DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of:                                            )
                                                                     )
---------------------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 14-02955
)
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Eric Borgstrom, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
______________
 Decision
______________
WESLEY, Roger C., Administrative Judge:
History of Case
On December 3, 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) Consolidated
Adjudication Facility (CAF) ), pursuant to Executive Order 10865 and Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing why DOD adjudicators could not make the
preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant, and
recommended referral to an administrative judge to determine whether clearance should
be granted, continued, denied or revoked.
Applicant responded to the SOR on December 15, 2014, and requested a
hearing. The case was assigned to me on May 7, 2015, and was scheduled for hearing
on June 16, 2015. A hearing was held on June 16, 2015, for the purpose of considering
whether it would be clearly consistent with the national interest to grant, continue, deny,
or revoke Applicant’s security clearance.  At hearing, the Government's case consisted
of three exhibits; Applicant relied on one witness (himself) and two exhibits. The
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transcript (R.T.) was received on June 24, 2015. Based upon a review of the case file,
pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility to access classified information is granted. 
Besides its four exhibits, the Government requested administrative notice of 11
documents, which are identified as follows: Annual Report to Congress on Foreign
Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage-2008, National Counterintelligence Center
(July 2009); Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial
Espionage-2000, National Counterintelligence Center (2001); and Annual Report  to
Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage-2005, National
Counterintelligence Center (August 2006); 
Other documents requested for official notice by the Government include the
following: Former State Department Official Sentenced for Mishandling Classified
Information (E.D. VA January 2007); Taiwan Exporter Arrested and Charged with
Exporting Missile Components from the United States to Iran, U.S. Department of
Commerce (February 2010); Taiwan Exporter is Sentenced to Three and a Half Years for
Conspiring to Export Missile Components from the United States to Iran, U.S. Department
of Commerce (August 2010);
Additional documents covered by the Government’s Administrative Notice are as
follows: Intelligence Threat Handbook [Unclassified] (June 2004); Two Taiwanese
Nationals Charged in New Jersey with Conspiring to Export Sensitive U.S. Military
technology to China, (D. N.J. April 2012); North Wales Man Sentenced for Illegally
Exporting Goods, U.S. Department of Commerce (January 2013); Taiwanese National
Pleads Guilty to Attempting to Illegally Export Aerospace-Grade Carbon Fiber, U.S.
Department of Commerce (December 2012); and Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces
Arrest of Queens Resident for the Export of Military-Use Items to Taiwan and Attempting
to Export them to China, U.S. Department of Commerce (December 2012).
Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for
administrative proceedings. See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 (App. Bd. April 12, 2007);
ISCR Case No. 02-24875 (App. Bd. October 12, 2006). Administrative notice is
appropriate for noticing facts or government reports that are well known. See Stein,
Administrative Law, Sec. 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006).  The Government’s administrative
notice request was admitted as HE 1.
For good cause shown, administrative notice was granted with respect to the
above-named background reports addressing the geopolitical situation and security in
Taiwan. Administrative notice was extended to the documents themselves, consistent
with the provisions of Fed. R. Evid. 201. This notice did  not foreclose Applicant from
challenging the accuracy and reliability of the information contained in the reports
addressing Taiwan’s current state.  
In addition to the above-described documents, I took official notice of  Background
Note: Taiwan, U.S. Department of State (September 2008) following the personal
appearance.  After receiving no objections from the parties, I assigned this document an
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official notice number of Xll. I also admitted two recent news summaries covering
Taiwan’s upcoming national elections in January 2016 as AE C.
Summary of Pleadings
Under Guideline B, Applicant allegedly has a mother-in-law and brother-in-law
who are citizens and residents of Taiwan. The nature of their relationships with Applicant
are not covered in the SOR.
In his response, Appellant admitted to having a mother-in-law and brother-in-law
who are citizens and residents of Taiwan. He denied that either of his listed relatives
could be placed in a position where Applicant would have to choose other than for the
interest of the United States. He claimed there is no conflict of interest, because of his
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, which dictate his
choosing in favor of the U.S interest should a conflict ever arise. Applicant further
claimed that his interactions with his family members residing in Taiwan are casual and
infrequent. And he claimed he has no foreign business, financial interest, or property
interest in Taiwan.  
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 60-year-old engineer for a defense contractor who seeks a security
clearance. The allegations covered in the SOR and admitted by Applicant are adopted
as relevant and material findings. Additional findings follow.
Applicant’s background
Applicant married in September 1988 and has three grown children who were
born and raised in the United States. (GEs 1-2) His wife is a naturalized U.S. citizen,
trained in biochemistry, and has been a homemaker since 1991. (GEs 1-2 and AEs B-C;
Tr. 32) Applicant immigrated to the United States with his parents in 1969 at the age of
14. (GEs 1-2 and AEs B-D) His mother is a naturalized U.S. citizen and resident of the
United States; while his father is deceased (date unknown). (GE 1) 
Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in December 1974. (GE 1) Between
September 1973 and September 1983, he attended a respected U.S. university and
earned degrees in engineering. Specifically, he earned a bachelor’s degree in electrical
engineering in 1977, a master’s degree in computer engineering in 1979, and a Ph.D in
electrical and computer engineering in 1983. (GE 1-2 and AE D)
Since 2012, Applicant has been employed by his current employer. (GEs 1-2 and
AEs B-D) as an engineering consultant. As an engineer, he designs computers and
chips. (Tr. 55)  Prior to joining his current firm, he was employed by a research firm as an
engineer. He worked for this firm for almost 30 years (i.e., September 1983 through
December 2012). Applicant claimed no military service. (GE 1)
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Applicant has no affiliation with a foreign government (Taiwan included) and has
never had any employment or contact with a foreign government or foreign nationals
attributable to his contacts with his relatives residing in Taiwan. (GE 2; Tr. 53)
Consistently, he votes in local U.S. elections. (Tr. 53) He has considerable assets in the
United States. His assets include a home (mortgage free) and a 401(k) retirement
account valued between $100,000 and $1,000,000. (Tr. 48-49) By contrast, neither
Applicant nor his wife own any property or investments in Taiwan, or inherited any
property from their parents. (Tr. 49) Applicant spends most of his spare time volunteering
in charitable activities in his local community. (Tr. 51-53)  
Applicant’s mother-in-law and brother-in-law are both citizens and residents of
Taiwan. (GEs 1 and 2) His mother-in-law is a widow in her mid-80s who served in the
Taiwan military and has since retired. (AE C) Applicant considers his mother-in-law and
brother-in-law to be persons of integrity “who would never allow themselves to be
influenced or coerced into asking him or his family to betray the trust represented by a
security clearance.” (AE C) Both are financially stable and require no financial support.
(Tr. 47) His mother-in-law has no affiliations or connections with the Taiwan military or
government, or any prior military service that would entitle her to a pension. She receives
a military pension through her husband’s military service (not by virtue of any military
service of her own), and recently became unemployed. (GE 2 and AEs C-D) Applicant
maintains infrequent contact with his mother-in-law. (AE B) He has met her on five
separate occasions: (a) when she visited Applicant and his wife in the United States in
1988 for their marriage, for the birth of their daughter in 1990, and for the birth of their
son in 1992 and (b) when he visited his mother-in-law in Taiwan in 1988, 1989, and
1990. (AE B; Tr. 41) 
Applicant’s wife does not have any regular contact with her mother. (Tr. 54-55)
Typically, she makes weekly calls to her mother-in-law and last visited her mother in
Taiwan in 2014. (Tr. 45, 49) She has infrequent contact with her brother. (Tr. 45)             
                                                                                                                                            
        Applicant’s brother-in-law is married with two sons. (GE 1; Tr. 44) His brother-in-law
is a retired military officer in the Taiwan army (with over 40 years of active duty service),
and presumably has a military pension. He currently works as an engineering civilian for
a Taiwan government-funded research institute in Taiwan. (GEs 3-4 and AEs C-D; Tr.
38) This institute’s research and development division is responsible for independent
research and the development of weapons systems and explosives. (GE 4; Tr. 38-39)
Taiwan authorities have reportedly turned a portion of the institute into science-based
industrial parks that could be used to accommodate private enterprises engaged in high-
tech product research, development, and manufacturing. (GE 4) Applicant believes his
brother-in-law has a military pension. (Tr. 47)
Applicant met his brother-in-law on three occasions: twice when Applicant was
visiting his mother-in-law in Taiwan in 1989 and 2001, and briefly in 1990, when the
brother-in-law was in the United States on a business trip. (AE B; Tr. 38-39) He last saw
his wife’s older brother in 2001 in Taiwan (Applicant’s last trip to Taiwan). In their
telephone encounters, they did not discuss the nature of his brother-in-law’s work. Only
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in 2013 during the course of his security clearance application was he made aware of his
bother-in-law’s employer. (AE B) Applicant maintains annual telephone contact with his
brother-in-law. (GE 2) 
Endorsements
Supervisors, friends, and co-professionals, who have known and worked with
Applicant for a number of years, praise his engineering and research contributions and
commend him for his integrity and trustworthiness. (AE A) His current employer’s
president and CEO has known Applicant as a colleague, work associate, and personal
friend for over 27 years. (AE A) He credited Applicant’s technical skills, teamwork, and
interpersonal skills as exemplary and praised his overall reliability and trustworthiness.
After working as a consultant for his current firm, his CEO converted him to regular
employment status in 2013 and is pleased with his recent performance. (AE A)
A friend of Applicant’s for over 18 years in Applicant’s church, who worked with
Applicant in church-sponsored youth ministries, described him as a person “with solid
personal integrity, strong inter-personal skills and an excellent ability to work with teams
of people who have varied gifts and maturity.” (AE A)
Taiwan’s country status
Taiwan has a rich history that dates back 12 to 15 thousand years.  Dutch and
Spanish colonists claimed the island in the 16  and 17  centuries. See Backgroundth th
Note: Taiwan, supra. Migration from the Chinese mainland over time supplanted the
aborigine peoples of Taiwan. Japan exerted considerable influence over Taiwan
following China’s ceding of Taiwan to Japan in 1895. (Id.)
Following the end of World War II in 1945, Taiwan reverted to Chinese rule.  Civil
war erupted soon after the reversion between Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang (KMT)
party and the increasingly influential Chinese Communist Party guided by Mao Zedong.
When the civil war ended in 1949, two million refugees (predominantly nationalists) fled
to Taiwan, where Chiang Kai-Shek established a separate provisional KMT capital in
Taipei. See Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 3. Mao’s victorious Communist party, in
turn, established the People’ s Republic of China (PRC).
For the past half century, Taiwan has demonstrated steady economic
development and today is a major international trading power.  Its accession to the world
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002 represented a significant achievement and
strengthened its standing in the expanding global economy. 
Taiwan has exhibited steady political development as well since its establishment
as an island government. Changes reflect a continuing liberalizing process that
culminated in the tightly contested election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000. See Background
Note: Taiwan, supra, at 5-6.  Chen’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won major
parliamentary victories in 2000 and again in 2004, enabling Chen to become the first
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opposition party candidate to win the presidency. Chen was re-elected in 2004 on a
platform that included a “defensive referendum.” (Id., at 6)  Such referenda have been
historically perceived to be closely linked to the question of Taiwan’s independence. 
Legislative elections in January 2008 produced a decisive majority for the KMT
party over Chen’s DPP. (Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 6) In the presidential
election that was held one month later, Ma Ying-jeou prevailed, securing a united
government under KMT control for the first time. (Id.) The January 2012 presidential and
legislative elections were held concurrently for the first time (as the result of a
constitutional amendment) and resulted in the reelection of Ma Ying-jeou and renewed
KMT legislative control by the victorious KMT party. 
Today’s Taiwan political system can appropriately be described as a multi-party
democracy under a constitutional umbrella comprising five branches: executive,
legislative, judicial, control and examination.  By all accounts, Taiwan has a good human
rights record and has demonstrated respect for the rule of contract in its commercial
relations. Recent news reports discuss Taiwan’s upcoming elections in January 2016.
See News Reports about Taiwan Elections Scheduled for January 2016, supra. Both of
Taiwan’s major parties have nominated women as their presidential candidates: Tsai
Ing-Wren of the DPP and Hung Hsiu-Chu of the KMT. Neither of these candidates are
related to a former Taiwanese leader and explanations abound for the rise of women in
Taiwan politics. (Id.) Most scholars attribute the rise of women in government to evolving
global trends in female involvement in politics. Who prevails could have significant
affects on U.S.-Taiwan relations. Whereas, Ms. Tsai has close connections to the Chen
Shui-bian administration (2000-2008), Ms. Hung is closely aligned to the DPP, rising
through its political ranks. (Id.)
Taiwan’s PRC relations
The PRC does not recognize Taiwan’s independence, and insists that there is
only “one China” (see Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 7).  Despite differences over
the PRC’s one China policy, Taiwan and the PRC have enjoyed increased contacts over
the past decade. (Id.) Over the past several years, Taiwan has relaxed restrictions on
unofficial contacts with the PRC. With Taiwan’s continued relaxation of its PRC policy
regarding unofficial contacts, cross-strait interactions have grown significantly. 
With increasing contacts between Taiwan and the PRC, cross-strait trade has
grown rapidly over the past 10 years. (Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 7-8) China is
Taiwan’s largest trading partner, and Taiwan is China’s seventh largest. (Id.)  In June
2010, following prolonged negotiations, the two sides signed an Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA), which was designed to liberalize cross-strait trade in
products and services, with the long-term goal of eventually creating and essentially free-
trade regime. The development of semi-official cross-strait relations between Taiwan and
the PRC hopefully will contribute to to tension reductions and to an environment
conducive to an eventually peaceful resolution of outstanding differences between the
two sides. (Id., at 8) 
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The PRC operates a large and sophisticated intelligence bureau, entitled the
MSS. See Intelligence Threat Handbook, supra, at 17-20. The MSS maintains active
intelligence gathering operations in Taiwan (Id., at 20). These operations use clandestine
agents to collect intelligence on Western consortia investing in the PRC who are
suspected of involvement in attempts to democratize the PRC, as well as other pro-
democracy groups thought to be engaging in anti-communist activities (Id.)
In the current political environment, it is still too early to predict the direction of
cross-strait negotiations between Taiwan and the PRC. Because of the PRC’s long
insistence on Taiwan’s acceptance of the “one China” principle as a requisite to any
jump-starting of negotiations over practical agreements in trade, cultural exchanges, and
other areas of mutual interest, future relations between the two sides remain cloudy at
best.
U.S.-Taiwan relations
In a joint communique with the PRC in January 1979, the U.S. announced its
recognition of the government of the PRC as the sole government of China and that
there is but one China, of which Taiwan is a part. (Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 7)
The Joint Communique stated that within this context the people of the United States will
maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.
To implement the joint communique, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA) in April 1979.  President Carter, in turn, signed the legislation into law on April 10,
1979.  Besides providing the legal basis for maintaining the U.S. unofficial relationship
with Taiwan, the TRA reinforced the U.S. commitment to providing defense assistance to
Taiwan. The TRA expressly provides for the continued sale of appropriate defensive
military equipment to Taiwan and declares that peace and stability in the area are in U.S.
interests. See Background Note, Taiwan, supra, at 9-10. And even though the United
States terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan following its de-recognition of
the latter, it has continued its sale of appropriate defensive military equipment to Taiwan.
(Id.)
While ambiguously written, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security against
cross-strait aggression by the PRC’s military forces is implicit in the TRA’s coverage of
U.S. responsibilities towards Taiwan. This implicit construction is oft-used to support
proponents of a “two China” policy.  To be sure, initial actions of the Bush Administration
in 2001 provided cause to conclude that President Bush abandoned longstanding U.S.
policy of “strategic ambiguity” in favor of a policy that placed a clearer emphasis on
Taiwan’s interests at the expense of the PRC. See Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 8-
9. More recent developments, though, reflect the smoothing of U.S.-PRC relations as a
part of the broader war on terrorism.  
Currently, the United States does not support Taiwan independence and opposes
unilateral steps by either side to alter the status quo. (Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at
9-10)  For so long as Taiwan’s national security remains under threat (both veiled and
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unveiled) from the PRC, Taiwan can be expected to pursue the development of its military
amidst expectations of military assistance from the United States. Stressing self-reliance,
Taiwan maintains a large military establishment (accounting for 2.9 per cent of its gross
domestic product). (Id, at 6). Its principal mission is to defend itself against the PRC,
which has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan (Id.) With its unchanged public
policy of maintaining “strategic ambiguity” in its official relations with Taiwan, the United
States can be expected to continue its support of Taiwan’s island security with the sale of
defensive military equipment.
Taiwan’s economic collection practices
Based on past reports to Congress, Taiwan is considered one of the most active
collectors of U.S. economic and proprietary information. In its 2008 Annual Report to
Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, the
Counterintelligence Executive (CE) listed Taiwan as well as the PRC among the most
active collectors based on cited surveys. See Annual Report  to Congress on Foreign
Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, supra, at 12. Specific incidents are cited in
the CE’s report that identify offenders of proprietary information thefts and attempts to
acquire export-restricted products. (Id., at 11)  
Recent espionage convictions document ongoing collection activities covering theft
of sensitive and proprietary information by and for Taiwan companies. See Administrative
Notice, supra, at 3-4, and press releases covering specific cases involving criminal and
civil charges brought against Taiwan exporters of controlled items and components and
sensitive technology, supra.  Multilateral export control regimes in place are voluntary and
not universally adhered to by member nations.
Stress points between Taiwan, the PRC and the United States
In its Annual Reports to Congress in 2000, 2005, and 2008, the National
Counterintelligence Executive described the PRC as a country intent on acquiring and
exploiting the knowledge developed by multiples of collection agents: legally, if possible,
and otherwise illegally by espionage. See Annual Report  to Congress on Foreign
Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, supra. Recent indictments of Chinese
citizens for espionage have served to highlight the PRC’s spying activities in the U.S. (Id.)
Violating  its own 2004 U.S.-China agreement, the PRC oft-fails to schedule timely end-
use inspection visits of dual-use items licensed for export to the PRC. Better export
controls can be effective only if they are multilateral in scope. Multilateral export controls
and arms embargoes, however, do  provide additional insurance against altering the
cross-strait military balance that has been long maintained. (Id., at 7) 
Without effective dual use export controls in place, the PRC can be expected to
acquire dual use technologies with military potential from the United States and Taiwan
through the United States and other source countries. Reported intelligence, though, is
lacking on any Taiwan use of its collection resources in the United States to supply
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thePRC with needed military technology (alone or through technology with known dual
use capabilities).
Other stress points between the PRC and Taiwan are reflected in periodic PRC
military exercises in the Taiwan Straits. See Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 6-7.
More frequent U.S.-PRC high-level exchanges have the potential to reduce cross-strait
military tensions.  (Id., at 7) 
Policies
The AGs for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (effective
September 2006) list Guidelines to be considered by administrative judges in the decision
making process covering DOHA cases. These Guidelines require the administrative judge
to consider all of the "Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying” (Disqualifying Conditions), if any, and all of the "Mitigating Conditions," if
any, before deciding whether or not a security clearance should be granted, continued or
denied. 
In addition to the relevant AGs, administrative judges must take into account the
pertinent considerations for assessing extenuation and mitigation set forth in AG ¶ 2(a) of
the AGs, which are intended to assist the judges in reaching a fair and impartial
commonsense decision based upon a careful consideration of the pertinent guidelines
within the context of the whole person. 
The adjudicative process is designed to examine a sufficient period of an
applicant’s life to enable predictive judgments to be made about whether the applicant is
an acceptable security risk. The following AG ¶ 2(a) factors are pertinent: (1) the nature,
extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to
include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral chances; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.
Viewing the issues raised and evidence as a whole, the following adjudication
policy factors are pertinent herein:
Foreign Influence
The Concern: “Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided  loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.
Adjudication under the this Guideline can and should considered the identity of the foreign
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country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.”
Burden of Proof
By virtue of the precepts framed by the Directive, a decision to grant or continue an
Applicant's request for security clearance may be made only upon a threshold finding that
to do so is clearly consistent with the national interest.  Because the Directive requires
administrative judges to make a common sense appraisal of the evidence accumulated in
the record, the ultimate determination of an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance
depends, in large part, on the relevance and materiality of that evidence. As with all
adversary proceedings, the Judge may draw only those inferences which have a
reasonable and logical basis from the evidence of record.  Conversely, the Judge cannot
draw factual inferences that are grounded on speculation or conjecture.
The Government's initial burden is twofold: (1) it must prove any controverted
fact[s] alleged in the Statement of Reasons, and (2) it must demonstrate that the facts
proven have a material bearing to the applicant's eligibility to obtain or maintain a security
clearance.  The required showing of material bearing, however, does not require the
Government to affirmatively demonstrate that the applicant has actually mishandled or
abused classified information before it can deny or revoke a security clearance. Rather,
consideration must take account of cognizable risks that an applicant may deliberately or
inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information.
Once the Government meets its initial burden of proof of establishing admitted or
controverted facts, the burden of proof shifts to the applicant for the purpose of
establishing his or her security worthiness through evidence of refutation, extenuation or
mitigation of the Government's case.
Analysis
Applicant is a naturalized U.S. citizen who immigrated to the United States from
Taiwan in 1969 with his parents at the age of 14 to pursue a better life. Security concerns
arise over the status of Applicant’s mother-in-law and brother-in-law, who are citizens and
residents of Taiwan, a country  historically friendly to the United States, albeit, one with a
reported history of economic collection activities in the United states.
Department Counsel urges security concerns over risks that Applicant’s mother-in-
law and brother-in-law residing in Taiwan, might be subject to undue foreign influence by
Taiwanese government authorities to access classified information in Applicant’s
possession or control. Because Applicant’s extended family members reside in Taiwan,
they present potential heightened security risks covered by disqualifying condition  (DC)  ¶
7(a) of the AGs for foreign influence: “contact with a foreign family member, business or
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professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion.” The citizenship/residence status of these extended
family members in Taiwan pose some potential concerns for Applicant because of the
risks of undue foreign influence that could compromise sensitive or classified information
under Applicant's possession and/or control. 
Little is known about the military backgrounds of both in-laws. All that is known
about Applicant’s mother-in-law is that she is a homemaker who receives a military
pension through her deceased husband.  Even less is known about his brother-in-law who
served as an officer in Taiwan’s army for over 40 years before his retirement. 
Because Applicant’s mother-in-law has a military pension, and his brother-in-law
has prior military service (although aged for the most part), a presumed military pension,
and current government employment with a Taiwan research institute, some consideration
of DC ¶ 7(b), “connection to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a
potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive
information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or
country by providing that information,” is warranted as well. Applicant’s contacts with his
mother-in-law and brother-in-law residing in Taiwan afford him some potential for
accessing Taiwan officials who might be interested in proprietary, sensitive, or even
classified information, that Applicant is privy to. Still, none of Applicant’s extended family
members have any identified affiliations or contacts with Taiwan officials currently known
to be associated with intelligence or military organizations interested in collecting
proprietary or sensitive information in the United States.
The AGs governing collateral clearances do not dictate per se results or mandate
particular outcomes for applicants with relatives who are citizens/residents of foreign
countries in general.  What is considered to be an acceptable risk in one foreign country
may not be in another. The geopolitical aims and policies of the particular foreign regime
involved do matter. And the AGs do take into account the country’s demonstrated relations
with the United States as an important consideration in gauging whether the particular
relatives with citizenship and residency elsewhere create a heightened security risk.
Taiwan, while reported to target the United States and its companies in the past for
economic and proprietary information, is still a country with no known recent history of
hostage taking or disposition for exerting undue influence against family members to
obtain either classified information, or unclassified economic and proprietary data. 
The special relationship that has existed between the United States and Taiwan
over the past half-century has been one marked by mutually reconcilable political and
economic interests. Reports of Taiwan intelligence gathering against U.S. companies are
counterbalanced by Taiwan’s history of friendship and partnership in a defense pact
formalized in 1979. The mutually supportive bonds that have linked Taiwan’s special
relationship with the United States have not been weakened by either the TRA, or the
geopolitical forces that have shaped the U.S.’s evolving relationship with the PRC.  
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Taiwan remains a friend of the United States and is a country whose democratic
institutions are not incompatible with our own traditions and respect for human rights and
the rule of law. Whatever potential heightened security risks arise as the result of
Applicant's having family members with citizenship and residency in Taiwan are by every
reasonable measure mitigated.  
As for security concerns associated with the presence of Applicant's mother-in-law
and brother-in-law in Taiwan, any potential heightened risk of a hostage situation or undue
foreign influence brought in the hopes of eliciting either classified information or economic
or proprietary data out of Applicant through his extended family members residing in
Taiwan is an acceptable one. For not only does Applicant have infrequent  contact with his
family members residing in Taiwan (bi-weekly for his mother-in-law and annually for his
brother-in-law), but he has no property or financial interests in Taiwan and has pledged his
loyalty and support to the United States where he has lived continuously since immigrating
to this country in 1969. During this time, he has amassed considerable property interests
and close family and community relationships. Applicant, accordingly, may take advantage
of one important mitigating condition: 
MC ¶ 8(a), the nature of the relationships with foreign persons,
the country in which these persons are located, or the persons
or activities of these persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to
choose between the interests of a foreign a foreign individual,
group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.
Whole person assessment also serves to minimize Applicant’s exposure to conflict
of interests with his Taiwan in-laws. Not only has Applicant become a naturalized U.S.
citizen (in 1974) and received his advance degrees in the United States, but he has made
every effort to work, save, and pursue his financial interests exclusively in the United
States. Applicant is highly regarded and trusted by his company CEO and close friends,
who are not aware of any risks of coercion, pressure, or influence that Applicant’s mother-
in-law and brother-in-law might be exposed to in Taiwan.  
In Applicant’s case, any likelihood of coercion, pressure, or influence being brought
to bear on any of his extended family members would appear to be minimal. By all
reasonable accounts of the presented record, Applicant has few visible conflicts of interest
with Taiwan citizens and residents or property interests in Taiwan that could be at risk to
exploitation or compromise by Taiwan authorities. The only potential exceptions are the
military pensions of Applicant’s mother-in-law and brother-in-law, and these pensions do
not appear to present any security risks that cannot be managed effectively. 
Overall, any potential security concerns attributable to Applicant's extended  family
members in Taiwan are sufficiently mitigated to permit safe predictive judgments about
Applicant's ability to withstand risks of undue influence attributable to his familial
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relationships in Taiwan. Favorable conclusions are warranted with respect to the
allegations covered by Guideline B.
Formal Findings
In reviewing the allegations of the SOR in the context of the findings of fact,
conclusions, and the factors and conditions listed above, I make the following separate
formal findings with respect to Applicant's eligibility for a security clearance.
GUIDELINE B: (FOREIGN INFLUENCE):  FOR APPLICANT
Subpara. 1.a:    For  APPLICANT
Formal Findings
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant's security clearance. 
Clearance is granted.
                                  
Roger C. Wesley
Administrative Judge