addition to those matters discussed in Department Counsel’s brief, we also note the
following, drawn from a U.S. State Department fact sheet of which the Judge took administrative
notice:
6“The most serious human rights problem during the year was increased government interference with, and
pressure on, media outlets . . . The second major human rights problem was intensified pressure on civil society,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and civic activists.  The third major problem was the practice of politically
motivated prosecutions and detentions, including the continued imprisonment of [a] former prime minister[.]” Other
problems in Ukraine include torture of detainees and prisoners, “an inefficient and corrupt judicial system . . . [and]
pervasive corruption in all branches of government[.]”  
4
Russia continues to accumulate military equipment at a deployment site in southwest
Russia.  The equipment includes tanks, armored vehicles, rocket launchers, artillery,
and air defense systems.
The State Department is “concerned much of this equipment will be transferred to
separatists[.]”
Russia has recently transferred Soviet-era tanks and artillery to the separatists.
Administrative Notice (AN) Document VI, U.S. State Department Fact Sheet,
Russia’s Continuing Support for Armed Separatists in Ukraine and Ukraine’s Efforts
Toward Peace, Unity, and Stability, July 14, 2014, at 1.
 A State Department travel warning advises U.S. citizens throughout Ukraine to avoid large
crowds and be prepared to remain indoors and shelter in place for extended periods of time should
clashes occur in their vicinity.  AN VIII, U.S. State Department, Ukraine Travel Warning, August
29, 2014, at 1.  A Congressional Research Service report states that Russia is engaged in an effort
“to destabilize eastern Ukraine,” and that, on March 6, 2014, the U.S. Administration issued an
Executive Order imposing various sanctions on parties undermining Ukranian sovereignty. 
Subsequent Executive Orders expanded the scope of these sanctions.  AN VII, Ukraine: Current
Issues and U.S. Policy, September 4, 2014, at 11. The cumulative effect of the evidence and material
that Department Counsel has cited, along with other administrative notice matters contained in the
record, underscores the instability of Ukraine at the hands of Russia and various separatist forces. 
It also underscores that the U.S. and Russia are undergoing a period of significant tension regarding
their competing policies in Ukraine, as the Judge himself noted in his finding about the anti-
American tone of the Russian-backed forces.  
In addition to Administrative Notice documents, Department Counsel cites to evidence
regarding Applicant’s employment history and her family circumstances, for example that, while
living in Ukraine, Applicant worked for a state-owned entity, one by which her sibling is currently
employed,7 and that Applicant communicates regularly with at least some of her Ukranian relatives. 
We also note Applicant’s testimony that her family has some ties to Russia, that Russian is their first
language, and that Applicant’s husband has some Russian ties.  Given all of this, we agree with
Department Counsel that the Judge has failed to draw a nexus between the Disqualifying Conditions
that he found raised by Applicant’s circumstances and Mitigating Condition 8(b).  That is, the
evidence provides a strong reason to foresee that Applicant’s relatives could become a means
through which she could come to the attention of persons in Ukraine or Russia interested in
obtaining protected U.S. information.  The Judge’s application of Disqualifying Condition 7(d) also
suggests that Applicant’s husband is another possible avenue of concern.  The Judge concluded that
these family circumstances pose a heightened risk of coercion or pressure, and it is not beyond doubt
that Applicant’s family ties within the U.S., excellent duty performance, good record concerning the
7Applicant testified that her sibling works in a clerical position.  Tr. at 88.  See ISCR Case No. 03-10954 at 4
(App. Bd. Mar. 8, 2006), for the proposition that an employee of a foreign government need not work at a high level or
in a position involving intelligence to be of security significance.  
5
handling of sensitive information, and other such evidence are sufficient to show that she would
always resolve conflicts of interest in favor of the U.S., given the standard set forth in Egan, supra. 
This is especially true in regard to the concern arising through Applicant’s sharing of living quarters
with her husband.8 
  
This is not to suggest that Applicant is disloyal or that she is other than a person of excellent
character.  However, common sense and a knowledge of the ways of the world suggest that even
those whose character is unimpeachable could be faced with circumstances that would seriously
tempt them to place the safety of parents, siblings, or parents-in-law ahead of other competing
interests.  Indeed, an applicant having relatives in a country hostile to the U.S. is explicitly cited by
the Supreme Court as a reason to deny an applicant a security clearance.  Egan, supra, at 529.  Given
the above, we are persuaded by Department Counsel’s argument that the Decision does not extend
appropriate weight to significant record evidence and official notice materials that cut against its
favorable overall result, thereby leaving unresolved doubt as to Applicant’s eligibility for a
clearance.  In contrast, the mitigating evidence upon which the Judge relied is not sufficient to
outweigh the concerns raised by that status of Applicant’s Ukranian relatives.  The Judge’s decision
relied on three considerations: Applicant’s good character, Applicant’s naturalization ceremony, and
Applicant’s having declined a job in Ukraine.  Her good character is less at issue in this case, in
which it is her circumstances that pose the problem.  Her naturalization ceremony is not telling in
a security clearance context.  Her decision to decline a job in Ukraine is consistent with a desire to
live in the U.S. but adds little to an analysis under Guideline B.  The Judge’s Decision fails to
consider important aspects of the case and runs contrary to the weight of the record evidence.  
Order
The Decision is REVERSED.   
Signed: Michael Ra’anan            
Michael Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairperson, Appeal Board
Signed: Jeffrey D. Billett              
Jeffrey D. Billett
Administrative Judge
8The strong ties within the U.S. that the Judge found to be mitigating obviously include Applicant’s husband,
himself a U.S. citizen employed and living here.  As stated above, the Judge also found that Applicant’s sharing living
quarters with him posed a heightened risk of coercion or pressure.  The Judge’s analysis seems to imply that this
relationship is both disqualifying and mitigating
6
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody                
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
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