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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)      ISCR Case No. 14-04587
)
Applicant for Security Clearance
Appearances
For Government: Philip J. Katauskas, Esq., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Richard Morris, Esq.
                                                                            
______________
Decision
______________
LYNCH, Noreen, A., Administrative Judge:
On October 22, 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD)  issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) alleging security concerns arising under Guideline B (Foreign
Influence), Guideline J (Criminal Conduct), and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). The
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense (DOD)
Directive 5220.6. Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the Adjudicative Guidelines (AG)
implemented in September 2006. 
Applicant timely answered the SOR and requested a hearing before an
administrative judge. A notice of hearing was sent on April 8, 2015, scheduling the
hearing for May 22, 2015. The hearing was rescheduled by notice dated June 2, 2015,
for August 25, 2015. The Government submitted five exhibits (GX 1-5), which were
admitted into the record. Applicant submitted 28 exhibits (AX A-BB)  which were
admitted into the record without objection. Applicant testified and presented one
witness. Based on a review of the pleadings, submissions, testimony and exhibits, I find
Applicant has not met her burden regarding the security concerns raised. Security
clearance is denied.
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            Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
The Government, through Department Counsel, requested that I take
administrative notice of certain facts relating to Afghanistan. The request and the
attached documents are included in the record file. The facts administratively noticed
are set out in the Findings of Fact, below.
Findings of Fact
In her answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations under
Guideline B in ¶¶ 1.a-1.d. She admitted the one allegation under Guideline J, but
denied the one allegation under Guideline E.  Her admissions are incorporated in my
findings of fact. I make the following findings:
Applicant is 31 years old and was born in Afghanistan. While in Afghanistan, she
worked in the U.S. Embassy. (AX N)  She came to the United States in 2008, and
became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2013. (AX G)  Applicant is single. (GX 1) 
Applicant obtained her undergraduate degree in 2013 from a university in the
United States. (AX K)  She has been employed with her current employer since 2014.
This is her first request for a security clearance. (GX 1)  
Applicant’s mother and two brothers (ages 11 and 16) are citizens and residents
of Afghanistan. Her father, who has renounced his Afghan citizenship, resides in
Canada, and has refugee status in Canada. (AX B)  He has applied for permission to
allow his wife and two sons to join him in Canada.  Applicant has one sister who is
residing in the United States and is now a U.S. permanent resident by her marriage to a
U.S. citizen. She expects to become a naturalized citizen in 2016.  Applicant had one
brother who was residing in the United States. He is a citizen of Afghanistan and has
applied for refugee status in Canada. He has renounced his Afghan citizenship, and is
a resident of Canada.  (Tr. 17)
Applicant’s parents have no connection with the Afghan government. Her father
was an independent taxi driver, and her mother is an administrative clerk who will soon
retire. She has contact with her mother about once a week by phone. (Tr. 35) She
traveled to Afghanistan once in 2013 to visit her sick mother. (Tr. 33)  
Applicant considers the United States to be her home. She  is not interested in
living in Afghanistan. She states that the United States gives her everything and in
Afghanistan there are no opportunities for women. She believes she was lucky to have
the opportunity to come to the United States. (Tr.) She has a voter registration card.
(AX I)
Applicant does not own any property in Afghanistan. She has no financial
interests in Afghanistan. (Tr. 36)
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Applicant’s sister came to the United States in 2006. She testified that she
attended university in the United States and received her undergraduate degree in
2010. (Tr. 16) Applicant’s sister confirmed that their father became a Canadian resident
and his dependents (mother and two teen sons) are undergoing the administrative
process to leave Afghanistan and live in Canada. Applicant lives with her sister. (Tr. 18)
Criminal Conduct
Applicant was arrested on September 25, 2013, and charged with Felony Grand
Larceny. She pled guilty to  grand larceny and was placed on supervised probation,
which ends in March 2016. (AX C) Applicant  was in a department store and purchased
a bag. She was then looking at baby clothes for a gift for a friend. She put the baby
clothes in her bag. She  then decided not to pay for the clothes and to leave the store.
(Tr. 37) When she was leaving the store, she was stopped by the “loss prevention
officer.” She was searched and the officer took the baby clothes.  Applicant stated that
they also confiscated her sunglasses and insisted that they did not belong to her but to
the store. (Tr. 38) She explained that is why she was charged with grand larceny
because the baby clothes were less then $100, but the sunglasses were more than
$200. (Tr. 38) She also stated that she offered to pay for the baby clothes, but the
police were called. (Tr. 47) She was adamant that she did not take any sunglasses from
the store. 
Applicant explained this is an isolated event in her life. She had the money to
pay for the baby clothes.  She is ashamed, and she does not know why she chose to
take the clothes without paying for them. (Tr. 38) She testified that she was taught
proper values and she has learned from her mistake. She understands that one bad
decision can have bad consequences. (Tr. 39) Applicant stated that she voluntarily
entered the plea and has completed 63 hours of community service. (Tr. 39, AX E)
Applicant presented a letter from her probation officer. (AX F) Applicant’s probation
officer states that she has complied and has been on a lower level of supervision since
March 2014. She calls  him once a month. As noted, her probation ends in March 2016.
The sentence was suspended pending the successful completion of the two years
supervised probation. In 2016 it will be determined if the case is dismissed or reduced
to a misdemeanor offense. (AX F)
Applicant’s sister is aware of the criminal conduct that is also at issue for
Applicant’s security clearance. She testified that Applicant is hard working and very
honest. Applicant told her sister that she was shopping and explained that after
purchasing a bag in the store, she looked at baby clothes for a gift and decided to put
the clothes in her bag, but she did not pay for them. (Tr. 22) Applicant could not explain
why she did this. Applicant’s sister was shocked at the behavior.
Personal Conduct
Applicant admitted the information that was raised under the Criminal Conduct
Guideline. The Personal Conduct allegation in SOR ¶ 2.a duplicates and incorporates
this same conduct.
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References
Applicant submitted a 2014 performance evaluation, which praised her skills and
expertise. She assumes additional responsibilities and is highly efficient and organized.
(AX O) She is considered a valued asset to the company.
Applicant has received many awards and certificates from her work, school, and
various leadership training over the years. She is a member of the National Society of
Collegiate Scholars. (AX N) 
She submitted several letters of recommendation from colleagues. Each attested
to her trustworthiness. Applicant is described as talented and hardworking. (AX S,U,
and V) Her brother-in-law, who is a former Marine, states that he would trust her with
security matters. (AX T)
Applicant’s current supervisor, a former military officer, writes that she is both
reliable and an outstanding employee. (AX W) She is recognized by her peers as
credible and by her seniors for her willingness to support the company mission. (AX W)
Administrative Notice
I take administrative notice of the following facts about Afghanistan, including the
fact that Afghanistan has been an independent nation since August 19, 1919, after the
British relinquished control. A monarch ruled from 1919 until a military coup in 1973.
Following a Soviet-supported coup in 1978, a Marxist government emerged. In
December 1979, Soviet forces invaded and occupied Afghanistan. Afghan freedom
fighters, known as mujaheddin, opposed the communist regime. The resistance
movement eventually led to an agreement known as the Geneva Accords, signed by
Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union which ensured Soviet
forces withdrew by February 1989.
The mujaheddin were not a party to the negotiations for the Accords and refused
to accept them. As a result, civil war continued after the Soviet withdrawal. In the mid
1990s, the Taliban rose to power largely due to the anarchy and warlordism that arose
after the Soviet withdrawal. The Taliban sought to impose an extreme interpretation of
Islam on the entire country and committed massive human rights violations. The
Taliban also provided sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden, as well as Al Qa’ida, and other
terrorist organizations.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, demands to expel Bin Laden and
his followers were rejected by the Taliban. U.S. forces and a coalition partnership
commenced military operations in October 2001 that forced the Taliban out of power by
November 2001. A new democratic government took power in 2004. Despite progress
made since the Taliban was deposed, Afghanistan still faces many daunting
challenges. Among these challenges are defeating terrorists and insurgents, recovering
from over three decades of civil strife, and rebuilding a shattered physical, economic,
and political infrastructure.
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The Taliban, Al-Qa’ida, other insurgent groups, and anti-Coalition organizations
continue to operate in Afghanistan, resulting in numerous attacks and deaths.
Insurgents have targeted non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Afghan journalists,
government workers, and UN workers. Instability along the Pakistan-Afghan frontier
continued to provide al-Qa’ida with leadership mobility and the ability to conduct training
and operational planning, targeting Western Europe and U.S. interests in particular.
Kabul, in particular, has seen a rise in militant attacks, including rocket attacks, vehicle-
borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and suicide bombings.
At this time, the risk of terrorist activities remains extremely high. The country’s
human rights record remains poor and violence is rampant. According to recent reports
from the U.S. Department of State, insurgents continue to plan attacks and kidnappings
of Americans and other Western nationals. Travel warnings are ongoing. Overall, the
State Department has declared that the security threat to all American citizens in
Afghanistan remains critical, as no part of Afghanistan is immune from violence.
The United States supports the efforts of the Afghan Government to establish a
vibrant civil society, one that emphasizes democratic principles through a rule of law
and creates accountable and transparent forms of government. The United States and
its international partners remain committed to helping Afghans realize their vision for a
country that is stable, democratic, and economically successful, and to an Afghan
Government committed to the protection of women’s rights, human rights, and religious
tolerance.
On May 2, 2012, the United States and Afghanistan signed the Enduring
Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the
United States of America, a 10-year-strategic partnership agreement (SPA) that
demonstrates the United States’ enduring commitment to strengthen Afghanistan’s
sovereignty, stability, and prosperity and continue cooperation to defeat Al-Qaida and
its affiliates.
In 2013, insurgents conducted a significant number of large vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device attacks, targeting Coalition Forces (CF) bases, military
convoys, and Afghan government buildings, mostly in southern and eastern
Afghanistan, including Kabul. Corruption is endemic throughout society, and flows of
money from the military, international donors and the drug trade continue to exacerbate
the problem.
Policies
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to .
. control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  Id. at 527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of
Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information
“only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”
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Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20,
1960), as amended and modified.  
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon an applicant meeting the
criteria contained in the adjudicative guidelines (AG). These guidelines are not inflexible
rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines
are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An administrative
judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision.
An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.
The Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the
possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation
of potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant concerned.”  See Exec. Or.
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is not necessarily a
determination of the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication the applicant has
not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance
Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in
the personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify an applicant
from being eligible for access to classified information.  The Government has the
burden of establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  See Egan, 484 U.S. at
531.  “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”
See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).  The
guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any
of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.  See ISCR Case No.
95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  
Once the Government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial
evidence, the burden shifts to an applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the
facts.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that
it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security
clearance.”  ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).  “[S]ecurity
clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Egan, 484
U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).
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Analysis
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The security concern under Guideline B is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or
resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.” AG ¶ 7(a). A
disqualifying condition also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group,
government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.” AG ¶
7(b). Finally, AG ¶ 7 (d) “sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion” may be disqualifying conditions in this case. 
Applicant’s mother and two young brothers are citizens and residents of
Afghanistan. She calls her mother every week and visited her in 2014. Applicant lives
with her Afghan sister who is in the United States. Her brother lives in Canada with her
father.  Based on this evidence, AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b) are raised.
Since the Government produced evidence to raise the disqualifying conditions in
AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut,
explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the
burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to
the Government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 
 Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to
those of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
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Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.
Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States,
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-
0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the
nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human
rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members
are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is
significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family
member is associated with or dependent upon the government, the country is known to
conduct intelligence operations against the United States, or the foreign country is
associated with a risk of terrorism.
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a). The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). Similarly, AG 8(b) “there is no conflict of interest, either because
the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government,
or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of
interest in favor of the U.S. interest” partially applies. 
Applicant has presented sufficient information to mitigate the security concerns
given her relationships and frequency of contact with her mother and two young
brothers in Afghanistan. Her father is a resident of Canada and her sister is living in the
United States and by marriage is a U.S. permanent resident citizen. Her other brother is
in Canada. Her father is in the process of getting her mother and younger brothers to
Canada. 
Applicant’s immediate family (sister) is a permanent resident of the United
States. Applicant has been in the United States since 2008. She is a naturalized U.S.
citizen. Her home is in the United States. She looks forward to fufilling her dreams and
goals in the United States.
While Afghanistan’s human rights record under the Taliban was dismal and
serious problems continue, its human rights record is slowly improving. Applicant has
worked in the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan. There is no evidence that Applicant or her
family has been pressured by any organization to provide any type of information,
classified, or otherwise, to Afghanistan. 
In every case where a family member lives overseas, there is a risk of pressure
on this relative and through them upon the holder of a security clearance. Applicant has
ties to the United States and strong ties to her mother in Afghanistan. However, her
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mother and brothers are in the process of moving to Canada to be with her father.
Applicant has presented sufficient mitigation under AG ¶ 8(b) and foreign influence
concerns are mitigated.
Guideline J, Criminal Conduct
AG ¶ 30 expresses the security concern pertaining to criminal conduct: “Criminal
activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its
very nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws,
rules and regulations.”
AG ¶ 31 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses;
(b) discharge or dismissal from the Armed Forces under dishonorable
conditions;
(c) allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the
person was formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted;
(d) individual is currently on parole or probation; and
(e) violation of parole or probation, or failure to complete a court-
mandated rehabilitation program.
Applicant’s admission about committing the shoplifting offense,  the evidence of
arrest in 2013 for grand larceny, a felony, and the fact that she is still on probation until
2016, is sufficient to raise AG ¶¶ 31(a) and (c) and (d). 
AG ¶ 32 provides three conditions that are potentially relevant:
(a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it
happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur
and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment;
(b) the person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and
those pressures are no longer present in the person's life; and
(d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not limited to the
passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or restitution, job
training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive community
involvement.
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After reviewing the mitigating conditions, I find that since Applicant is still on
probation, she has not mitigated the concerns under the criminal conduct guideline.
She will complete probation in 2016. She is successfully employed, educated and this
is her only criminal incident. She is ashamed of her behavior. However, at this time she
has not met her burden of mitigation.  
 Guideline E, Personal Conduct
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect
classified information.
AG ¶ 16 describes the following conditions that could raise a security concern and may
be disqualifying:
(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is
not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single
guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not
properly safeguard protected information;
(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any
other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse
determination, but which, when combined with all available information
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply
with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the
person may not properly safeguard protected information. This includes
but is not limited to consideration of:
(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of
client confidentiality, release of proprietary information,
unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or other
government protected information;
(2) disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the
workplace; 
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; and
(4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other
employer's time or resources.
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(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct,
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such
as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's
personal, professional, or community standing,....
Applicant admitted in her answer to the SOR that her conduct reflected
questionable judgment with regard to the criminal incident in 2013. Her conduct
adversely affected her personal, professional, and community standing.  AG ¶¶ 16(c)
16(d) and 16(e) are established.    
AG ¶ 17 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
 (c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior
is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the
stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable,
or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur;
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress;
(f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable
reliability; and
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased or
occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's
reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules
and regulations.
Applicant acknowledged her criminal behavior in her answer. This was an
isolated incident.  However, she is still on probation. This was a serious lapse in
judgment and is recent. After considering the mitigating conditions outlined in AG ¶ 17, I
conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concern under personal conduct. 
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
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participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole-person concept. As noted above, the
ultimate burden of persuasion is on the applicant seeking a security clearance. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the whole-person factors.
Applicant is aoung woman who was born in Afghanistan. She came to the United
States in 2008. She became a naturalized citizen in 2013. Her mother and two young
brothers remain in Afghanistan waiting to join her father who is now living in Canada
and is in the process of obtaining visas for his dependents Applicant’s mother and two
young brothers). Applicant is single and lives with her sister in the United States. She
has no other contacts or interests in Afghanistan. She has mitigated the foreign
influence concerns.
In 2013, Applicant purchased a bag in a department store, but then decided to
take baby clothes and not pay for them. She acknowledges that she made the choice
not to pay for them despite the fact that she had money. She pled guilty and is on
supervised probation until 2016. She has completed the community service, but still
reports to her probation officer. She has no other criminal incidents. This was an
isolated incident. This behavior is unlikely to recur.  But since she is still on probation,
she has not mitigated the criminal conduct concerns, as well as the personal conduct
security concerns.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.d: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline J: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
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Subparagraph 3.a: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance.
Clearance is denied. 
                                                     
NOREEN A. LYNCH.
Administrative Judge